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House of Assembly - Fifty-Fifth Parliament, First Session (55-1)
2025-02-20 Daily Xml
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State Development Coordination and Facilitation Bill

Second Reading

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN (Lee—Treasurer, Minister for Defence and Space Industries, Minister for Police) (15:41): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

I seek leave to have the second reading speech and explanation of clauses inserted into Hansard without my reading them.

Leave granted.

South Australia continues to build on its global leadership position in clean energy, harnessing our state's rapid progress to a remarkable 70% renewables in its electricity mix – on track to 100% by 2027. This provides a solid platform, supported by successive governments, to not just decarbonise our grid and our economy – but also to shape the jobs of the future.

Whether it's for critical minerals processing, gigawatt-scale data centres powered by clean energy, or green manufacturing, iron and steel – South Australia has what the world needs. And importantly, this State has a chance to leverage this unique position to decarbonise its own economy and that of other jurisdictions – all while providing stable, well-paying jobs for South Australians.

At the same time, we're also building an unprecedented pipeline of housing projects to deliver more homes, more quickly for a growing number of South Australians, keeping the Australian dream of owning your own home alive for current and future generations.

And making sure we continue to provide this state's growing population with the unmatched quality of life that South Australia is known and envied for, means that we must complement this with all the infrastructure and services that growing populations need – from trunk transport or water infrastructure, health or education facilities through to social infrastructure and green space.

Responding effectively to the national housing crisis and transitioning our economy while growing it are both considerable challenges. But they are challenges we are confronting head on.

Both issues are giving rise to more, larger, more complex and more urgent developments – all of which need clarity on suitable sites and approvals. And this must occur at a faster pace than ever before, driven by the urgency of housing demand and by global investment and supply chains pivoting to where they can access the resources they need for the future – gigawatt-scale clean energy, critical minerals, skilled people, and so forth.

Through its recent inquiries into this state's regulatory framework and renewables competitiveness, the South Australian Productivity Commission noted that we must take bold action to seize the transformational opportunities ahead of us, and avoid falling behind in how we regulate large and complex projects.

The same undeniably also applies to how this State responds to the national housing crisis and seeks to seize the intergenerational economic opportunities ahead of it in other areas such as defence.

Concrete examples of the scale, complexity and urgency of anticipated development include:

Large housing developments and new communities that trigger the need for new trunk and enabling infrastructure;

Critical minerals processing facilities;

Net zero industry hubs for green metals, manufacturing or fuels, connected to key inputs located elsewhere, such as clean energy and minerals, via multi-user infrastructure corridors;

Gigawatt-scale data centres, powered by clean energy;

Infrastructure and facilities critical to AUKUS and its supply chain.

This Bill seeks to address these challenges through a bold but responsible approach – an approach based on sensible systems reform to improve proactiveness, coordination and efficiency to enable a place-based approach, while preserving our regulatory standards and environmental protections.

This Bill also includes specific reforms announced as part of our Housing Roadmap, designed to help deliver more homes, more quickly. This includes provisions to improve and streamline infrastructure schemes, bringing them in line with other Australian jurisdictions; to master plan and deliver new communities more quickly; and to facilitate public and private enabling and utilities infrastructure to bring those large housing developments to life – which as we have seen over the last years is a critical but often overlooked part of the broader solution to the ongoing national housing crisis.

Governments throughout Australia and right across the world are in similar positions, and are equally looking to reform their planning and approvals systems in response.

In June 2024, New South Wales established a Coordinator-General function to coordinate the delivery of key priorities in renewables, housing, and the Western Sydney growth area.

Queensland continues to refine its long-standing Coordinator-General model – achieving successes in critical minerals, green manufacturing and infrastructure corridors – and governments in both the Northern Territory and Western Australia are understood to be preparing similar reforms.

The Australian Government is also preparing and consulting on a central regulatory coordination function for major transformational projects, a national 'front door' for transformational projects, which aligns with the reforms contained in this Bill.

And other jurisdictions right across Europe and the US are similarly introducing clean energy go-zones and regulatory efficiency measures.

It is no surprise, therefore, that industry and experts alike are asking governments to show leadership, do their bit, and pull out all stops to deliver well-paying jobs in future industries, to decarbonise our economy, and deliver affordable homes for South Australians to thrive in.

The message is clear, consistent, and compelling: government has a role to play in making it happen.

A role in providing earlier-stage certainty and predictability. In delivering improved coordination and efficiency right across the planning and regulatory system. And in de-risking development by taking a proactive role in identifying suitable areas for development, rather than a reactive role.

And those things are exactly what this Bill will help deliver. But it will do so the right way.

We are looking to provide certainty and efficiency, and put in place a proactive, place-based approach to planning and regulation; not one that speeds things up at the expense of our environment, perhaps our greatest asset and which makes South Australia such a wonderful place to invest, do business, and most importantly of all – to live.

Indeed, a range of industries expressed their needs on this very clearly: they are looking for proactive regulation that assists them in developing the right projects in the right places – reducing risk, uncertainty and therefore delays, while being sensitive to what our environment needs, and what our community expects.

And that's consistent with what independent experts recommend – including leading research institutions from across the nation and right here in South Australia as well.

In summary, this Bill will provide for:

Improved coordination across our planning and regulatory system;

The ability to proactively apply our existing planning and regulatory processes;

Pathways to take a place-based approach to de-risking critical developments through 'state development areas' – environmentally and economically suitable 'go zones', proactively assessed by regulators, where such development can be facilitated at pace while meeting our existing planning and regulatory requirements;

Streamlined provision of enabling infrastructure to get more large housing developments built more quickly;

Increased capacity and efficiency; and

Greater influence over development and environmental outcomes through conditions and other mechanisms.

Given the economy-wide nature of the challenges we are facing, particularly with decarbonisation, this Bill proposed a designation approach, based on economic, environmental and social considerations on a needs-basis, instead of a system of limited sectoral application. This will ensure a contemporary, fit-for-purpose and future-proofed framework.

Newly proposed mechanisms would be able to be applied to projects declared on the basis of a 'Primary principle', which requires consideration of anticipated social, environmental and economic outcomes and impacts on both the state and the local level.

This is akin to similar tests of 'state significance' already in use in the Planning, Development and Infrastructure Act 2016, with mandatory requirements to contemporaneously publish such decisions to ensure transparency.

This will result in balanced decision-making and careful consideration of not just the state interest, but local communities' interests as well. Importantly, this principle promotes balance, rather than prioritising one element over the others; it would operate alongside – not instead of – any substantive decision-making requirements flowing from other Acts; and it would also apply to other key functions provided for by this Bill.

To ensure independent decision-making and greater capacity for system-wide coordination, a new, dedicated authority is proposed to administer these newly proposed functions. This Coordinator-General's Office will be a more contemporary version of the models that exist in other Australian jurisdictions, adapted to a South Australian context and taking a more collaborative approach.

To ensure efficiency, a general duty to reasonably cooperate with this new authority is proposed to apply to existing state authorities, similar to what exists in relation to the Planning Commission.

And to achieve a suitable balance between board-based decision-making and efficient delivery, this new body would take the form of a four-person board with the ability to decide complex matters collectively while also providing it with the flexibility to set procedures for the delegation of less complex matters to individual members.

CGO's members – including its chair – will be strongly focused on the key challenges of boosting housing supply and decarbonisation, including the transformational growth opportunities it presents.

However, given the highly specialised expertise required for the timely delivery of AUKUS, this Bill also proposes that one member with relevant expertise and experience to AUKUS be appointed, to ensure CGO is required to ensure it has the capability to support the uniquely complex and important endeavour that is AUKUS in an well-informed, rigorous yet efficient manner.

Finally, to maintain the highest levels of transparency and accountability for a new entity with a comparatively broad remit, a strengthened disclosure of interests regime is proposed for CGO – one that goes above and beyond the requirements that apply to other statutory authorities.

Three types of project or area declarations would apply – coordinated projects, designated projects and State development areas.

The Coordinator-General's Office would declare coordinated projects based on the application of the aforementioned Primary principle. Upon declaration, the Office would be able to set, vary and align timeframes for statutory processes and decisions by other state authorities, subject to mandatory prior consultation with the relevant regulatory entity.

In addition to standardising and providing assurance to applicants, there are instances where this could also be used to streamline timeframes, where this is feasible.

Minimum timeframes of no less than one month are provided for, and the provision is deliberately designed to require prior consultation and stop short of imposing standardised, one-size-fits-all timeframes as are in place elsewhere, as we know this would give rise to unrealistic, high-risk or otherwise irresponsible outcomes.

The Minister responsible for this Bill would be able to declare designated projects, again based on the application of the Primary principle, but also on a test of 'state significance' akin to a similar test that already exists in the Planning, Development and Infrastructure Act 2016. This declaration would enable the Coordinator-General's Office to apply the aforementioned power to align, vary or set timeframes, as well as a suite of other functions.

This includes a call-in provision, a condition-making ability, a review function, the ability to perform certain assessment processes under the Planning Act, provisions to develop infrastructure, acquire easements or land, and also for the Minister to instruct CGO to take over responsibility for a development from another state agency.

Combined, these provisions are designed to improve system-wide coordination and efficiency, provide the ability to control and manage outcomes and impacts, and streamline the delivery of enabling infrastructure.

Each of these powers are deliberately drafted to require prior mandatory consultation with relevant entities and, critically, are designed to preserve the rightly rigorous standards and requirements that apply under existing legislation. This is explicitly provided for in the relevant sections.

The most significant new concept introduced by this Bill is that of State development areas. These would serve as de facto 'go zones' for certain types of development, based on appropriately rigorous regulatory assessment of the area and following mandatory public consultation.

