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Legislative Council - Fifty-First Parliament, Third Session (51-3)
2009-05-12 Daily Xml
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STATUTES AMENDMENT (PUBLIC HEALTH INCIDENTS AND EMERGENCIES) BILL

Introduction and First Reading

Received from the House of Assembly and read a first time.

Second Reading

The Hon. G.E. GAGO (Minister for State/Local Government Relations, Minister for the Status of Women, Minister for Consumer Affairs, Minister for Government Enterprises, Minister Assisting the Minister for Transport, Infrastructure and Energy) (17:39): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

I seek leave to have the second reading explanation inserted in Hansard without my reading it.

Leave granted.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) in The World Health Report 2007—A Safer Future: Global Public Health Security in the 21st Century reminded the world that every day, the constant movement of people and products carries with it the potential to spread highly infectious diseases and other hazards more rapidly than at any time in history. As the WHO put it 'A sudden health crisis in one region of the world is now only a few hours away from becoming a public health emergency in another.'

'Today's highly mobile, interdependent and interconnected world provides myriad opportunities for the rapid spread of infectious, and radionuclear and toxic threats. Infectious diseases are now spreading geographically much faster than at any time in history. It is estimated that 2.1 billion airline passengers travelled in 2006; an outbreak or epidemic in any one part of the world is only a few hours away from becoming an imminent threat somewhere else.'

'Infectious diseases are not only spreading faster, they appear to be emerging more quickly than ever before. Since the 1970s, newly emerging diseases have been identified at an unprecedented rate of one or more per year. There are now nearly 40 diseases that were unknown a generation ago. In addition, during the last five years, WHO has verified more than 1100 epidemic events worldwide. Among them was a deadly new disease, SARS—Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome—which sparked an international alert in 2003. Today, there is a real and continuing threat of a human influenza pandemic that could have much more serious human and economic consequences'.

More recently, in the context of the unfolding H1N1 Influenza 09 (Human Swine Influenza) outbreaks, the Director-General of the WHO, Dr Margaret Chan, in a statement made at the Secretary-General's briefing to the United Nations General Assembly in May 2009, made the following points—

'Influenza pandemics are caused by a virus that is either entirely new or not known to have circulated among humans in recent decades. This means, in effect, that nearly everyone in the world is susceptible to infection.

It is this almost universal vulnerability to infection that makes influenza pandemics so disruptive.

Historically, influenza pandemics have encircled the globe in two, sometimes three, waves. During the previous century, the 1918 pandemic, the most deadly of them all, began in a mild wave and then returned in a far more deadly one. In fact, the first wave was so mild that its significance as a warning signal was missed.

The world today is much more alert to such warning signals and much better prepared to respond.

The pandemic of 1957 began with a mild phase followed, in several countries, by a second wave with higher fatality. The pandemic of 1968 remained, in most countries, comparatively mild in both its first and second waves.

At this point, we have no indication that we are facing a situation similar to that seen in 1918. As I must stress repeatedly, this situation can change, not because we are overestimating or underestimating the situation, but simply because influenza viruses are constantly changing in unpredictable ways. The only thing that can be said with certainty about influenza viruses is that they are entirely unpredictable.'

Later in May, when addressing the ASEAN + 3 Health Ministers' special meeting, Dr Chan indicated that 'the world is better prepared for an influenza pandemic than at any time in history...'. The years of tracking the H5N1 avian influenza virus in humans and animals taught the world to expect a pandemic and to plan for such an event.

The Australian Government and each of the States and Territories have been planning, and continue to plan, for the possibility of an outbreak of pandemic influenza. The National Action Plan for Human Influenza Pandemic and the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza (AHMPPI) describe the overarching aim of pandemic preparedness as being to protect Australians and reduce the impact of the pandemic on social and economic functioning. As AHMPPI notes, 'An influenza pandemic has the capacity to cause economic and societal disruption on a massive scale. If Australia is prepared, we are more able to reduce dramatically the impact of an influenza pandemic by minimising the number of people who become infected, protecting critical infrastructure and essential services in our society and considerably improving the health outcomes for those who are affected.'

Planning is based on a set of assumptions that have been identified using the best scientific and medical evidence. Processes are in place for continual review of these assumptions, to ensure planning continues to be evidence-based and in line with the latest advances, and to reassess the assumptions as quickly as possible following the emergence of a pandemic, should it behave differently than initial assumptions suggested.

