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House of Assembly - Fifty-First Parliament, Third Session (51-3)
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STATUTES AMENDMENT (CHILDREN'S PROTECTION) BILL

Introduction and First Reading

The Hon. M.J. ATKINSON (Croydon—Attorney-General, Minister for Justice, Minister for Multicultural Affairs, Minister for Veterans' Affairs) (15:54): Obtained leave and introduced a bill for an act to amend the Children's Protection Act 1993, the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 and the Summary Procedure Act 1921. Read a first time.

Second Reading

The Hon. M.J. ATKINSON (Croydon—Attorney-General, Minister for Justice, Minister for Multicultural Affairs, Minister for Veterans' Affairs) (15:55): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

The bill amends the Summary Procedure Act 1921 and the Child Protection Act 1993 and makes consequential amendments to the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 to establish measures to prevent and punish the exploitation of runaway children.

I introduce the bill as part of the government's response to recommendation 47 of Commissioner Ted Mullighan's report of the Inquiry into Children in State Care, presented to this parliament on 1 April 2008. The government shares his concern about the situation of young people who have run away from home or from a care institution and to take shelter with an adult who supplies money, shelter, food, alcohol or drugs in return for the child's providing sexual services to the exploiting adult or the service of selling drugs for the exploiting adult.

These young people are often unwilling to incriminate the exploitative adult for fear that this will cut off their supply of money, drugs or alcohol. Their experience of state intervention has not always been a happy one. Their very resistance to professional help makes these children all the more vulnerable to harm.

The options now available to separate these young people from exploitative adults are not effective because they depend on the young person's cooperation or because they are limited in their scope or application. I seek leave to have the remainder of the second reading explanation inserted in Hansard without my reading it.

Leave granted.

In his report, Commissioner Mullighan explained the shortcomings of the current law this way in Chapter 4: State Response, Part 4.2: Children in State care who run away: Stopping the perpetrators:

Section 76 of the Family and Community Services Act 1972...makes it an offence to unlawfully take a child from his or her placement, or to harbour or conceal a child. It is rarely used. Proof of the charge generally requires evidence from the child that he or she was ‘induced’ or provided with a ‘refuge’. A child who absconds from a residential care facility to obtain benefits for sexual favours and/or leaves to go to a ‘refuge’ is not likely to be willing to give evidence against the person who gave those benefits and/or provided that refuge.

Section 80 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935...makes it an offence to abduct a child under 16. However, it requires proof that the child was taken or enticed away by ‘force or fraud’; or that the child was harboured by someone who knows the child was taken or enticed away in those circumstances. A youth support worker who took a 15-year-old child under the guardianship of the Minister interstate was recently convicted of an offence against section 80(1a). Generally, however, it is not well suited to deal with the situation where a child in State care runs to the paedophile because proof of ‘force or fraud’ would require the child to both report and give evidence against the offender.

Section 99 of the Summary Procedure Act 1921...provides for a court to make a general restraint order against a person. However, it requires proof that a person has been behaving in an ‘intimidating or offensive manner’ on two or more separate occasions. Such proof in court would generally require the evidence of the child. Failure to comply with a restraining order is an offence punishable by imprisonment, although proof of non-compliance may require evidence from the child.

Section 99A of the Summary Procedure Act 1921...provides for the making of paedophile restraint orders. It does not rely on the evidence of the child or children, and the application can be made by a police officer. An order may be made restraining a person from loitering near children in any circumstances, or it can restrain the person from being near children at specified places or in specified circumstances. The court must first be satisfied that the person has been found loitering near children on at least two occasions and there is reason to think the person will do so again unless restrained. ‘Loitering near children’ means the person loiters, without reasonable excuse, at or in the vicinity of a school, public toilet or place at which children are regularly present; and children are present at the school, toilet or place at the time of the loitering. Again, its applicability to children in State care who run away and are sexually exploited is very limited.

Section 38 of the Children’s Protection Act 1993...permits the Youth Court to make an order that a person not have contact with a child. However, this applies only to someone who is a party to an application for a care and protection order relating to the child; usually a parent, guardian or custodian. It is evident that the current legislative provisions are not generally suited to addressing this particular issue and/or would require evidence from the child.

Investigating and prosecuting sexual or drug offending by the adult is also difficult if the young person, as the alleged victim or primary witness, won’t co-operate.