This is a tried and tested concept supported by industry, regulators and environmental stakeholders – one that is already operating successfully interstate and overseas as a way to de-risk and streamline development responsibly, by focusing on identifying and pre-planning genuinely suitable areas.

Provisions governing the establishment of State development areas include a range of appropriate exclusions designed to ensure our protected areas such as National Parks remain protected.

Further provisions relating to State development areas provide for the creation of a State development area plan, governing issues such as zoning of land, land use, infrastructure siting, identification of environmental matters and ensuring cumulative impacts are considered and well-managed. They would also set out the formulation of economic, environmental and social objectives for the area and guidance on how the various functions within this Bill would be used to achieve those objectives.

This Plan would require mandatory public consultation and subsequent publication in the Gazette to ensure upfront clarity among the community and proponents alike regarding the intended activities and arrangements within these areas, as well as the ability to influence them, as is appropriate.

Another key feature of State development areas would be the ability for the Coordinator-General's Office to work with regulators to carry out pre-assessments of proposed developments within them, which, once done, would enable more rapid approvals based on the rigorous regulatory process having been done upfront, thereby reducing uncertainty, risk and scope for delay.

This process would enable our statutory processes to be conducted proactively while maintaining existing statutory requirements, strengthening the role of existing regulators while delivering significant benefits to proponents.

Provisions relating to State development areas are designed to lend themselves well to the development of complex precincts and corridors, including those involving multiple proponents – for example net zero industry hubs connected to their key inputs such as renewables generation and minerals extraction.

It is important to note that no change is proposed in relation to land access pathways and multiple simultaneous land use under existing legislation and policy settings. Proponents will continue to seek this under existing legislation, with any relevant processes remaining unchanged.

This Bill furthermore applies existing functions to enter and acquire land and develop infrastructure to the newly proposed authority, primarily to assist with infrastructure provision. These provisions apply or mirror clauses that already exist in the Highways Act and Land Acquisition Act, and do not change the process, rights, entitlements or recourse currently available.

As with the large majority of planning and regulatory legislation, this Bill also includes mechanisms of last resort for one-off modifications or exemptions. This is made subject to appropriate limitations and exclusions, but – in contrast to existing Acts – to mandatory consultation, to the requirement to prepare and furnish Parliament with relevant reports, and importantly – and again, in contrast to most existing Acts –also allows for modification instead of exemption, and will be subject at all times to full Parliamentary scrutiny, in the same way Regulations are.

This will deliver a standardised, better-informed approach than many existing such arrangements, which generally neither include scope limitations nor consultation or reporting requirements, and do not always offer the ability to take the more proportionate approach of modification or provide Parliament with the ability to exercise its scrutiny through disallowance.

While this Bill shows ambition, its focus is quite deliberately on getting our own house in order. We are acutely aware that there is a lot that can be done to improve coordination and proactiveness within government – but it is important to avoid putting pressure on our communities and Aboriginal communities in particular. In many instances, any such efforts would be ineffective or even counterproductive.

That's why we have not included the Aboriginal Heritage Act within the scope of this Bill, and why we have included provisions that require upfront consideration and comprehensive, genuine and early-stage consultation and collaboration, which will be of paramount importance to the Coordinator-General's Office.

Finally, this Bill proposes a number of consequential amendments.

Firstly to the Planning Act – logical amendments designed to bring South Australia's infrastructure schemes in line with the scope of their interstate counterparts, while making them less burdensome and time-consuming to establish.

Secondly the Urban Renewal Act, to ensure that Act's development and implementation frameworks can operate seamlessly alongside the newly-proposed mechanisms in this Bill, and particularly to ensure cross-reference to the newly proposed Coordinator-General's Office and State development areas.

Combined, the proposed provisions will improve our state's ability to apply its planning and regulatory processes in a more proactive, place-based and efficient manner, with improved system-wide coordination. Importantly, it will do so while continuing to adhere to the high standards and protections that South Australians rightly expect.

The government recognises that while these reforms are predominantly procedural, their scope is broad and their potential impact considerable.

Accordingly, the government conducted a rigorous multi-month consultation throughout the majority of last year, involving more than 55 stakeholder meetings and follow-up meetings, meetings with more than 30 organisations, industry groups, independent experts, civil society and interest groups and regulators. During the public consultation stage, engagement was broadened to include tens of thousands of members of the South Australian community via the YourSAy platform, with more than 1,200 people accessing the consultation directly.

The government received, listened and responded to a wide range of feedback. In fact, we took extra time after consultation to ensure we truly get the balance between fostering development while protecting our environment right. As a result of this comprehensive and collaborative approach, the large majority of recommendations made were able to be adopted in the Bill that is being introduced to Parliament here today.

I would like to thank each and every one of the individuals and organisations who took the time to help shape this important and necessary reform initiative.

This Bill represents a sensible next step towards facilitating development that delivers high-value investment and jobs in future industries. It will support timely and responsible decarbonisation in a way that grows the economy.

And this Bill represents a further acceleration of South Australia's response to the ongoing housing crisis. By helping to turn large land releases into living and breathing neighbourhoods as quickly as possible – particularly by ensuring the enabling infrastructure is delivered without delay – this Bill will help get more South Australians into their own homes sooner.

And finally, this Bill ensures we are on the front foot and ready to facilitate the infrastructure and developments we need to deliver on AUKUS – keeping Australia secure and local industries thriving.

I commend this Bill to Members.

Explanation of Clauses

Part 1—Preliminary

1—Short title

2—Commencement

These clauses are formal.

3—Interpretation

Definitions are inserted for the purposes of the measure.

4—Primary principle

This clause provides for the primary principle, namely, that if the Minister or CGO performs a prescribed function in relation to a project or a function under any other Act in connection with the performance of a prescribed function in relation to a project, the Minister or CGO must have regard to the economic, social and environmental outcomes of the project (for the State as a whole and in the locality of the project), in addition to any relevant objects or principles under the other Act.

Part 2—Coordinator General's Office

Division 1—Coordinator General's Office

5—Establishment of Coordinator General's Office

The Coordinator General's Office (CGO) is established as a body corporate.

6—Constitution of CGO etc

CGO consists of 4 members nominated by the Minister and appointed by the Governor. The member appointed to be the principal member may use the title 'Coordinator General'. One member must have knowledge, expertise or experience relating to AUKUS.

7—Removal from office

This clause provides for the removal of members from office.

8—Casual vacancies

This clause provides for vacancies in membership of CGO.

9—Ministerial direction

This clause provides for the Minister to give directions to CGO. Certain limitations and procedures relate to the giving of directions.

Division 2—Functions etc

10—Functions generally

The functions of CGO are provided for.

11—Cooperation by designated authorities

This clause provides that a designated authority must seek to cooperate with CGO in the performance of CGO's functions and in the performance the designated authority's functions (insofar as may be appropriate and relevant in the circumstances).

Division 3—Related matters

12—Procedures

This clause provides for the procedures of CGO's meetings.

13—Minister's representative may attend meetings

This clause provides for a representative of the Minister to attend meetings of CGO.

14—Vacancies or defects in appointment of members

This clause makes provision in relation to vacancies or defects in appointment of members of CGO.

15—Disclosure of relevant interests

Members of CGO must disclose their relevant interests.

16—Remuneration

Provision is made in relation to remuneration of members of CGO.

17—Staff

Provision is made in relation to the staff of CGO.

18—Delegation

A delegation power of CGO is included.

Part 3—Project coordination and facilitation

Division 1—Preliminary

19—Interpretation

Certain interpretative provisions are inserted for the purposes of the Part, including designated Act, designated decision, designated function and disallowable notice.

20—Effect of Part etc

This clause provides that (except as otherwise provided by or under the measure) the Part (including a notice or other instrument under the Part) has effect according to its terms and despite any other Act or law of the State.

Division 2—Project declarations and establishment of State development areas

21—Coordinated projects

CGO may declare that a project is a coordinated project.

22—Designated projects

The Minister may declare that a project is a designated project.

23—Establishment of State development areas

The Governor may establish a specified area of land as a State development area.

Division 3—Functions—projects generally

24—CGO may vary or specify time periods relating to certain functions

CGO is authorised to publish a notice to vary a period of time applying to the performance of a function (including the making of a decision) under a designated Act in relation to a relevant project or determine that such a function is to be performed within a specified period of time.

Certain limitations and procedures relating to a notice under the provision are provided for.

Division 4—Functions—declared projects

Subdivision 1—General

25—CGO may call in designated function

CGO is authorised to call in a designated function (which is defined) for CGO to perform in accordance with the provision. If CGO calls in a designated function, the function may be performed by CGO (in accordance with the provision) as if the function had been duly delegated to it by the original entity (which is defined). A notice calling in a designated function may modify or exclude the application of a designated Act (or a provision of a designated Act) to the extent that CGO considers necessary for the purposes of performing the designated function (having regard to the primary principle under the measure).

26—CGO may impose, amend etc conditions on certain decisions

CGO may give a decision maker for a designated decision (which is defined) a notice directing the decision maker to impose such conditions on the designated decision as CGO thinks fit.

A notice under the provision applies despite any provision under the designated Act regulating or limiting the conditions to which a designated decision may be subject or the process or manner in which such conditions may be imposed or amended.

Certain limitations and procedures relating to a notice under the provision are provided for.

27—CGO may review certain decisions

This clause provides for CGO to review a designated decision (by written notice given to a decision maker for the designated decision within 10 days after the making of the designated decision (or such longer time as is approved by the Minister)).

Certain limitations and procedures relating to a notice under the provision are provided for.

Subdivision 2—Particular functions relating to State development areas

28—State development areas—functions generally

This clause provides for CGO's functions generally in relation to a State development area.

