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Legislative Council - Fifty-Second Parliament, First Session (52-1)
2010-07-21 Daily Xml
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INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION BILL

Second Reading

Adjourned debate on second reading.

(Continued from 12 May 2010.)

The Hon. A. BRESSINGTON (22:07): I rise to indicate that I will be supporting the second reading of this bill. I will not go into as great detail as I did on 26 September 2007 and 15 October 2008, but I will reiterate that I believe that this is probably one of the most important bills that we will debate in this place and also remind members that my concerns about an ICAC are really that we do not have an independent commission against corruption that merely deals with politically advantageous issues, and this ICAC would actually deal with the concerns of everyday citizens concerning the corruption of process of government departments that I, and other members in here, hear about multiple times in a day. I think it is very important, if we are going to insist on an ICAC, that we actually take those matters into consideration.

The fact is that we get those complaints in here every day—I do, and more than once a day—mainly because the government says we have so many levels of review that it is all just working fine and dandy in South Australia. But, in actual fact, if our ministerial officers; ombudsmen; commissioners for public employment, equal opportunity, health and community services complaints; the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board; Medical Board; Police Complaints Authority; court authorities; and countless other such review and oversight bodies actually worked to deliver justice, we would not be sitting here having this debate. It seems that the opposition and crossbenchers are the only ones who acknowledge that we have serious issues in this state as far as following through on appropriate policy and enforcement of legislation. I believe it is time to get that in order.

I relate to members here that I am considering moving some amendments. They are not going to be complicated amendments, but they will look to provide a level of protection, as I have said, to whistleblowers as well. The honourable Vickie Chapman of the opposition stated during the election campaign that the Whistleblower Protection Act needed to be reviewed, and we here have all acknowledged that at some stage. When the Hon. Robert Lawson was here, he stated that it was a most useless piece of legislation, and I tend to agree with him. I think that, if we are going to have an ICAC here in South Australia, and if we are going to actually rely on whistleblowers from time to time to bring issues to that ICAC, those whistleblowers need to have extended protection under the ICAC bill other than the flimsy protection that is afforded to them under the Whistleblowers Protection Act.

I hope honourable members here will support—as I believe they will—an ICAC in South Australia. I hope that the government this time around sees common sense. They could perhaps attribute a part of the swing against them in some seats in the last election to the fact that they were not listening to the people about this very issue.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN (22:12): I will not detain the chamber for too long this evening. This bill is another ill considered and ill thought-out approach by the opposition that does not really address this issue in a thorough and thought-out way. The Hon. Mr Wade said that this bill represents 22 years of collective wisdom, I think it was, of legislative councillors from all over the place. What this bill embodies is the wisdom of whoever invented and drafted it in the 1980s in New South Wales.

The Hon. R.L. Brokenshire interjecting:

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: This is not a speech I have used before at all. In fact, I am extemporising; therefore, it would be unlikely that I would have used the speech before.

Members interjecting:

The PRESIDENT: The Hon. Ms Bressington has had her go. She might sit there and listen or leave the chamber, and the Hon. Mr Brokenshire might like to do the same. The Hon. Mr Finnigan.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: Thank you, Mr President. The Hon. Mr Brokenshire confirms my point that the ICAC bills that get moved are, in fact, just a carbon copy of the New South Wales model. There is no estimate here of the cost, which could be based on interstate ICACs of between $15 million to $40 million. Again, there is no thought given to how this would be paid for within the confines of the budget.

The mover, the Hon. Mr Wade, has mentioned authorities backing up or giving evidence for his bill. One is Senator Bob Brown, which is obviously just a play to make sure that the Greens support the bill. The second is Mr Ken MacPherson. Correct me if I am wrong, Mr President, but I am sure that we have spent an awful lot of time hearing from members of the opposition about how Mr MacPherson is not doing a good job with the Burnside council inquiry. The Hon. Mr Lucas is always telling us how he is laughing all the way the bank; he has taken us for a ride with the money that we have paid him. The Hon. Ms Lensink this very evening—not half an hour ago—was getting stuck into Mr Ken MacPherson, yet the Hon. Mr Wade holds him up as one of the reasons why his bill should be supported. This is the kind of bending in the wind that we see with the opposition—no consistency, no overall thoughtful or well-considered approach.