This Bill introduces additional measures that target the exploiting adult, rather than the child, and in a way that does not depend on the cooperation or evidence of the child.

Child-protection restraining order

The Bill introduces a child-protection restraining order that will restrain an adult person from having contact with a child under the age of 17 years if the person, not being the child’s guardian, resides with that child somewhere other than the home of the guardian. To make such an order, the court must be satisfied that this living arrangement may expose the child to sexual abuse or drug offending, and thinks that, in the circumstances, the making of the order is appropriate.

For these purposes, the child’s guardian is a parent of the child, a person who is the legal guardian of the child or has the legal custody of the child or any other person who stands in loco parentis to the child and has done so for a significant length of time.

There are three circumstances in which a court may make a child-protection restraining order against an adult living with a child in this way:

1. when the adult or any other person who lives at or frequents the premises where the child and the adult live or have lived has, within the past 10 years, been convicted of a prescribed offence;

2. when the adult or any other person who lives at or frequents the place where the child and the adult live or have lived is or has ever been subject to a child-protection restraining order; or

3. when the court is satisfied that, as a consequence of the child’s contact or residence with the adult, the child is at risk of sexual abuse or of engaging in or being exposed to conduct that is an offence against Part 5 of the Controlled Substances Act 1984.

A prescribed offence is a child sexual offence or an offence against Part 5 of the Controlled Substances Act 1984. Child sexual offence’ is defined to mean any one of a number of listed offences committed against or in relation to a child under 16 years of age. The list of offences includes rape, indecent assault, incest and offences involving unlawful sexual intercourse, acts of gross indecency or child prostitution.

One of the grounds for making a child-protection restraining order against a person is that, having satisfied itself of other relevant factors, the court is satisfied that the child’s contact or residence with that person places the child at risk of sexual abuse and that the making of the order is appropriate in the circumstances. For these purposes a child is sexually abused not only if a child sexual offence is committed against or in relation to the child but also if the child is exposed to the commission of a child sexual offence against or in relation to another child.

A court can make a child-protection restraining order even if the defendant him or herself has not committed a sexual offence or even if the defendant is not the person allegedly sexually abusing the child, as long as it is satisfied that the risk of sexual abuse is a consequence of the child’s contact or residence with the defendant, and the order is appropriate in the circumstances.

Being a civil application, the court must satisfy itself of the risk of sexual abuse on the balance of probabilities.

The other ground for making a child-protection restraining order against a person is that, having satisfied itself of other relevant factors, the court is satisfied that the child’s contact or residence with that person places the child at risk of engaging in, or being exposed to conduct that is an offence under Part 5 of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 and that the making of the order is appropriate in the circumstances.

A feature of the living arrangements at which these orders are aimed is the exploitation of the child’s drug or substance abuse habit or addiction. If the court is satisfied (again on the balance of probabilities) that the adult is supplying the child with money to buy drugs or involving the child in some aspect of drug consumption, trade or manufacture, then, even though the adult has not been convicted of a prescribed offence, it may find that the child is at risk of engaging in or being exposed to conduct that is an offence under Part 5 of the Controlled Substances Act 1984.

The court will not make an order unless satisfied that it is appropriate to make it. In determining this, the primary consideration is the best interests of the child. In considering the best interest of the child, the court must have regard to anything it thinks relevant, including:

the degree of control or influence the adult exerts over the child;

the adult’s prior criminal record (if any);

any apparent pattern in the adult’s behaviour towards this child or other children and any apparent justification for that behaviour; and

the views of the child and the child’s guardian to the extent that they are made known to the court. Of course, the child might not wish to attend, and nor, for that matter might the child’s guardian. It is not compulsory for them to do so. So that they have the opportunity to put their views to the court, the Bill permits the court to require personal service of the complaint on the child or the child’s guardian and to make any orders it thinks are necessary to give the child or guardian that opportunity.

When it makes a child-protection restraining order, the court may impose such restraints on the adult as are necessary or desirable to protect the child from any apprehended risk.

A child-protection restraining order may also provide for the temporary placement of the child (pending, if necessary, proceedings before the Family Court or the Youth Court) into the custody of a guardian or such person as the court directs or into the custody of the Minister to whom the administration of the Children’s Protection Act 1993 is committed and the care of such person as the Chief Executive or nominee directs. An order of this kind is subject to any current proceedings before, or orders of, the Family Court or the Youth Court.