The South Australian government has been working, and continues to work, with other governments, the community and the private sector to plan for the challenges that may be faced during a pandemic.

Under the State's emergency arrangements, the Department of Health has responsibility for identifying and managing the response to a human disease incident. It will activate response phases and direct when activities and strategies need to change. In the event that a human disease outbreak involves a national and/or international response (such as an influenza pandemic) it will work in conjunction with Commonwealth, State and local governments.

The Department has developed a series of plans to guide South Australia's response to an influenza pandemic. These are 'live documents' and, as with AHMPPI, the plans will continue to be updated as new clinical evidence or other prevention and management strategies emerge or are developed. The plans will form part of, or be recognised in, the State Emergency Management Plan.

The key strategies that will drive South Australia's response to pandemic influenza are to delay it, contain it and sustain the response, control it and recover from it.

Each of these responses has specific triggers, actions and objectives which support both national and international strategies.

1. Delay it

Once the pandemic virus emerges overseas, the aim is to control or eliminate the virus within other countries to prevent, or delay to the greatest extent possible, the arrival of the virus into Australia and South Australia.

2. Contain it and sustain the response

Once the pandemic virus arrives in Australia, the aim is to contain the outbreak as much as possible and prevent transmission and spread for as long as possible. The response will be sustained while awaiting a pandemic vaccine.

3. Control it

The aim is to control the pandemic spread with a vaccine.

4. Recover from it

Once the pandemic is under control, return to normal, while remaining vigilant.

Legislative preparedness needs to take into account the nature of the development of a pandemic and provide the powers necessary to support response strategies.

Government response to pandemic influenza resides within a legislative framework of which the primary structures are:

Commonwealth quarantine powers

State public and environmental health powers

National health security legislation

Commonwealth and State emergency powers

The Commonwealth has express legislative power with respect to quarantine under the Quarantine Act 1908. While several SA public health doctors hold appointments under the Commonwealth Quarantine Act 1908, these powers are traditionally used for border control and operating under the direction of the Commonwealth Director of Human Quarantine.

It is possible under the Quarantine Act for the Governor-General to issue a declaration of an epidemic or the danger of an epidemic caused by a quarantinable disease in a part of the Commonwealth, which then enables the Commonwealth Minister to give directions to control and eradicate the epidemic by quarantine measures or measures incidental to quarantine. The Commonwealth has indicated that its powers could be used in the event that a State's or Territory's powers had gaps or were inadequate to address the outbreak.

As the National Action Plan for Human Influenza Pandemic noted, States and Territories have reviewed their powers in relation to quarantine arrangements within their own jurisdictions.

The State's public health powers under the Public and Environmental Health Act 1987 (P&EH Act) currently provide a basis for health officers to respond to outbreaks of certain diseases by directing affected persons into quarantine. However, there are shortfalls in these provisions, most notably, that there is no clear power to quarantine asymptomatic (well) people who have had contact with a case or a suspected case to prevent them unwittingly passing on infection before they themselves become symptomatic.

It is critical that the State has adequate powers to address an outbreak of disease, such as an influenza pandemic, in the State and not be reliant on actions/directions from the Commonwealth. The two sets of powers and levels of government need to be able to work together in a co-ordinated manner.

The State's emergency powers under the Emergency Management Act 2004 (EM Act) are far-reaching but the early recognition of warning signs of a pandemic by the Department of Health, together with its expertise, make it better placed to respond to such an emergency in the first instance. Under the State's emergency arrangements, the Department of Health has responsibility for identifying and managing the response to a human disease incident.

States and territories recently participated in the development of new national health security legislation (the National Health Security Act 2007—'NHSA').

The NHSA provides for the exchange of public health surveillance information between jurisdictions and with the WHO to enhance the early identification of and timely response to national or international public health emergencies, including an influenza pandemic. It also establishes the operational arrangements for Australia to meet its obligations under the International Health Regulations (IHR). (The IHR aim to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.)

The NHSA is underpinned by an intergovernmental agreement which establishes a surveillance and decision-making framework to support co-ordinated national response to public health emergencies, such as an influenza pandemic. The Agreement recognises the responsibility of States and Territories for responding to public health threats within their jurisdictions in accordance with their own public health and emergency legislation and plans. The role of the AHPC will complement, and not impede, the authority of jurisdictions to act.