29—State development areas—planning functions

This clause provides for CGO to publish a State development area plan setting out certain planning matters for the State development area.

Subdivision 3—Interaction with other Acts

30—Division of land etc in State development area

This clause provides that relevant authority (within the meaning of the Planning, Development and Infrastructure Act 2016) must accept that a proposed division of land in a State development area satisfies the conditions specified in section 102(1)(c) or (d) of that Act to the extent that such satisfaction is certified by CGO. It also provides that any requirement imposed by a relevant authority under Part 15 Division 2 of the Planning, Development and Infrastructure Act 2016 must be consistent with any provision of a State development area plan under section 29(1)(c).

31—Impact assessed development

This clause provides for the Minister to declare that a declared project or development that is part of a declared project is deemed to be development that falls within the category of impact assessed development for the purposes of the Planning, Development and Infrastructure Act 2016. The clause also provides for other matters relating to such impact assessed development.

32—Assessment of essential infrastructure and State agency development

This clause provides for the Minister to make certain declarations relating to essential infrastructure and State agency development under the Planning, Development and Infrastructure Act 2016.

33—Applications for prescribed approvals under Mining Act 1971 or certain designated Acts

This clause provides for the Minister to declare that an application for a prescribed approval (which is defined) in relation to a declared project may be made to CGO (instead of the person to whom the application would otherwise be required to be made under the Mining Act 1971 or another relevant designated Act). Such a declaration has the effect of substituting references to the Minister under the Mining Act 1971 or other relevant designated Act with references to CGO for the purposes of the application for the prescribed approval.

Subdivision 4—Expedited approval where regulatory requirements satisfied

34—Definitions

Certain definitions are set out for the purposes of the Subdivision.

35—Statement of regulatory requirements for facilitated projects

This clause authorises CGO to prepare and adopt a proposal for a project in a State development area for the purposes of promoting development in the State (defined as a facilitated project). CGO may direct a responsible entity (being the entity responsible for granting an approval under a designated Act in relation to a facilitated project) to prepare a statement of regulatory requirements in relation to the facilitated project. After complying with the procedures under the provision, the responsible entity must publish the statement and (if it considers that the facilitated project meets the requirements of the designated Act) issue a certificate (a facilitation certificate) to that effect and publish it in accordance with any requirements of CGO.

36—Expedited approvals where facilitation certificate issued

In connection with the preceding provision, this clause provides that, if a responsible entity has issued a facilitation certificate for a facilitated project, a person may apply to the prescribed authority (which is generally CGO, but in certain circumstances is the Minister responsible for the measure or another Minister designated by the Governor) for an approval under a designated Act in relation to the facilitated project in accordance with the section. Subject to certain requirements and procedures under the provision, the responsible entity is authorised to grant the applicant an approval under a designated Act in relation to the facilitated project.

Subdivision 5—Other functions

37—CGO may be authorised to undertake essential infrastructure works

This clause provides for the Minister to authorise CGO to undertake essential infrastructure works for the purposes of a declared project.

38—Entry onto land etc

This clause provides for a person authorised in writing by CGO to enter and occupy land for a designated purpose (which is defined).

39—Compulsory acquisition of land

This clause provides for CGO to acquire land (with the consent of the Minister) and applies the Land Acquisition Act 1969 to the acquisition.

40—CGO may take over State projects

This clause provides for CGO to take over State projects (which are defined).

41—Revocation of community land classification for land acquired

This clause provides for community land under the Local Government Act 1999 to be disposed of by a council, with the approval of CGO, in connection with the acquisition of the land for the purposes of a declared project.

Division 5—Other matters

42—Disallowable notices—protected areas and general environmental duty

Certain limitations are imposed on disallowable notices in relation to protected areas and in respect of the general environmental duty under section 25 of the Environment Protection Act 1993.

43—Disallowable notices—consultation and publication

Certain requirements are imposed in relation to consultation on, and publication of, disallowable notices.

44—Disallowable notices—Parliamentary scrutiny

This clause provides for Parliamentary scrutiny of disallowable notices.

Part 4—Miscellaneous

45—Limitation on time allowed for appeal or review of decisions

This clause provides for a limitation on the time allowed for an application for appeal against or review of a decision made in connection with the operation or administration of the measure.

46—Certain applicants to provide reports, information or material

The clause authorises CGO to require regulated applicants (who are defined) to provide reports, information or material.

47—Provision of information

The clause authorises CGO to require the provision of certain information by a designated authority.

48—Confidentiality

CGO is prohibited from disclosing certain information except in certain circumstances.

49—Amendment of notices etc

The clause provides for the amendment of a notice published in the Gazette under the measure.

50—Recovery of costs

The clause authorises CGO to recover, as a debt due from a proponent of a project, reasonable costs incurred by CGO in relation to the performance of a function for the purposes of the project. CGO must obtain the consent of the proponent to do so.

51—Annual report

This clause requires CGO to prepare an annual report.

52—Regulations and fee notices

A standard regulation-making power is provided for.

Schedule 1—Designated Acts

This Schedule sets out the list of designated Acts for the purposes of the measure.

Schedule 2—Disclosure of relevant interests

This Schedule provides for the disclosure of relevant interests by members of CGO.

Schedule 3—Related amendments

This Schedule makes related amendments to the Planning, Development and Infrastructure Act 2016 and the Urban Renewal Act 1995.

Mr TELFER (Flinders) (15:42): I rise to speak today on what is really a pretty significant bill, which puts in place another mechanism into the system of planning and development. As I will put forward in my speech, the opposition like the concept and are looking for clarification through the committee process on a few different matters.

The State Development Coordination and Facilitation Bill 2025 establishes the Coordinator-General's Office. It is stated that the purpose of the office is to manage 'projects of importance to the state' and to advise on how to improve delivery of such projects in state development areas (SDAs). It is putting a structure in place when it comes to some of these strategically important projects.

I can only assume that the genesis, or at least a bit of the guidance towards this bill, may have come from the South Australian Productivity Commission's work, their inquiry into the reform of South Australia's regulatory framework that was published on 29 October 2021. It is certainly something which has been on the radar of this side of politics, and thus that is why I am only assuming that it is something that has helped guide, at least the early stages, what we are debating today.

The final report of the Productivity Commission was prepared after consultation with South Australian regulators, state government departments, industry associations and businesses, as well as careful deliberations on the submissions which they put forward. When considering similar policy areas or similar directions to what we are debating today, I am certainly taking their wisdom into account.

That Productivity Commission report said the South Australian Productivity Commission was tasked to identify regulatory reforms to better support investment, reverse negative productivity trends and foster economic growth while protecting public interests. South Australia's business regulatory framework was examined against leading international and national practice. The commission report recommended that these shortcomings, relative to best practice, be addressed by strengthening governance, policy guidance and policy capabilities, building on existing governance arrangements where possible. The commission stated:

To increase transparency and accountability and drive improvements in regulator performance the Commission proposes the SA Government establish a statewide framework for monitoring and reporting on performance.

They made the statement around this being complemented by statements of expectations for business regulators and initiatives to improve their capability, such as training and regulator communities of practice. I was very interested to read, in reviewing a lot of the works of the Productivity Commission put forward, their conclusion at the time in this report from 2021. It states:

South Australia's regulatory framework generally supports effective practice throughout the different stages of the regulatory life cycle. [On the whole], the current regulatory architecture does not deviate substantially from the standards of better practice implemented in other Australian jurisdictions.

Nonetheless, the Commission considers that the overall efficiency and effectiveness of [South Australia's] framework could be strengthened by pursuing an even closer alignment with the better practice principles developed by the OECD.

It continues:

Significant benefits could be achieved by improving the coherence and timeliness of regulators' decision-making through enhanced coordination, increased digitisation and by embedding continuous improvement more effectively within the state's regulatory architecture.

It states:

The Commission's analysis of the different stages of the regulatory life cycle shows that some areas, including both ex ante and ex post evaluation, could be strengthened by the creation of a small centralised continuous improvement, advisory and oversight function within a central agency of the South Australian Government.

When we are considering this quite comprehensive bill today, and as the debate continues and questions get asked, this is the direction that came into my consideration, from the Productivity Commission's recommendations. As we look through this bill, we see a bit of the framework that the government is putting forward. I note that the CGO, the Coordinator-General's Office, is to consist of four members, one of whom must have 'knowledge, expertise or experience relating to AUKUS'.

This is obviously in the shadow of the opportunity but also the challenges that our state is going to have to deal with not just in the short and medium term but also in the long term with the opportunities that the AUKUS agreement brings for our state. It is something that I will unpack a little bit more through the questions in the committee stage as to some of the reasoning and justifications for this being part of the process.

The Coordinator-General's Office, under this bill, would effectively operate as a special projects department, with responsibility for oversight of major projects in these state development areas (SDAs). This would be in addition to the oversight and regulatory burdens already borne by the existing department within the state government. Importantly, this bill does not define where one of these SDAs can be geographically located, so it could allow potentially for major housing and defence projects to be located within the Greater Adelaide region but also, I hope, could be utilised for looking at potential opportunities within regional areas.

I was interested in the media coverage from The Advertiser a couple of weeks ago, on 8 February, where the commentary around this project, this bill, was included. It said that the CGO will reduce the regulatory burden on businesses to allow for increased economic activity in addressing housing and employment shortfalls.

That commentary in the media was interesting, because in my reading of the bill and even I think in the government's own press release it does not say that that is what this bill will do. The press release's words were that it ensures 'the regulatory work will have been done ahead of time, allowing for quicker approvals within them once an application is made'.