The other great evidence is an Advertiser poll that said Isobel Redmond was more trusted than Mike Rann. Apparently, the basis for lawmaking in this state is now what an Advertiser poll said about who people trust. That is the best way. So, when you want to make major changes to the legal and integrity structures of this state and when you want to make considerable changes to our legal system and the way in which we govern and the public administration of our state, you rely on an Advertiser poll about who people trust: that is the big guide. That is what we get from the shadow attorney-general. Why they even bother having a shadow attorney-general with a law degree is beyond me, because apparently Advertiser polls are all you need to look at.

We know that the idea of having an ICAC solves all problems in relation to corruption and provides somewhere to go for political issues is simply a furphy because what generally happens is that those who are dissatisfied with what other bodies, such as the police or whoever, are doing will generally claim that the ICACs are not doing the right job either.

I draw honourable members' attention to what Mr Barry O'Farrell, the Leader of the Opposition in New South Wales, who aspires to be the next premier, said in a story on the ABC website on 6 September 2009, as follows:

NSW corruption claims: ICAC should 'break down doors'. The New South Wales opposition says the authorities should be breaking down doors to investigate the death of slain businessman Michael McGurk and allegations of a tape exposing government corruption.

You might recall, Mr President, that this was indeed investigated by ICAC and dismissed as having no merit whatsoever, but here was Mr Barry O'Farrell, the Liberal leader in New South Wales, saying that ICAC should be breaking down doors and that 'ICAC's inner spring has wound down'. So, he is saying that ICAC is not doing its job because it was not giving credence to very discredited claims which were investigated by the ICAC and dismissed summarily.

The opposition leader in Queensland, the leader of the Liberal National Party, John-Paul Langbroek, is saying that they need a royal commission in Queensland because the Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC) in that state is not doing its job. According to John-Paul Langbroek, the CMC is not doing its job; it is not investigating corruption. It is not good enough; they need a royal commission.

So, the idea that a one-stop shop fixes all your problems is just nonsense. As we have seen, Liberal leaders in other states, when it suits them, politicise and carry on trying to get political advantage and criticise the ICACs that do exist in those states because they are not providing them with the political outcomes they want. So, I think members need to think a bit more carefully about what ought to be done in this regard, and that is precisely what the government is doing.

I do not know whether honourable members are perhaps not paying enough attention to what the government is doing. I draw honourable members' attention to a ministerial statement on public integrity made in the other place by the Attorney-General, Mr Rau, on Tuesday 22 June, which states:

In my statement of 6 May, I also informed the house that I would review the operation and effectiveness of South Australia's public integrity system with a view to improving any imperfections that this review may identify.

On 12 May this year, I wrote to a number of interested parties to seek their views about the public integrity framework here in South Australia. These parties included a number of statutory officers and bodies which play a role in the system. I invited parties to make a submission about any improvements or changes they believe would strengthen and enhance the public integrity structures in South Australia and aid public confidence in the system.

The closing date of 14 June for the receipt of these submissions has now passed and my department is considering the content of the submissions received. I expect that some late submissions will be received and these will also be considered. I recognise that there may be contributors who may not wish their submissions to be put in the public domain for a variety of legitimate reasons. I respect this and I do not consider that it is for me or my department to release these submissions or identify contributors, particularly as I do not know to what extent, if at all, these submissions were prepared on a confidential basis.