In parallel with the general planning for an influenza pandemic, the SA Department of Health, in collaboration with a number of other agencies such as SAPOL, has been reviewing its legislation to respond to public health emergencies. Regard has also been had to national work to ensure there are mechanisms that enable jurisdictions to respond in a nationally co-ordinated way in the event of a public health emergency such as a pandemic.

In addition, the unfolding international 'real life' situation with H1N1 Influenza 09 (Human Swine Influenza) has caused added focus on areas for further improvement in legislative powers.

The P&EH Act is over 20 years old and while it provides some powers, the potential for new epidemics necessitates complementing existing infectious disease controls with broader public health emergency powers to respond appropriately. The Government is engaged in a broad review of the overall P&EH Act and changes will be brought before this House in due course.

It should also be noted that, while the focus is currently on disease, public health emergencies may arise from agents that may be biological, toxins or poisons and not 'quarantinable diseases' within the scope of the Quarantine Act. The proposed new provisions in the P&EH Act provide powers to deal with public health incidents and emergencies that are not disease-specific.

Some jurisdictions already have significant public health emergency powers in their legislation or are in the process of updating them.

The Bill makes significant amendments to the EM Act and the P&EH Act. A number of consequential amendments are made to other legislation.

The scheme within the Bill maintains the EM Act as the principal, overarching Act for management of a State emergency.

It provides an additional mechanism to respond to public health incidents or emergencies under the P&EH Act without needing to seek a declaration under the EM Act until such time as that may be required. This better reflects the Department of Health's responsibility for identifying and managing the response to a human disease incident.

The amendments enable a two-stage approach from an emergency management perspective—

In the initial stages, Health, with its expertise to manage a health issue, will manage the response. If the situation warranted it, the Chief Executive, Department of Health (CE Health) could declare a public health incident or emergency after consultation with the Chief Medical Officer and the State Co-ordinator under the EM Act. If that occurred, once a public health incident or emergency is declared, most of the EM Act powers ‘come across' and the CE Health can exercise them under a public health incident or emergency declaration.

If the situation escalated in magnitude, such that a whole-of-government State emergency response was necessary, the State Co-ordinator under the EM Act would be approached, seeking a declaration under the EM Act. This would be with the aim of ensuring a co-ordinated approach to whole-of-government strategic decision making.

The scheme also allows for an easy transition from the P&EH Act to the EM Act if and when this is needed, that is, a scaling up in the level of response should it get to the stage where co-ordination of a number of agencies is required.

Each public health emergency would need to be considered separately, given the features would most likely be different and may have the potential to change rapidly (for example, there is much uncertainty about the nature of pandemic influenza virus and how it might develop).

However, it is likely that the stage at which an EM Act declaration would be sought would be when the situation had deteriorated to the point that the emphasis needed to shift to the provision of priority products and services and maintenance of essential services.

Once an EM Act declaration had been made, the State Co-ordinator could (under clause 26 of the Bill—new section 37C(3)—request the Chief Executive, SA Health (CE Health), to revoke a public health emergency declaration. If that occurred, the CE Health would be able to act under delegation of the State Co-ordinator to continue the Health response, using the same powers but under the EM Act.

It would be possible under the provision for declarations under the EM Act and P&EH Act to operate in tandem, with the State Co-ordinator attending to whole-of-government, maintenance of priority and essential service matters and the CE Health continuing the Health response.

Clearly, in such circumstances, Cabinet, the Emergency Management Council of Cabinet and the State Emergency Management Committee would be monitoring the situation.

Turning specifically to the key provisions in relation to the EM Act—

Clause 3(2) amends the definition of emergency to clarify that the definition relates to an event occurring in the State or outside the State, or both. The amendment makes it clear that invoking the provisions of the Act does not rely on an event having reached the State. This provision is particularly important in relation to a public health emergency such as an influenza pandemic, given the unpredictability of influenza viruses.

Duration of declarations—the experience gained from the Eyre Peninsula bushfires and the planning for a pandemic have shown the current timeframes for duration of declarations to be insufficient. The amendments therefore introduce greater flexibility by extending the maximum initial period for major emergencies to 14 days and clarifying that that period may be extended by such further periods of any length as approved by the Governor. In relation to a disaster declaration, the amendments extend the maximum initial period for disasters to 30 days and clarify that that period may be extended by such further periods of any length as approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.

Clarification is provided that an emergency may be declared to be an identified major incident, major emergency or disaster whether or not the emergency has previously been declared to be a public health incident or public health emergency under the P&EH Act. Thus an emergency that has been dealt with under the P&EH Act may be taken over and dealt with under the EM Act.

