HANSARD
SITTING CALENDAR
SEARCH
LIVE BROADCAST
Hansard Dynamic Subject Index
Legislative Council - Fifty-First Parliament, Third Session (51-3)
2009-11-18 Daily Xml
Contents
Pdf Xml

CONSENT TO MEDICAL TREATMENT AND PALLIATIVE CARE (VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA) AMENDMENT BILL

Committee Stage

In committee.

Clause 1.

The Hon. A. BRESSINGTON: I move:

Page 3, line 4—Delete 'Voluntary Euthanasia' and substitute:

Nominated Care Options—Voluntary Euthanasia.

The amendment standing in my name is that the name of the bill be changed from Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care (Voluntary Euthanasia) Amendment Bill to Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care (Nominated Care Options—Voluntary Euthanasia) Amendment Bill. I will take a very short time to explain this.

Over the past three years, I have heard negative things about voluntary euthanasia, and I was convinced that this was a procedure that could not be contained. I am still not convinced that, over a period of 25 years or less, this bill will not change, but let us look realistically at the legislation we have passed in this place. This is all legislative review and, as far as I can see, a number of slippery slopes have already occurred with the approval of the majority of members in this place, and members know very well the legislation I refer to, such as WorkCover.

I have not allowed myself to be lobbied at all on this particular issue. I have refused to meet with the pro lobby group, and I have refused to meet with the against lobby group, because at the very onset of this the Hon. Mark Parnell made it very clear that this was going to be on the paper for a long time and that it was a conscience vote.

However, when we talk about nominated care options for voluntary euthanasia, I believe that we need to be very clear that that is exactly what voluntary euthanasia is: it is a nominated care option for the very small percentage of people who cannot be assisted by going through that process of palliative care and getting to the point of double effect.

There are some people like that. I have spent time, over the period since this bill has been on the Notice Paper, speaking to people who are not involved in any lobby. I have spoken to palliative care workers, and they have identified that this small group of people do exist. The dilemma for us is: what we do about that? Do we ignore the fact that they exist, or do we put legislation in place that can relieve the pain and suffering of people who cannot or do not respond to conventional medical treatments?

I have also had concerns about the double effect and how that is being proposed as the only option for people who have a terminal illness. Doctors who have spoken to me have told me that the double effect is a procedure that is above scrutiny and that there is no way of monitoring whether that is being administered, because who can be inside a doctor's head at the time of administering that ongoing pain relief of morphine? I have had doctors admit to me that sometimes that process is hastened a little over a three or four day period, because it is the kind thing to do. I was not aware until last weekend, when my sister, who has been a nurse for 40 years, identified to me that there is a code.

We can argue all we like that doctors can be trusted with the double effect, and I agree. I am not saying that the double effect should be eliminated or anything else because of this bill. I am just saying that all the arguments relating to voluntary euthanasia about the potential for abuse and the potential for a slippery slope really do exist already with the double effect, yet doctors are trusted with that procedure. As I have said, there is no accountability. Death is listed as death from the terminal illness. There is no need to record that a doctor has had any input into the pain relief of that person or even note doses or anything else. It is not referred to the Coroner; it is not questioned.

If we trust doctors enough to administer the double effect in an ethical manner, which I do, why do we believe that the introduction of voluntary euthanasia for the terminally ill will turn our doctors into Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde and that they will all of a sudden become killing machines? It is a better option. This is about consent to voluntary euthanasia. This is about people choosing, in the terminal phase of a terminal illness, whether or not they want to prolong their suffering.

It is all very well for us to sit here in our chairs and debate the whys and wherefores of how much pain and suffering a person should endure, and it is all very right and well to leave that decision up to medical practitioners and perhaps family members, but nobody else knows what an individual is going through. Pain tolerance is a relative matter. We all know that some people have a higher tolerance of pain than others.

The other thing I would like to get clear is that survival is a basic instinct of human beings. We do not opt out of this world at the drop of a hat. There is an argument that, now that VE could be made available, we will see hundreds of people flocking to doctors asking to be put down. That is a huge decision for an individual to make, and I believe that an individual will make that decision only when enough is enough for that person. We know that the sick and dying—those who are suffering—are actually committing suicide. How dare we turn our back on that? How dare we pretend that is not happening?

How dare we say that all will be well as long as we have a double effect when we know that people are killing themselves because of intolerable suffering. We are here to do a job. We are here to revise legislation that is put before us in the here and now, and we are here to amend that legislation and to make sure that it is the strongest possible legislation we can have.

The reason for the title 'nominated care' is to make it very clear that this is nominated by the person. It is not nominated by family members, it is not nominated by the medical practitioner but by the person who is actually going through that pain and suffering themselves. Voluntary euthanasia is what it is. This is a highly emotive issue, it is a highly divisive issue, and none of us is ever going to please all the people all the time.

Let me just make it very clear: this has been my conscious decision, it has been my conscience vote. It has not been influenced by any side, left or right. I have not been promised any lurks or perks for voting on this in a certain way, and I most certainly—

The Hon. R.P. Wortley: Are you saying that we have?

The Hon. A. BRESSINGTON: No.

The Hon. R.P. Wortley: If you haven't taken a lurk or perk, does that mean that we have?

The CHAIRMAN: Order!

The Hon. A. BRESSINGTON: I am making a point of comments that have been made to me over the internet and by telephone calls from some who did not expect me to vote in this way. I am putting it on the public record. I am not accusing other members of not putting as much thought into this, and I am certainly not condemning anybody for the way they are voting on this, because it is a tough issue.

I feel it is important that everybody knows that this has been my conscience vote, and there has been no inducement, there has been no lobbying—I have not accepted any lobbying. I have, however, taken into consideration the numerous emails that I have received about the concerns for this, and hence my amendments to try to make it easier for people to bear.

I know that those against will not be swayed by these amendments, and that is fine, but I have done my best as a legislator to put in place a solid piece of legislation. That is my contribution on this. This one amendment—amendment 1, Bressington 2—is not one of those amendments that is referred to as part of the package whereby, if the amendments failed, I would vote this bill down. This was a late amendment that I put up to clarify in the title what the bill actually stands for. I will leave it at that.

The Hon. S.G. WADE: The Hon. Ann Bressington in her comments repeatedly focused on that aspect of the active request, which is clause 19(1)(a) and which provides:

an adult...who is in the terminal phase of a terminal illness.

I think it would be fair to say that in the general community that is what people are talking about when they answer surveys about voluntary euthanasia. I acknowledge that the vast majority of the community, who consistently respond to public opinion polls, would allow that. But I think it would be wrong for this committee to see this bill in that context. It does not stop there. Clause 19(1)(b) provides that euthanasia is also available to:

an adult...who has an illness, injury or other medical condition that—

(ii) irreversibly impairs the person's quality of life so that life has become intolerable to that person.

That is not the terminal phase of a terminal illness. As I said in my second reading contribution, almost all people with a disability in Australia would fall into that category of clause 19(1)(b)(ii). I think that if you ask the average Australian, do you believe that people with a disability should have the right on demand to receive assisted suicide, they would say no.

The Hon. A. BRESSINGTON: I would just like to respond to that. I wonder how the Hon. Stephen Wade can then explain the fact that there was a representative of Dignity for the Disabled at the rally out the front of this building. We all know that Dr Paul Collier is a highly intelligent, able person. His issue with that was, 'How dare anyone make an assumption on behalf of disabled people; you are not in our skin, and you are not in our position. If we decide that life has become intolerable then we have a right, just like everyone else.'

Now let us just stop and think about this. This requires psychiatric assessment. I do not believe that any psychiatrist or any VE board worth their salt would grant voluntary euthanasia to a person who has just been in an accident and has not had the time. Other parts of this bill provide that where there is no hope of medical treatment, where all possible medical treatments have been pursued—

The Hon. S.G. Wade interjecting:

The Hon. A. BRESSINGTON: Listen!

The Hon. S.G. Wade interjecting:

The Hon. A. BRESSINGTON: If the Hon. Stephen Wade has such little faith in psychiatrists and other medical professionals, and in the VE board itself, making a judgment on this, on an individual's right to choose that life is intolerable after a period of time, then, as I said, it would not matter what amendments, what safeguards were put in place, because they would not please him.

The CHAIRMAN: Just before we continue, we should establish some ground rules, because there are 53 clauses to this bill and a number of amendments. I will not tolerate it being debated in committee. There are amendments, and honourable members can ask questions on the amendments and on the clauses, but I will not tolerate people repeating their position—everyone has had a chance to make a second reading contribution—and then someone else getting up and arguing with that position. We have gone through that.

It will be a long night. I address both sides on this. I want to be as fair as I possibly can in this debate, so I will be tough on both sides. I think that if we stick to the rules of the committee and ask questions on the clauses, and question the mover of any amendments, we will get along just fine.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: I do not wish to revisit the second reading debate, but I would like to respond to something the Hon. Mr Parnell said in relation to my criticisms of the provisions of the bill. He said that I do not want the bill to work and so, I suppose, my criticisms should be taken with a grain of salt.

It is true that I will oppose the third reading, and I have not suggested otherwise, but it has been my understanding that one should approach legislation on a conscience issue on the basis that it would succeed, and you should therefore do your best to try to make it a good piece of legislation, even if you ultimately oppose it. I certainly do not think that means that I or anyone else who opposes the bill should sit out the committee stage.

Having said that, a number of amendments were filed a couple of weeks ago by the Hon. Mr Parnell, and we have had a large number of amendments filed today by the Hon. Ms Bressington. I commend her for the thought she has obviously put into the matter and on the safeguards she thinks are necessary but, given that a lot of us have not had an opportunity to study them in detail, I make the point that—speaking for myself—whatever contribution I make on amendments this evening and how I vote should not be taken to necessarily represent how I might approach the bill in the future should I be here next year—God and the people of South Australia willing.

I think a lot of honourable members would be in that position, because we all know that it is extremely likely that, even if this bill does pass, it will need to be reintroduced in the next parliament. I place on the record that, from my point of view, I do not see my position on any amendments as setting a precedent as to how I would vote in future, should I have the good fortune to serve.