After considering these submissions, taking advice from my department and further consultation, I intend to report to cabinet and this parliament about my conclusions and any proposals for improvement that may arise. I will not now pre-empt the outcome of this review by speculating on what proposals will arise. As I have indicated, my review of South Australia's public integrity framework is now well underway. Any recommendations I take to cabinet will be based on the need to maintain and enhance public integrity and community confidence in public administration in South Australia.

That is the end of the ministerial statement made by the honourable Attorney-General on 22 June in the other place.

So, the government is going about considering the issue of enhancing and upholding public integrity in this state in a considered and thoughtful way, taking account of the existing structures that we have in this state, listening to what those involved in the system have to say and considering the budgetary implications that would arise from any proposal.

The government is considering in a thoughtful and measured way what is the best way to ensure that public integrity is upheld and enhanced in this state, rather than simply grabbing the model from New South Wales, chucking it on top of the rest of our legislation, with no costings, no consultation and no thought about whether or not it really fits within the existing framework of this state.

What the government is doing is taking a thoughtful, measured and considered approach that will aim to enhance and uphold public integrity and confidence in public administration in this state, rather than this ill thought-out and ill-conceived approach.

The Hon. S.G. WADE (22:21): If there are no other members who want to make a second reading contribution, I would like to sum up and close the debate at the second reading stage. I thank honourable members who have made contributions and acknowledge that a number of members have indicated to me that they stand by their statements on the record.

In terms of the contribution made by the Hon. Ann Bressington, I thank her for it, and I agree with her that this is one of the most important issues facing the state, not merely for dealing with current issues in relation to corruption but also in helping to build a future South Australia that is resilient against corruption. That seems to be an aspect that the government fails to grasp.

As I indicated in my second reading explanation, we are happy to work with the crossbenchers, and I particularly acknowledge the Hon. Ann Bressington's interest in exploring whether this bill could be enhanced, particularly in relation to whistleblower protection, and we would be keen to do that with her.

In summing up, and with a view to helping members consider their position at the second reading stage, I briefly reflect on developments that have occurred since my second reading explanation on 12 May. Before I made my second reading explanation, the Attorney-General had announced that he was going to undertake a review of the current arrangements, but the nature of that review was not clear.

Only subsequently did it become clear that only existing public sector anti-corruption agencies were invited to make submissions. These are the very people who have a direct interest in maintaining the current arrangements. The request for submissions only seeks views on current arrangements, not views on establishing an ICAC or any other mechanism.

Submissions were sought on 14 June; in other words, five weeks after they were requested, and that day happened to be a public holiday. This was hardly a well-considered review, as the Hon. Bernard Finnigan would have us believe. The Director of Public Prosecutions—one of the few people invited to make a submission—has publicly indicated that he understood that the request excluded the consideration of an ICAC.

The Attorney-General's ministerial statement clearly ruled out the public's preference for a state-based ICAC. He colourfully ridiculed calls for a state-based ICAC in the following terms. He said they were 'noisy but unsupported by a substratum of fact or logic', and, 'In the absence of evidence, logic does not [support] the need for an ICAC.' That, to me, sounds to be pre-empting the review and has all the hallmarks of a Clayton's review.

Even the review lacks the transparency and trust that anti-corruption bodies are meant to engender. The review was by invitation only and it was closed to the public. The review was not conducted with openness and, as the Hon. Bernard Finnigan has reminded the house, the minister's own ministerial statement states that he does not know how confidential the submissions might be so he will not make any of them available.

Why not say to people, 'If you are making a submission to me on a matter of public interest, please expect it to be made public'? Instead, he insists that it is, by nature, a confidential discussion. The terms of reference of the review would not consider significant changes to anti-corruption measures in South Australia. I would respond to disorderly interjections by saying, 'No, I don't believe the Attorney-General's in-house closed-door review is adequate.'

The other development since my second reading speech on 12 May was the one in Victoria. By late last year, the Brumby ALP government was the only companion of the Rann government in being sceptical about the need for an ICAC. Since then, both governments have reviewed their position. The differences in the approach between the two governments is marked and is a condemnation of the arrogance of the Rann government.

