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House of Assembly - Fifty-Fifth Parliament, First Session (55-1)
2023-10-19 Daily Xml
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Bills

Statutes Amendment (Ombudsman and Auditor-General) Bill

Second Reading

The Hon. J.K. SZAKACS (Cheltenham—Minister for Police, Emergency Services and Correctional Services) (15:31): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

This bill makes some modest amendments to the Ombudsman Act 1972 (Ombudsman Act) and the Public Finance and Audit Act 1987 to update the terms and conditions of employment of the Ombudsman and the Auditor-General and to provide a review of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1987 within two years.

This bill contains a number of amendments made in the Legislative Council. At the outset, I indicate that the government intends to progress this bill in its current form inclusive of the amendments made by the Legislative Council. This bill arises following the decision of the Ombudsman, Mr Wayne Lines, to resign from his role at the end of this year and the Auditor-General, Mr Andrew Richardson, approaching retirement age.

Mr Lines was appointed as the Ombudsman by the then Governor in Executive Council following a recommendation by resolution of both houses of parliament on 18 December 2014. Having served as the Ombudsman for over nine years, Mr Lines has had an impressive career in the Public Service and legal sector. Before his appointment as the state Ombudsman, Mr Lines served as the South Australian WorkCover Ombudsman from 2008 to 2014 and this is a first. I met Mr Lines and had the pleasure of working closely with him during my time as the secretary of SA Unions. Prior to that, Mr Lines worked in the legal sector, including 16 years in the Crown Solicitor's Office.

As South Australia's sixth Ombudsman, Mr Lines has played a vital role in holding government and public servants to account. He has always carried out his work with the utmost professionalism and has considered matters in an impartial and even-handed manner. On behalf of our government, I thank Mr Lines for his longstanding service to the South Australian community and I wish him and his family all the very best for the future.

The Governor in Executive Council appointed Mr Andrew Richardson as Auditor-General in South Australia from 1 June 2015. Mr Richardson continues in the role of Auditor-General, but is approaching the age of 65, at which time the office will become vacant. Members would be well aware of the important work of the Auditor-General in auditing the financial reports and operations of government and departments and local governments around the state.

The Auditor-General's annual report is an important process in identifying issues and maintaining high standards of accountability across government. Similarly, the opportunity for members in each house to scrutinise ministers on the content of those reports is an important annual convention. On behalf of members and the government, I would like to thank Mr Richardson for his important service to the state and I wish him well for the future.

I now turn to the substance of the bill. The Ombudsman Act currently has no set term of appointment for the Ombudsman. Instead, it provides that the Ombudsman's appointment expires on the day on which the incumbent attains the age of 65 years. Following the announcement of his resignation, Mr Lines wrote to the Attorney recommending that section 10 of the Ombudsman Act be amended to reduce the term of appointment for the Ombudsman to seven years with eligibility to be reappointed to a maximum term of 10 years.

The Ombudsman noted that this provision means that a person over the age of 65 years could not currently be considered for the position, whereas a person appointed at the age of 40 could hold tenure for 25 years. He also noted that a seven-year term of appointment with a possible further three years is consistent with the term of office for other statutory officers. Unlike South Australia, Ombudsmen in all other Australian jurisdictions are appointed for a set term, and there are no age restrictions on the tenure of their office.

In the commonwealth, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory Ombudsmen are appointed for a set term not exceeding seven years and are eligible for reappointment. By contrast, in Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory Ombudsmen are appointed for a set term of or not exceeding five years and are eligible for reappointment up to a maximum term of 10 years in total. In Victoria, the Ombudsman is appointed for a term of 10 years but is not eligible for reappointment.

In anticipation of the forthcoming vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman, and as recommended by the incumbent, this bill amends the Ombudsman Act to:

provide that the Ombudsman is to be appointed for an initial term of seven years but is eligible for reappointment provided that the total term does not exceed 10 years; and

remove the age restriction, which provides that the Ombudsman's term of office expires on the day on which they attain the age of 65 years.

During the course of preparing the amendments to the Ombudsman Act, it was identified that similar provisions apply to the appointments of the Auditor-General, which are also out of step with the other jurisdictions. The Public Finance and Audit Act 1987 currently has no set term for the appointment of the Auditor-General. It provides that the Office of the Auditor-General becomes vacant if the Auditor-General, amongst other things, attains the age of 65 years.

Similar to the issues raised in relation to the Ombudsman Act 1972, a person over the age of 65 years cannot be considered for the position of Auditor-General when it becomes vacant and a person appointed at age of 40 could hold tenure for some 25 years. Unlike here in South Australia, Auditors-General in all other Australian jurisdictions are appointed for a term and there are no age restrictions on the tenure of their offices.

In Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory, the Auditor-General is appointed for a period of seven years and is not eligible for reappointment. In Victoria, the Auditor-General is appointed for a fixed term of seven years, however is eligible for reappointment. In New South Wales, the Auditor-General is appointed for a fixed term of eight years and is not eligible for reappointment. In Western Australia and Tasmania, the Auditor-General is appointed for a fixed term of 10 years and cannot be reappointed for a term exceeding 10 years.

Mr Richardson is soon due to reach the maximum statutory age limit permitted for a person to hold office as the Auditor-General, being 65 years of age. Upon attaining 65 years of age, the office of Auditor-General will become vacant. Accordingly, the bill amends the Public Finance and Audit Act to:

provide that the Auditor-General is to be appointed for an initial term of seven years, but is eligible for reappointment, provided that the total term does not exceed 10 years, including any period acting in the office of Auditor-General;

remove the age restriction, which provides that the Auditor-General's term of office expires on the day on which they attain the age of 65 years; and

the salary and allowances of the Auditor-General will be determined by the Remuneration Tribunal (as opposed to the Governor).

The above approaches for the Ombudsman and the Auditor-General are similar to the terms and conditions of appointment for the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption, the Director of the Office for Public Integrity and the Judicial Conduct Commissioner, each of whom are appointed for a set term not exceeding seven years and are eligible to be reappointed provided that their tenure does not exceed 10 years in total.

I note that for many years that practice has been for the Auditor-General's remuneration to be determined by the Remuneration Tribunal, notwithstanding the reference to the Governor in the act. To that end, the bill does not make a practical change to the current arrangements but will confirm them in legislation.

It is intended that these amendments will apply to the appointment of the next Ombudsman and the next Auditor-General. Given this, it will be important for these amendments to commence prior to the appointment of the next Ombudsman and Auditor-General. In the event of a vacancy in the office of the Ombudsman, the matter of inquiring into and reporting on a suitable person for appointment is referred to the Statutory Officers Committee of the parliament. The committee will work with the Statutory Officers Committee to undertake this process as required by the Ombudsman Act.

In contrast, the Auditor-General is appointed by the Governor in Executive Council. The government is currently undertaking a recruitment process in relation to the appointment of the next Auditor-General, which will be considered in due course. Finally, the bill also provides for a review of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1987 to be undertaken within two years of the commencement of these amendments. I commend the bill to members, and I seek leave to insert the explanation of clauses into Hansard without my reading it.

Leave granted.

Explanation of Clauses

Part 1—Preliminary

1—Short title

This clause is formal.