The Hon. R.D. LAWSON: I briefly state my opposition to the honourable member's amendment No.1, which is to alter the title of this bill by deleting the words 'voluntary euthanasia' and inserting 'nominated care options—voluntary euthanasia'. I believe the title of legislation is important and that it should reflect the contents of the legislation. I think for the first time in my period in this parliament the Labor government has been putting titles to bills, some of which the Legislative Council has rejected and amended, which are designed to send a particular political message or to put some spin on a measure. For example, there was the Children's Protection (Keeping Them Safe) Amendment Bill which the Legislative Council, with the support of the Hon. Ann Bressington, quite rightly rejected. We call a spade a spade; we are not going to allow legislation to carry a title which is not truly reflective of its contents. I believe that the insertion of the words 'nominated care options' would be to create, to my mind, something of a spin on what this legislation actually contains.

To describe voluntary euthanasia as a care option, I think is truly remarkable. Voluntary euthanasia is not about caring for one's life. Care is to preserve life. Voluntary euthanasia is about a nominated termination of life. I simply do not believe that it is appropriate to have this legislation dressed up as providing a care option. It does not provide a care option: it provides an option for termination of life.

The Hon. M. PARNELL: I support the amendment and I thank the Hon. Ann Bressington for putting it forward. While this is her amendment, the reason I support it is that it adds emphasis to what it is we are talking about today which is voluntary euthanasia. I have made the point before that the V-word (voluntary) is the one most missing in all of the contributions that have been made by those who have opposed this legislation. The whole reason for putting these voluntary euthanasia provisions within the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Bill is to make that point: that this is one of a range of measures that a person can choose for themselves.

I think this amendment just makes it crystal clear that that is what we are talking about. I think it does not represent spin, but clearly it is necessary because so many people have refused to recognise this as voluntary euthanasia. It has been referred to so many times as 'euthanasia' which, as I have said before, is when you take your dog to the vet. The dog does not ask to be taken: you choose to do that as an act of kindness. 'Voluntary euthanasia' is a voluntary act of an adult individual.

The Hon. S.G. WADE: Like the Hon. Bernard Finnigan, I would like to respond very briefly to a suggestion the Hon. Mr Parnell made in his second reading speech which indicated that he misunderstood a point I tried to make in my second reading speech. My whole second reading speech was focused on how I did not want a bill that discriminates against people with disability. I would like to associate with a quote of Mr Parnell in which he said:

We need to have a system which applies to everyone and which treats everyone with dignity and as an individual.

I agree with that and I think that, therefore, there are two options for a non-discriminatory bill that I would be willing to consider. One is where VE could only be available in the terminal phase of a terminal illness—therefore, a person with a disability without a terminal illness would not be able to access VE—or we could be looking at a bill which offered VE for anybody who has found their life intolerable. They are two non-discriminatory options. This bill is not that: it says that, if you do not have a disability, you can only have a terminal phase of a terminal illness and, if you have a disability, you can have it on demand. I believe this bill is discriminatory and should be opposed.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: I rise briefly to say that I oppose this amendment. Like the Hon. Mr Lawson, I think it is extraordinary that we would use the term 'care option' to describe voluntary euthanasia because it would precisely be that there would be no further medical care of a person who was euthanased voluntarily.

I think it is a bit of a furphy that the Hon. Mr Parnell has referred to a couple of times, that there is some sort of Orwellian attempt by opponents of voluntary euthanasia—active voluntary euthanasia as opposed to physician-assisted suicide—to refer to it as euthanasia in some sort of way. We all know what we are talking about but I and others have expressed concern that with voluntary euthanasia will come, inevitably, some involuntary euthanasia, and I think that is a point worth making.

Where does this end? We could put 20 words in the title to try to say what it is we are saying. I admire the Hon. Mr Parnell's front in supporting the amendment because, of course, he wants to ensure that the suite of amendments gets up. However, I think even he would recognise—

An honourable member interjecting:

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: Yes, he will speak for himself but it is a rather extraordinary proposition. If I could just respond to the Hon. Ann Bressington's interjection that it is happening now, as I said—

The Hon. A. Bressington: It may be happening.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: It may be happening now. As I said in my speech, if we believe that was the case and the current potential penalty is imprisonment, why would we think that with this framework in place it would mean doctors would be more law abiding? If the Hon. Ms Bressington wants to suggest some sort of regime where the deaths of people with terminal illnesses are reported in some way to monitor how they are dying, then that is certainly something I would be happy to talk about.

If we are concerned that there is abuse going on—I am not convinced there is widespread evidence of it—surely there are other ways in which we ought to try to monitor and get a handle on that rather than go down the route of legalising active voluntary euthanasia.

The committee divided on the amendment:

AYES (8)
Bressington, A. (teller) Darley, J.A. Gago, G.E.
Gazzola, J.M. Hunter, I.K. Parnell, M.
Winderlich, D.N. Wortley, R.P.
NOES (13)
Brokenshire, R.L. Dawkins, J.S.L. Finnigan, B.V.
Holloway, P. Hood, D.G.E. Lawson, R.D.
Lensink, J.M.A. Lucas, R.I. (teller) Ridgway, D.W.
Schaefer, C.V. Stephens, T.J. Wade, S.G.
Zollo, C.

Majority of 5 for the noes.

Amendment thus negatived.

Clause passed.

Clauses 2 to 5 passed.

Clause 6.

The Hon. A. BRESSINGTON: I move:

Page 4, lines 9 to 14 [clause 6, inserted paragraphs (a) and (b)]—Delete paragraphs (a) and (b) and substitute:

(i) who are in the terminal phase of a terminal illness; or

(ii) who have an illness, injury or other medical condition (not being a treatable psychiatric illness) that—

(A) results in permanent deprivation of consciousness; or

(B) irreversibly impairs the person's quality of life so that life has become intolerable to that person,

This amendment refines the present eligibility criteria by stating that a treatable psychiatric illness cannot be the basis of an application for voluntary euthanasia under clause 19(1)(b)(ii). This will be reflected in both the objects of the act and clause 19(1)(b)(ii).

I am advised that the wording of the amendment will restrict access to the mentally ill claiming intolerable suffering, while still recognising that those suffering from an intolerable physical and terminal illness may suffer a form of depression as a result of their pre-existing illness.

It is a great concern of mine that people with a mental illness, particularly young adults, may seek access to voluntary euthanasia as a means of ending their suffering. I will be very brief, but I did see a TV documentary about 18 months or two years ago about voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands. A group of people was asked, 'What if you've got a depressed 15 year old who just can't keep going?' Their response was, 'Well, if they're sick of being here, then who are we to tell them that they should be?'

That has been a big concern of mine. It played on my mind and it has obviously been an issue for a lot of people who have been emailing. I move this amendment to deal with that, to make it very clear that this bill and access to voluntary euthanasia would not apply under those circumstances.

The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD: This amendment is a step in the right direction, I think, for the reasons outlined by the Hon. Ms Bressington, but in my view it does not go nearly far enough. The reason for that is quite clearly, as I think the Hon. Mr Wade outlined in his contribution on clause 1, that the provisions of the bill—that is, voluntary euthanasia—would be available to people who find that their life has become intolerable 'to that person'. We are not dealing only with the terminally ill in this bill. Let us be very clear about that. We are dealing with people who may not be terminally ill.

In fact, a number of cases overseas spring to mind of people who have not been terminally ill, yet have qualified for euthanasia provisions overseas. A couple I will mention quite quickly. One of them was a gentleman by the name of Daniel James, a 23 year old rugby player from Worcester in England who was paralysed after being crushed in a rugby scrum during training. He decided that he did not want to continue to live his life in a wheelchair, and he was euthanased last year. My reading of this bill is that he would qualify under this bill. He was not terminally ill. He simply believed his life was intolerable.

I also note that, in the Netherlands in 1991, a court accepted a claim that a physician should not be convicted for administering a lethal dose to a 25 year old woman who was suffering anorexia. Again, I believe that she would qualify under this bill and, for that reason alone, it certainly will not have my support. I think the problem is that this is a very broad net to cast, indeed. As the Hon. Mr Wade said, when people think of euthanasia, they think of people who are at the absolute end stages of their life; that is, they are clearly terminally ill. We often hear the phrase 'the terminal phase of a terminal illness'. This bill is cast much broader than that.

The Hon. S.G. WADE: I have already indicated that I have a fundamental objection to discriminatory legislation, and the Hon. Ann Bressington's amendment would compound discrimination with further discrimination. Let us say I agreed with the Hon. Ann Bressington and felt that people with a disability who found their life intolerable should be able to terminate their life. Why would I then exclude those whose disability was a psychiatric one? It is discrimination on discrimination.

I agree with the Hon. Bernard Finnigan's comment that, having received these amendments only at 10 to 12 today, it has been extremely difficult to unpack them and understand them. However, in the limited research that I have been able to do, I think that excluding treatable psychiatric illness is both discriminatory and also, if you like, denies the right of medical self determination for people who have mental illness and who may be completely lucid and rational at the time they are making that decision. In that regard, I would like to quote not from a voluntary euthanasia or an anti-euthanasia document but from a document from an organisation that focuses on suicide prevention. Let us remember that euthanasia is often referred to as assisted suicide. It states:

Estimates of the percentage of people who suicide that is related to mental illness vary considerably from study to study ranging from 30 per cent to 90 per cent of all suicides.

This is the 19(1)(b)(ii) category. These are the people who are finding their life intolerable and who are actively, at this stage, pursuing a suicide without assistance. Later in the same document it states:

While mental illness is linked to suicide, this does not mean that everyone who takes their own life is mentally ill or is emotionally or intellectually disturbed when they make that decision.

I think that is a fundamental point. The Hon. Ann Bressington's position apparently is that she supports the right of people to make decisions about whether or not they can tolerate their life, except for people with a psychiatric disability. The document goes on to say:

For some suicide may be an impulsive and irrational act but for others it may be a carefully considered decision, particularly where the person believes that his or her death will benefit others.

As I said, I cannot support discriminatory legislation. I certainly cannot support doubly discriminatory legislation.

The Hon. M. PARNELL: I support this amendment, and I note that the Hon. Dennis Hood acknowledges that it is an improvement. In fact, it falls into that category of all the amendments—that is, the ones I have moved and the ones that the Hon. Ann Bressington has moved—which have resulted from discussions with people about concerns that they had that could be alleviated by improvements through the wording of the bill. The important thing to note with this is that the inclusion of the words 'not being a treatable psychiatric illness' is designed to ensure that the intolerable suffering of a person is in fact the result of some illness, injury or condition other than a treatable psychiatric illness. If it is the treatable psychiatric illness that means that someone's life is intolerable, you fix the psychiatric illness; you treat it. As the Hon. Ann Bressington pointed out, it is not designed to exclude someone who might have some terrible disease that causes them suffering they cannot put up with and they might be depressed as well.