As I said, this side of parliament is certainly cognisant of the potential advantages for our state with this office coming into play, but we also have to be aware of exactly what it does. It does not really reduce the regulatory burden overall. Rather, it shifts that burden to earlier in the process with all regulations remaining in place.

Thus, there are really two possible outcomes when considering economic activity expansion. Firstly, instead of receiving unsolicited proposals, the government allows itself to pick winners before the private sector has an opportunity to perhaps conduct its due diligence, forcing the private sector into an obligation to follow government instructions on development. This is one, as decision-makers, we do have to be careful of, because as we all know—it does not matter whether we are a new backbench member or a well-experienced member on the front bench of government—we do get all sorts of different proposals and projects and opportunities that come across our desks.

The discussion that we have had through question time over the last few days and unpacking what the future of the Hydrogen Jobs Plan means for South Australia is a classic example of there being risks for government being the ones that are dictating either a location, a design or a structure for an economic opportunity without an input of what the private sector is trying to guide. This is the risk that we have to be aware of when considering this sort of legislation.

The second possibility that there is within this framework is that the CGO is merely an extra department with its own demands and regulations in place. The overall concept of a major projects manager really is consistent with examples that we have seen in times past. Indeed, the Olsen Liberal government back in the 1990s had something similar in place. This is why, upon reading the legislation, there are some aspects which I am cautious and uncertain about and hope to get some clarification from the Treasurer throughout the committee process.

There are definitely positives in this bill, not least of which is found from section 28 onwards, where state development areas will be assessed for existing infrastructure, required infrastructure and environmental values and issues within an SDA, and that the CGO may undertake infrastructure works where necessary to facilitate development. From my perspective, such preplanned advice and government responsibilities are certainly long overdue and should be welcomed. Another one which I think is a positive step is the limiting of appeal times against decisions made being capped at 20 business days. It is another major improvement on current systems. However, I believe there is room for improvement within this bill.

Over the last couple of weeks, I have had a number of conversations with stakeholders, with industry, with industry groups, and there is cautious support, I probably would say. There are still many uncertainties and apprehensions. We will take the time between the houses to consider if this is something which we may look to fine-tune with amendments that the opposition may bring before it is considered in the other place. This is the sort of structure that we need to get right as decision-makers, because it can be something which can help enable the financial and economic opportunities of the state, or it could end up being something that languishes and potentially even creates another level of bureaucracy or another level of hurdles for potential private investment.

There certainly remains a level of uncertainty, especially around some of the ministerial discretion over the CGO within the bill and, again, this will be something that I will ask the Treasurer about, allowing for potentially a degree of politicisation within the CGO. That is something where I look back at other examples throughout the years—decades even—of this sort of thing being in place and I think that usually where they tend to fail and trip over is when the politics of either side get involved and things can fall over pretty quickly. There is a level of ministerial discretion here, and in addition to the failure of the bill, really, to abolish any existing regulatory burden already present within the legislative obligations or regulations that we have to deal with.

There is an opportunity to consider the requirement of the CGO upon completion of prioritised regulatory work to provide a submission to the government of the day on the potential of the abolition of existing regulatory requirements, where the CGO deems it to be of future public benefit. Given the access to resources provided to the CGO under section 17 of this bill and the possibility to set up the CGO as not just a red tape buster but as a red tape cutter, I think that potential could assist in encouraging future growth in the face of potential blockages; for instance, limiting the appeal time to 20 business days for all future developments and not just ones that are being decided on by the CGO within those SDAs. That could create economic opportunities outside of those that have had the focus of the government of the day, the CGO of the day that happens to designate this SDA.

The challenges around ministerial discretion I have touched on and will continue to do so. The ministerial discretion over the CGO also presents opportunities for development in the state's interest rather than what may be a narrow political one if there wasn't that discretion, as opposed to what we currently have there. As I said, we on this side are going to be considering the feedback that we are hearing from industry and from those who are having to deal with this current level of bureaucracy within the planning system and see whether there are amendments which potentially could be put in place to take a bit of that potential politicisation out of the process. This is a theoretical thing—and I am not accusing the current government or the minister that would have responsibility that they would be wielding their political might to try and direct the CGO, but, if there is something in a piece of legislation that allows it, it is something we need as lawmakers to be absolutely cognisant of.

The other thing I think we can probably consider looking at on this side is the constitution of the CGO, which maybe can allow for superior private sector and regional involvement in the processes undertaken, so there is that real reference back to the reality of what is happening within the system. Under section 6 there is the potential for us to be considering amendments and, as I said, in between the houses I am going to be having a look at those opportunities, because there is a designation within this legislation that one of the members has to have—what was the actual wording around the AUKUS involvement: 'Knowledge, expertise or experience relating to AUKUS', that specialised capability. If we are going to be proactive about looking at the future of the whole state of South Australia, I think there potentially could be the opportunity to specify that a member of the CGO should have a regional experience expertise knowledge when it comes to trying to look at what opportunities there are within regional South Australia.

With those words, I have outlined where my initial thoughts are with the structures that are in place currently with the drafting of this bill. I look forward to any other contributions and the committee stage. I cautiously approach this with an optimistic view of what could be a positive opportunity for our state if it is delivered well and if it is managed well. As I said, we will be considering over the next period of time, before it is considered in the other place, ways that we as the opposition might put forward things to fine-tune and better this piece of legislation. With those few words, I look forward to the next stage.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN (Lee—Treasurer, Minister for Defence and Space Industries, Minister for Police) (15:59): I thank the member for Flinders for his contribution and his willingness to consider the bill this afternoon. I think he summarised some of the issues quite well, and that is that the introduction of this regime via legislation is an effort to try to improve project consideration processes within government, and getting it right can unlock a significant opportunity to expedite projects of varying significance and scale. I reaffirm for the house that that is certainly the aim of this legislation.

I also acknowledge that the member for Flinders is right to want to interrogate how that is proposed in this legislation to be best achieved. In that respect, we look forward to the committee stage, where we can have those discussions and hopefully outline some further information to address those queries from the member for Flinders. With that, I commend the bill to the house.

Bill read a second time.

Committee Stage

In committee.

Clause 1.

Mr TELFER: When considering any bill, it is often a broader perspective than when considering the short title, obviously. Treasurer, can you perhaps outline a little bit for the house? Obviously, I have not read the aspects that have been inserted into Hansard yet, so I await with anticipation what further explanations may be put there, but can you perhaps for my information explain some of the motivations and the purpose behind this bill, the justification and how you came to the point of putting forward this bill, which, as we heard before, is broad in the purposes at the start but also does include some specifications around specific inclusions that it is looking to achieve?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I thank the member for Flinders for his question. I agree that he has been without the benefit of the details of the second reading speech; ironically, as am I, as I have handed it to the house staff. Luckily, we have an adviser to assist the member for Flinders and I through the consideration of the clauses.

Very, very generally speaking, this is a more detailed and nuanced version and this time established in legislation to have a Coordinator-General here in South Australia—a much more sophisticated and advanced regime than we had following the global financial crisis and the management of a series of projects largely around the BER (Building the Education Revolution) projects, when the government chose to appoint directly a Coordinator-General who was given authority by cabinet to corral the various government agencies that each have a role in making decisions that would allow for particular types of development. That was the old, if I could put it colloquially, less formal model of having a Coordinator-General, and the experience was really good.

There are those of us who have followed these issues for a long time, and I know the member for Unley would be aware of these: there were other states that also received significant amounts of money for the Building the Education Revolution projects, and some of those states and many of those projects in those states were beset by time and cost overruns, poorly defined scope, difficulty getting to market, etc.

In fact, I can remember an exposé of one particular project in the Eastern States, which was a single-storey cream brick building on a school site, which was delivered to the outrageous sum of $600,000. Of course, in today's terms you would think back on those days and think, 'Jeez, if only.' Aside from that lighthearted remark, the experience in South Australia worked well and it has forever really engendered calls, particularly from the development industry, that the government of the day would revive a similar type of regime.

What this government is doing through this bill is trying to establish a Coordinator-General as a statutory office with a statutory officer leading it and providing, as is clearly defined in this bill—and it is quite a detailed bill—a clearly defined regime by which different levels or different types of developments can be undertaken. Each of those different types of development are described in the bill as a 'coordinated project', a project that can be nominated by the Coordinator-General for that officer to take on quite limited powers or involvements in the planning application and consideration process.

There is a higher level of involvement, which is referred to in this bill as a 'designated project'. That is a project that is nominated by the relevant minister and that enlivens a broader range of powers and capabilities of the Coordinator-General under this act. There is something that the member for Flinders referred to, the state development areas, which have to be approved by cabinet and recommended to the Governor for approval. That enlivens the full range of powers under this act.

We understand and admit it will take some time, particularly for the development industry to become conversant with this and know whether they should be availing themselves of any of the powers under this act or not and, if they are, what sort of stream they should be following and what sort of support they can expect from the Coordinator-General. That is the first thing.

The member for Flinders also referred to the government's existing unsolicited proposals process. It is probably worth me going back over a bit of history. Again, a seasoned campaigner like the member for Unley would remember the genesis of the unsolicited proposals project where recommendations were made by the Auditor-General, I think, in a couple of subsequent annual reports, that there should be a formalised policy within government for government to have a regime superintended by senior public servants and not ministers to consider proposals that come to government on an ad hoc and hence unsolicited basis, so that there is a regime that can assure the community that there is probity and equity for the remainder of the community about how those propositions are put forward.

That, I guess, is something else I would say in this context. This is not necessarily meant to displace the Auditor-General's concerns in that regard and hence the unsolicited proposals process. This is meant to be a far broader regime, far more broadly available to the industry so that they can get some further and better assistance in government when considering and dealing with their development proposal, whether that is a yes or a no ultimately.