The Brumby government—a government which shares the Labor heritage—chose to have a high level, independent review and appointed an independent commissioner. It published clear and open terms of reference and its review took six months. By contrast, the Rann government's is relatively quick and dirty. It is internal to the minister's office; there is no public request for submissions; and there is a very brief time frame. Structurally, it is not designed to achieve a publicly transparent, publicly confident result.

On 2 June, six months after that review was announced, the Brumby government received the review. I think we were told on the Friday that it might take some weeks for the Brumby government to come to a view, but by 2 June (whether that was a Monday or Tuesday, I am not sure), there was the cogency for the need for an ICAC. The Victorian government was the only government that had been holding out with the Rann government against an ICAC but, within days, they accepted the need for an ICAC and they announced that move. So, this leaves South Australia as the only state in the federation which does not—

The Hon. B.V. Finnigan interjecting:

The PRESIDENT: Order! The Hon. Mr Finnigan had his go. The night will end a lot sooner without the interjections.

The Hon. R.I. Lucas interjecting:

The PRESIDENT: The Hon. Mr Lucas will remain silent. The Hon. Mr Wade.

The Hon. S.G. WADE: I will continue with my remarks and I can assure the Hon. Bernard Finnigan that I am masterfully ignoring him. He can do all he likes to get onto Hansard but I will not give him that opportunity. We are the last state in the federation without an ICAC. The arrogance of this government and its review shows that it has learnt little from the election of 20 March. We might not have been able to win a majority of seats with a majority of votes at the last election, but you can be sure we will do it at the next election.

My third reflection on the developments since my second reading explanation in the middle of May is that the government has finally put to rest the furphy of a federal ICAC. Following the Tasmanian announcement in the middle of last year that they were going to have an ICAC and comments from the then prime minister Kevin Rudd that he thought that anti-corruption commissions were an important part of public integrity, premier Rann let loose a decoy (I hope that is not offensive to any duck hunters present) of a federal ICAC. Nobody had ever suggested that an ICAC would benefit from being federally based—

Members interjecting:

The Hon. A. BRESSINGTON: Point of order, Mr President.

The PRESIDENT: Order! The Hon. Ms Bressington has a point of order.

The Hon. A. BRESSINGTON: I think that the language of the Hon. Bernie Finnigan towards the Hon. Stephen Wade was most unparliamentary and I would ask him to withdraw it.

The PRESIDENT: What did he say?

The Hon. A. BRESSINGTON: He called him an idiot.

The PRESIDENT: The Hon. Mr Finnigan should withdraw that remark.

The Hon. B.V. FINNIGAN: I withdraw it and I look forward to getting the Liberals to withdraw all their interjections, too. I would love to see some of them on the record.

The PRESIDENT: Order! The Hon. Mr Wade.

An honourable member: We'd like to get them on the record, too.

Members interjecting:

The PRESIDENT: Order! The Hon. Mr Finnigan withdrew his remarks. There is no need to carry on about it. The Hon. Mr Wade.

The Hon. S.G. WADE: In case members were not able to gain the last point through the babble from government backbenchers, the federal ICAC, which was let loose by premier Rann as an attempt to justify why he thought that he did not need to follow the lead of every other state ALP jurisdiction except, at that stage, Victoria, was this proposal for a federal ICAC. There had not been any suggestion of a federal ICAC for state-based corruption at that point.

In fact, as far as I know, other than premier Rann's idea and that of the South Australian government, there is still none. As I said in my second reading explanation, the Greens bill for a federal ICAC—and if there were a Greens member here they might defend their federal colleague—is for federal corruption. As I understand it, there is no proposal from any government or any entity other than the Rann Labor government for a federal ICAC to deal with state corruption.