Well, if you can cure their depression and they still find the suffering intolerable, they qualify. I do not understand at all that this is some form of double discrimination: it is basically a form of protection to make sure that people we can help through the medical system are helped. It is only those who see no help that would be entitled to apply for voluntary euthanasia.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: We are now looking at the wording of this clause, which refers to the objects of the act rather than that which deals with active requests. Perhaps the honourable mover could offer some guidance if he does not want this to be the test provision as we do seem now to be debating it. I share the concerns raised by other members, as I indicated in my second reading contribution, about paragraph (ii) of this amendment to clause 6 in relation to conditions which irreversibly impair the person's quality of life so that life has become intolerable.

Indeed, that could apply to paraplegics or people suffering from shingles in their later years, which can be incredibly painful, or whatever. I think it would be very unfortunate if they were considered the sorts of conditions that could be considered eligible for voluntary euthanasia. I would like to raise a couple of questions with the mover. Is there any definition of 'terminal phase of a terminal illness'? How is that assessed? Is there some point? I know that some jurisdictions refer to a prognosis of six months to live. How does the honourable member see that being defined or working? I could not see a definition of it.

I have a question of the Hon. Ms Bressington in relation to her amendment. In relation to a treatable psychiatric illness, who will make that judgment? It appears from my reading of the bill, including all the amendments (and correct me if I am wrong), that if the Hon. Mr Parnell's amendment is accepted you would need potentially to go to the same specialist twice to get him or her to sign off on your request for active voluntary euthanasia. You would not be required to see a psychiatrist, as such. I am interested in who makes that assessment. If you have cancer and you go to your oncologist to request voluntary euthanasia, and you do that twice in accordance with the provisions of the bill, is he or she the person who makes a judgment about whether or not you have a treatable illness. I am sorry; that would apply in other medical conditions. So, it would not be an oncologist, assuming that the cancer was terminal.

Anyway, let us say that you are going to your specialist or treating physician in relation to whatever condition it is that irreversibly impairs your quality of life. Is that the person who makes a judgment about whether or not you can be considered to have a treatable psychiatric illness? What happens—and the Hon. Mr Parnell touched on this possibility—if someone has led a very active life and they become paraplegic or quadriplegic? They may well then be suffering depression or anxiety of an advanced kind. How do you distinguish? Is it their condition of disability that irreversibly impairs their quality of life? How do you separate that out from the psychiatric illness which may be as a result of such a sharp change in their life circumstance?

The CHAIRMAN: Does the Hon. Mr Parnell intend to answer the questions?

The Hon. M. PARNELL: I will answer on behalf of the Hon. Ann Bressington. The honourable member asked questions of both of us. There were quite a few questions there and I will do my best. In this bill there is no definition of 'terminal phase of a terminal illness'. The honourable member knows that the bulk of this bill is the insertion of a new part into the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995, which contains two definitions: the definition of 'terminal illness' and the definition of 'terminal phase of a terminal illness'.

A terminal illness means an illness or condition that is likely to result in death, and the terminal phase of a terminal illness means the phase of the illness reached when there is no real prospect of recovery or remission of symptoms on either a permanent or temporary basis. So that is where those definitions lie.

The other questions that the honourable member asked were a mixture of both medical, if you like, and personal—medical in terms of who is to say what is the medical condition or the treatable psychiatric illness and who makes that assessment; and then you have the other part of the definition which talks about suffering becoming intolerable. Clearly, the second part, the intolerable suffering, is to that person. That is their judgment. That is not the doctor's judgment: that is their own judgment. But, in terms of the rest of the honourable member's question—the illness, the injury, the medical condition, the treatable psychiatric illness—as you work through the flow chart of how the bill would work, you have the treating doctor, the specialist and referral to the psychiatrist, if that is required. You also have all the paper work lodged with the voluntary euthanasia board, so there is another doctor: there is a palliative care expert.

I think that any of those people who see any issue or difficulty or hear alarm bells ringing have an obligation under this bill to make appropriate inquiries, particularly in relation to things such as duress where, if you take the examples that people have used before of very slight injury and the person just insists that their suffering is intolerable, that is certainly going to trigger further inquiries about why it is that the person is lodging an application for voluntary euthanasia. So, the answer to the honourable member's question is that all those professionals involved in the process have some role in determining that the person is eligible under section 19.

The Hon. S.G. WADE: I would like the Hon. Mr Parnell to continue his illustration. He mentioned that, if someone had a minor condition and they went through the process, the board would look to see whether there was duress. If the board found there was no duress and they still met the criteria under 19(1)(b) because they had a medical condition that they found intolerable, even if that medical condition is minor, can the Hon. Mr Parnell show me where in the bill they would become ineligible because of a judgment other than their own subjective judgment—and I refer to section 19(1)(b)(ii)?

The Hon. M. PARNELL: I think the reality of what the honourable member is saying is that in those what you would call extreme cases, where a person is seeking to bring themselves within the operation of the bill and they look at all the criteria and find that they do not apply, the answer is that, if their state of mind is such that they want to end their life, they will probably just end it themselves, anyway. They are not going to persevere with the paperwork and wait until they have gone through the whole process of the doctors, the psychiatrists, the specialists and the board. I am not sure what else the honourable—

The Hon. R.D. Lawson: And the Statutory Authorities Review Committee.

The Hon. M. PARNELL: The Hon. Rob Lawson says 'and the Statutory Authorities Review Committee' as well. I think old age is the greatest threat to that person rather than any condition that they are facing. Basically, this bill is about putting in the safeguards and the checks and balances so that those who are most deserving of our compassion will obtain it.

I understand, and I always knew, that a big part of the debate over this bill would be from people who only want it to apply to that proportion of the population who are in the terminal phase of a terminal illness, full stop. But we know from the evidence that there are people suffering from terrible conditions that, in fact, do make their life intolerable to them. It is not about to kill them any time soon in terms of weeks or months, but they still find that there is no cure and there is no alleviation of the pain. They have been through this whole process with doctors. They have had their diagnosis, they have had their prognosis and they have had all the options explained to them. They have explored all the latest options for palliative care. When all those things fail, yes, they become eligible under this bill.

I guess the desire of members—and I appreciate it is an honestly held desire—to have this law apply to as few people as possible is a reasonable position to take. I want it to apply to those who genuinely need it.

The Hon. DAVID WINDERLICH: I will be supporting the amendment. As has been previously expressed by the Hon. Mark Parnell, the inclusion of 'treatable psychiatric illness' simply does focus on eliminating those who can be treated from consideration for voluntary euthanasia—and that makes sense.

The other key point is that this eligibility criteria is only the start of the process. After that safeguards come into play. In particular, clause 19(3)(c) provides:

if the medical practitioner suspects that—

(i) the person intending to make the request is not of sound mind; or

(ii) the decision-making ability of the person is adversely affected by the person's state of mind,

then before making the request, the person must obtain a certificate from a psychiatrist...

If someone came with a minor condition that would not meet a normal understanding of what constitutes suffering, it would be a trigger for psychiatric assessment, so that safeguard is built into it, as well.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: I think the Hons Mr Parnell and Mr Winderlich highlight the weakness of the second part of the definitions provision.

The CHAIRMAN: The Hon. Mr Finnigan is debating it.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: In response to my question about who is to determine it, the Hon. Mr Parnell said that it is not for the doctor but, rather, the person because life has become intolerable to that person, so it is the person seeking the euthanasia who makes the decision, not the doctor.

Yet the Hons Mr Parnell and Mr Winderlich said that all these medical opinions and the approval of the board need to be obtained before euthanasia can take place. If it is not a sufficient reason why they want to access voluntary euthanasia they will not be able to do so. It seems to me to be entirely contradictory to say that it is up to them to judge whether their life has become intolerable but all these others can stop them.

I do not think the 'treatable psychiatric illness' issue has been addressed sufficiently. The Hon. Mark Parnell seems to be suggesting that people have to see two doctors, but it is my understanding that they can see the same doctor or specialist twice, if the amendment is carried. The Hon. Mr Parnell seems to be suggesting that they have to see two medical professionals, but that is not my understanding of the bill. Perhaps the honourable member could clarify that.

While a medical practitioner can refer someone to a psychiatrist, there is no obligation on them to do that. It could be a specialist with almost no knowledge, apart from what they have learnt as a trained doctor. Obviously, they have done a—

The Hon. J.M.A. Lensink: Which is significant.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: They have a medical degree and they have an understanding of mental illness. I am not suggesting they know nothing; they certainly know a lot more about it than I. They are not a psychiatric specialist, so there is nothing to stop them making the judgment, ultimately, that a person is of sound mind. They can refer the person to a psychiatrist, but they are not obliged to do that if it is their medical opinion that the person in question is of sound mind. I wonder whether the Hon. Mr Parnell could clarify the procedure. It is my understanding you could see the same doctor or the same specialist twice rather than having to see two different ones.

The CHAIRMAN: I remind members that there might be 22 consciences in here, all with a different opinion on the bill, and the various amendments, etc. I am not going to tolerate debating. You had your chance in the second reading debate and you had your chance on clause 1. We will stick to the amendments and stick to questions on the amendments and the clauses so we can get through this bill and allow the 22 consciences to exercise a vote.

The Hon. M. PARNELL: Thank you, Mr Chairman. The number of doctors involved will vary according to the circumstances of the individual person. The type of situation we were discussing was the person about whom you would think, 'They can't possibly fit within the definition of a person entitled to apply.' I am saying that for people in that category there will be a lot more doctors having a look at their situation. For example, there is the first doctor that they go to. If they have some condition that is not normally associated with an application for voluntary euthanasia there will probably be the specialist, and that is my amendment that we will get to later.

If it is a condition that would not normally give rise to suffering that is unbearable there is the option for the psychiatric assessment and, in fact, I think that is pretty well assured in those circumstances. If a person has a minor condition that would not normally have them regarded as an applicant then there is a psychiatrist involved. Then I mentioned all the other medical professionals that are involved as well, including on the voluntary euthanasia board, and they will ask the same questions. So, there are a number of doctors involved.