Part 2—Amendment of Ombudsman Act 1972

2—Amendment of section 10—Term of office of the Ombudsman etc

Currently, the Ombudsman holds office for a term expiring on the day on which they attain the age of 65 years. The amendment proposes to amend this to provide that the initial term of appointment of the Ombudsman is for a period of 7 years. Proposed new subsection (1a) provides that a person appointed to be Ombudsman is, at the end of a term of appointment, eligible for reappointment but cannot hold office for terms (including any term as Acting Ombudsman) that exceed 10 years in total.

The other amendment is consequential.

Part 3—Amendment of Public Finance and Audit Act 1987

3—Amendment of section 24—Appointment of Auditor-General

This clause proposes to amend section 24 to provide that the initial term of appointment of the Auditor-General is for a period of 7 years. Proposed new subsection (2a) provides that a person appointed to be Auditor-General is, at the end of a term of appointment, eligible for reappointment but cannot hold office for terms (including any period acting as Auditor-General) that exceed 10 years in total.

The clause also proposes to provide that the Remuneration Tribunal, rather than the Governor, will determine the salary and allowances of the Auditor-General.

4—Amendment of section 27—Vacation of office of Auditor-General

This amendment is consequential.

5—Insertion of section 42A

This clause inserts section 42A as follows:

42A—Review of Act

This section requires the Minister to cause a review of the operation of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1987 to be undertaken, and a report prepared and submitted to the Minister, within 2 years of the commencement of the section. The report must be laid before both Houses of Parliament within 6 sitting days after receipt by the Minister.

Schedule 1—Transitional provisions

1—Transitional provisions

Transitional provisions are set out for the purposes of the measure.

Mr TEAGUE (Heysen) (15:42): I rise to indicate the opposition's support and also to indicate that I will be the lead speaker for the opposition. I will make some observations about how we got to this point in what is a fairly short but important piece of legislation to provide for the term of the Ombudsman and the Auditor-General at a time when, as it happens—it is extraordinary to reflect on some of these coincidences, notwithstanding these are both roles that under the present arrangements might be held by both incumbents over a long period—we find ourselves in circumstances where both will be bringing an end shortly to their long and distinguished service.

In the case of the Auditor-General, it is because Mr Richardson reaches the retirement age that is provided for subject to the current legislation, and, as the minister has indicated, in the case of the Ombudsman, Wayne Lines has indicated and we know that he will be retiring later this year. As is a sign of the diligence of Mr Lines, in the process of his departure he has made an observation in relation to a reform step that ought to be applied to bring, in his case, the term of the Ombudsman into line with other like roles—indeed, roles that one might compare, and we have heard from the minister, interstate by moving away from a retirement age and instead appointing the Ombudsman for a term, and that has provided in the circumstances an opportunity to consider the situation as it applies to the term of appointment for the Auditor-General.

It is good to make clear at this point that what we have, in what is a short piece of legislation that deals essentially with those two topics and then a couple of further beneficial matters, albeit succinctly over a couple of pages, is a bill that is really very much the product of the work of the opposition and the crossbench. I recognise those members of the crossbench in another place, in particular the Hon. Connie Bonaros MLC for her work in bringing amendments—not only a thoughtful contribution to the amendments to the term for the Ombudsman and the Auditor-General but for bringing to the fore the formalisation of this longstanding practice of determining the salary of the Auditor-General and in terms of review of the act.

To be really starting from the start, I join with the minister in expressing thanks on behalf of the opposition and also personally to Ombudsman Wayne Lines for his long, capable and dedicated service in the role of Ombudsman for the state of South Australia. I know Wayne, having got to know him further in his role as Ombudsman, and I have seen him in action. In the brief time that I was minister responsible, I had the occasion to visit with his team and to see the way in which the Ombudsman's office conducts its work.

I certainly congratulate and thank Wayne Lines for his work as Ombudsman over these many years. I do not know whether it was his intent, but he has certainly served for a period of time that one might now expect under the new regime, served over an extended period. He has demonstrated the merits of an appointment over such an extended period for an independent officer, and I think it is fair to say that those on all sides have observed his capacity to do his work as Ombudsman without fear or favour, with skill and with expertise. I certainly wish him well on his retirement—if that is what it is—and in terms of future endeavours, and I am sure that all members of this place will join with me in those sentiments.

Of course, I extend the same thanks, respect and regard to Mr Richardson on his retirement from the role of Auditor-General—also a role in which he has served now with distinction over an extended period of time. There will be a moment to return to this particular aspect, but I think what we have seen from the Auditor-General is the very model of an independent office of probity dedicated to discharging those statutory obligations and from a point of view of fearless independence.

We have seen that on display at all times, but perhaps no more so than in the months since March 2022 and the advent of the Malinauskas Labor government, because the Auditor-General has been very clear about the requirements that he needs met in order to discharge his functions. Sadly, the circumstances he has faced since March last year have prevented him from doing so.

It is well that the minister says that the annual report of the Auditor-General is an important document. It is; it is a hugely important document, and the parliament is in the practice of setting aside a period of time specifically for the purpose of considering the matters contained within it. We pause for a moment and think on that: the parliament has a whole range of duties and business before it at all times, but the fact is that on this very day we have considered and formalised the process by which the parliament will devote its entire attention to the analysis of the annual report of the Auditor-General.

There is perhaps no better opportunity to highlight the fact that on that very occasion we will be forced, as a parliament, to consider an annual report that the Auditor-General describes as necessarily incomplete, a report about which, in significant material respects, the Auditor-General has sadly been forced to observe that he is unable to form an opinion in respect of significant transactions.

I will come back to the particulars of that important step, indeed back to the previous report of the Auditor-General, in order to illustrate just how important the annual report is to this place and to the people of South Australia in terms of being able to analyse the probity of government decision-making agency by agency, particularly with respect to significant projects.

For the moment, I thank Mr Richardson for his work over the whole period of his time as Auditor-General. The most recent annual report, and his observations in relation to access to cabinet documents, serve, for these purposes, to highlight the need, where we come to reform the terms upon which the Auditor-General is engaged, to provide certainty of tenure, so that the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman can be sure to be exercising their functions without fear or favour and independent of influence in any way.

So important is that imperative that when this bill was introduced by the government not so very long ago, against the background of what I have just described in terms of the Ombudsman's plans and the Auditor-General's imminent retirement, in response to the Ombudsman's suggestion perhaps—and this might have arisen anyway—the government's proposal was, 'Well, in respect of both offices there will be appointment for a term not exceeding seven years.'

To track through the steps of response, the opposition's response to that was to say, 'What we need in order to fulfil these objectives is to ensure that there is certainty of tenure over an extended period of time.' We cannot be in a situation where the government of the day might like to make an appointment up to the time of an election, or might like to just give enough tenure to have a bit of a look at the officeholder and if impressed then provide some extra term or something of that nature, where there could be any possibility that the incumbent would somehow be beholden in terms of their tenure, at least as far as the substantial term is concerned, to any variation from government.

The government proposed a term not exceeding seven years. The opposition proposed setting that initial term to a period of seven years. I am glad that the government has adopted that proposed change. We see that in clause 2(1) and in clause 3(1) in respect of the Ombudsman and the Auditor-General respectively, and that is a good thing.

Something that gave us, perhaps, comfort in terms of heading in that direction came more or less simultaneously at the time of first consideration of the bill from the Auditor-General, who said that the Auditor-General's preference would be, like the Ombudsman, to move away from the statutory retirement age and, rather than have any element of the potential for extension of variation simply, to have an appointment.