Important new powers are proposed for section 25. The State Co-ordinator or an authorised officer are provided with the following additional powers when dealing with emergencies declared under the principal Act:

to remove or destroy, or order the removal or destruction of, any building, structure, vehicle, vegetation, animal or other thing;

to carry out, or cause to be carried out, excavation or other earthworks;

to construct, or cause to be constructed, barriers, buildings or other structures;

to direct a person to remain isolated or segregated from other persons or to take other measures to prevent the transmission of a disease or condition to other persons;

to direct a person to undergo medical observation, examination (including diagnostic procedures) or treatment (including preventative treatment);

to require a person to furnish such information as may be reasonably required in the circumstances.

The first three of those powers were identified as being necessary, or requiring clarification, in the wake of the Eyre Peninsula bushfires. However, they may potentially have application in a pandemic situation and are therefore included.

The latter ‘health' powers are included to make it quite clear that in a declared emergency, persons, including well contacts of someone who has been exposed to a pandemic influenza virus, can be directed to remain isolated or segregated or take other measures to prevent transmission of a disease and may be directed to undergo medical observation or treatment.

In addition, the State Co-ordinator is given the power, in extraordinary circumstances, to authorise authorised officers, or authorised officers of a particular class, to provide, or direct the provision of, medical goods or services or a particular class of such goods or services on such conditions as the State Co-ordinator thinks appropriate.

The other ‘health' power that is included is proposed section 26A which enables the Minister to modify the operation of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 during the period of a declared emergency for the purposes of response or recovery operations. This can only be after consultation with the Minister responsible for the administration of the Controlled Substances Act 1984.

The above ‘health' powers are significant and are discussed in more detail below.

These proposals have been developed in consultation with SAPOL and SAPOL supports them.

Turning to the amendments to the P&EH Act, it is clear that there is a need to have modern public health law that can respond not only to ‘traditional' public health issues, but also has the flexibility to deal with emerging public health concerns of the 21st Century. New and emerging dangers—including emergent and resurgent infectious diseases and incidents resulting in mass casualties, have focussed attention on the adequacy of legislative frameworks. As was observed in the Exercise Cumpston 06 Report, the community expects government to provide leadership in preventing disease outbreaks and, in the event of an outbreak, to respond and assist recovery quickly and effectively. Public health legislation therefore needs to be flexible enough to respond to a variety of emergency situations and integrate with other emergency responses.

Some communicable diseases can be infectious before an individual produces symptoms that would lead to a diagnosis. As a result it may be necessary to quarantine asymptomatic (well) people who have had contact with a case or a suspected case to prevent them unwittingly passing on infection before they themselves become symptomatic.

The existing powers under the P&EH Act do not provide a clear power to do that.

While people tend to be co-operative if the reasons for doing so are explained to them and it is made as easy as possible to do so, there also needs to be powers available to deal with non-compliance. It could be expected that in a situation of rapidly escalating magnitude, such as an influenza pandemic, compliance could become an issue.

The Bill therefore provides new powers for the Chief Executive, Department of Health (CE Health) to declare a public health incident or emergency after consultation with the Chief Medical Officer and the State Co-ordinator under the EM Act. This is not a power that would be exercised lightly. Once a public health incident or emergency is declared, most of the EM Act powers are applied and the CE Health can exercise them under a public health incident or emergency declaration.

A public health incident, which has application for 12 hours (mirroring the identified major incident under the EM Act) might be declared for a serious incident, but one not as dire as a public health emergency.

A public health emergency can be declared by the CE Health for a period not exceeding 14 days and any further period must be approved by the Governor.

On declaration of a public health incident or emergency, the CE Health must take action to implement the Public Health Emergency Management Plan and cause such response and recovery operations to be carried out as thought appropriate.

The Department has developed a series of plans to guide South Australia's response to an influenza pandemic. These are 'live documents' which will continue to be updated as new clinical evidence or other prevention and management strategies emerge or are developed. The plans will form part of, or be recognised in, the State Emergency Management Plan.

The powers available to the CE Health are significant. Clearly, they will not be exercised lightly or capriciously.