However, the point for me is not ticking the boxes, and the more doctors the better. We could have built into this bill, 'You have to see five doctors; you have to get 10 second opinions.' We could have done all sorts of things that would just add hurdles to a person's exercising their right. However, the safeguards that were built into this bill are that the people who are the most deserving cases, the clearest cases—and if we take for example the terminal phase of a terminal illness, in most cases, it is likely to be their treating doctor. It can be that same doctor they go to twice if they also happen to be a specialist in that field, and if there is no question or issue around their psychiatric condition then there might not be a psychiatrist.

I do not think that that devalues this bill, simply because they so clearly comply with a person eligible under section 19 that they do not need all those other doctors to assess it. In any case, there is still the palliative care; the other doctor on the voluntary euthanasia board.

The Hon. R.D. LAWSON: I indicate that I will not be supporting this amendment. The Hon. Dennis Hood suggested that the insertion of the words 'not being a treatable psychiatric illness' improves the clause. I do not believe that it does improve it. I think it creates uncertainty.

These objects, which are then brought forward in a later provision in the bill covered by the mover's amendment No. 3, create two classes of persons entitled to euthanasia. One is those who are in the terminal phase of a terminal illness and the other is those who have an illness or other medical condition that becomes intolerable; roughly speaking, two classes. What the mover proposes to do is to insert into one of those clauses the words 'not being a treatable psychiatric illness'—so, to bar one of those classes from being eligible for voluntary euthanasia.

However, the very insertion in one class of a disqualifying condition means that, by inference—and very strong inference—that excluding provision does not apply to the previous. So, a person who is in the terminal phase of a terminal illness, not being a treatable psychiatric illness, would be eligible, and I believe that creates uncertainty. I also believe the expression 'treatable psychiatric illness' is one of indefinite meaning. It is interesting to see that the Hon. Mark Parnell when he was describing this was talking about psychiatric conditions. We usually do talk about psychiatric conditions, because some psychiatric conditions might be classified as illnesses and others not, and there is a whole range of conditions that might or might not amount to illness. I believe there is also uncertainty in that expression 'treatable psychiatric illness'.

There might be some psychiatrists who say that every psychiatric condition is treatable by some pill or other. There will be others who might say, 'You can take the pills and the potions and the lotions and have the therapy but, ultimately, it will not make any difference to the psychiatric condition.' For those reasons, I will not be supporting this amendment.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: I have to concur with the Hon. Mr Lawson. While I appreciate that the Hon. Ms Bressington is trying to ensure that people who are suffering from severe depression or some psychiatric condition are not able to access voluntary euthanasia on that basis alone, I think this amendment makes the clause worse. So, I will be opposing it.

I think the Hon. Mr Lawson just made a very good point. The phrase 'treatable psychiatric illness' could mean anything in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, fourth or fifth edition, or whatever it is up to. A whole range of things can be considered to fall into that category. I do not think anyone seriously addressed the issue I raised at the beginning of the debate on this amendment; that is, if you are suffering from a treatable psychiatric illness because of whatever condition that has led to your life being intolerable, how do you sort out that problem?

On the question of paragraph (ii), generally, the mover said that it is up to the person seeking voluntary euthanasia to decide whether life has become intolerable for them. To say that various doctors along the way somewhere can intervene I think places a large burden on them to make an assessment, when the mover has indicated that it is up to the person making the active request to make the judgment as to whether life has become intolerable for them.

The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD: For the sake of clarity, I ask the Hon. Mr Parnell to respond to this scenario. My understanding is that it is possible that the minimum number of doctors a person would see in order to qualify for voluntary euthanasia under this bill, if they found their situation intolerable, is one doctor. For instance, a person who is a paraplegic—that is, they have no need to see a specialist, obviously—could consult their GP and say, 'My life is intolerable. I can't live as a paraplegic any further.'

The GP would not refer them to a specialist because, obviously, it is not necessary: they are a paraplegic and there is no treatment. Some GPs would make an assessment of their mental state that they did not suffer from any particular medical condition, so there is no need for a psychiatrist; therefore, they could request euthanasia that day and be euthanased the next day. Is that correct?

The Hon. M. PARNELL: I do not think what I said before necessarily resonated, in that this is about the individuals more than about the doctors. It is the individual's choice, or their right, to make a request, and we have built that request-making process into a medical framework. The honourable member asks: how quickly could it happen, and is it true that you could see just one doctor?

The alternative is all those people who see no doctors. What they do is take their own life, and often they take it in terrible ways, to be found by their families. So, the answer to whether it could be just one doctor in terms of the direct consultation is: yes, it might just be one doctor; in other cases, it will be more doctors.

It seems to me that we are missing the point if the test for the success of a bill is a doctor count. The test is whether the person is eligible, whether they are acting voluntarily, or whether they are suffering from a treatable psychiatric illness, in which case let us treat them. I think we can get too hung up in thinking that the only good system is one that has as many doctors as possible involved because this is the person exercising their free will. We should not lose sight of the fact that we have many people in Australia every week ending their own life, and many of them are doing so because there is no help for them in the medical profession because no-one is allowed to help them.

The CHAIRMAN: Order! I think all that has been said in the second reading contributions. We do not have to repeat that.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: I rise to indicate that I will be supporting this amendment proposed by the Hon. Ann Bressington. I draw on some advice the Hon. Caroline Schaefer gave me early in my political career: regardless of whether the same number of people vote for this bill at the third reading or against it, as did at the second reading, along the way you should look to make improvements. I think that supporting this amendment does make an improvement to the bill. As I said, drawing on the Hon. Caroline Schaefer's early advice, I think that because this improves it I will be supporting the amendment.

The Hon. J.S.L. DAWKINS: I could say ditto, but I will be supporting this because I believe that it does improve the bill.

The CHAIRMAN: That is the way I like to hear it: quick, incisive and to the amendment.

The committee divided on the amendment:

AYES (10)
Bressington, A. (teller) Darley, J.A. Dawkins, J.S.L.
Gazzola, J.M. Hunter, I.K. Lensink, J.M.A.
Parnell, M. Ridgway, D.W. Winderlich, D.N.
Wortley, R.P.
NOES (11)
Brokenshire, R.L. Finnigan, B.V. Gago, G.E.
Holloway, P. Hood, D.G.E. Lawson, R.D.
Lucas, R.I. (teller) Schaefer, C.V. Stephens, T.J.
Wade, S.G. Zollo, C.

Majority of 1 for the noes.

Amendment thus negatived; clause passed.

Clauses 7 and 8 passed.

Clause 9.

The Hon. A. BRESSINGTON: I move:

Page 5, after line 15 [clause 9, inserted section 18(1)]—Insert:

Statutory Authorities Review Committee means the committee of that name established under the Parliamentary Committees Act 1991;

In moving this amendment, I indicate that amendment No. 25 is consequential to this amendment. These amendments seek to actively involve the Statutory Authorities Review Committee in the oversight of the voluntary euthanasia board and, in turn, the application of voluntary euthanasia and the compliance with this act. As a statutory authority, the voluntary euthanasia board will fall under the purview of the Statutory Authorities Review Committee. This is appropriate, and I am confident that SARC will conduct its inquiries into this legislation in a forensic and impartial manner to ensure that voluntary euthanasia remains an active inquiry of SARC, and, in doing so, provide constituents with a consistently active forum to report any concerns or abuses to that board.

My amendments require SARC to conduct a biannual review of the act and any associated regulations. This is intended to provide a healthy level of scrutiny and, given that each inquiry is to have a specific focus upon compliance with the act, it will provide this parliament with a continually updated report on the application of voluntary euthanasia and issues that may arise.

Additionally, SARC will be given the power to direct the voluntary euthanasia board to inquire into any matter that SARC thinks fit, which complements a subsequent amendment of mine, to the investigative powers of the voluntary euthanasia board. A report of SARC will be required to be provided to the minister as well as the parliament, and the minister will in turn have a maximum of 28 days to respond to the parliament with details of which recommendations will be implemented and the reasoning underpinning those that will not.

Much of this mirrors conventional practice, except for the 28-day period in which the minister must respond, which would otherwise be four months. However, while all acts are deserving of scrutiny and most reports deserving of implementation, I can think of no other that demands the attention of the minister in this parliament like this legislation. To prevent abuses, all levels of oversight will need to be vigilant, and when an issue is identified we need to be responsive.

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY: I suggest that this be made a test clause for the later amendments that relate to the role of the Statutory Authorities Review Committee. That would at least save the time of the committee. I wish to oppose this clause, because I really think it is one of the more absurd amendments that has been moved in a committee.

The Statutory Authorities Review Committee has been in operation now for some years, and it has a particular role and function. I have never been a member of the committee, but I am sure there are those who have. One would be well aware that one of the things you would not expect the Statutory Authorities Review Committee to do is to basically examine individual cases of requests for euthanasia.

Really, if one looks at the subsequent clause—new clause 52A, the function of the Statutory Authorities Review Committee—if this packet of amendments is carried, it would be getting down to a situation where this parliamentary committee may refer a matter, in relation to a particular request, or a particular class of requests, for voluntary euthanasia to the board for inquiry under section 38. The clause then overrides the Parliamentary Committees Act in relation to directing the minister and gives the minister 28 days to respond.

As if that is not bad enough, it should be remembered that the Statutory Authorities Review Committee is a committee of the Legislative Council only. When we have had reports in the past on voluntary euthanasia they have come through the Social Development Committee, which, of course, represents both houses of parliament. I would have thought that, if you were to have a role for a parliamentary committee in looking at this legislation, that would be the obvious committee to do it. In any case, I am not sure that you would get any parliamentary committee down to the detail of looking at individual requests. Certainly, I would have thought that it would be the appropriate committee to look at it.

The fact is that it is a committee of both houses of parliament. I suppose in a way, if you wanted to sink this bill, this is the clause guaranteed to do it. I am sure that members of the House of Assembly, if they ever get to debate this bill—and we know they will not anyway because there will not be time to do it in this parliamentary session—would not permit the supervisory function to be done by a committee of the Legislative Council only.

If one thinks through what that might mean in terms of membership of the committee and the like, it really is a completely unworkable proposition. As I said, I suppose if you wanted to sink the bill this is guaranteed to do it. However, I certainly will not support this clause because I believe it is an absurd proposition that a committee of this parliament, established to look at statutory authorities, should be given the incredibly detailed task of getting down to almost individual requests for voluntary euthanasia.

One could say much more about the absurdity of the proposition but, given the hour, I will not take up any more time of the committee. As I said, this really should be a test clause for later amendments.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I agree with the position put by the leader that this ought to be a test clause.