My recollection is that the Auditor-General was of a view that that ought to be for a period of 10 years. I think there is a lot to commend about that view. Ten years is clearly a substantial period of time that extends well beyond the term of any single term of government, and it has the virtue of being both not subject to variation and not subject to any seeking of favour, as it were, with a view to extension.

The bill as amended, therefore, has set a fixed term of appointment in respect of both, and the same term. Those who look for uniformity in these matters will be pleased to see that in respect of these two important independent public roles there is the establishment of this fixed term of seven years and there is the possibility to make comparative analysis with other independent roles, and it is a good thing.

In respect of both, there is preserved the possibility or the eligibility for reappointment, in each case for a period so that the total term does not exceed 10 years. I hope that has some practical dividend, in that it will afford the possibility, for circumstances of necessity or desirability, to make a short extension of the term beyond that fixed term of seven years. In striking the right balance in these things, it might be observed that the initial term of seven years is really what ought to be providing the bulwark of independence to the role, while the possibility to extend for a further short period of time might be a practical measure in circumstances that might confront government from time to time.

In respect of the Auditor-General, clause 3(3) goes on to formalise what I understand and the minister has observed is a longstanding practice. The Remuneration Tribunal sets the relevant salary. It is a good thing that that is formalised and will bring it into line with a range of other roles. I recognise the work of the Hon. Connie Bonaros MLC in bringing that forward, as I understand it, in another place, together with provision for review of the act. We have taken the opportunity to introduce those measures.

The substantive part of it that those following the debate in the circumstances of the present time will be able to draw assurance from is sending a clear indication that the person appointed in both respects will be expected to continue in exactly the same way as the Ombudsman and the Auditor-General do now, as roles that are the subject of appointment independent of government and able to provide their fearless interrogation of government process.

To put that matter into even more immediate focus on a day when the state's national newspaper has emblazoned on its front page three words—'Super Sized Secret'—in respect of a matter that has occupied now some significant part of the interrogation of the government over the last two days in relation to a cybersecurity breach that we have not heard about until probing questions from the shadow treasurer and from the Leader of the Opposition at question time in this place, South Australians will be reminded, as they look at the state's national newspaper and its front page, of what has been a track record of this government, over the course of this last period since the election in March last year—at a variety of turns, in a variety of contexts, and concerning a variety of subject matter, where confronted with the possibility—to suppress, to keep secret, to keep behind closed doors, to prevent the public from access and to keep transparency away by whatever means it can. The eyes of the public will be well and truly trained on measures that would provide for the tenure of those who would fill these independent probity roles.

We bear in mind that, in the context of this increasingly dark cloud hanging over transparency in government in South Australia, a few short weeks ago, when met with the impending resignation on the one hand and end of term of another of two very important probity officers, the initial form of the legislation that was introduced into this parliament would have provided for the possibility for the government of the day to appoint the Auditor-General for perhaps a year to start with to see how they go, to see what sort of prods they put into the government, to see how much difficulty they make for the government and maybe to be extended from there. One can see the obvious practical difficulty in terms of independence in those circumstances.

Agree or not with those issues of concern from those who are in these probity roles, I think we can all see that, if you are going to shine a light on government from one of those roles, then you are going to need to have the certainty of tenure with which to do it. So there is good cause for concern, and there is good cause to keep a close eye on a proposal that comes along that might chip away at that in circumstances where the front page of the paper on the day the matter is being debated is headed 'Super Sized Secret' because it comes against a background.

When we go right back to the beginning of sittings following the election back in March in what I thought was an inadvertent misstep by the Manager of Government Business, we saw on day one the removal of the time period for the answering of questions on notice, something that had been applied throughout the course of the Marshall Liberal government. No longer is there a deadline for response to questions on notice, and we saw what ensued.

We saw the response. the heightened concern about a lack of transparency. I think the headline was something along the lines of 'secret state' in response to that immediate action, and we were all put on notice: 'Hang on, this looks like we might have now just seen the commencement of a government that is going to be a bit prone to taking steps to keep things from the people of South Australia if it can possibly manage to do so.'

As I say, it is important, as the minister observes, to reflect on the importance of the Auditor-General's annual report, an important document as it is. I will come back to Report 7, which preceded it by just a few short weeks. In the annual report, Report 8 of 2023 of the Auditor-General, at page 7 of the Executive Summary it makes a startling observation. There, the Auditor-General refers to previous reports before making the observation that I referred to earlier. It is under the heading 'Limitation of scope: inability to form an opinion on whether transactions were conducted properly and in accordance with law'. The Auditor-General says, and I quote:

As I have indicated in previous reports—

he is there referring chiefly to Report 7 of 2023, and I will come back to it in a moment—

Cabinet approval, obtained through Cabinet submissions, is a key element in administrative processes in South Australia. In particular, Cabinet approvals are required for transactions above thresholds established in Treasurer's Instructions 8 Financial Authorisations and 17 Public Sector Initiatives and in relation to transactions involving real property under Premier and Cabinet Circular PC 114 Government Real Property Management.

The Auditor-General continues:

I summarised our experiences with accessing Cabinet documents in recent years in my latest report, Report 7 of 2023 Access to Cabinet documents, which I delivered to Parliament in September 2023.

I pause there. I have that to hand, as do all members of this place, and in this regard I have reflected on the importance of all of us as members of the parliament having a sufficient self-respect as a parliament as distinct from the executive closely to read and to consider the concerns raised by the Auditor-General in this document, because, what do you know, a few weeks later the Auditor-General is wanting to come along to us with the document that the minister has described just now as an important document, the annual report, and not be in a position to say what he then has to say at the bottom of page 7, and I quote:

In 2022‐23, I sought access to evidence of approvals by Cabinet to be able to conclude on whether selected transactions had been undertaken ‘properly and in accordance with law’ as required by the PFAA. I was not provided with that evidence and so I am unable to form an opinion on the extent to which transactions associated with them were undertaken properly and in accordance with law.

Here I am quoting the Auditor-General, because he provides a list, and it is not a short list. He says:

The following is a list of the items for which I requested evidence of Cabinet approval in line with established practice:

I will come back to Report 7 which spells out what established practice is—self-respect, folks.

What were they? First, he requested evidence of cabinet approval in line with established practice of approval—and they are not small items—for the relocation of the new Women's and Children's Hospital and the associated cost increase—not able to form an opinion as to the extent to which that transaction was undertaken properly in accordance with law. What a shameful reflection that is on probity and transparency of the current government. Secondly, he requested approval for the modified design and cost of the north-south corridor Torrens to Darlington project—unable to form an opinion on the extent to which that transaction, and transactions associated with it, was undertaken properly and in accordance with the law.

The people of South Australia deserve better, and we are hearing it these very days from the Auditor-General. This is the importance of tenure over an extended period of time for the Auditor-General. You need a fair degree of independence to be able to speak this kind of plain truth to a government that is avoiding the provision of documents in line with established practice and all members of this parliament ought to be concerned with this as a matter of high priority.

The occasion that the parliament will have to analyse the document, defective as it necessarily is in the light of the limitations placed upon the Auditor-General, is in just a few days' time. We have moved in that way on 31 October and in the days following. But do not expect to see there a confident view, or indeed any opinion, from the Auditor-General as to the lawfulness or the properness of decisions in respect to the Women's and Children's Hospital or the north-south corridor's Torrens to Darlington project. That is just the first two. The Auditor-General goes on, and it is important for the parliament in the context of the debate as we move to ensure the certainty of tenure of whoever might fill this important office in the future.