New clause 25(3)—

Can only be exercised by the State Co-ordinator or Chief Executive for the duration of a declaration

Must arise from advice of the Chief Medical Officer

Who would be permitted to do what and on what conditions is within the control of the State Co-ordinator or Chief Executive and would be tightly controlled. It may, for example, be used—

in the event of workforce shortages and if interstate health professionals were available and brought urgently to assist, and there was not time for them to go through the registration process with the relevant professional board, the provision could be used to authorise them to provide specified goods or services on specified conditions;

in the event that flu clinics were established, perhaps with only one senior doctor if the workforce was stretched, and it was necessary for para professionals to assist, they may be authorised to do so. A clinical governance framework is being developed for flu clinics, with various sets of clinical guidelines to which staff will have to adhere. The conditions attached to the authorisation could explicitly require such compliance.

The rationale for the inclusion of new clause 26A, which allows for the Controlled Substances Act 1984 to be modified, was primarily to cover situations that may arise with the distribution and supply of medication during a pandemic where there may not be a formal prescription and nurses or other health professionals may need to assist with supply;

There are checks and balances built in—

it is the Minister who would issue the notice;

the Minister must form the opinion that it is necessary or desirable to do so;

it could only be done for the purposes of the response or recovery operations;

the Minister is obliged to first consult with the Minister responsible for the administration of the Controlled Substances Act;

the notice can only be for the duration of a declaration.

The government recognises that the proposed powers in the Bill are significant and substantial powers. It makes no apologies for seeking to have such powers available should they need to be used to protect South Australians in the event of a public health emergency such as an influenza pandemic. The granting of significant powers does carry risk—that risk is outweighed by the recognition that the exercise of those powers would be for the purpose of promoting the common good.

I commend the Bill to Members.

Explanation of Clauses

Part 1—Preliminary

1—Short title

This clause is formal.

2—Amendment provisions

This clause is formal.

Part 2—Amendment of Electricity Act 1996

3—Amendment of section 54—Emergency legislation not affected

This clause makes it clear that nothing in the Electricity Act 1996 affects the exercise of powers that are able to be exercised under Part 4A of the Public and Environmental Health Act 1987.

Part 3—Amendment of Emergency Management Act 2004

4—Amendment of section 3—Interpretation

Clause 3(1) includes in the interpretation section of the principal Act, the definition of Chief Medical Officer.

Clause 3(2) amends the definition of emergency to clarify that the definition relates to an event occurring in the State or outside the State, or both. The amendment makes clear that invoking the provisions of the Act does not rely on an event having reached the State.

5—Amendment of section 17—Authorised officers

This clause clarifies that the appointment of authorised officers may be made subject to conditions specified by the State Co-ordinator.

6—Amendment of section 23—Major emergencies

This clause amends section 23 of the principal Act to extend the maximum initial period for major emergencies to 14 days and to clarify that that period may be extended by such further periods of any length as approved by the Governor.

7—Amendment of section 24—Disasters

This clause amends section 24 of the principal Act to extend the maximum initial period for disasters to 30 days and to clarify that that period may be extended by such further periods of any length as approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.

8—Insertion of section 24A

This clause inserts section 24A into the principal Act.

24A—Public health incidents and emergencies

Proposed section 24A clarifies that an emergency may be declared to be an identified major incident, major emergency or disaster whether or not the emergency has previously been declared to be a public health incident or public health emergency under the Public and Environmental Health Act 1987. This indicates that an emergency that has been dealt with under the Public and Environmental Health Act 1987 may be taken over and dealt with under the Emergency Management Act 2004.

9—Amendment of section 25—Powers of State Co-ordinator and authorised officers

This clause gives the State Co-ordinator or an authorised officer the following additional powers when dealing with emergencies declared under the principal Act:

to remove or destroy, or order the removal or destruction of, any building, structure, vehicle, vegetation, animal or other thing;

to carry out, or cause to be carried out, excavation or other earthworks;

to construct, or cause to be constructed, barriers, buildings or other structures;

to direct a person to remain isolated or segregated from other persons or to take other measures to prevent the transmission of a disease or condition to other persons;

to direct a person to undergo medical observation, examination (including diagnostic procedures) or treatment (including preventative treatment);

to require a person to furnish such information as may be reasonably required in the circumstances.

In addition, the State Co-ordinator is given the power, in extraordinary circumstances, to authorise authorised officers, or authorised officers of a particular class, to provide, or direct the provision of, medical goods or services or a particular class of such goods or services on such conditions as the State Co-ordinator thinks appropriate.