The Hon. B.V. Finnigan: Stop the presses!

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Well, that is untrue. The Hon. Mr Holloway and I have agreed on many things over the years; it is just that we tend to be quite vigorous on the things on which we disagree. However, on this occasion I think it is sensible that it be treated as a test clause; it is a critical part of the package of amendments being moved by the Hon. Ms Bressington in relation to the legislation (there are other critical parts as well).

I have to say that in my experience in parliament this is one of the more bizarre and outrageous amendments I have seen—and I have seen a fair few over my years—to a critical piece of legislation. I think that to actually involve the Statutory Authorities Review Committee—

The Hon. A. Bressington interjecting:

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: No; I understand that it is a statutory authority, but to actually involve the Statutory Authorities Review Committee, or indeed any parliamentary committee, in the sort of detailed package of amendments being suggested here would, I think, appal even some of the supporters of the legislation. They would be appalled at the prospect of people such as myself, the Hon. Ms Zollo and the Hon. Mr Finnigan—because I suspect that, if the legislation passed, the Hon. Mr Hunter would be off the committee in a flash and the Hon. Mr Finnigan would be on it again pretty quickly—with the views that we hold in relation to voluntary euthanasia, controlling what is in effect a de facto appeal court. It is like, and I use the term, 'stay of euthanasia' appeal provisions being given to a group of members of parliament.

Put aside the argument of whether it is a Legislative Council or joint house committee; frankly, my view is any parliamentary committee. This package of amendments is saying, when we get to 52A, that the committee may refer a matter in relation to a particular request for voluntary euthanasia to the board for inquiry under clause 38B. This is a particular case, so if there is a particular case being considered by the board in relation to an application for voluntary euthanasia, and someone complains about that particular issue, the Statutory Authorities Review Committee can get involved in that specific case if it chooses. Clause 38B provides:

The Board must inquire into the following matters:

(a) a report received by the Board under section 38A;

Note—

The Board must also postpone the administration of voluntary euthanasia if a report is made to the Board—see section 38C(2).

(b) a matter referred to the Board for inquiry by the Statutory Authorities Review Committee.

When you look at 38C(2), relating to orders of the board, without going through all the detail, it provides:

If the Board receives a report under section 38A, the Board—

(a) must, before inquiring into the matter, make an order postponing the administration of voluntary euthanasia pursuant to the relevant request…

That is the point the Hon. Mr Holloway was making; in relation to an individual case for voluntary euthanasia, we will involve the Statutory Authorities Review Committee.

As I said, I suspect that some of my friends who are supporting this legislation would be appalled at the prospect that I, Rob Lucas, would be placed in the position of making a judgment that may influence a decision in relation to the voluntary euthanasia board. Whether it is me or anyone else in this chamber, whatever their views are on the legislation, I think it is a bizarre prospect to have the Statutory Authorities Review Committee getting involved in a range of activities, but in particular in relation to particular requests for voluntary euthanasia. There are other provisions in the bill and the amendments which refer to the fact that a person who believes that someone who has made a request for voluntary euthanasia may have been acting under duress or inducement can report that belief to the board. So, you might have somebody who is complaining that voluntary euthanasia may well be as a result of duress or inducement, but that is part of the Hon. Ms Bressington's amendments and it is also part of the package that we are considering.

If someone raises the issue of a particular case with the Statutory Authorities Review Committee—and the Hon. Ms Zollo is the current chair—what is the committee to do? Do we say, 'Sorry, our next scheduled meeting is in two weeks? We will consider it in due course.' What if you do not have a quorum for a meeting? Members of parliament would be placed in an invidious position where, if there is something obviously critical in relation to a particular decision and someone is raising a particular set of issues and concerns, and if the members of parliament on the committee were to say that they cannot meet until Monday or for two weeks or that they cannot get a quorum, one could imagine the publicity in the media in relation to the people who are raising the particular case saying that members of parliament are not prepared to cut into their holidays or their weekend or stop what else they are doing to have an urgent meeting of the Statutory Authorities Review Committee in relation to whatever the matter is that has been raised.

There is a variety of other reasons that the Hon. Mr Holloway has hinted at or referred to in his contribution as well. I can concur with those. I do not concur with the suggestion that it ought to go to the Social Development Committee. I am not sure that he is actually suggesting that, either. This is a critical part of the package of amendments that is being proposed by the Hon. Ms Bressington. As I said, I trenchantly oppose this provision as part of the package of provisions that is being suggested.

I guess my final comment in relation to the issues is a comment to the Hon. Mr Parnell, and that is this. The bill as you introduced it was a bill that you genuinely believed in and all I can see in this package of amendments is potentially your agreeing—and I will let you speak for yourself—to something to try to get the legislation through. I think you ought to stay true to the principles that you introduced to the council in the legislation and, as I said, people would be appalled at the prospect of having me, the Hon. Ms Zollo and potentially the Hons Mr Finnigan and Mr Brokenshire sitting in positions of decision-making as would be envisaged as part of this package of amendments.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: Perhaps I could ask a question of the honourable mover of this amendment. We have not had these amendments long but my reading is that, as the Hon. Mr Lucas has indicated, basically the Statutory Authorities Review Committee would essentially be able to instruct the board to hold somebody's active request. If someone had a complaint with the way the voluntary euthanasia board was acting, they could complain to the Statutory Authorities Review Committee, which would ask the board to review it.

The Hon. A. Bressington interjecting:

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: It sounds to me as if the board would be reviewing its own decisions on the instructions of the committee. Can you clarify those two points?

The Hon. A. BRESSINGTON: This is obviously an example of why ministers have parliamentary counsel sitting beside them to clarify pieces of legislation. The point of this amendment was not for the SARC to make decisions on active requests at all. That is what the board is there to do.

The board is there to go over and make sure all the procedures are followed, all the boxes are ticked, that there is no duress being placed on the person, and that psychiatric evaluations have been done—that is the board's responsibility. It does not come anywhere near what the responsibility of the SARC is under this amendment.

The SARC is there to review statutory authorities. The VE board is a statutory authority. Now, I might be crazy but for the past two years the SARC has been reviewing the conduct of WorkCover, of the Housing Trust, of the Office of the Public Trustee—all on their conduct and all based on complaints from constituents about how they are operating and how they are upholding the legislation. This is no different. It is just ensuring that, when a complaint is made about the fact that procedure may not have been followed and people are not getting anywhere with the VE board, they have a road to the SARC to call for that inquiry.

This was one of my main concerns about how the system works—departments investigating departments. This was a way of ensuring that people who had a complaint that the process had not been applied and followed, had a road to politicians' ears to say, 'Guess what? This isn't being carried out properly. My mother was euthanased against her will, my brother forced her, and the VE board has not responded to my concerns.'

Then the SARC can call the VE board in—as we do with WorkCover and every other statutory authority. This was a safety mechanism. I do not agree that this particular amendment should be made a test case for the others because the absolute interpretation of this amendment has been twisted and turned. I am sure, on the request of the draftsman, that I made very clear the intention of the SARC and that he would not be drafting it exactly opposite and have it as a useless amendment in order to get this bill thrown off the table. My wishes to the draftsman were very clear and he did not see a problem with them.

We take our advice from legal draftsmen, as we are supposed to, or we give them advice about what we want and they draft it. He was very clear and double-checked on what the intention was. I say that this is a deliberate attempt by some people in this place to absolutely misrepresent the intention of this amendment. Again, I say thank God for parliamentary counsel.

The CHAIRMAN: And thank God for consciences, because they see things in all different lights.

The Hon. CARMEL ZOLLO: I think the Hon. Ann Bressington has clearly attributed to those members who have already spoken in relation to the SARC, something which they certainly have not said. Even from what the Hon. Ann Bressington has just placed on the record, it would appear to me that she would foresee the role of SARC to be looking at things on a case-by-case basis—individual cases. Clearly, that is not SARC's purview, and I have to place that on the record.

The Hon. A. Bressington: To look into the conduct of the board?

The Hon. CARMEL ZOLLO: On a case-by-case basis that is not really our role, the Hon. Ann Bressington. I really do think this would be totally unworkable.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: I do not wish to frustrate members or prolong the committee but this is a pretty important matter and I think we are entitled to debate it.

The CHAIRMAN: Those other consciences have been sitting pretty quietly. They have already made up their mind, I take it, as to what they are going to do with it. Those who have already spoken have clearly made up theirs.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: The only contribution I made was to ask a couple of questions of the mover.

The CHAIRMAN: And indicate you would not be supporting it.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: I asked a couple of questions of the mover. The mover has indicated that indeed the SARC would be looking at individual cases. Under her amendment No. 25, the committee may refer a matter in relation to a request or a particular class of requests for voluntary euthanasia to the board. Also, proposed new subsection (1) is very broad as to what it can inquire into. I understand what she is trying to achieve here, and I am not doubting her understanding of the clause, but—

The Hon. A. Bressington: But you would draft it better than a draftsman, would you?

The CHAIRMAN: Order!

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: The clear reading of proposed new subsections (1) and (2) of amendment No. 25 would allow SARC to look at individual cases.

The Hon. A. Bressington: As you interpret it.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: It is pretty clear to me.

The CHAIRMAN: If you already understand it, there is no necessity to ask the mover a question.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: I think it is fair that I give the mover a chance to respond to my concerns. I will oppose this clause because it is clear to me that it would mean SARC having a role in looking over individual cases, and I think that would be a very invidious position to put honourable members in. I understand what the mover is trying to accomplish. I think there might well be some role for a parliamentary committee in relation to overseeing voluntary euthanasia in the sense of how it operates or in the way that parliamentary committees oversight certain things.

However, the notion that a parliamentary committee composed of honourable members of this council would be scrutinising individual cases of voluntary euthanasia to see whether they were correctly carried out or, indeed, to potentially stop them being carried out (if somebody were very quick off the mark in asking for review of a board decision), I just cannot support that as a notion that would be appropriate for a committee of this parliament.

The CHAIRMAN: My conscience says that, if a parliamentary committee is looking at it, I would be a long time dead waiting for them.

The Hon. R.D. LAWSON: I am generally in favour of parliamentary committees and other parliamentary mechanisms having oversight of the operation of policy and the implementation of policy, and I began by thinking that this perhaps was a case where parliamentary counsel had not recorded in the draft what the mover intended.