A child-protection restraining order will expire when the child reaches the age of 17 years, or at such earlier time as the court directs.

The way child-protection restraining orders are sought, varied and revoked is the same as for other restraining orders under the Summary Procedure Act. It is likely that police will bring most complaints, acting on the advice of Families S.A., or on the advice of the child’s parents or guardian, or both.

Proceedings for child-protection restraining orders, although directed at an adult, will inevitably identify the child and details of that child’s relationship with the adult respondent and others. Because the purpose of the proceedings is to protect the child, the Bill restricts the people who may be present for these proceedings in the same terms as for child-protection proceedings in the Youth Court and prohibits publication of any information that might identify the child.

Section 19A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 extends the power to make restraining orders beyond the Magistrates Court to any court that finds a person guilty of an offence or sentences a person for an offence. The Bill amends s19A to ensure that when a court exercises the authority given by s19A to make a child-protection restraining order, the same special restrictions on publication and on who may be present in court apply to those proceedings in that court as to child-protection restraining order proceedings before the Magistrates Court.

Most child-protection restraining orders will be made by the Magistrates Court or by a court sentencing an adult for an offence and exercising the powers of a Magistrates Court by operation of s19A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988.

The Youth Court, however, even though not a court that sentences people for offences committed as an adult, may also make child-protection restraining orders by operation of section 7(c) of the Youth Court Act 1993. Section 7(c) gives the Youth Court the same jurisdiction as the Magistrates Court to make, vary or revoke a restraining order under the Summary Procedure Act 1921 where the person for or against whom protection is sought is a child or youth.

These provisions are not directed at the victim of child exploitation but at the exploiter. A feature of exploitation is the dependence of the victim on the exploiter. Sadly, exploited children are only too likely to try to return to the exploitative adult even when the adult has been restrained from further contact with the child. It would, however, be counter productive for a restraint process designed to protect children to make the exploited child liable to an offence for conduct that is a product of that exploitation. The Bill provides that a child cannot be convicted of an offence of aiding and abetting, counselling or procuring a breach of or failure to comply with a restraining order.

The penalty for breach of a child-protection restraining order will be the same as for a breach of any other restraining order: a Division 5 penalty (a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment).

As they may for other kinds of restraining order, police may arrest or detain a person without warrant if they have reason to suspect the person has breached a child-protection restraining order.

Restraining the exploitative adult is only one part of the solution to this difficult problem. The other is moving the child to a safe home and arranging for counselling or other help that the child might need. As already mentioned, the child may often want to stay with the exploitative adult and may return to, or refuse to move out of, the adult’s home after a child-protection restraining order has been made against that adult.

To help police and child-protection officers deal with these situations, the Bill makes a related amendment to s16 of the Children’s Protection Act 1993 to say that if a child-protection restraining order prevents a person from residing with a child and the child resides with the person during the operation of that order, the child will be taken to be in a situation of serious danger from which these officers are authorised to remove the child under section 16.

This amendment leaves no doubt that the officers have authority to remove the child forcibly if the child will not leave voluntarily.

Section 16 requires an officer who has removed a child in this way, if possible, to return the child to the child's home unless the child is a child who is under the guardianship, or in the custody, of the Minister or the officer is of the opinion that it would not be in the best interests of the child to return home, in which case the officer must deliver the child into departmental care.

Arrangements for the future care of the child are not the subject of this Bill.

Direction not to harbour, conceal or communicate with child

The Bill amends the Children’s Protection Act 1993 to authorise the Chief Executive to direct a person by written notice not to communicate with or harbour or conceal a named child who is under the guardianship or in the custody of the Minister. The direction will also refer to attempts to communicate or to harbour or conceal and assisting another person to harbour or conceal.

These directions are aimed to protect vulnerable children who are in State care from the kinds of exploitation referred to by Commissioner Mullighan in his report.

The Chief Executive may issue such a notice if he or she believes this is reasonably necessary to avert a risk that the child will be abused or neglected or that the child will be exposed to the abuse or neglect of another child, or to avert a risk that the child will be engaged in or exposed to illegal drug activity, or if the issue of the notice is reasonably necessary to otherwise prevent harm to the child.

The Act already defines abuse and neglect of a child as sexual abuse and also as physical or emotional abuse or neglect such that the child suffers or is likely to suffer physical or psychological injury detrimental to the child's wellbeing or such that the child's physical or psychological development is put in jeopardy.