Mr TELFER: Some of this is obviously hypothetical or a summation, but has there been any work done, looking back at other projects, as to what the potential time reductions or financial benefits there may have been with previous projects and thus those sorts of advantages that you can point to for potential future projects, as far as time and money basically. They are one and the same, really.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I can, I guess, speak figuratively without pointing to a particular project that we have experienced, but by way of example if the Governor on recommendation of the government declares a state development area, that will enable the Coordinator-General and the agencies involved to do a whole lot of preliminary work which can then be used as a baseline by proponents for particular developments.

I am not saying that this is going to be one, but you have mentioned, quite rightly, in your second reading contribution the concept of having somebody involved in this regime who is familiar with AUKUS and that is because, for example, we recognise that there are going to be parts of the state, in particular the Osborne shipyards and potentially a growing precinct around the defined shipyards, that are going to need to be really significantly developed in a way that they are not at the moment.

In that respect, if this was applied to that example, then you may be aware that the government has already undertaken to conduct a master plan for the entire Lefevre Peninsula which would include setting out where, for example, some of those major utilities needs will be, whether it is power, water, gas and so on, as well as—it was not in my electorate but quite adjacent to it—making sure that all of that next 50 or 100 years of sea level fluctuations or overall increase is taken into account for future developments in that area. That is a long way of saying that getting all of that kind of baseline work done by the Coordinator-General in the state development area means someone can then bowl up as a proponent and they have far less of that preliminary work to do. That is one example.

The other example is defining timeframes for consideration of particular decisions that need to be made at the moment by discrete government agencies. For example, whether it is the EPA, whether it is the Department for Infrastructure and Transport, whether it is native vegetation or an environmental clearance and so on, actually defining the time inserts a level of certainty into the process via this regime that I think most people in the industry are absolutely crying out for.

The old adage is that the worst decision you can get from government is no decision, because it is just that uncertainty. People have all this capital that they have corralled to invest into a development, and when you cannot get a clear timeframe or a decision out of government, it kind of sits there not deployed, and with year-on-year construction inflation, the cost of the development goes up. If there are further questions down that route, I am happy to take them, but they are two very broad, indicative examples about how time and hence cost can be saved.

Mr TELFER: Further on from that, the risk—and I spoke about it in my second reading contribution—is if it is government that is trying to set up that foundation, that framework, that starting point, doing that initial work, it could misjudge and put a whole body of work into an area, a location, an industry which may not come to fruition. This is why I was flicking through before, not fail safes, but what accountability do you see within this? Is it back to the responsible minister, back to cabinet?

You want effective, efficient and productive use of government resources. There is the potential for a whole big body of work to be done that is, in the end, wasted. So what accountability measures do you see will be necessary that I have not picked up yet? I have a stack of questions nuancing the finer detail, but this is that overall broader perspective on that.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: That is a good question. Firstly, for the state development area, how do you make sure that is not wasted effort or, worse, maybe intruding on an area that somebody, for example in the private sector, is already looking at doing? The process will require a mandatory six-week public consultation process before that recommendation goes to the Governor. That would enable anyone, really, but affected parties—including members of the development industry, let alone locals around that area and so on, councils and interested stakeholders—to contribute to that consultation process and for that to be considered before that recommendation is considered by the Governor.

Mr TELFER: That other one was a supplementary, sir. I am happy to do it on one of the other 52 clauses, if you want.

The CHAIR: Member for Flinders, I will give you another question—behave.

Mr TELFER: Treasurer, obviously this is a piece of legislation that has many different facets across departmental lines. Which departments were specifically involved in the planning or the drafting of this bill?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: There is a longstanding forum of senior public servants called the Economic Officials Committee and that comprises all economic-related departments as well as all regulators in government. But to give you an idea about who that comprises and who was hence involved in the compilation of the bill, it was led by DPC. It obviously included DPC, and the Department for Environment and Water, the Department for Housing and Urban Development, the Department for Energy and Mining, the EPA, SA Water, Treasury, and if there are any others as they come to mind, I will update my answer. But it is largely pretty much everyone involved in the economy.

Mr McBRIDE: First of all, thank you for the opportunity to speak and, minister, may I wish you good luck with the pursuit of this bill. No doubt it will pass this house without any sort of voting issues; as we know, the numbers are on your side.

When I was allowed to have the briefing on this piece of legislation, I actually understood and I can actually understand why you are doing this. But I have got some really clear questions that I hope the government will ask itself. When I asked what is the interpretation of this State Development Coordination and Facilitation Bill 2025, it was explained to me that you are going to create a committee or a body of people to watch legislation work its way through parliament. I instantly responded, without interjecting, and said, 'Don't you think there are enough people watching already?' With that, they smiled. I was not trying to be rude, but that in itself can be an issue in the sense that we are all watching, but what are we doing about it?

My question to you then, minister, is: how do you measure the success of this new committee and how can you tell that you are actually implementing something that actually does work and works more effectively and efficiently compared to prior to the date of this commencement and this committee actually acting in the way you want it to?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I thank the member for MacKillop for his question. I was preparing in my mind to answer how this was directly going to benefit the constituents in MacKillop, but I trust that will be a subsequent question.

I am not sure; I was not at that particular briefing that the member for MacKillop had. I would hesitate to agree that the description of this was to create more people to watch legislation through parliament. The member for MacKillop might say, 'Haven't we got enough people watching legislation go through parliament?' Well, I am not sure there are enough, because we are not selling tickets, clearly, for the limited seating that we have in this place.

Mr Telfer interjecting:

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: It is all streaming. The strongest source of revenue for the state's coffers is the Kayo subscription for parliamentary proceedings. So, I do not think it is that, but how will we know whether this is a success? I cannot nominate a number of projects or identify with specificity how many weeks saved, how many dollars saved and so on in considering those projects.

I think the member for MacKillop would be aware, as many of us are, that the development industry has been calling out—as I mentioned in my first remarks during this stage of the bill's proceedings—that they would like to see some regime like this to give greater certainty to the consideration of the projects and the proposals that they put forward and to how they are considered.

People will have views about whether this is the right structure and format and whether the timeframes are appropriate and correct, but what this does is establish into law certainty around the processes involved and give an avenue for a proponent of a development the resources of government to assist them to get decisions made in a timely way.

As I mentioned before, half facetiously, the worst thing that happens in government considering projects or proposals put forward by proponents is that it just gets sucked into a black hole—or, given my upbringing, I would use a Star Wars reference and say the Sarlacc slowly digesting it over a period of 10,000 years of agonising pain; I think that is the quote from Return of the Jedi—and that is the last thing the development industry wants to see. Notwithstanding that every now and then a Boba Fett will emerge unexpectedly from the Maul of the Sarlacc and continue on their merry way, we want to remove that type of uncertainty, member for MacKillop, and ensure that there is a far swifter process.

Mr McBRIDE: I thank the minister for his detailed, good answer. I understand your intentions here too, minister, and from the perspective of your government. One of the things I had the opportunity to do when I had the briefing was to explain what I have seen happen to the planning code, which has gone down from 22,000 pages to 4,000 pages. In particular, which I think is actually what your government is trying to do here, if someone goes into the planning code and says, 'I want to buy a house' and you are going to make this house a really simple house—so that it meets some really good, straight criteria: so far from the street, so far from your neighbours, such a height with such a roof, so big—it is a four to six week process.

Guess what? When you start wanting to go to three storeys and have cellars, and impede on your neighbours and perhaps impede on a streetscape it all becomes a lot harder, particularly if you might want to stick four houses on a block that only had one. All that becomes a lot harder. In this process, you are actually trying to do the same thing but it feels like you are looking in the rear-vision mirror rather than looking through the front windscreen.

I have heard your language on the other side: that you would love to see more infrastructure in SA Water and pipelines and you would love to see more wastewater pumps and pipelines taking wastewater away to the treatment plants, you would love to see housing divisions and subdivisions and house builds in Adelaide, and you even know where they are because you have listed them and labelled them in southern suburbs and northern suburbs.

I am saying: why don't you roll out that development plan and say, 'This is what you have to do, Mr Developer; this is where the money needs to be spent. And guess what? We have the legislation here, ready, done and dusted, passed through the parliament.' If you put half-a-metre pipes through the streets of this place and onto that development, you are going to have the sewerage works, septic works and everything else done rather than expecting the developer to come through and work through it.

We find ourselves in this beautiful place today, with the political grandstanding and all the positions of power that we know exist, and then what we are going to do is add another layer of people in here to look—I am a little bit cynical when I say 'look'; I am hoping they do a lot more than look—at legislation that potentially gets stuck.

Minister, my question to you is: is there an opportunity with this committee—or this new level of bureaucracy that sits underneath what they call a State Development Coordination and Facilitation Act 2025—to be a little bit more proactive and look through the front windscreen in the direction in which we are going and get the legislation and the development codes and plannings all done, so when the developers say 'We're going to do this, we want to do this', here you go; it is done, it is passed, and we do not have any more politics involved?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Thank you, member for MacKillop. They are salient points that you raise there. To continue on with my popular culture references, my learned adviser here advised me to tell the house that I could say, as Meatloaf would have, 'You took the words right out of my mouth.' That looking through the front windscreen, getting all of this preliminary work done, making sure that if there is a large, for example, land release for housing, in line with the member for MacKillop's example that he gave in his question, this is what a state development area declaration could do.

It would enable that far out from the time when a developer is actually ready to start construction of the houses. A coordinator-general can do all of that preliminary work about where should the utility infrastructure go, what specification of potable water infrastructure should there be and how should that augmentation be provided to that particular land, where should the pipes go, and so on, and also the same with sewage, same with electricity, same with gas, and so on. That is not the purpose but a purpose of this bill, and that is just for housing development.