Thirdly, there is the approval for the amended expenditure total for the Darlington upgrade project and approval for the implementation and associated costs of expanding the electronic medical record system (EMR) to country local health networks. He cannot form an opinion on the extent to which those transactions were taken properly and in accordance with law. It is extraordinary. There is also approval for the procurement process for the replacement of Masterpiece as the main accounting system used by most of the SA government.

So far, we have the most significant hospital project on the go, the most significant transport and infrastructure project in the state's history and the electronic medical records system for local health networks, but it goes on. It includes the approval of the contracts for the South Australian Housing Trust maintenance services, the approval of the Department for Education's waste management service contract, the approval for the return of rail service operation to the SA government and associated contractual arrangements, and the approval of the business case and associated expenditure for the Adelaide Botanic High School expansion.

This is a catalogue of the significant, if not all, capital projects involving expenditure by state government over the relevant period and here we have the Auditor-General, thankfully, by virtue of the integrity of the office, saying in the boldest of terms that, because he was not provided with the evidence ordinarily provided, he is unable to form an opinion on the extent to which those transactions were proper or lawful. He goes on:

approval for the transfer of land associated with the Festival Plaza from the Department of the Premier and Cabinet to the Urban Renewal Authority

approval for the approach to the Hahndorf township improvements and access upgrade

approvals for specific settlements associated with the compulsory acquisition of properties for the north-south corridor

approval for the disposal of surplus land; and

approval for the Adelaide Aquatic Centre replacement approach.

We remember that, yet that famously is the subject, as we know, of an election commitment and one that the new government was keen to promote and to bring very much to the public view.

We then know, because the minister has told us recently, that it is the subject of a significant cost blowout, and the specification for it has led to some controversy, but the Auditor-General is not in a position to offer an opinion about whether transactions associated with that were taken properly and in accordance with law because he requested evidence of cabinet approval in line with established practice and he was not provided with the evidence. That is a disgrace. He goes on:

approvals associated with specific government office accommodation leases

approval of the procurement approach for the Hydrogen Jobs Plan

I mean, seriously! I continue:

approval for the extension of services provided by Spotless under the Royal Adelaide Hospital Public Private Partnership.

approval for the disposal of land through transfer at Thebarton.

And he indicates for good measure that:

At the time of this report, I have not received any of the Cabinet approval documentation I requested.

It is a disgrace. It is shame on the government, and it is well that this parliament shine a great big spotlight on this not only today and in the course of setting the tenure arrangements for the Auditor-General's successor but at the first opportunity that the parliament has to interrogate this important annual report, an annual report that is significantly the subject of proviso really as to its core ability to express relevant opinions.

So we see over two short pages in the Executive Summary the Auditor-General laying bare what has led to his inability to form a view about the lawfulness and appropriateness of core government decision-making for the relevant period.

The Treasurer had something to say about this earlier in the week in question time. He was asked by the Leader of the Opposition about his concern about those comments by the Auditor-General. And as we have heard previously from the Treasurer in the media and in this place, comments that I was previously moved to remark upon, the Treasurer said earlier in this week that, well, yes, he was familiar with that expression of inability to form an opinion, the one that I have just referred to just now in the course of debate. The Treasurer went on to say, and I quote:

…the Auditor-General makes those comments in the broader context of his wanting access to all of the detail of cabinet submissions that sits behind the government's decisions to authorise expenditures on those projects.

Mr Cowdrey: It's his job.

Mr TEAGUE: Yes, that's exactly what he does and that's exactly what he is endeavouring to do to complete the annual report, the one that the minister quite correctly adverted to just now as being one of those important pieces of work that the Auditor-General does annually. So, yes, of course he was, Treasurer, making those comments in that broader context, if you like, or actual context, or just making those comments because that is his job. The Treasurer goes on to say, 'Of course'—well, 'of course'—I do not know. I quote the Treasurer's remarks:

Of course, there is a difference of opinion about whether the Auditor-General for audit opinion purposes, needs evidence of the decision being taken—

By then the house was unable to restrain its outrage and the Speaker was required to intervene. The Treasurer then went on to say:

…and authorising the appropriation and expenditure on those projects, and, of course, whether the Auditor-General is wanting to make himself familiar with other much broader detail in respect of those projects.

Alright, yes, the difference of opinion. Well, let's be clear about what the opinion of the Auditor-General is. He is the one who is the subject of the bill and those who fill that role are collectively the ones for whom we must ensure there is sufficient certainty in terms of length of tenure, and a reason why it is well to focus on clause 3(1) of the bill. If we are talking about a difference of opinion, we have the opinion of the Auditor-General on the one hand, and I quote:

I was not provided with that evidence and so I am unable to form an opinion on the extent to which transactions—

that is the long list of significant transactions that I have referred to—

associated with them were undertaken properly and in accordance with law.

That is about as devastating a reservation as one can make in an audit report. So I am just not able to express a view about what I am supposed to express a view about in respect of that catalogue of significant items.

The Treasurer has referred to there having been a difference of view. It is not exactly clear really what the difference is. The Treasurer certainly did not make it clear whether or not the government was of a view that the Auditor-General could in fact form a view, absent those documents—do not really know—or it might be interpreted that the Treasurer is saying, 'Well, there's a difference of view as to whether or not the Auditor-General had an entitlement, reasonably and properly, to expect that those documents would be provided.'

I concede it is not 100 per cent clear on the face of what the Treasurer had to say whether he was gainsaying the Auditor-General in terms of whether he had a capacity to form a view or whether—and I suspect it was really the latter—he was really talking about a difference of view as to whether or not the Auditor-General really was entitled to receive those cabinet submissions

The reason why I suspect it was the latter is that we have heard it from the government now repeated ad nauseam over recent months, this kind of mantra that somehow the government is going to give us a lecture in what cabinet in confidence amounts to, and the 100-year-long traditions of cabinet confidentiality, and that this is—

Mr Cowdrey: Providing documents in that context.

Mr TEAGUE: A provision, as the shadow treasurer offers, of cabinet submissions to the Auditor-General in that context. I have news for the Treasurer and the government, and anyone else who might have something to say about this on the government's side, that this has been now well and truly called out. There has been ample opportunity for the Treasurer, for the Premier, for the government to explain anything further about this that might provide what the Treasurer was referring to as a broader context, let alone a rationale.

All you have to do is go back a few weeks to a very succinct report of the Auditor-General—a reason why these otherwise extraordinary and startling conclusions of the Auditor-General in the annual report do not come as a surprise. You only have to go back a few weeks to see the report to which the Auditor-General referred, Report 7, to find the long-term history, the medium-term history and the current dereliction of duty by the government with respect to transparency, set out plainly on the face of the short pages of this report.

It makes you think, when you read this in all of its clarity, that the only conclusion that you can draw really, as a member of the parliament—or, indeed, as a member of the South Australian community—is that the government is simply willing to brazen this out and is simply willing, as it was in terms of the way it treated the parliament back on the first days of sitting after the March election, to take deliberate actions to remove transparency and then to just brazen it out, with no need to respond in substance, even to the point where it renders the Annual Report of the Auditor-General subject to the most fundamental and devastating of provisions, with the Auditor-General being unable to form an opinion on the extent to which those significant transactions were undertaken properly and in accordance with the law.