10—Amendment of section 26—Supply of gas or electricity

This clause enables the State Co-ordinator or authorised officer to direct a person to connect or reconnect a supply of gas or electricity to premises, adding to their existing powers to direct a person to shut off or disconnect such services.

11—Insertion of section 26A

This clause inserts section 26A into the principal Act.

26A—Modification of Controlled Substances Act

Proposed section 26A enables the Minister to modify the operation of the Controlled Substances Act 1984, if it is necessary or desirable to do so.

12—Insertion of section 31A

This clause inserts section 31A into the principal Act

31A—Confidentiality

Proposed section 31A makes it unlawful for a person to intentionally disclose medical or personal information obtained in the course of the administration or enforcement of this Act in relation to another person unless that disclosure is—

made in the course of the administration or enforcement of this Act; or

made with the consent of the other person; or

required by a court or tribunal constituted by law.

Part 4—Amendment of Essential Services Act 1981

13—Amendment of section 6—Power to require information

This clause adds the requirement that any information obtained by the Minister under section 6 relating to the provision or use of an essential service be relevant or incidental to the administration of Part 4A of the Public and Environmental Health Act 1987 (Management of Emergencies).

Part 5—Amendment of Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005

14—Amendment of section 3—Interpretation

This clause clarifies that the definition of emergency relates to an event occurring in the State or outside the State, or both. The amendment makes clear that invoking the emergency provisions of the Act does not rely on an event having reached the State.

15—Amendment of section 42—Powers

This clause gives an officer of SAMFS the following additional powers when dealing with a fire or emergency:

to remove or destroy, or order the removal or destruction of, any building, structure, vehicle, vegetation, animal or other thing;

to carry out, or cause to be carried out, excavation or other earthworks;

to construct, or cause to be constructed, barriers, buildings or other structures;

subject a place or thing to a decontamination procedure;

to direct a person to submit to a decontamination procedure.

16—Amendment of section 44—Supply of gas or electricity

This clause enables a person lawfully dealing with a situation under the Division to direct a person to connect or reconnect a supply of gas or electricity to premises, adding to their existing powers to direct a person to shut off or disconnect such services.

17—Amendment of section 97—Powers

This clause gives an officer of SACFS the following additional powers when dealing with a fire or emergency:

to remove or destroy, or order the removal or destruction of, any building, structure, vehicle, vegetation, animal or other thing;

to carry out, or cause to be carried out, excavation or other earthworks;

to construct, or cause to be constructed, barriers, buildings or other structures;

subject a place or thing to a decontamination procedure;

to direct a person to submit to a decontamination procedure.

18—Amendment of section 99—Supply of gas or electricity

This clause enables a person lawfully dealing with a situation under the Division to direct a person to connect or reconnect a supply of gas or electricity to premises, adding to their existing powers to direct a person to shut off or disconnect such services.

19—Amendment of section 108—Functions and powers

This clause adds to the functions of SASES, the function of assisting the Chief Executive within the meaning of the Public and Environmental Health Act 1987, in accordance with the Public Health Emergency Management Plan, in carrying out prevention, preparedness, response or recovery operations under Part 4A of that Act.

20—Amendment of section 118—Powers

This clause gives an officer of SASES the following additional powers when dealing with a fire or emergency:

to remove or destroy, or order the removal or destruction of, any building, structure, vehicle, vegetation, animal or other thing;

to carry out, or cause to be carried out, excavation or other earthworks;

to construct, or cause to be constructed, barriers, buildings or other structures;

subject a place or thing to a decontamination procedure;

to direct a person to submit to a decontamination procedure.

21—Amendment of section 119—Supply of gas or electricity

This clause enables a person lawfully dealing with a situation under the Division to direct a person to connect or reconnect a supply of gas or electricity to premises, adding to their existing powers to direct a person to shut off or disconnect such services.

Part 6—Amendment of Gas Act 1997

22—Amendment of section 54—Emergency legislation not affected

This clause makes it clear that nothing in the Gas Act 1997 affects the exercise of powers that are able to be exercised under Part 4A of the Public and Environmental Health Act 1987.

Part 7—Amendment of Health Care Act 2008

23—Amendment of section 51—Functions and powers of SAAS

This clause enables SAAS to direct a person holding a restricted ambulance service licence to assist with the provision of response and recovery operations in such a manner as the SAAS sees fit if a public health incident or public health emergency has been declared under the Public and Environmental Health Act 1987.