If we are talking about broadscale industrial development into the future somewhere out in regional South Australia, whether it is for a renewable energy project or a mining project or whatever, we will also be able to do the same sort of thing. With particular reference to that state development area, that is exactly the same. I think we are striving for the same outcome.

Mr McBRIDE: I have one last question, then I am just going to leave you to it and wish you all the best. What assurity can the minister give the parliament about this new bill here, that the new body that he is developing will potentially be of benefit for development, benefit for the government, benefit for the state, that it will be about fast-tracking and moving developments through this parliamentary system and that it does not become a power horse of its own where they say, 'Well, it is not going to happen unless we give our authority. If you don't come through us, we are not going to get this through the house.' That becomes almost an authority to move developments through, but all of a sudden it grabs the reins and starts pulling on the levers of government, politicians, bureaucrats and the decision-makers that all work off this Parliament House.

What assurity can the minister give that this other level—and someone might say it cynically but I am going to be hopeful and keep my fingers crossed—is a good idea for the development of the state and does not become another level of bureaucracy that just gets in the way, particularly if it does something that they may not like or something the parliament might not like, or a sitting member of Flinders might want out in the Eyre Peninsula, but all of a sudden this body says, 'No, over our dead body. We are going to give that to the member for Flinders because we need it, hopefully in MacKillop?' How do we make sure this body does not become the elephant in the room that then takes over and controls legislation through this place?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: It is a good question and an important one to raise because that would be the worst outcome, if we went to the effort of contriving this regime and getting it legislated and it actually had the opposite effect to what was intended. I completely understand his concern in that respect. We have heavily consulted on the bill, particularly with industry groups and also with those groups sometimes who find themselves opposed to certain types of developments, including—I am not targeting them—representatives of the environment lobby. They do not share those concerns. They think we have the balance right—so both industry and people who usually raise concerns about fast-tracking development approvals. There is also quite a significant transparency regime, not after the fact in an annual report, although there is an annual report, but in real time as well.

Published on a website as well as gazetted in the Government Gazette will be what is under consideration and the decisions that are being made. Hopefully, that gives some transparency around how the Coordinator General's Office and the Coordinator General carry themselves in executing against their task.

I also think, though, that all of us—and by that I mean all members of parliament—would be the first to know if the user experience by proponents of developments was worse than present or not even a significant improvement on the present, because this is not meant to circumvent consideration of environmental approvals or transport-related approvals or utility-related approvals. It is meant to coordinate them and expedite them according to those decision-making frameworks.

I remember when I first became transport and infrastructure minister over 10 years ago now. There are no prizes for guessing who would have provided this commentary. I had one proponent say, 'I am currently trying to get development approvals for 41 service stations in 41 different council areas with 41 different sets of requirements from each of those councils. That is just from the council. Then I have to deal with the Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure,' as it was back then. I have never found out whether this rumour is true, but the story goes that the reason why On the Run changed its brand colour from green to black was its proximity to traffic lights. I hope that is an untrue fable of bureaucracy, but that would be an appalling state of affairs if that was true and that was the sort of red tape that was being tied around proponents.

Coordinating approvals so that somebody does not have to go and get their development approval from councils, subject to whether Transport is happy, and then go and get the ingress and egress to the development approved by Transport, no doubt after repeated and varying requests for traffic modelling, and then have to go to SA Water and so on—that is what this is designed to alleviate and expedite.

I am pretty confident, of course, that the way in which this bill has been structured will achieve that, but if we are not successful, if this passes the parliament and is established and we are not successful, then I am very certain that proponents and representatives of the development industry will be the first to let us all know.

Clause passed.

Clause 2.

The CHAIR: Which clause is next?

Mr TELFER: Let's go to clause 2.

The CHAIR: Let's not rush it.

Mr TELFER: No, definitely not. We chuckle, but this is a pretty substantial bill that I am trying to get through. Minister, you referred to the consultation that you have done with industry and the like. Can you outline some specifics perhaps for me about who you consulted with in the development of this bill?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I am just trying to find some particulars on the organisations, but I will give you some overall information about how the consultation was run. Firstly, obviously within government, reflecting the earlier question about which agencies were involved and so on, that ran on an iterative basis between February 2023 and December 2024, and then we had targeted external consultation between February and March 2024 for about a month. That was a targeted consultation supported by a discussion paper and the stakeholders were industry technical and expert groups, including industry bodies, universities, former Coordinators-General and so on.

Then we went out for a second round of targeted external consultation with the draft bill. That was with the same groups—industry technical and expert groups, including industry bodies and universities and also independent regulators, environmental non-government organisations and the Law Society. Then stage 3 was the full public consultation in August 2024, so that was the draft bill plus all of the relevant papers that went with it. There was a public consultation process via the YourSAy website. It was announced and promoted on social media. There were direct calls for submissions to previously engaged stakeholders and then a follow-up engagement, a fourth stage, between August and October 2024, and further discussions with key groups, including housing and environmental groups to ensure that the bill was workable.

So there were 55 direct engagements with particular stakeholder groups and those included either virtual or in-person meetings and workshops, including some multiple sessions with key groups, direct emails to seek written feedback to others, presentations, workshops and webinars with industry bodies and their member businesses. I am advised more than 36,000 South Australians were advised directly of the public consultation on the bill through direct email and 1,200 people were engaged with the online consultation on YourSAy.

We received several dozen formal submissions and responses to those solicitations for written feedback. The large majority of responses, I am advised, were supportive with support coming from a broad range of different sectors. Our understanding, based on careful further engagement with the environmental sector, is that we have been able to address the majority of their concerns to their overall satisfaction, trying to strike a balanced approach.

I will whip through a list, because it is lengthy, in no particular order: the Smart Energy Council; the Property Council of South Australia; the University of Adelaide; the Urban Development Institute of Australia; the South Australian Business Chamber; the South Australian Chamber of Mines and Energy; Flinders University; the University of South Australia; the Premier's Climate Change Council, including the external members of that council; Iberdrola Australia; the Defence Teaming Centre; the Association of Mining and Exploration Companies (AMEC); the Australian Energy Producers; the Law Society, as I mentioned earlier; the Climate Council; the Local Government Association; the Conservation Council; the South Australia Nature Alliance; the Coast Protection Board; the Native Vegetation Council; the South Australian Heritage Council; the Clean Energy Council; Ai Group; the Australian Industry and Defence Network; the Space Industry Association of Australia; Regional Development Australia; the Planning Institute of Australia; the Pastoral Board; Fortescue Future Industries; the Australian Land Conservation Alliance; the Housing Industry Association South Australia; ElectraNet; ReNu Energy Limited; Green Building Council of Australia; ECOSSAUS Australia, which is quite the acronym, even for government; the Parks and Wilderness Council; the South Australian Wine Industry Association; and the City of Onkaparinga.

Mr TELFER: That is a comprehensive list. Thank you; I appreciate that. Obviously we are in some interesting/challenging economic times at the moment and looking back at projects which could have been advantaged by something like this being in place is important, but so is looking ahead at what potential economic activity there could be and the challenges specifically within regional South Australia of working through some of the restrictions that they have to deal with.

Was there consideration given for the constitution of CGO to include the provision for someone who has specifically regional experience and knowledge, that specification which you provided with the AUKUS aspect? Was that consideration given as part of the development of this?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Generally speaking, yes, but I think the way in which that would find its voice is in one of the four nominations from the minister. While the example I gave earlier to the member for MacKillop about housing might indicate that if there is a particular need for the government of the day to try to expedite large areas suitable for future housing development that might encourage the declaration of a state development area for that purpose, we might want to do the same thing in a regional area, for example, if it is related to—

Mr Telfer interjecting:

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Yes, port project, renewable energy, mining-related infrastructure, whale infrastructure and enabling infrastructure for that, for example, on the Eyre Peninsula. That might then lend the government of the day to think, 'Do you know what? We have a regional heavy workload coming up and it would be good for us to have somebody with regional experience or familiarity, as we have done in the past.'

Mr TELFER: Just following on from that then—and I would not ever assume, as I said in my second reading speech, that this reflects on the current government, minister or decision-makers—what safeguards are in place to ensure that the CGO is not simply stacked with political appointees of the minister's preference? What safeguards are in place to ensure a genuine diversity of experience, knowledge and skills, as opposed to identity politics or diversity for diversity's sake or that sort of thing that government can be certainly be accused of if there are not those safeguards in place?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I think it is a reasonable question, because this body is going to require some pretty specific subject matter expertise, and the concern that the member raised is about making sure that this is not stacked with political appointees that mean that the office cannot achieve the ends that it is designed to. We all like politicians. Some of our best friends are politicians, no doubt.

Mr Telfer interjecting:

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: What did Paul Keating say? 'If you want a friend in politics, get a dog.' I think that if this office does not have a range of people who bring the right skills to the office, that enable that detailed and really particular consideration of quite technical planning and development matters, it is just not going to work. They also have to be appointed by the Governor and, of course, gazetted, so there will be transparency about who is being appointed to this and whether they are capable.

Similar to how the previous government established Infrastructure South Australia and we have carried that on, that has continued a membership of people who are pretty deeply experienced in infrastructure planning or delivery. In a similar vein, we think that this body is going to need a broad range of people with those sorts of planning and development shots as well.

Clause passed.

Clauses 3 to 5 passed.

Clause 6.