However, by way of explanation, she said that, for example, the issue, 'My mother has been euthanased without her consent,' was the sort of question that could be referred by the committee to the board. If you allow the committee to become involved in the question, 'My mother has been euthanased without her consent, and the board has not allowed it,' you also become involved in the question, 'I want to be euthanased, but the board won't allow it and therefore I want you, SARC, to intervene on my behalf with the board and say that I should be euthanased as I wish to be, but the board is frustrating me.'

So, I believe that the draftsman has correctly reflected what the member intended, and what the words actually say is that SARC will have an involvement in individual cases and, for reasons given by others, I think that is undesirable.

The committee divided on the amendment:

AYES (7)
Bressington, A. (teller) Darley, J.A. Gago, G.E.
Gazzola, J.M. Hunter, I.K. Parnell, M.
Winderlich, D.N.
NOES (14)
Brokenshire, R.L. Dawkins, J.S.L. Finnigan, B.V.
Holloway, P. Hood, D.G.E. Lawson, R.D.
Lensink, J.M.A. Lucas, R.I. (teller) Ridgway, D.W.
Schaefer, C.V. Stephens, T.J. Wade, S.G.
Wortley, R.P. Zollo, C.

Majority of 7 for the noes.

Amendment thus negatived.

The Hon. A. BRESSINGTON: I will not be moving any further amendments. I made it very clear at the beginning to all voting members that it was a matter of my amendments going through as a package. I would just like to express my absolute disappointment at the misrepresentation that occurred with the last amendment.

The Hon. M. PARNELL: I move:

Page 6, after line 25 [clause 9, inserted section 19(3)]—

After paragraph (b) insert:

(ba) if the medical practitioner is not registered under a law of this state as a specialist in respect of the kind of illness, injury or other medical condition that the person intending to make the request has, the person must—

(i) consult with such a specialist and obtain a report from the specialist containing—

(A) the information specified in paragraph (b)(i), (ii) and (iii); and—

(B) any other information required under the regulations; and.

(ii) provide the medical practitioner with a copy of the report prior to the preliminary appointment referred to in paragraph (b);

My amendments fall into two categories. One relates to the situation where the doctor who is approached to grant a request for voluntary euthanasia is not a specialist in the field in which the person is suffering, and the other stream of amendments relates to people who might be acting under duress and how we can ensure that such people are not able to access euthanasia.

My first amendment relates to the specialist. It is a simple amendment, which basically says that if the medical practitioner who has been approached is not a specialist in the kind of illness, injury or other medical condition that the person intending to make the request has, the person must go to a specialist to get a report. This is to cover the situation where the doctor who is approached does not have the expertise and an additional opinion is sought so that a proper diagnosis, prognosis and explanation of palliative care options can be given.

Amendment carried.

The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD: I have a question of the mover. I may be mistaken here, and forgive me if I am, but I want to clarify something, not on the amendment just on the clause. Looking at the definitions in clause 9, obviously the term 'medical practitioner' is used a number of times. It seems to me from my reading of the bill—and indeed the act which the bill seeks to amend—that a dentist would be able to perform euthanasia. Section 4 of the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act defines 'medical practitioner' as follows:

Medical practitioner means a person who is registered on the general register under the Medical Practitioners Act...and includes a dentist;

That section is not amended or specifically excluded anywhere in this bill as far as I can tell, and therefore my understanding is that, should this bill pass, dentists will be able to perform euthanasia. Can the mover comment?

The Hon. M. PARNELL: I would have thought that, unless a person's suffering was as a result of some dental condition—and I am not in any position to know whether that is likely to be the result—although we did see circulated a picture of a woman who suffered the most terrible cancer of the face which ate her jaw, made her go blind, and there was a range of horrible disfiguring and painful conditions—the clause we are discussing kicks in and they have to go to a specialist in that field in relation to the illness from which they are suffering, a report has to be prepared and the prognosis, the diagnosis, the explanation of options and all that stuff will be provided by the specialist.

That has covered the situation about whether the person is entitled to apply. The honourable member's concern is that, having clearly been found to have qualified, there is some prohibition on dentists giving drugs. There is not much I can say about it other than that I am not sure whether dentists are entitled to prescribe the full range of drugs, including those that are likely to end a person's life. At the end of the day it does not matter because the person will have gone to a specialist and have been found to qualify.

In any event (and we will get to a clause later), the doctor is entitled to supply the drugs for self-administration provided the doctor stays in the area. I do not see that it makes a great deal of difference, but I do accept what the honourable member says, that the definition of 'medical practitioner' does include dentists. I would be most surprised if any person who was not suffering from an intolerable dental condition would in fact go to a dentist; and if I was on the voluntary euthanasia board and I saw that it was a dentist who had signed off on all the paperwork, I would be asking some pretty serious questions. I do not see that, at a practical level, it makes any difference.

The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD: Just to be clear, under this bill a dentist will be able to administer euthanasia. The Hon. Mr Parnell makes the point that, in many cases, they would see a specialist, and I accept that, but not in all cases. It will be possible under this bill for a dentist to euthanise a patient. Let us be clear about that.

The Hon. M. PARNELL: I move:

Page 6, after line 30 [clause 9, inserted section 19(3)(c)]—After subparagraph (ii) insert:

or

(iia) the person intending to make the request is acting under any form of duress or inducement (including duress or inducement due solely to a perception or mistake on the part of the person),

This falls into the second category that I described previously. This series of amendments, Nos 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, followed my discussions with the Hon. John Darley. It was to make it as clear as possible that there was an active obligation to ensure that a person was not making a request under some form of duress, including forms of duress that might be imagined in the person's mind. The words are whether the person making the request 'is acting under any form of duress or inducement (including duress or inducement due solely to a perception or mistake on the part of the person)'. That is to cover the situation where the person believes that they are a burden to their family and are putting duress on themselves, even though that may well be a mistake or perception—as it mostly is, as we know, in families.

This series of amendments, and I am happy to use this as a test, makes it clear that there is an active responsibility to inquire into and ensure that such duress does not exist, as opposed to the original wording, which was if a person believed they were suffering from duress. So this makes it a more active request.

Amendment carried.

The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD: For the sake of clarity, I point out that in section 19(3)(c), as the honourable member has said and acknowledged, there is not a specific requirement for a patient to go to a psychiatrist—it is only if the initial doctor feels it is necessary—but that is not really the point I want to make. The point I want to make is with respect to section 19(3)(d), and that section outlines a cooling off period of 24 hours before the euthanasia can take place. I make the point that this is an extremely short cooling off period given that, under current South Australian law, we have a two day cooling off period to buy a second-hand car and a three day cooling off period to buy property—land, a house, or whatever it may be. I feel strongly that this cooling off period is, to say the least, terribly inadequate.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: I have a question in relation to subdivision 2, advance requests, whereby section 20(5) provides:

The validity and legality of a certification of a psychiatrist that a person is of sound mind, or that the person's state of mind is unlikely to adversely affect the person's ability to decide to make an advance request, cannot be challenged or questioned in any proceedings (other than proceedings under this Part).

Is the meaning of that that a psychiatrist could find themselves in proceedings before the Medical Board in relation to a certification that they had made?

The Hon. M. PARNELL: That is not the case. In fact, one of the Hon. Ann Bressington's amendments made it clear that they were still subject to disciplinary action. I am not sure whether we will be seeing that amendment. The purpose of that clause is basically to prevent the situation where the medical judgment of a psychiatrist is disputed and we find people hopping from doctor to doctor until they get the result they want. I do not believe there is anything in here that prevents a person from being disciplined, if the discipline relates to misconduct. Just the fact their judgment call in relation to the purposes of this act cannot be questioned does not mean that any other misconduct or malpractice they commit would not still be subject to medical discipline.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: The words 'cannot be challenged or questioned in any proceedings' would seem to indicate that the Medical Board could not have an oversight in relation to it. A lot of the proceedings before the Medical Board are about a diagnosis, so I am not sure whether it fits in. I understand what the mover is saying—that we want to avoid doctor shopping—but I think the clause needs further examination.

The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD: I refer to new section 31 and the specifics around the quorum for the board. The honourable member has set up a board of five members but new section 31(1) provides that three members could constitute a quorum of the board. It is important to note that in relation to two of those members required under the bill one is a medical practitioner and the other is a palliative care specialist. Given the quorum is only three members, there could be a situation where a quorum is composed and no medical people are present in the board meeting when the decision is made. The palliative care specialist and the medical practitioner may not be there because only three are required to form a quorum.

The CHAIRMAN: We are jumping ahead a bit because the next indicated amendment is to page 6 and that question related to page 13. If the Hon. Mr Parnell were to answer that question now it might help.

The Hon. M. PARNELL: The answer I would give is to say two things. First of all, amendments that may no longer be before us removed one of the ministerial nominees and replaced it with the Public Advocate. The other point is that decisions of the board must be unanimous so, whichever way you look at it, if only three out of the five attended a meeting and they are unanimous, it is still a majority of the board. If five of them are there, then the five of them have to be unanimous.

The CHAIRMAN: I ask the Hon. Mr Parnell to move the next amendment because both those questions—one from the Hon. Mr Finnigan and the other from the Hon. Mr Hood—were up the track a bit.

The Hon. M. PARNELL: I move:

Page 6, after line 37 [clause 9, inserted section 19(3)(c)]—After subparagraph (iv) insert:

and

(v) the person is not acting under any form of duress or inducement (including duress or inducement due solely to a perception or mistake on the part of the person);

Amendment carried.

The CHAIRMAN: I ask the Hon. Mr Parnell to move amendment No. 4, page 6, line 7.

The Hon. M. PARNELL: I move:

Page 7, after line 6 [clause 9, inserted section 19(3)(d)]—After subparagraph (iii) insert:

(iiia) if a copy of a report from a specialist is required to be provided to the medical practitioner under paragraph (ba)—must be accompanied by a copy of the report; and

This amendment is consequential because it provides that if a specialist is involved the specialist report has to form part of the paper trail for voluntary euthanasia. It is consequential to accepting that a specialist might be involved where the doctor agreeing to help with voluntary euthanasia is not a specialist in that field.

Amendment carried.

The CHAIRMAN: We will now deal with amendment No. 5. If anyone has any questions on these amendments, they can jump in. I do not want to be seen not to be giving members an opportunity to ask questions on the amendments. This is the amendment to clause 9, page 7, after line 34.

The Hon. M. PARNELL: All the rest of my amendments relate to that question of duress, so I will move them one at a time but I will not speak to them all individually.