So what did the Auditor-General say in Report 7 of 2023: Access to Cabinet documents—a report, I might add, he brought to the attention of the Speaker and of the President in another place in late September? The Auditor-General observed that, first of all, in case anyone was wondering:

The confidentiality of Cabinet discussions and documents is a longstanding and well-recognised convention.

Of course it is. The corollary to that is also true, as the Auditor-General observes:

The Auditor-General had long been given access to required Cabinet submissions without compromising this convention—

that is, until 2016. In terms of the South Australian practice, 2016 is a moment, therefore, that punctuates the history of provision of those important cabinet submissions.

For those following the debate, it is well to pause here at consideration of a change of longstanding practice that was applied first in 2016 because, folks, we have seen it all before. What happened in 2016? The government just now has been keen to talk about longstanding conventions and traditions and provisions in relation to cabinet processes, notwithstanding the then longstanding practice of cabinet submissions being provided to the Auditor-General for that particular purpose.

The government came along to the Auditor-General—that is, of course, the Auditor-General who is very conscious of the parliament and community's expectation that he discharge his statutory responsibilities independently, impartially and professionally and that he has the necessary powers, or so he thought, to do so. He is approached by the Deputy Premier in 2016 and, helpfully, he sets out at page 19 of his report a tabulated chronology of events in this regard just so that there can be no mistake.

He says that from September 2016 (as the table tells us on page 19) to September 2017—so about a year in the lead-up to the 2018 election; that is where we are, folks, the previous Labor government, and it has all happened before—the Deputy Premier met with the Auditor-General and said, 'Well, you're not having access anymore.' We had this period then of what we are now reliving in 2023, and more about that in a moment.

The Deputy Premier could only have been there giving that bad news to the Auditor-General off the back of cabinet approval for that approach. One asks who else was around the cabinet table at that time? None other than the leader of the present government, the then Minister Malinauskas, now Premier of South Australia in the new Malinauskas Labor government.

As one of those sitting around that particular cabinet table that must have formulated a view about its attitude to the provision of documents to the Auditor-General, along goes the Deputy Premier to the Auditor-General and says, in September 2016, that the Weatherill government is no longer providing him with those documents he has been provided with in a routine way. So we see the Labor secret state DNA just rolling through.

We had a full year in the lead-up to the 2018 election when that was the order of the day, with the Auditor-General left in the sort of circumstances we see here described at the commencement of the annual report. So intolerable was that set of circumstances that the Auditor-General—and I have to imagine the scene over this period of time—is now flailing around in the dark, unable to access those important documents. The Auditor-General makes the observation then that from September 2017 there was introduced a kind of cabinet policy that said, 'Well, you can have access to the cabinet decision sets. You can have that, but only that.'

It is the maintenance of the secret state DNA: 'Well, you can have a little morsel. You can have that little bit.' So for this period from September 2016, under the previous Labor government, we saw the advent of this endeavour to keep this important material from the Auditor-General. It is a disgrace. It is a disgrace in the same way that the present circumstances are a disgrace, make no mistake—like so many other things.

What happens then following the election of the Marshall Liberal government? The Auditor-General comes along to the new government, after these 16 long years of Labor, remember, but particularly against the insult of September 2016 imposed upon the Auditor-General. The Auditor-General comes along to the Marshall Liberal government and says, 'I am flailing around in the dark here. I have had this imposed upon me against a background of longstanding adherence to practice that says I get these documents so that I can do my job. I can't do that, so I am continuing to push.'

Remember, you have to have the kind of certainty and independence of tenure in a probity role like that in order to be able to do that. The attention span of public authorities can be much shorter in a whole variety of ways. Here we have an Auditor-General who has to keep up the battle, keep up the advocacy over a period of years and across a change of government, thank goodness, finally in March 2018. The same independent Auditor-General, the same probity role with the same capacity through certainty of tenure, keeps up speaking truth to power to the point where that Auditor-General speaks that same truth to the new Marshall Liberal government.

What does the Marshall Liberal government do? It says, 'Right, got it, understand. What we will do is we will formalise this. It has proved to be the subject of difficulty because you were denied back in September 2016 by the previous government after that long period of the convention prevailing, and you have been through this period of torment, where you have been flailing around and unable to do your job properly because you have been denied, so what we will do to make sure that you can do your job in the future, not only through certainty of tenure but also through certainty of practice, is we will set about a new formalised approach.'

And so we see PC047 established by the Marshall Liberal government, and I congratulate Premier Marshall and the cabinet at that time not only for solving the problem, not only for enhancing necessary transparency, but for providing a regime around that. It would have been understandable for the Marshall Liberal cabinet to say, 'We will just restore the longstanding conventional practice and we will go back to that,' but it did more than that.

It established a formal process, PC047, that made the release of the cabinet submissions and attachments available to the Auditor-General in line with PC047, and there were no problems. I might even get out an observation from this Report 7, just indicating, but we have certainly heard nothing to the contrary, for obvious reasons, right up to the period at which there is a change of government in March 2022.

For those following along—and I commend the obtaining of a copy of this document to all South Australians—the table mentions the period from March 2019, the advent of PC047, to March 2022. In March 2022, there is an election and a change of government; Malinauskas Labor comes along and that member of the 2016 cabinet is now at the head of the cabinet table. Through that period, and prior to the change, access was granted to cabinet submissions and attachments under that particular process, PC047.

Let's be clear about it—and here is where there is the morsel of a reference that can so easily beguile and mislead, because we have heard it protested repeatedly by the government—since March 2022, the government has continued with PC047. So far, so good. There is an endorsement of that being an appropriate process for the formalisation of the grant of such documents to the Auditor-General. It continues on with no change, as per the Marshall Liberal government. So far, so good. Members of the parliament will have heard members of the government protesting along those lines in recent weeks and months.

But what is the key difference? The key difference is when you go to the third column of the table, on the access granted column, instead of the 'yes' that you see applicable to the Marshall Liberal period pursuant to that protocol, what is the answer: 'no—requests declined or unresolved'.

You reap what you sow, Malinauskas Labor, because you get to the point where in June 2023, when that very important document that the Auditor-General is responsible for producing is tabled in this parliament, the ignominy of the government is writ large in front of all of us because the Auditor-General is forced to express himself in the terms that I have described. There are two categories of no. The first category is request declined; at least that is coming up-front and saying it straight out. The Auditor-General also observes that some of them were unresolved.

It is a good thing to just make some particular reference there to the way in which the Auditor-General has been treated over that period. It was not just, 'That's the way it's going to be, end of story.' What emerges from the pages of this report is that the Auditor-General has been subjected to this kind of rope-a-dope scenario from the government over months, ever since March 2022. You can imagine that panning out. After the change of government, the Auditor-General says, 'Righto, PC047 is in place. That works well; let's just keep that going,' and the new government says, 'Righto, yeah, we'll keep doing that,' and, pursuant to that, the answer is no and unresolved.

What is unresolved? There is a request for six cabinet submissions in July 2022, no response; August 2022, four cabinet submissions, no response; 25 October 2022, the Chief Executive of DPC advised that the government declines to provide the cabinet documents requested in July and August—so right, the rot sets in in October, if it had not already by the silence in July and August. February 2023, requested two cabinet submissions and also requested a review of the existing PC047—it's not working, you know?

You might say nothing has changed from one government to next, but you have to watch them. You have to watch them really carefully, because same-same but different. Good protocol applied consistently throughout a period of years by the Marshall Liberal government, with the answer being yes; good protocol applied post March 2022 by the new, but old, Malinauskas Labor government and the answer is no—it is no or unresolved. I will get to the unresolved in a second.