Mr TELFER: Treasurer, this clause is obviously talking about the constitution of the CGO and a bit of that specificity around membership. To unpack that a little bit, the clause states that there must be provision made for one member who has 'in the Minister's opinion, knowledge, expertise or experience relating to AUKUS'. Why is that left to the discretion of the minister rather than outlining criteria or will there be specific criteria that may be included in subsequent regulation? The broad aspect of 'knowledge, expertise or experience relating to AUKUS' does not necessarily say it is an engineer or someone with qualifications. It could be someone who was doing the media for an associated business. That specificity is not here. Is it envisioned to be included in regulation or do you believe that the criteria that says it is up to the minister's opinion is the structure that is adequate?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I am not sure that there is a plan to more particularise those qualifications which would satisfy the minister or, indeed, the parliament that somebody is AUKUS-capable. If I can give a simile elsewhere in the public sector, we have long had an organisation as part of the public sector now called Defence SA, which started out as the defence unit, and we have tried to have the chief executive of that organisation as somebody familiar with the defence industry in some way. Initially, it was retired Rear Admiral Kevin Scarce who was recruited from the Royal Australian Navy, and he was in fact in charge of naval procurement for the Navy. We recruited him at a time when we were trying to win the air warfare destroyer contract, so that was an absolute no-brainer.

At other times, we have had someone who is retired from the Royal Australian Airforce who was working for an industry prime. We have had somebody who had come from industry and has in fact gone back to industry. He is now at SAAB—Andy Keough—who I am sure the member is familiar with. The incumbent is somebody who has worked in industry. He has served in the Australian Army and has also worked most recently in the higher education sector. They are all pretty broad variations of people who we think would be capable to provide a defence lens to lead that public sector organisation.

When we are talking about AUKUS, there are two parts: AUKUS pillar 1, which is the pursuit of the SSN-AUKUS delivery schedule to build the nuclear-powered conventionally armed submarines here in South Australia; and there is AUKUS pillar 2, which is largely all of the technology streams that come from it.

Beyond that, we are not really intending on specifying because at different points in time we might have different needs from that person with AUKUS experience. At the outset, we might want someone who is familiar with what is needed to design and deliver a shipyard that can build nuclear-powered submarines. At another point in the future, we might want someone who is familiar with growing and delivering a workforce that is nuclear-capable or nuclear-ready or we might want someone who is in the future perhaps familiar with what is required to seize the opportunities to build our industrial involvement in all those AUKUS pillar-2 technologies. They are all really different variations of AUKUS and conceivably you would need pretty different people in each of those roles.

Part of the AUKUS effort at the moment is people who are capable of liaising with and negotiating with members of the commonwealth government, members of the US and UK governments and senior defence brass from all three countries. That person might not be particularly capable, but they are all a broad palette of people who conceivably could fulfil that. I would hope that from my explanation of that that it would not just be somebody who worked in a comms role at a defence prime who was not conversant with what is required to make a success of AUKUS for South Australia.

Mr TELFER: Just for clarification, the simile that you did with the defence force, is that structured in the same sort of way that is broad and gives the minister the discretion to be able to make the appointments?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Yes, in fact that is a good question. There is not really any tight structure over Defence SA, it has just been the practice of the government of the day about recruiting somebody into Defence SA who has defence industry experience or senior defence service experience. They are just a chief executive who are appointed by the Premier of the day on terms and conditions as agreed with that Premier from time to time. It has just been the custom and practice. Here we are actually being more particular with this role. We are actually requiring them in legislation to have familiarity in some way with AUKUS-related endeavours.

Mr TELFER: It could be surmised that it is overkill by specifying. The clause talks about the appointment of a deputy member of the CGO in the absence of another member, but there is not the provision that the deputy member, if they were substituting the AUKUS designant, would need to be qualified to have AUKUS experience. Is this me reading too much into it or is this just an oversight that you think if it did come up then the minister of the day would make a decision if it is the one that they are trying to deputise to that it would be a skill set that they would look to replicate?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: The member might be aware that the appointment of deputy members to various boards or committees and so on is usually for the purpose of that person acting as a short-term proxy in the absence of the substantive member. It would not be envisaged that that deputy member would be undertaking the role or responsibility for a protracted period of time. It would be stepping in on the temporary unavailability or absence, if they are away for whatever reason just on that short-term basis. For that reason, there is not much need to particularise it.

Clause passed.

Clause 7.

Mr TELFER: Clause 7, Treasurer, talks about the removal from office and probably starts to touch on a little bit about the ministerial discretion and influence and that sort of stuff. It talks about the removal of a member from the CGO for any reason basically and then in point (d) on the recommendation of the minister. Is there a risk that the independence of the CGO could be at risk if the CGO's position is dependent on a recommendation one way or another from a minister to remove them? It can be at the stroke of a pen seemingly. Is there a risk to the apparent or otherwise independence of the CGO with this in place?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I do not think so. It is not inconceivable that as the work of the office progresses, as either particular projects are considered and dealt with and finalised or those state development areas are successfully declared and all of the work that goes along with that successfully executed, the work program of the CGO might change, and that might necessitate a different type of membership that the minister of the day should be free to change up according to those priorities.

Of course, it might also, as an extension of that example, just be the case that somebody with really particular skills that are deemed to be particularly valuable by the minister for whatever that future work program is is more highly desirable than somebody else who has been on it for a period of time whose capabilities and skills are less relevant to that work program. I think that is the reason, otherwise, these clauses are reasonably standard for the appointment to particular committees or instruments which are established by statute.

Mr TELFER: Paragraph (d) is basically a catch-all for whatever may come. Paragraphs (a) to (c) clearly lay out criteria for removal from the CGO. Which of these are superfluous? It could be (a) to (c) that could be superfluous, and we could just say that the Governor may remove a member of CGO from office on the recommendation of the minister and that would suffice. Paragraphs (a) to (c) are sort of clear, whereas (d) does open up that question about independence and political influence and the like.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I think you could also argue it the other way as well. I think if we are establishing a body like this as legislators, we want some comfort that there is an immediate ability to remove someone for misconduct. I think that would be something pretty standard that we would look for. Similarly, if the incumbent is not doing the work which they are engaged to do—basically (b)—then they should be removed as well, or, if they are simply not doing the work or they are doing a really bad job of it, that is (c).

I do think you have to give the flexibility to the minister of the day to reflect the membership of the CGO along with the priorities of either the development industry or the government of the day. If I were the minister responsible and I appointed a group of people that I felt were really capable of executing the forward work program that I can see the office is going to do, there might be an election, there might be a change of government and you become the minister, for example.

The government that you are a part of might have a whole different bunch of priorities for the CGO and the work that it is going to do, and you might say, 'Do you know what? We have a regional-based agenda, and we want to comprise this with people with the right technical skills that have established credentials for delivering stuff out in the regions, so we are just going to move on those people on the CGO who, in our view, do not have those same regional credentials.'

I do not think that is unreasonable. Yes, you could say that that is the use of the political influence of the minister of the day, but that is why ministers should have that discretion: to make sure that these instrumentalities or these statutory authorities have the capacity to carry out the work that the elected government of the day prioritises.

Mr TELFER: I absolutely agree with that, and that is why I was asking if maybe paragraphs (a) to (c) are superfluous. Because (a) to (c) are there with specifications, I am envisioning that, if a letter is written by the minister to the person, saying, 'Thank you very much,' you basically would be saying, 'On paragraph (a) in the legislation, because of your misconduct, I am dismissing you,' or it could be paragraph (b), 'in breach of'.

There would be no minister that would bother using (a) to (c) because they are able to just move them on. Because there is the detail of the (a) to (c), do you think, in light of (d) there needs to be a disclosure, some sort of explanation or reason for dismissal under 7(d)? If you understand what I am saying, paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) give a justification, a specific disclosure as to why, and on paragraph (d), you could just say, 'Thank you very much.' Do you think there needs to be put in place for (d) an explanation as to why, a justification? Obviously, it is still a discretion.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I do not think so. I will go back to my earlier comment. I think the parliament should demand that the Governor can remove someone for something like misconduct or for not doing the work properly or not doing the work that they have been contractually engaged to do, for example. If it is just left up to the discretion of the minister, where is the obligation on the minister here to remove someone under 7(c)? There is not one. According to how we have drafted this bill, that is an automatic out, for example. I think that gives the parliament more confidence that there is a robustness to this regime.

Mr Telfer interjecting:

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: It is on the decision of the government, and that is a recommendation to the Governor from Executive Council or from the cabinet. I actually think this is a more robust regime than just leaving it up to the whim of the minister of the day. While it might not be for everyone, I think in this sort of area the minister of the day should have discretion to reflect either the economic priorities as they are generally understood in the state, or the priorities of the particular industry that is proposing to undertake development for the benefit of the state, or to reflect the priorities of the government.

The priority of one government might be, 'Alright, let's make sure we've got lots of planners, engineers, quantity surveyors, defence experts because the program over the next five to 10 years is defence, defence, defence.' But in the future, it might be mining or agriculture or housing or whatever. In my view, the government's view, we think the minister of the day should have that discretion to reflect those priorities as they change.

Clause passed.

Clause 8 passed.

Clause 9.

Mr TELFER: Clause 9(1) allows the minister to give a direction to the CGO. We did not dwell long on definitions, but the term 'direction' is not defined within the bill. What do you envisage constitutes a direction? Is it the equivalent of an order from a minister, or is it more a submission for them to consider? This word 'direction' I think can probably be considered from a couple of different angles.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: It is a good question and an important one, given that we are dealing with potentially the handling of developments that could be significant in terms of their dollar value or impact on local communities, environment and so on.

The concept of direction is the same in this legislation as it is elsewhere, and it is essentially the capacity for the minister to provide an instruction to the Coordinator General or to the office. My advice is that the framing of ministerial direction here and the allowance and the prevention of it, as it is set out here, is the same for the State Planning Commission. For example, I am told the minister can direct the State Planning Commission to advise him or her on a particular matter or a particular development but the minister cannot direct them to decide a particular way. That small level of example is how this is consistent with our existing planning law.