The CHAIRMAN: You can move them all together, and if anyone has any questions on them they can ask them.

The Hon. M. PARNELL: I move:

Page 7, after line 34 [clause 9, inserted section 19(5)]—After paragraph (b) insert:

and

(c) in any case—that he or she, after making reasonable enquiries, formed the opinion that the person was not acting under any form of duress or inducement (including duress or inducement due solely to a perception or mistake on the part of the person).

Page 8—

After line 24 [clause 9, inserted section 20(2)(c)]—After subparagraph (ii) insert:

or

(iia) the person intending to make the request is acting under any form of duress or inducement (including duress or inducement due solely to a perception or mistake on the part of the person),

After line 31 [clause 9, inserted section 20(2)(c)]—After subparagraph (iv) insert:

and

(v) the person is not acting under any form of duress or inducement (including duress or inducement due solely to a perception or mistake on the part of the person);

Page 9, after line 31 [clause 9, inserted section 20(4)]—After paragraph (b) insert:

and

(c) in any case—that he or she, after making reasonable enquiries, formed the opinion that the person was not acting under any form of duress or inducement (including duress or inducement due solely to a perception or mistake on the part of the person).

As I have said, these amendments impose a positive obligation on a person to make reasonable inquiries as to whether someone is acting under duress.

Amendments carried.

The Hon. R.D. LAWSON: We have a final question on clause 9. Given the honourable mover's concession that, because the definition of medical practitioner includes 'dentist', a dentist could initiate or be part of the authorising process for voluntary euthanasia, can the member indicate how that can possibly be justified?

The Hon. M. PARNELL: The honourable member's question basically is to take the situation where a person's medical skill applies to a particular area and, therefore, say that that training is inadequate for them to be part of this process. As I have pointed out, the ability of a dentist alone to be part of voluntary euthanasia would be very unlikely unless, as I said, the person suffering intolerably was suffering from a dental condition.

The point that I would make is that the alternative that is practised every day is that people take their own lives—no dentists, no doctors, no tinkers, tailors, soldiers or sailors. To suggest that a medical professional whose primary area of practice is in dentistry is somehow ineligible to be involved at any stage, I think, is to devalue that profession and to overstate the likelihood that they would ever be the sole medical practitioner involved.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: I am not sure I would agree with the honourable mover that a large number of suicides are terminally ill people, but we will not go into that for the moment. I refer to page 10, subdivision 3, section 22, 'Variation of requests'. It is my understanding that section 22 refers to both active and advanced requests; is that correct?

The Hon. M. PARNELL: I think the answer is probably yes. It refers to section 19, which is active requests, and section 20, which is advanced requests. The point is simply made that people are allowed to change their mind, and we need to make sure that we have recorded whenever that occurs.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: I am just wondering how that interacts with section 23, 'Interaction between requests', which suggests that if two or three requests were made by the same person, a bit like a will, the latest one is valid. How do you square that off with the ability to vary requests?

The Hon. M. PARNELL: It is exactly the same as a will. A subsequent will revokes a prior will but you can execute a codicil to a will, which varies it. I think the point would be that someone might still want to be able to access voluntary euthanasia but some small component of a precondition might change, or some other desire as to how it was to occur might change. Those changes should be able to be recorded in the register. If a person wants to go back to square one and commence the process again, they can, and the latest request is the one that would be the current one.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: So, if two requests existed and someone tried to vary the earlier request, the board would say, 'Well, that request has been nullified by your subsequent request'?

The Hon. M. PARNELL: I think this would be an administrative matter for the board. The board is the custodian of the requests, and if there are multiple requests from one person, and maybe from different doctors, the whole nature of a board is that you can keep track of that. I suppose the honourable member might think of a situation in which a person uses 10 different aliases and goes to 10 different doctors and 10 different specialists, and that might cause a problem. Ultimately, one of the values of having this board is that there is that central repository of requests, unlike wills, where you find half a dozen law firms holding half a dozen wills in relation to a person, and you have to find the latest one. This is a far safer system than that.

The ACTING CHAIRMAN (Hon. J.S.L. Dawkins): The Hon. Mr Finnigan, I think we are getting to the stage where I am going to put the question. I will allow you—

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: Mr Acting Chairman, the mover did, essentially, put words into my mouth, so I would like to respond. I was not suggesting that someone with lots of aliases and lots of doctors would be putting in multiple requests. I certainly would not like anyone to trust me with the filing system for this. I am sure that we are all aware that there are problems with records management on occasion and that these situations will arise.

The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD: I am jumping ahead quite a bit, but I would like to make some comments on sections 41 and 42 in clause 9. Correct me if I am wrong, but section 41 in clause 9 appears to provide that no appeal is possible against a decision of the board if it approves euthanasia, but section 42 in the same clause, the very next section, talks about there being a right of appeal if it does not approve euthanasia. So, if I am correct, what we have is that the bill allowing an appeal when euthanasia is denied, but not allowing an appeal when euthanasia is approved. Is that correct?

The Hon. M. PARNELL: The situation that was sought to be avoided is one you often find in controversial legal issues such as this in which organisations seek to interfere in every case. We see it in relation to abortion and matters such as that. You see it, too, with people in hospitals wanting the machines turned off. You often get organisations—not always religious, but often—seeking to interfere, not because they have any particular relationship with the person, or even know them, but just because their moral values are that they do not want the thing to happen that has been approved.

The section has been deliberately worded because the entire object of the bill, and, in fact, one of the guiding principles for all people making decisions under the bill, is to give effect, as far as possible, to the wishes of the person. The wishes of the person must prevail against anyone else who is trying to stop them exercising what I am saying is a basic human right. So, that does stop people from saying, 'I know my brother or my mother is suffering intolerably. I know they want to die, but my particular moral values say they shouldn't be allowed to do that, so therefore I am going to appeal,' and this section prevents that. On the other hand, a person who is denied their human right should be able to challenge that decision.

The Hon. R.L. BROKENSHIRE: Further to that, I have a question of the mover of the bill because it appears that, at least in looking at the way this is drafted, it is totally wrong. In fact, one might argue that it is an illegal provision within the bill, because what I see from this is that this is actually making the board higher than probably the highest court in the land and is certainly making the decisions of this board higher than those of any court in this state.

The board is dealing with matters of life and death; we know that. With a novel law on which there is no Australian case law and little law in any jurisdiction, it is extraordinary to deny any right to appeal a declaration of the board to a higher court. I have never, in my years in parliament, seen a clause that does that and, frankly, I cannot see how it could be done in this case.

I acknowledge that the board is permitted, under section 38(2)(d), to refer a matter of law to the Supreme Court. However, when you drill into it, the problem with this and the fundamental flaw, which I have never seen before in any legislation in my time in parliament, is that, whilst that provision is there, it appears that the board could proceed to ignore the ruling of that court and make a declaration contrary to that ruling knowing that its declarations cannot be appealed.

A government appointed panel making life and death decisions that cannot be appealed is a serious threat, in my opinion, to the vulnerable and undermines the base parameters of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which exist to protect adults who may be lacking legal capacity. I ask whether the honourable member can categorically guarantee that this clause will deny any of the base principles of an appeal to the Supreme Court or a higher court. In any case, because of the way in which it is drafted, would the honourable member agree that the board could just dismiss and ignore those court recommendations?

The Hon. M. PARNELL: The situation the honourable member describes is virtually impossible to imagine. He is saying that there will be court orders and that this board will be able to ignore them. Well, why will there be court orders? Clearly, people who do not want anyone to have the right to voluntary euthanasia will take whatever steps they can to make sure there are opportunities to stop it happening.

The honourable member says how outrageous it is that we might have decisions that cannot be subject to court action. I have not brought my records, but I wonder whether in fact the honourable member may have voted for such clauses, or at least not supported me in my attempt to remove them. They are called privative clauses; they exist all over legislation and provide that certain decisions are beyond judicial review. If it were not for the lateness of the hour, I would get on my hobbyhorse of section 48E of the Development Act, which basically provides that no decision made by anyone can be challenged in any form whatsoever, amen.

I just make the point here that this is a human rights bill. What I am saying in this clause is that I do not want the ability for people who have no real interest in it to be able to deny a person their human right by frivolous, vexatious or whatever legal challenges. It is a shame, but there are some people who would rather someone die in agony than allow them to use this clause and, if they could use the legal process to achieve that end, they would. Do not get me wrong, but there are people in society for whom that is the way they operate: they would rather the person end their days naturally in agony rather than be able to access this law. So, I am going to deny those people that right, but I do not believe we should deny the people who believe they do qualify the right to test that decision.

The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD: I will not delay the committee. Obviously, it is getting late. I had possibly 10 or 12 more questions, but I will use this as my last question. It skips right ahead to section 51 of Division 9, titled Insurance. This section seems to me to be quite unfair to insurers. It would allow a person to take out a hefty life insurance policy just days before requesting voluntary euthanasia and, because the previous section requires the death certificate to record the condition as causing their death, rather than euthanasia causing their death, it means that under many life insurance policies, according to an email I have from the industry itself, they would still qualify for a life insurance payout.

Of course, in this country, we have a lot of life insurance policies that do not require any particular preconditions. If you are under a certain age, you qualify; it is as simple as that. I am advised that, if euthanasia were to become legal in South Australia, that would change quite rapidly. Premiums would rise substantially in some cases, and also the availability of life insurance would become much, much more restrictive. In fact, I have an email from Holly Dorber from the Investment and Financial Services Association saying that the industry is confused about this section and wants me to note their concern. I will read a very short snippet from it, as follows:

As currently drafted, there are a number of aspects of the bill on which IFSA's—

which is the body itself, the Investment and Financial Services Association—

Life Insurance members would seek clarification regarding practical application. In particular clause 19...clause 50...and clause 51 contain wording which is confusing, difficult to understand and which may be contradictory in parts.

It goes on to say that essentially it is unworkable in their view.

I think the other aspect that is important here that has not yet been touched on is the financial aspect. There is a life insurance industry out there which of course will be affected by this. The fact is that the bill requires the death certificate to be essentially falsified, because it will require a condition to be put on the death certificate rather than euthanasia as the cause of death.