I apologise to the crossbenchers because I did intend for my summing up to be shorter but, as I continue to get interrupted by government members, I will need to restate my position. The government let loose this decoy in July last year, yet in November it failed to put it on the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG) agenda. I will spell this out because the government is being belligerent in not letting me deliver my summing up.

In the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General in November, former attorney-general Atkinson chose not to put it on the agenda. If it was so important and it was the solution to corruption challenges, which presumably the Premier decided was sufficient to suggest a federal ICAC, why didn't they put it on the agenda?

In SCAG in May this year there was underwhelming interest in an ICAC. It was well known amongst the legal community, the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General and the bureaucrats that support them, but it took the Victorian announcement to flush out this government and this Attorney-General to admit that the federal ICAC was dead. It was only after that he said it was unlikely that a national ICAC would be successful.

I think the Attorney-General indicated that 'there is little support for establishing a national anti-corruption body in the foreseeable future'. Instead of being a constructive contribution to a national debate, the federal ICAC proposal has been exposed as a weak decoy by an arrogant Premier.

The fourth element of the developments since my second reading explanation in mid-May has been the Burnside saga. The Burnside council dilemma is a case study and an argument for an ICAC. The day before I tabled the bill, the New South Wales ICAC issued a report which showed that local government is almost twice as likely to engage in functions with a high risk of corruption than state agencies, making them much more vulnerable to corruption. I also note as a footnote that the Charles Sturt inquiry that the council referred to the Ombudsman in December last year is another example of a matter that could be considered by an ICAC.

I was going to leave out the next portion of my speech but, because government members are keen for me to defend my proposal, I will continue. The government is saying that there is no need for an ICAC, yet it has established a major inquiry into the Burnside council. In this context I have received an email from an officer of the Burnside council which challenges my use of the word 'corruption'. I thought it might be helpful to outline elements of the minister's ministerial statement and elements of the terms of reference, and reference them to my bill to show how useful my bill could be in terms of dealing with corruption.

I am glad that government members are interested in this. There are three elements from the minister's statement. The first statement from 22 July was that 'allegations have mounted considerably in recent months, including claims of bullying and harassment, undue influence, defamation and leaked confidential information that raise serious concerns and I need to be assured that the council is not failing in its responsibilities to the ratepayers of Burnside'. Clause 5(2)(a)(iv) of the bill provides:

conduct of a public officer or former public officer that involves the misuse of information acquired in the course of his or her official functions (whether or not for his or her benefit or for the benefit of any other person);

The leaked confidential information which the minister referred to in a ministerial statement of 22 July is clearly an example of leaked confidential information which would come within the parameters of this bill we are now bringing up in the second reading. In the second element, the minister says:

I have decided on the terms of reference for the investigation (attached) that are capable of getting to the bottom of this matter. The terms will address potential breaches of law and/or failure to meet obligations, including potential undue influence.

This bill under clause 5(2)(b)(ii) provides:

grounds for disciplinary action under any law;

And 'undue influence' under clause 5(2)(a)(i) provides:

conduct of a person that adversely affects, or could adversely affect, directly or indirectly the honest or impartial exercise of an official function by a public officer or public authority;

I put it to you, Mr President, that that is clearly covered by the minister's ministerial statement in relation to the failure to meet obligations, including potential undue influence. Considering the acute interest of government members, I will proceed with another example from the minister's statement. The minister's statement of 22 July makes clear that disciplinary action is possible resulting from the investigation.

For the benefit of government members I will read from the ministerial statement the relevant section:

Section 273 of the Local Government Act 1999 details potential actions available to the minister as a result of an investigation, ranging from:

making recommendations to council;

directions to fix problems;

recommend the Governor declare a defaulting council (possibly involving suspension of all of its councillors);

appointing administrators; and

eventually vacating positions.

I refer members to clause 5(2)(b)(iv), which provides:

grounds under any law for removing a public officer from office, whether or not the proceedings for an offence, disciplinary action, breach of the code or removal from office can still be taken.