Mr TELFER: Just to flow on with that for some clarification for the house, clause 9(2) then outlines the scenario where a minister must not give directions to the CGO and then clause 9(3) states that the minister 'may direct CGO to cease performing a particular function', but there are not those qualifying guidelines surrounding such a direction. Clause 9(1) seems to define giving direction in the actionable, positive sense and clause 9(3) states that the minister may order the CGO to cease a function—so in the negative, the stop sense. Does clause 9(2) nullify clause 9(3), or can the minister direct the CGO to cease a function regardless of clause 9(2)?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: It is a good question and I think the way that you frame the question is entirely reasonable, because on the face of it it might seem inconsistent. The purpose of this is to enable the minister to tell the Coordinator General to, as it says, cease a particular function. That might be conducting a public consultation process, or a particular assessment or approval, and that gives the minister the capacity to pause the development consideration process.

I am advised the reason it has been included is to give the minister, and hence the government of the day, the capacity to reflect what might be, for example, the overall will of the community that might be up in arms about a particular project. So the CGO is just doing the right thing according to law and carrying out its functions, but if it is causing too much consternation, for example, the minister has the capacity to step in and stop it.

Mr TELFER: So that function is sort of that lower level, step-by-step aspect?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Yes.

Mr TELFER: Clause 9(4), 'The Minister must consult with CGO before giving a direction.' Does this requirement to consult mean the minister's consultation can simply be an order given to the CGO that a direction is coming? As we were talking about before, clause 7(d) just allows whatever action. What is the intention of that aspect there with 'consult'? Is that a formalised process or is that you going to them and telling them, 'This is what I'm going to do?'

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I think it is probably somewhere in the middle. It is not a YourSAy website process, for example, but it might be perhaps what you and I would regard as a courteous interaction between two professionals before a decision is taken. If you are the minister and I am the CGO, you might say to me, 'Look, I've got this issue. I'm unsure as to how I should think about it or consider it. I'm thinking about asking you for some advice about the issue generally and what the options are on how it could be considered going forward.' That is the sort of consultation, by way of example, that I think that clause is.

Mr TELFER: It is not formalised in as much as you are obligated to do it?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: That is right. I do not think it would be as brusque as, 'Alright, you listening? Right, here's your direction.' I do not think it is anything like that; it is more, perhaps, alerting the CGO to the issue and testing their capacity or availability to be able to respond to that direction before issuing whatever that direction might be. I think that is probably the best way I can put it.

Clause passed.

Clause 10.

Mr TELFER: I appreciate the opportunity to go through this thoroughly. It is pretty front-end heavy, as these often are, and I am sure we will run through the rest more quickly. So, 10(1)(b) in particular talks about the function of the CGO being 'to identify improvements that may be made to the regulation of projects in the State'. Is this a formal requirement of the CGO to provide an update after each project on how regulations themselves can be improved or abolished potentially, hopefully in an ideal situation, or is this simply a request or suggestion of the CGO?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Clause 10(1)(b) requires that that task absolutely be undertaken, but it enables flexibility for the CGO in how it does it. The example my adviser has just given me is that it maybe that in the CGO's annual report it says, 'In the last year we consistently experienced this particular issue, which, given what it caused us or the proponent or the community in being consulted with, etc., provides an opportunity for the government or the parliament to reform how that works.'

Or, it could be something else entirely. It could be that in the course of doing its work during the year it may put up a briefing to the minister saying, 'Look, we have encountered an unusual obligation on the government or the proponent or the community in dealing with this development. It seems to the mind of the CGO that this is an unintended consequence of whatever particular piece of legislation is drafted. In due course it might be desirable for the government to consider fixing that.' There is utter flexibility in how that is done. They are just two ways that it could be done, but it must be done.

Mr TELFER: Is that reporting to the minister or to parliament?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: It could be either. For example, if it is in its annual report, that is tabled in parliament, so it could be to the parliament. It could be to the minister. They are probably the two most obvious examples.

Mr TELFER: At 10(1)(e), the function of the CGO is:

to provide a single point of contact, coordination and support for proponents of projects in their dealings with designated authorities on a case by case basis (case management) and, as part of the CGO's case management, to assist other designated authorities in performing their functions in relation to projects;

On this basis, is it accurate to say that there are no reductions in departments having a say over a particular project or, as I said, a reduction in regulations, but simply the CGO being a figurehead where all regulatory issues must go? If so, how does such a role speed up the process as opposed to simply seeing a continuation of the current processing timelines?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Obviously, the single point of contact is going to be desirable for a proponent. So rather than going to—and just conceptually—the planning department and then having to go off separately to SA Water, and then having to go off separately to the EPA, and then having to go off to the transport department and so on, having the one point of contact with government and then that point of contact having to go to each of those different, for want of a better term, development stakeholders within the public sector agencies, is desirable for the proponent.

But in addition to that, the coordinator-general and their office are able to stipulate timeframes in which that can occur. For an individual proponent, what has happened in the past and what might conceivably happen in the absence of this, is that you would approach one agency and you would go through a process with them. Then they would send you off to the next agency and then the clock starts again and so on and so on and so on. This enables not only the coordination on the proponent's behalf but doing things in a more simultaneous way which should reduce timeframes.

Mr TELFER: I have one more on this one, being at clause 10(1)(h). One of the functions of the CGO is:

to support transition to and economic development of net zero carbon emission industries and promote ecologically sustainable development;

Is this potentially a new regulation, a new layer, requiring any project that goes before the CGO to be carbon neutral? How is it reducing red tape on businesses and project proponents to enforce this sort of new regulation?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: In short, no, that is not required. Of the 11 different functions that are set out in clause 10(1), not all of them need to occur in each of the projects or initiatives that the CGO is promoting. For example, in every project consideration you do not necessarily have to identify the regulatory improvement that we were talking about previously. However, where it is relevant, the functions of the coordinator-general office should be able to better facilitate development in that particular area but, again, just where it is relevant.

Mr TELFER: So it is not an obligation, it is an option.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: That is right.

Clause passed.

Clause 11 passed.

Clause 12.

Mr TELFER: The Treasurer states the procedure of the CGO, including its quorum, will be determined from time to time by the principal member acting on the advice of the other members of the CGO. I am curious why the quorum of the CGO is allowed to be determined by the CGO itself and not by the bill. As far as process goes, it is a strange one.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: It is a good question, and I can see why on the face of it it might elicit that concern that the member highlighted, but I guess there are a few different thoughts that sit behind this. One is it provides for speed and agility in some elements of decision-making of the CGO. For example, if there is a particular project that is being dealt with and the decision that needs to be taken by the CGO is the imposition of a deadline or a timeline for one part of the process, then that should be able to be done by one member, rather than having to convene a majority of members, for example, or achieving a quorum.

It is also the case that at the other end of the scale, if you are dealing with a state development area, then you may need the input of some members but not others, depending on what their experience and capability is, and it may not be worth imposing a requirement for a set number of people who may not be relevant to the discussion or the decision that has to occur in that consideration to be there. That could actually add to delay, if you say, 'Those two can meet this week, but if you need three of them, you are going to have to wait until the week after.' I guess it is that simple in that respect.

Mr Telfer: I question that sounds simple.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Well, it is that plain. I guess there is nothing else really that is sitting behind it. Again, it is to try to foster that capacity of the CGO to be a bit more nimble and quicker in considering and making decisions at different points in the overall development consideration process.

Mr TELFER: I can unpack that a little bit more and run a couple of scenarios. Potentially, can the CGO vary the quorum required for a meeting on a meeting-by-meeting basis? Who actually decides on what the quorum is going to be for any specific item or consideration? Is that something which is pre-emptively decided by members of the CGO, or is that decided depending on the item? There could be a scenario where there are four members of the CGO, and there is not really a hierarchy in place. One member may decide, 'I can just decide on this aspect and I can have a meeting with myself and decide on it.'

It may be a long bow, but seemingly it is separate to the rest of the CGO. Obviously, there is the staff component, the secretariat component of the CGO that would have to be involved in it. Is this a decision on quorum based on when you arrive at the meeting you decide what your quorum is going to be, or is there a structure in place to provide a bit more guidance? As I said, this one just jumped out at me. It was quite unique when it comes to governance.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I think that is not unreasonable to be raising those issues. In clause 12(1), it is determined by the principal member, which is the Coordinator General. They are effectively the chair of the meetings of the members, and so it is the chair or the Coordinator General themselves who makes that determination about how many need to be present. You will see in subsection (2) there is the provision for a member of the CGO who is not able to be present to be informed as soon as practicable, and then there is the transparency element of it, that whatever that decision is it has to be immediately published on the website. That ensures, internally at least, everyone is across the decisions that have been made. There is the element of making sure that internally everybody knows what is going on, but then there is the public accountability and transparency element by making sure those decisions are published quickly and publicly.

Mr TELFER: Just one more question on clause 12. Clause 12(3) provides:

(3) CGO must have accurate minutes kept of its meetings and ensure that a record of its decisions is maintained.

Will this include any meeting attended by the minister's representatives? Was this included as a matter of good governance, or as we have come to see in a few of these other arrangements, at times some governmental meetings may not have minutes kept as readily as some may think. Is this just to provide that surety around that good governance?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Yes, in short. There must be minutes kept of meetings. It is important that the minutes are kept and it is required by this clause. That will include those meetings which no doubt we will discuss when we resume next week under clause 13, where the minister's representative might attend those meetings as well.

Clause passed.

Progress reported; committee to sit again.

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