How would you write down, for instance, shingles if someone decided that they wanted euthanasia because their shingles were intolerable, or their paraplegia was intolerable to them? Then, presumably, on the death certificate it would say 'paraplegia', which I think is unacceptable, and, apparently, so does the life insurance industry.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: If I could just come back to the point about the Supreme Court appeals. I understand what the Hon. Mr Parnell is saying, that he does not want people who have no connection to the person seeking voluntary euthanasia to be able to hold it up in court. But, I really think the Supreme Court is well able to prevent that from happening, or to recognise it. We all know that there are plenty of occasions when organisations and individuals try to get in on court cases, and the courts are well able to decide whether or not they have any proper standing.

I am sure we are all familiar with cases in the US of capital punishment, where there are lots of organisations that devote themselves to trying to stop things in the courts, and they are not usually that successful, because generally the court says, 'Well, you might have a passionate view about this, but it's not really your concern.'

I will briefly make a general point, which I will make in my third reading contribution, in that I think the committee stage has highlighted that there are a lot of issues that we need to work through with this bill, or any bill like it. Given the lateness of the hour, and we know that this is very unlikely to be dealt with before the election and will need to be reintroduced, I am happy to not delay the committee further, but I place on record that I think that those of us who will still be here, and I hope to be one of those, will need a lot of time to deal with this when it is reintroduced.

The Hon. R.D. LAWSON: On the question about the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, the Hon. Mark Parnell said that his clause, a privative clause, as he correctly described it, prevents organisations and other what might be termed busy-bodies appealing to the court, and that this was a human right, and that if a person wanted to have themselves euthanased it is their right to do so and not the business of anybody else to appeal against that decision.

However, his clause 42 provides that an appeal may be instituted by a person to whom section 38 applies. Section 38 applies not only to the person who is to be euthanased but also to the treating medical practitioner or the registrar. So, here you are: you give these third parties the right. You do not give the parents, the guardian or the person who might be living with the person to be euthanased any standing to appeal, but you give these what might be termed neutral persons a right to intervene by this appeal process. I do believe that the honourable member misstated, no doubt inadvertently, as I understand it, the effect of clause 42(2) of the bill.

The Hon. M. PARNELL: The honourable member is correct in that the class of persons who can appeal are these other people, but I would strongly disagree that these are somehow people who do not have a direct role. These are people, whose decisions, if incorrect, or if there is something wrong with them, are fundamental to whether or not voluntary euthanasia can take place. What a person's brother, uncle, cousin, mother or father thinks is not.

However, there is the medical practitioner, the person who has to certify that they have actually interviewed the person twice, that they have explained the diagnosis and prognosis—I will not go through all that again—and, if that is a different person, the registrar. The reason for those people being included is an exercise in caution for something terrible that could go wrong where something urgent needs to be done, such as an urgent Supreme Court injunction. It makes sense for these people to be able to do that; if, for example, they decide that there has been some fraud involved, or something, you need to have a mechanism for them to get involved. The main people we are trying to keep out are those the honourable member described as busybodies.

I come back to the fact that this is overwhelmingly the person's right. If there is some flaw in the exercise or administration of their right, in the paperwork or whatever, it makes sense for the medical practitioner who is likely to administer voluntary euthanasia, or the treating medical practitioner, or in fact the registrar, whose sign off is critical, for them to be able to urgently approach the court if they need to do so.

The committee divided on the clause as amended:

AYES (11)
Bressington, A. Darley, J.A. Dawkins, J.S.L.
Gago, G.E. Gazzola, J.M. Hunter, I.K.
Lensink, J.M.A. Parnell, M. (teller) Ridgway, D.W.
Winderlich, D.N. Wortley, R.P.
NOES (10)
Brokenshire, R.L. Finnigan, B.V. Holloway, P.
Hood, D.G.E. Lawson, R.D. (teller) Lucas, R.I.
Schaefer, C.V. Stephens, T.J. Wade, S.G.
Zollo, C.

Majority of 1 for the ayes.

Clause as amended thus passed.

Title passed.

Bill reported with amendments.

Third Reading

The Hon. M. PARNELL (00:06): I move:

That this bill be now read a third time.

I take the opportunity now to make some brief third reading comments and I will not keep members long, given that it is already late. I acknowledge that this has been a difficult bill for many members but I think overwhelmingly we have handled it in a spirit of democracy. Reasonable questions have been asked; I think reasonable answers have been given, but I think it will be important for this house to pass this bill finally, not because finally passing it will bring it into law—clearly, it will not. Clearly, it would be unlikely that we will have time for it to go through the House of Assembly. So, there is every likelihood that passing this bill tonight will see us debating this issue again next year.

But the reason why I think it is important for us to do this tonight is that it will give incredible hope to those dozens of groups around Australia and those thousands of people who have been working for decades to have a house of parliament in Australia recognise that the right to voluntary euthanasia is an important human right. We know that 10 years ago the Northern Territory took this step but, in terms of the six foundation states of our nation, we have not had a house of parliament pass a bill through all its stages. For those people who I know are not going to support the third reading, we will be back—I am fairly confident of that. We will need to debate these issues again. But for those who have been supportive, I thank you for your support. The vast majority of Australians who consistently say they support voluntary euthanasia with safeguards I think will thank you as well, and I think this will be an important day for South Australia and, in fact, an important day for our nation.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN (00:08): If I could briefly put on record again that, bearing in mind some of the Hon. Mr Parnell's remarks, this bill will need to be reintroduced (or any bill would need to be reintroduced) in the next parliament after the election. As I wrote to honourable colleagues, I think the fact that this was being dealt with late in the session means that we did not give the consideration to the proposition that we might or should in relation to a select committee or a parliamentary inquiry, with a more extensive opportunity for briefings and community debate that I do not think really happened on this occasion. So, I encourage honourable members to think about that when they are not campaigning for re-election: how that would be achieved or how they might see that being achieved after the election if this bill is reintroduced.

I disagree with the Hon. Mr Parnell in relation to what the passage of this bill would mean because I think I would caution supporters and opponents alike that whatever happens this evening is not going to set a particularly valid precedent, given that 11 members of the council will be elected afresh in March and at least some of them will be new members. So, it is something that I think members will need to reconsider next year—and I hope to be one of those.

We spent a couple of hours (or perhaps a little more in the committee stage) but I suggest it will take a lot longer than that. There was a whole range of issues that certainly I intended to raise that we did not deal with and I think there are a number of things we need to look at very carefully.

This is very important legislation and, if it were to pass both houses of parliament, I think that, even though I oppose the concept and the principle and will continue to do so, we certainly need to take care to ensure that we get it right, as much as we are able. I think this evening's debate has demonstrated that there are a few areas in this bill which you can drive a truck through and it would need some serious work if it were to become law.

I conclude by reiterating that I believe legalising active voluntary euthanasia is bad law and that this proposition is perhaps the worst variant that has been put before this parliament, and I urge honourable members to oppose it.

The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD (00:11): The question for us tonight is not whether or not people are in favour of or against euthanasia. That is not the question before us tonight. The question before us tonight is: is this the correct model of euthanasia to be legalised in this state? There will be some members in this chamber who, by and large, are happy to support euthanasia with safeguards and the like. The question for those members is: is this the model they are willing to put their name to?

I would like to reiterate some of the things that came out of the committee stage tonight. This bill does not require somebody to receive euthanasia who has a terminal illness. Under the definition, a dentist or any GP can actually administer euthanasia and, therefore, end someone's life. The referral to a psychiatrist is optional and not required. There is a shorter cooling-off period for euthanasia under this bill than there is when buying a second-hand car or a piece of property in this state.

The quorum arrangements for the board are such that no medical person or palliative care specialist is required to be present when the board makes its ruling. There is no appeal against a decision of the board to allow euthanasia. A patient can be seen by only one doctor and, indeed, will be seen by only one doctor—a GP in some circumstances, or possibly a dentist.

The insurance industry does not want this bill, according to the communication I have had from their peak body because it does not think it is workable. Indeed, something we did not get to debate tonight is that much of the finer detail of this bill will be decided by regulation.

I reiterate that we are not debating on what people's feelings are about euthanasia tonight; we are not voting on that at the third reading. We are voting on the specifics of this bill. The question for those considering supporting the bill is: are you happy to put your name to a bill that has those provisions? I certainly will not be.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY (Leader of the Opposition) (00:13): I rise to make a few brief comments at the third reading of this bill. I should start by indicating a change of position for myself in that I will not be supporting the bill. I know that will be a disappointment to some of those who are supporters, and probably those who are opponents of the bill will be pleased.

In the past four or five days my mother has passed away and I suppose I am drawing on some personal experiences. Over that period I have spoken to a number of people who are medical practitioners and people who deal at the coalface.

This is a conscience decision. The Hon. Caroline Schaefer has often said to me, at times a bit flippantly, that she does not think I have a conscience and therefore I should not participate in conscience debates. It is probably unfair of me to bring her into it at this stage.

I was a little offended in the second reading debate when my very good friend, the Hon. Terry Stephens, had a crack at me because this is a conscience decision. I do not come here with any great religious disposition, as do some members who are opposed to the bill, or any other real position. At this point in time I just do not feel comfortable supporting the bill. There are some parts of it that my conscience just will not allow me to support. With those few words, I indicate that I will not be supporting the bill.

The PRESIDENT (00:15): As Chair and President, I would like to say a few words because I sit and listen to everybody else's conscience and debate in the council and, you never know, I might get the casting vote or I might not. However, I do want to put on record that I do support the bill and I will support the bill if I get the casting vote.

I also want to challenge some who have said that this is not the correct model, because those who have said that have not moved any amendments to make it the correct model. So, I appreciated everybody's point of view and I certainly appreciated the way members conducted the debate. I thought it was a credit to this council the way individual members conducted themselves and the way they appreciated other people's votes and conscience and contributions to the bill. I want to thank members for that.

The council divided on the third reading:

AYES (9)
Darley, J.A. Dawkins, J.S.L. Gago, G.E.
Gazzola, J.M. Hunter, I.K. Lensink, J.M.A.
Parnell, M. (teller) Winderlich, D.N. Wortley, R.P.
NOES (11)
Brokenshire, R.L. Finnigan, B.V. Holloway, P.
Hood, D.G.E. Lawson, R.D. Lucas, R.I. (teller)
Ridgway, D.W. Schaefer, C.V. Stephens, T.J.
Wade, S.G. Zollo, C.

Majority of 2 for the noes.

Third reading thus negatived.

PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS
MEMBERS
GET INVOLVED
ABOUT PARLIAMENT
VISIT
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY
CONTACT