The Bill makes it an offence for a person, without reasonable excuse, to contravene or fail to comply with such a direction. For non-compliance with a direction not to communicate with the child, the maximum penalty is $4,000 or imprisonment for one year. For non-compliance with a direction not to harbour or conceal the child, the maximum penalty is $15,000 or imprisonment for four years.

Offence of harbouring or concealing a child etc

In addition to giving the Chief Executive these powers to protect children who are under the guardianship or in the custody of the Minister, the Bill also makes it an offence to harbour or conceal such children or to prevent such a child’s return to State placement knowing that the child is absent from that placement without lawful authority. The offence extends to assisting others to do these things. It carries a maximum penalty of $12,000 or imprisonment for one year.

For the purposes of the offence, a State care placement means placement of the child in the care of a person or in a place by the Minister exercising his powers in relation to children under his care and protection pursuant to s51(1) of the Act.

For each offence the maximum penalty is a fine of $12,000 and imprisonment for 1 year.

Neither offence requires proof that the person induced or enticed the child away or knew the circumstances of the child’s absence from the State placement. All the prosecution need prove is that the person knew the child was absent from a State care placement without lawful authority at the time the person committed the prohibited act (that is, harbouring or concealing the child or preventing the child’s return to the State care placement, or assisting another to do these things).

This does not entirely overcome the difficulty pointed out by Commissioner Mullighan in relation to an offence against s76 of the Act:

A child who absconds from a residential care facility to obtain benefits for sexual favours and/or leaves to go to a ‘refuge’ is not likely to be willing to give evidence against the person who gave those benefits and/or provided that refuge.

It is, however, an improvement, and will help stop the gap in cases where the exploitation of the child has already occurred before the Chief Executive has issued a direction or before a child protection restraining order has been made, or that occurs in spite of those actions.

Summary

This Bill cannot resolve the difficulties that Families S.A. and the courts may have in arranging the future care of a child who has been exploited in the ways I have identified.

It will, however, give State authorities and parents options to help separate vulnerable children from exploitative adults and by so doing, protect them from harm.

When a child runs away from State care and the Department knows who the child is staying with, the Chief Executive can give a written notice directing that person not to harbour or communicate with the child.

The Chief Executive can also give such a direction in a less extreme situation, when the child is still living in State care or placement but is spending a lot of time at another place with a person who is believed to be exploiting the child, or is frequently communicating with the child.

A person who does not comply with such a notice commits an offence.

There is also an offence of harbouring or concealing or preventing the return of a child to State placement or assisting another to do these things. It can be charged whenever there is proof that the person knew the child was absent from State placement without lawful authority, but will be particularly useful when the person cannot be charged with the offence of failing to comply with a notice (for example, for a person, not notified him or herself, who assists a notified person).

The proposed child-protection restraining order may be used for any child who runs away, whether from State care or from parents, and who by living with the person sought to be restrained is in danger of exposure to sexual abuse or drug offending. The order can impose whatever restraints the court thinks necessary to protect the child from apprehended risk, including restraint on any form of contact or proximity or on being in a particular place. It ensures judicial scrutiny is given to the restrictions sought to be placed on the alleged exploiter.

For children who are not in State care, the only option, other than asking police to exercise their power to remove children from situations of serious danger, will be the proposed child-protection restraining order. The parents or guardians of the child can make the complaint themselves under the proposal for a child-protection restraining order, without having to go through police or the Department, although the more usual course would be to go through police.

I commend the Bill to Members.

Explanation of Clauses

Part 1—Preliminary

1—Short title

This clause is formal.

2—Commencement

This clause provides that operation of the measure will commence on a day to be fixed by proclamation. Section 7(5) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 will not apply to the amending Act (in case it is necessary to delay the commencement of certain amendments beyond the second anniversary of assent).

3—Amendment provisions

This clause is formal.

Part 2—Amendment of Children's Protection Act 1993

4—Amendment of section 16—Power to remove children from dangerous situations

Under section 16 of the Children's Protection Act 1993, an officer who believes on reasonable grounds that a child is in a situation of serious danger from which it is necessary to remove the child in order to protect him or her from harm is authorised to remove the child from any premises or place. The officer is authorised to use such force as is reasonably necessary for the purpose. An officer, for the purposes of the section, is a police officer, or an employee of the Department for Families and Communities authorised by the Minister to exercise the powers of the section.