Part 8—Amendment of Public and Environmental Health Act 1987

24—Amendment of section 3—Interpretation

This clause inserts a number of new terms in the Act that are required for proposed Part 4A dealing with the management of emergencies. The definitions are as follows:

(a) Chief Medical Officer means the Chief Medical Officer of the Department and includes a person for the time being acting in that position;

(b) emergency has the same meaning as in the Emergency Management Act 2004;

(c) emergency officer means a police officer or a person holding an appointment as an emergency officer under section 7A;

(d) public health emergency—see section 37B;

(e) public health incident—see section 37A;

(f) Public Health Emergency Management Plan means a plan (or a series of plans) prepared by the Chief Executive comprising strategies to be administered by the Department for the prevention of emergencies in this State and for ensuring adequate preparation for emergencies in this State, including strategies for the containment of emergencies, response and recovery operations and the orderly and efficient deployment of resources and services in connection with response and recovery operations;

Note—

It is contemplated that the Public Health Emergency Management Plan will form part of, or be recognised in, the State Emergency Management Plan prepared under the Emergency Management Act 2004.

(g) recovery operations has the same meaning as in the Emergency Management Act 2004;

(h) response operations has the same meaning as in the Emergency Management Act 2004;

(i) State Co-ordinator means the person holding or acting in the position of State Co-ordinator under the Emergency Management Act 2004.

25—Insertion of section 7A

This clause inserts section 7A into the principal Act.

7A—Emergency officers

This clause provides for the appointment of emergency officers and is equivalent to the provision enabling the appointment of authorised officers under the Emergency Management Act 2004. It is anticipated that emergency officers will be involved in the administration of proposed Part 4A (Management of emergencies).

26—Insertion of Part 4A

This clause inserts Part 4A into the principal Act.

Part 4A—Management of emergencies

37A—Public health incidents

This clause enables the Chief Executive to declare an emergency to be a public health incident. Such a declaration remains in force for a maximum of 12 hours.

37B—Public health emergencies

This clause enables the Chief Executive to declare an emergency to be a public health emergency. Such a declaration remains in force for a maximum of 14 days but may be extended by such further periods of any length approved by the Governor.

37C—Making and revocation of declarations

This clause provides that—

the Public Health Emergency Management Plan may contain guidelines setting out circumstances in which an emergency should be declared as a public health incident or as a public health emergency;

consultation with the Chief Medical Officer and the State Co-ordinator (within the meaning of the Emergency Management Act 2004) must take place before a declaration is made; and

the Chief Executive must revoke a declaration under this Part at the request of the State Co-ordinator.

37D—Powers and functions of Chief Executive

This clause sets out the main powers and functions of the Chief Executive on the declaration of a public health incident or public health emergency. These are—

to take any necessary action to implement the Public Health Emergency Management Plan and cause such response and recovery operations to be carried out as he or she thinks appropriate; and

to provide information relating to a public health incident or public health emergency to the State Co-ordinator in accordance with any requirements of the State Co-ordinator.

37E—Application of Emergency Management Act

This clause applies certain provisions of the Emergency Management Act 2004 (modified in accordance with subsection (2)) with the effect that, on the declaration of a public health incident or public health emergency, the Chief Executive or emergency officers will be able to exercise most of the powers that are able to be exercised by the State Co-ordinator and authorised officers under the Emergency Management Act 2004. The applied provisions of that Act are:

Part 4 Division 4 (Powers that may be exercised in relation to declared emergencies) except section 25(1) and (2)(n);

Part 4 Division 5 (Recovery operations);

Part 5 (Offences);

Part 6 (Miscellaneous) except sections 37 and 38; and

definitions in section 3 of terms used in the above provisions.

27—Amendment of section 47—Regulations

This clause adds to the regulation making powers in section 47 of the principal Act, the power for the regulations to provide for such matters as are necessary in consequence of conditions directly or indirectly caused by an emergency declared to be a public health incident or public health emergency under the Act.

Part 9—Amendment of Summary Offences Act 1953

28—Amendment of section 83B—Dangerous areas

This clause provides that a declaration of a dangerous area, locality or place under section 83B of the Summary Offences Act 1953 may not be made in relation to circumstances arising in an emergency for which a declaration under the Emergency Management Act 2004 or Part 4A of the Public and Environmental Health Act 1987 is in force.

Debate adjourned on motion of Hon. D.W. Ridgway.


At 17:40 the council adjourned until Wednesday 13 May 2009 at 14:15.


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