February 2023, four cabinet submissions, no answer; April 2023, four cabinet submissions, no answer; again in April 2023, and then later in that month the Chief Executive of DPC thought, 'Hang on, these are stacking up now. I thought you'd go away after October 2022 when I said you're not getting them.' 'I keep requesting them because that's my job,' says the Auditor-General, 'because I've got an annual report that's going to come up at some point soon and, if I am going to express an opinion, I am going to need the documents otherwise you're going to be prone to this kind of observation.'

In April 2023—the chief executive is switched on—the chief executive must know that this is what is in the offing. This kind of damning observation, this kind of dysfunctionality is in the offing with respect to the annual report if this keeps up and the chief executive, the Auditor-General tells us, proposed an 'alternative approach'. That did not seem to bear any fruit immediately. So we see that in July 2023, the Auditor-General requests a further 12 cabinet submissions to which he receives no response. We talk about those that are unresolved.

What did the CE propose? Well, the Auditor-General tells us—again, the beauty and importance of having an independent statutory officer in a probity role with the tenure and independence to be able to speak these truths—the Department of the Premier and Cabinet CE in April 2023 wrote to the Auditor-General noting the Auditor-General's view on needing access to cabinet documents to execute his responsibilities under the Public Finance and Audit Act, and the Auditor-General quotes the CE of DPC at page 21 of the Auditor-General's report as follows:

The CE DPC advised:

Cabinet confidentiality is an underpinning principle of our Westminster system of government. Decisions about releasing Cabinet information, in any circumstance, must balance preserving longstanding conventions to protect Cabinet deliberations against broader public interest and accountability.

As an Auditor-General of then many years' standing—and we are here talking about him reaching retirement age after long service in this role—that must have been about the most galling passage that might have been received. One wonders at the temerity of the chief executive to write to the Auditor-General in those terms and to start lecturing the Auditor-General about underpinning principles of the Westminster system, and the balancing of 'preserving longstanding conventions to protect the Cabinet deliberations against the broader public interest and accountability'.

See that word 'broader' again? That is the word that the Treasurer was using in question time earlier this week to describe the context in which there was a difference of opinion: 'You just go broader,' but there is nothing broad about this. This is just a straightforward refusal by the government to provide appropriate transparency in relation to the most significant government transactions of the period—no two ways about it. He went on. 'The CE Department of the Premier and Cabinet,' the Auditor-General tells us, 'proposed an alternative approach'. They are devastating in their modesty these observations, and we can only be grateful that the Auditor-General has troubled to set this out:

The CE DPC proposed an alternative approach to efficiently balance preserving longstanding conventions of Cabinet confidentiality with enabling the Auditor-General responsibilities to be fulfilled. The approach entailed the CE DPC making written representations to me about Cabinet decisions and processes in the context of my audit requests.

The Hansard might not report the mirth that is elicited on the rehearsal of those words. The Auditor-General then says:

I acknowledge the CE DPC's authority and intent to provide me with the information I needed to perform my audit role.

Mr Cowdrey interjecting:

Mr TEAGUE: Yes. He is a gentleman and a scholar, the Auditor-General. You would expect nothing less. He continues:

However, I gave several reasons why the proposal would not satisfy my obligations as the independent auditor reporting to Parliament. This report encapsulates the key reasons.

I also requested a return to the earlier practice of receiving only the Cabinet decision sets.

Remember that one. That was the arm wrestle, that was the last Labor government coming along to the Auditor-General and trying it on, saying, 'No, you get nothing. You are out. Nothing.' A bit of arm twisting later and they just hand over the decision sets. So the Auditor-General said, 'Alright. Well, at least I have been able to arm twist that much in the past.'

The Auditor-General explains:

The decision set is the part of a Cabinet submission that shows the decisions made, any conditions that apply (eg further reporting to Cabinet, stage approval, timing etc), the Cabinet approval stamp, date and signature. It does not reveal deliberations of Cabinet, only the decisions o be implemented by public authorities. Having access to this would provide the sufficient audit evidence required for approval. However it would not address having express access to any attached operational documents and other information available in Cabinet submissions.

In other words, it might be just enough to get over the line to avoid the disastrous observations that we have now seen ensue in the annual report—maybe. But the Auditor-General is making it very, very clear that that is far from the gold standard, and the Auditor-General is really pointing a pathway back to PC 47.

Remember every time you hear the government from now on, just prick up your ears when you hear the government saying, 'We are just applying what was applied under the Marshall government.' Same same but different: same process applied, answer different. Yes, under Marshall Liberal; no or unresolved, under Malinauskas Labor. This is where the Auditor finds himself stuck. The Auditor-General is then forced to observe:

As agencies are our primary source of audit evidence, I also requested that the government give clear advice to agencies about access to operational documents with a view to working through current arrangements efficiently and practically.

No further correspondence occurred on these requests.

A moment ago I said that the Auditor-General had found that his requests for documents were either refused or unresolved. Now, I set all that out—it is on page 21 of the report—just to flesh out what I think the Auditor-General meant by 'unresolved'. If I might paraphrase, it means: Auditor-General met with an attempt at childlike hand-holding by the CE, 'Thanks, no. That will not cut it. That is not my job. Good try but I actually need to form my own view, not rely on your representations.'

Then, secondly, despite having said, 'At least give me what the last Labor government was willing to do once I twisted its arm enough after a year of flailing around,' no dice on that front either, no further correspondence entered into—so, unresolved.

We then see the Auditor-General goes on to couch his observations in terms of access to cabinet documents in other Australian jurisdictions, so that is there for all to see and a setting out of practice and culture principles that are critical to information access. The Auditor-General is really quite thorough in his report in this regard, setting out as he does the full protocols in terms of the protection of confidentiality and its importance, and the house will bear in mind that none of this comes against a background of some sort of scandalous leak of the like that we have seen the subject of The Advertiser's front page today—what did it say again?—'Super Sized Secret'.

None of it comes against the background of some leak out of the Auditor-General's office that has led to saying, 'Whoa, this won't work.' On the contrary, we have heard the government say, 'We have continued the same practice that applied under the Marshall Liberal government.' It was a good protocol and there was no reason for any change, of course. It was simply: Auditor-General asks under Marshall Liberal and Auditor-General gets. Under the Labor government, Auditor-General asks and the answer is no or he is strung along or it is unresolved.

It is a disgraceful and shameful set of circumstances and a most invidious position that the government now finds itself in as this parliament proceeds to contemplate setting aside time to consider this—

An honourable member interjecting:

The ACTING SPEAKER (Mr Brown): Standing order against use of props.

Mr TEAGUE: —important annual report. We will hear from the government, as we must. We will hear from the Premier in coming days and I hope what we will hear is that this time is taken up by an opening mea culpa, an opening apology, and by the opportunity for the Auditor-General to then be provided with these documents that he has made plain at page 8 of the executive summary of the annual report are preventing him from forming an opinion. Of course, I refer in this regard also to the equivalent expression of opinion in the controls opinion of the Auditor-General, the companion piece to the annual report, the corollary document. It simply could not be clearer.