New subsection (1a), to be inserted by this clause, provides that if a restraining order has been made under section 99AAC of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 preventing a person from residing with a child, and the child is residing with the person during the operation of the order, the child will be taken to be in a situation of serious danger from which an officer is authorised to remove him or her.

5—Insertion of heading to Part 7 Division 1

New provisions relating to harbouring children in the care of the Minister are to be inserted into Part 7 of the Children's Protection Act 1993. That Part is therefore to be separated into two Divisions. This clause inserts a heading to Division 1.

6—Insertion of Part 7 Division 2

This clause inserts Division 2 of Part 7 of the Children's Protection Act 1993.

Division 2—Offences relating to children under Minister's care and protection

52AA—Definition

This section provides that a reference to a child in Part 7 Division 2 is a reference to a child who is under the guardianship, or in the custody, of the Minister.

52AAB—Direction not to harbour, conceal or communicate with child

This section provides that the Chief Executive of the Department for Families and Communities may, by written notice, direct a person not to communicate, or attempt to communicate, with a specified child during a specified period. The Chief Executive may also direct a person by written notice not to harbour or conceal, or attempt to harbour or conceal, or assist another person to harbour or conceal, a specified child during a specified period.

The Chief Executive may only issue such a notice if he or she believes that it is reasonably necessary to do so to avert a risk of a type specified in the provision or to otherwise prevent harm to the child. The specified types of risk are as follows:

that the child will be abused or neglected, or be exposed to the abuse or neglect of another child;

that the child will engage in, or be exposed to, conduct that is an offence against Part 5 of the Controlled Substances Act 1984.

The maximum penalty for contravening or failing to comply with a direction of the Chief Executive is a fine of $4,000 or imprisonment for one year.

52AAC—Offence of harbouring or concealing a child etc

Section 52AAC prohibits a person from doing the following in relation to a child if the person knows that the child is absent from a State care placement without lawful authority:

harbouring or concealing the child;

assisting another person to harbour or conceal the child;

preventing the return of the child to the State care placement;

assisting another person to prevent the return of the child to the State care placement.

A State care placement is a placement of a child in the care of a person, or in a place, by the Minister pursuant to section 51(1) of the Act.

Part 3—Amendment of Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988

7—Amendment of section 19A—Restraining orders may be issued on finding of guilt or sentencing

Section 19A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 authorises a sentencing court to exercise the powers of the Magistrates Court to issue a restraining order under the Summary Procedure Act 1921 against a person when sentencing the person for an offence.

New subsection (1b), inserted by this clause, provides that section 99KA of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 applies to any proceedings of a court relating to a restraining order made by the court under section 99AAC of that Act.

Part 4—Amendment of Summary Procedure Act 1921

8—Amendment of section 4—Interpretation

This clause makes a consequential amendment to the definition of restraining order in section 4 of the Act.

9—Amendment of section 99—Restraining orders

This amendment is consequential on the repeal of section 99A. The Act will no longer include a general provision specifying the persons who can apply for restraining orders. Instead, each section under which application can be made for a restraining order is to specify who can make a complaint. A complaint may be made under section 99 by a police officer or a person against whom, or against whose property, the behaviour that forms the subject matter of the complaint has been, or may be, directed.

10—Amendment of section 99AA—Paedophile restraining orders

Section 99AA provides for the making of paedophile restraining orders. New subsection (a1) provides that a complaint may be made under the section by a police officer.

11—Amendment of section 99AAB—Power to conduct routine inspection of computer etc

Section 99AAB(2) currently includes a divisional penalty. This clause amends the section by making the form of the penalty consistent with other penalties in the Summary Procedure Act 1921. The maximum penalty, imprisonment for two years, remains the same.

12—Insertion of section 99AAC

This clause inserts a new section into Part 4 Division 7 of the Summary Procedure Act 1921. The provisions of Division 7 provide for the making of restraining orders by the Magistrates Court.

Under proposed new section 99AAC, a complaint may be made by a police officer or a child, or the guardian of a child, for the protection of whom a restraining order is sought under the section. The Magistrates Court may make a restraining order against an adult defendant for the purpose of protecting a child if—

the defendant (who is not a guardian of the child) and the child are, or have been, residing together at premises where no guardian of the child also resides; and

the defendant or some other person who resides at, or frequents, premises at which the defendant and the child reside or have resided—

has been convicted within the previous ten years of a child sexual offence or an offence under Part 5 of the Controlled Substances Act 1984; or

is or has been subject to a restraining order under section 99AAC; and

the Court is satisfied that as a consequence of the child's contact or residence with the defendant, the child is at risk of sexual abuse (as defined in subsection (5)) or engaging in, or being exposed to, conduct that is an offence under Part 5 of the Controlled Substances Act 1984.

The court must also be satisfied that the making of the order is appropriate in the circumstances.

Under subsection (2), the Court's primary consideration when determining whether or not to make a child protection restraining order, and in considering the terms of the order, must be the best interests of the child. In determining the best interests of the child, the Court must have regard to—

the degree of control or influence exerted by the defendant over the child; and

the defendant's prior criminal record; and

any apparent pattern in the defendant's behaviour towards the child or other children; and

the views of the child and any guardian of the child; and

any other matter that the Court considers relevant.

The Court may require that a copy of the complaint be served on the child or the child's guardian. The Court may also issue orders to ensure that the child, or a guardian of the child, is given an opportunity to be heard in relation to the complaint.

A restraining order made by the Magistrates Court under section 99AAC may do the following:

it may impose restraints on the defendant that are necessary or desirable to protect the child from any apprehended risk;

it may provide for the temporary placement of the child into the custody of a guardian of the child or another person as directed by the Court, or into the custody of the Minister for Families and Communities and the care of the Chief Executive of the Department for Families and Communities;

it may include any consequential or ancillary orders.

A restraining order under section 99AAC expires when the child reaches the age of 17 years or at an earlier time specified in the order.

Certain restrictions, specified in subsection (6), apply if the complainant is not a police officer. For example, the Court must not issue a summons for the appearance of the defendant and must dismiss the complaint unless it is supported by oral evidence.

13—Repeal of section 99A

Section 99A specifies the persons who can make a complaint under Division 7. This clause repeals the section because, as a consequence of related amendments, each section under which a restraint order can be made is to specify who can make a complaint.

14—Amendment of section 99C—Issue of restraining order in absence of defendant

This amendment is consequential. Subsection (3a) of section 99C is not required because it is clear from the terms of section 99CA(2) that the provisions of that subsection apply despite any other provisions of the Act.

15—Amendment of section 99F—Variation or revocation of restraining order

Section 99F provides that the Court may vary or revoke a restraining order on application by a police officer or certain other persons. The section as amended by this clause will allow for the variation or revocation of a restraining order made under section 99AAC on application by a parent or guardian of the child for the protection of whom the order was made.

16—Amendment of section 99I—Offence to contravene or fail to comply with restraining order

Under section 99I, a person who contravenes or fails to comply with a restraining order is guilty of an offence. New subsection (5), to be inserted by this clause, provides that a child for the protection of whom a restraining order has been made under section 99AAC cannot be convicted of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring an offence against section 99I relating to a contravention of, or failure to comply with, the restraining order.

17—Insertion of section 99KA

This clause inserts a new section. Proposed section 99KA prohibits the publication of any report of proceedings under section 99AB or proceedings under section 99F to vary or revoke a restraining order made under section 99AB if publication of such a report is prohibited by the Court or the report identifies the child for the protection of whom the restraining order is sought or has been made or reveals certain information relating to the child. The maximum penalty for a breach of this prohibition is a fine of $10,000.

Section 99KA also provides that no person may be present in the Court during proceedings for the issue or variation of a child protection restraining order. The following are excepted from this prohibition (but may be excluded by the Court):

officers of the Court;

officers of the administrative unit of the Public Service charged with the administration of the Children's Protection Act 1993;

parties to the proceedings and their legal representatives;

witnesses while giving evidence or permitted by the Court to remain in the Court;

any guardian of the child for the protection of whom the restraining order is sought;

any other persons authorised by the Court to be present.

18—Amendment of section 104—Preliminary examination of charges of indictable offences

Section 104(6) currently includes a divisional penalty. This clause amends the section by making the form of the penalty consistent with other penalties in the Summary Procedure Act 1921. The maximum penalty, imprisonment for two years, remains the same.

19—Further amendments

This clause updates the Summary Procedure Act 1921 by substituting 'police officer' for 'member of the police force'.

Debate adjourned on motion of Hon. I.F. Evans.

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