In commending this bill to the house, I hope—because it is going to need to be dealt with in other ways over the time ahead, nothing is clearer—that by illustrating the circumstances in which the Auditor-General has drawn to attention a glaring failure of transparency of the government it makes very clear, if it ever was not, the critical importance of ensuring that, when we appoint an Auditor-General and when the government goes about the process of appointing an Ombudsman, in respect of these roles, it is essential that there is certainty of lengthy tenure, that there is independence and that there is therefore the capacity of those office holders to speak the necessary truth to government, including as we have seen on the face of the annual report tabled just now in the parliament and its predecessor, the Report of the Auditor-General, Report 7, Access to Cabinet Documents. There will be, of course, much more to say in both of those respects.

Again, and perhaps in closing with respect to this contribution to the second reading debate on this bill, I express my appreciation of the work of both the Ombudsman and the Auditor-General. I hope and trust that those who will be appointed following the retirement of each of them will continue the fine tradition of skill and independence with which these two gentlemen have served our state. I commend the bill.

Mr COWDREY (Colton) (17:05): I rise today to make a second reading contribution on the Statutes Amendment (Ombudsman and Auditor-General) Bill of 2023. While I will not necessarily be as verbose as my colleague in my contribution and will be slightly quicker, I assume, given the fact that I have a time limit to start, I just wanted to reiterate a number of the points made by the shadow attorney-general in regard to this bill because they are incredibly important to both the statutory officers not only in referencing their individual positions but also to their offices and the employees within those wider organisations.

While this bill reaches this place in a different form to what it entered in the Legislative Council, those changes that have been made in both the opinion of the opposition and the opinion of certainly the crossbench—or the majority of the crossbench—in the Legislative Council there are certainly improvements that have been made to this bill.

While the change of language is shifting away from a term of not exceeding seven years, in clause 3(1) of the bill and also in clause (2)(1) of the bill, to a wording of an initial term of seven years, and while there are very few letters and words that change within the shift the practical implication of that change is quite significant.

The shadow attorney certainly has done a good job in referencing the desire and ambition of that office, in particular both of those offices, both the Ombudsman's office and the Auditor-General's office, and the desire and need for those officers to sit independent of any political or other influence and to sit in a way that they are able to provide an impartial view to this parliament and to sit in a way that they are free of undue influence.

I will start my contribution by joining the government and the shadow attorney in adding my thanks and respect for the significant contributions of the two individuals who have fulfilled those offices, both the Ombudsman and the Auditor-General, over the last significant number of years. We are making amendments to the bill before us today to essentially shift away from a requirement for retirement age that brings on a forced retirement to a situation where we are appointing for a period of time. While this may be a step towards greater consistency with other jurisdictions, what would potentially be termed a more modern approach to these appointments, it is important that when we are making these changes that we do it right.

The suggestion that was put to the other place by the government, in terms of an appointment that may not exceed seven years, certainly had the potential—and one would not hope that there was a desire but one that certainly allowed the potential—for the government of the day to perhaps appoint, let's say, for instance, an Auditor-General and to give him a period of time, or what would be termed in other work environments a period of probation, of perhaps 12 months so that the government can assess exactly how they were going to undertake their duties of that office. We know, and it has been said on multiple occasions, about the importance of that office in providing frank and fearless advice to the parliament itself because, ultimately, it is the parliament that both these officers report to.

In thanking both gentlemen for their service to the parliament, I want to also reflect on the importance of both of the offices. I do not know that there is a day or week that goes by, particularly in the world and environment that we operate in, within our electorate offices, where we have numerous people coming to our offices seeking assistance with a range of issues but, ultimately, in many circumstances, their ability to interact or deal with decisions of government. I think it would be fair to say, without it being too much of a stretch, that every single member of this house at the very least has referred to or had conversations with the Ombudsman on behalf of a constituent over the period of time.

To Mr Wayne Lines, thank you for your service to the South Australian people over that period of time. To Andrew Richardson, on his upcoming retirement from the role due to the current legislative restrictions on age limitation, we thank him as well for his work and his distinguished service in the role of Auditor-General within our state.

If we shift to the very premise that has underpinned the push and the rationale to make the amendments in the other place, it is very clear that security of tenure is an important part of securing independence for those who undertake these roles, particularly as we have seen and has been mentioned by the Attorney-General, if we reference the period of time that has transpired since the change of government.

The role of the Auditor-General, and the role of audit more generally, has always been, despite changing over time, to provide a level of certainty and comfort to this very chamber and to the members within it that the transactions, the approvals and the processes undertaken by the government of the day have been done so appropriately. One would think that having that level of comfort and ability and understanding that those transactions have been undertaken in a manner in accordance with the law would simply be a minimum requirement those of us in this place should be seeking from the government of the day.

If I reflect over the period of the last government—and the shadow attorney has detailed the changing arrangements over a period of time in terms of the Auditor-General's ability to have access to the requisite documents that he requires to fulfil his statutory duties under one of the acts of parliament we are looking to amend today, the Public Finance and Audit Act—when we look at his historic access to the requisite documents to undertake his duties, we see that that has changed over a period of time.

We have got to a point now where—and I think it is easy sometimes to overuse the word 'unprecedented', but the annual report that the Auditor-General has handed down to this very parliament this week is unprecedented in nature. Effectively, this parliament has been told that more than $20 billion of public money has been approved to be spent—well, we assume has been approved to be spent appropriately—without the independent statutory officer responsible for ensuring that what has transpired has been done in accordance with the law. He cannot tell us that that has happened.

We are not talking about small projects. We are not talking about small decisions. We are talking about over $20 billion worth of infrastructure projects and transactions, basically every major decision that this government has taken to this point in time. We have no assurance that they have been undertaken in a manner in accordance with the law.

That troubles me. That troubles the shadow attorney. That troubles, I hope, members of the media. That troubles, I hope, members of the government backbench. They in all reality, like the rest of us, despite having more skin in the game, are being asked by their cabinet to wholeheartedly trust them: 'It's okay, we don't need an independent officer to tell this parliament—not just you, but every other member of it—that what we are doing is being done in accordance with law.'

Just reflect on that circumstance. It is well and truly unbelievable that decisions in regard to projects such as the relocation of the Women's and Children's Hospital, the north-south corridor Torrens to Darlington project, amended expenditure for the Darlington upgrade project, the replacement of Masterpiece, the Festival Plaza land transfer, the Hahndorf Township Improvements and Access Upgrade, the Adelaide Aquatic Centre replacement approach and the Hydrogen Jobs Plan. Every single one of these decisions—and I have not read the full list. I am not offered the same opportunity in this house as my friend the shadow attorney-general to go through those.

But what is even more galling—and the shadow attorney has well stepped through the changes in access over time and the changes in approach that have been undertaken—is the argument that is being run by the other side in regard to why this is okay, because this difference of opinion, this difference in view as to access by the Auditor-General that at the very least we know the Treasurer and the Premier have, is not consistent.

We know that prior to September 2016 the Premier, the Deputy Premier, the member for West Torrens and the Treasurer at the very least—I am sure there are other ministers on that side that were also in cabinet at that time—had happily provided cabinet submissions to the Auditor-General at that point in time. There were no issues then; there was no overriding claim that cabinet confidentiality needed to ensure that the Auditor-General be refused access to these documents. There was not an issue at all.

In the context of the lack of transparency, the secrecy, and not just in their approach to the Auditor-General's access, we can reflect on how the government approached the university merger. They had no intention whatsoever of sharing with South Australians how they reached the conclusion that it was in the state's best interest to merge the universities. It was, 'Take us on our word. We've done it. It's fine.'

If you look at the more recent cyber attack within Super SA through a third-party provider, there were ample opportunities for the government to walk in here and explain to South Australians what happened. There were ample opportunities to put out a press release. Did they do it? No; because they had made a concerted decision to keep these things secret, just in the way they are doing to a point that does not allow an independent statutory officer to determine that the conduct, that the decisions, that the processes, that the financial transactions of this state, are being conducted in a manner appropriate and in line with the law.

While those on the other side, as I have mentioned, have flip-flopped, have gone from having no issues in providing these documents to now a steadfast resolve that cabinet confidentiality overrides any degree of accountability, we should look around the country. What is happening there? We had the then McGowan-led Labor government introduce a bill from government to provide express permission for the Auditor-General to access cabinet documents to fulfil their duties under their equivalent act.

If you are not satisfied that a Labor government is moving in that direction, you could look at the former Perrottet Liberal government in New South Wales that moved similar legislation to provide express access to their Auditor-General to the relevant documents they needed to fulfil their duties under the equivalent act. You look at the federal parliament, where there has been no need to go down the path we have ended up on here in this state because, guess what? The convention where the government of the day has provided documents to the Auditor-General is still in place today.

What we are talking about is an unprecedented turn to secrecy, one that Labor governments in this state have tried before, and one where the Auditor-General of the day at the very least was able to wrestle some degree of a semblance of the documents he required to ensure that he was at the very least satisfied that things were being done in an appropriate manner.

No, nearly two years into this Malinauskas Labor government we have not even had that concession. What we have had is a steadfast resolve to double down, to run this folly line in the media that, 'Nothing has changed, there is nothing to see here, we are using the same process that was in train during the previous government.' Well, it is just bollocks. It is complete and utter bollocks.

Who should be mad? It is not just the people on this side of the chamber. It is not just the media. It is not just the poor Auditor-General, who is only trying to do his job at the end of the day, to access the documents that he requires to undertake his duties under the Public Finance and Audit Act, but ultimately it is the people of South Australia.

That is why the changes that were made, the amendments that were made prior to the bill arriving in this house, are important: because of tenure, because of independence. While the other side may scoff, while they may have no interest in transparency, while they may have no interest in accountability of government, it matters to people for a reason, because without accountability you do not have trust, and what we have seen over this last week is that the people of South Australia cannot trust this government.

Mr BROWN (Florey) (17:25): As difficult as it might be to follow the thunderous rhetoric of the member for Colton and the member for Heysen, I will try to assist the house by providing a contribution on this bill.

Both the office of the Ombudsman and the person who holds that office as its central figure play a fundamentally important role in South Australian public administration and our community life. The South Australian government established the Ombudsman's office in 1972, at a time when jurisdictions around the world were pursuing the creation of similar offices. Maintaining the office as a strong and independent entity enables and promotes good public administration in South Australia that is characterised by fairness, integrity, transparency and accountability.

The remit of the South Australian Ombudsman is to consider complaints, usually lodged by members of the public, about entities, including state government departments and state authorities as well as councils and their elected members. They also consider complaints in relation to misconduct and maladministration by public officers. In relation to ReturnToWorkSA, they consider breaches of the service standards and other administrative acts of the Return to Work corporation and self-insured agencies. The Ombudsman also considers requests to review freedom of information decisions.

Anyone, including an individual, group or organisation who is directly affected by an agency's acts, can make a complaint to the Ombudsman. An act in this case includes a failure to act. It is also the case that anyone can make a complaint about misconduct or maladministration, whether or not they are directly affected by it.

When an agency is determined by the Ombudsman to have made an error, the Ombudsman may recommend action to ensure improvement in its future operations. The office of the Ombudsman may also work with parties involved to resolve a particular matter. The role of the Ombudsman is recognised on a cross-partisan basis as providing important and valuable services, free of cost, to the South Australian community. Appointees to the role are chosen with care on the basis of particular qualifications, as the South Australian public should rightly expect.

One qualification the public might not find overly important is that the person occupying the role of the Ombudsman be not older than 64 years and 364 days. Under the relevant legislation as it now stands, there is no set term of appointment for the Ombudsman. Instead, the Ombudsman's appointment expires automatically upon the incumbent reaching the age of 65.

Our current Ombudsman highlighted that this would mean a qualified person who had already reached the age of 65 could not be eligible to hold the position for even 20 minutes, whereas a person appointed to the role in their 40s could remain in it for 20 years. Certainly, there was a time in human history when 65 was perhaps considered a bit of a doddering age, whether justifiably or not. That time, however, has long ago passed.

The age limitation provision remaining in our state's legislation is neither appropriate nor material to the public interest. The word 'ageist' has been mentioned by members in the other place, and I agree that this is just about the only way we can reasonably regard the current provision by contemporary standards of thought.

Upon his recent announcement of his resignation from the role of Ombudsman, Mr Wayne Lines suggested that section 10 of the act should be amended to implement a term of appointment of seven years, with eligibility to be reappointed for a further three years, to reach a total maximum term of 10 years. This limited term suggested by Mr Lines is consistent with the term of office for other holders of statutory office in our state. Set terms of appointment are also in place for ombudsmen across other Australian jurisdictions.

Following the recommendation of Mr Lines and with the fact in mind that a new Ombudsman will be selected not long in the future, the Statutes Amendment (Ombudsman and Auditor-General) Bill amends the existing act by providing that the Ombudsman will be appointed for a set term not exceeding seven years and is eligible for reappointment up to a total term length of 10 years, as well as removing the provision which requires that the role be vacated upon the incumbent reaching the age of 65. While amendments were being developed to change the Ombudsman Act, it was identified that similar provisions apply with the appointment of the Auditor-General. These provisions, too, are anachronistic at best, as well as being out of step with what is in place in other jurisdictions.

The Auditor-General reports to the parliament on audits that have been conducted on state and local government agencies in areas covering financial reports and operations, controls, and matters that are of the public interest. The audits that the Office of the Auditor-General performs seek to determine whether the services and activities of state and local government are effective, efficient and appropriately accounted for. The Auditor-General also provides recommendations to public sector agencies on improvements they might make in order to deliver better value for the spend and better outcomes for the South Australian community.

Each year, the Auditor-General's annual report assists with highlighting issues across government, and members in each house of parliament are supported in their scrutiny of ministers on the basis of the contents of that report. As for the Ombudsman, there is broad agreement that the Auditor-General performs a role that is important and furthers the public interest.

Within reason, I doubt that any person would suggest that the age of the Auditor-General should be a determinative consideration in determining their suitability to serve in the role. But, as in the case of the Ombudsman, a new Auditor-General must soon be appointed due to the impending retirement of our incumbent Auditor-General, Mr Andrew Richardson, which will be mandatory under current provisions, as I understand he will reach the age of 65 later this month. With those few words, I commend the bill to the house.

The Hon. J.K. SZAKACS (Cheltenham—Minister for Police, Emergency Services and Correctional Services) (17:30): I thank members for their contribution, particularly the member for Florey for his short, succinct but important words. I thank the member for Colton and the member for Heysen for their contributions—obviously very impassioned, somewhat interesting speeches. I certainly understand that it is not the will of the house, should I be corrected, to enter into committee, but will be in the hands of the member for Heysen on that.

Bill read a second time.

Third Reading

The Hon. J.K. SZAKACS (Cheltenham—Minister for Police, Emergency Services and Correctional Services) (17:31): I move:

That the bill be now read a third time.

Bill read a third time and passed.

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