Referring back to the minister's statement, clearly that potentially brings the Burnside inquiry into the ambit of this ICAC. I notice that the minister has lost interest, but, nonetheless, I will speak on for the record.

An honourable member interjecting:

The Hon. S.G. WADE: The government members demanded to know more about my bill; I feel duty bound to inform them. I will just clarify: that was in relation to the relevance of my bill to the minister's ministerial statement of 22 July. I thought I might turn now to the terms of reference of that investigation. First, dot point 1 under section 1 states:

...the alleged improper use of confidential council information by elected members and by staff of the council.

My ICAC bill under clause 5(2)(a)(iv) would deal with that matter. The terms of reference at dot point 2 under section 1 state:

...the obligations of elected members to act honestly and with reasonable care and diligence in the performance of the discharge of their official functions and duties.

I draw the attention of members to clause 5(2)(b)(ii), which provides:

grounds for disciplinary action under any law;

And clause 5(2)(a)(ii) provides:

conduct of a public officer that constitutes or involves a dishonest or partial exercise of his or her official functions.

The third issue I raise is term of reference 4, which states:

...whether improper weight has been placed by elected members or by staff on the council in making any decisions of council on the views and/or influence of a person who is neither an elected member or a member of staff since the 2006 election.

I remind members of clause 5(2)(a)(i) of my bill, which provides:

[Matters which involve the] conduct of a person that adversely affects, or could adversely affect, directly or indirectly the honest or impartial exercise of an official function by a public officer or public authority [are covered by this act].

I hope that deals with the inquiries by government members as to the relevance of my bill to corruption, because it provides a current example of a matter which is taxing the resources of this state in dealing with matters in relation to local government. We would not be in the position we are in in relation to the Burnside council if we had an ICAC. I would just clarify—

The Hon. P. Holloway interjecting:

The Hon. S.G. WADE: I would love to have another go; I really would. We would not be in the position we are in in relation to the Burnside council if we had an ICAC. I specifically refute the allegations of the Hon. Bernard Finnigan. I challenge him to find one place in the record where I have made a criticism of Mr Ken MacPherson. I have constantly held, and I will continue to hold, this minister accountable for her mismanagement of the local government portfolio.

I am not going to allow the Hon. Bernard Finnigan to try to provide cover for a weak and incompetent minister by trying to deflect them as a personal attack on a person who is not the target. I believe it is this minister who has mismanaged the local government portfolio and the Burnside inquiry. I believe it is this government which has failed to put in place an ICAC that could well have avoided this situation. Let me explain why an ICAC actually would have made it much less painful to deal with the Burnside situation.

Firstly, independence; we need to avoid situations where politicians are making judgments on whether or not corruption should be investigated. What we have in the local government situation is a state government politician who has, to be frank, political allies in the local government sector and who is being asked to decide whether or not corruption allegations should be investigated. It is important that we establish independence in determining whether there is a case of corruption to answer. We need independence in terms of who is the investigator.

Now, under the current system, the minister for local government in relation to local government matters has actually got to find an investigator. That, in itself, is a choice and that, in itself, raises a factor for dispute in the process of dealing with corruption. Also, there is an issue of independence in terms of the setting of time frames, the costings that are provided and the processes that are involved.

Surely this house does not need any more reminding that those issues are contentious. I am constantly raising issues in relation to those matters in this house. If we had an independent ICAC and those matters were in the hands of an independent ICAC, the independent ICAC would have the confidence of the state to get on with the job. To be frank, I do not have confidence in this government; I do not have confidence in this minister.

An ICAC would also have flexibility, which would have given us a better capacity to deal with the Burnside situation. For example, we understand that there are at least two, if not more, distinct elements in the investigation in relation to Burnside. With an ICAC, one or other of those elements might well have been able to have been dispatched before the others needed to be resolved. We would not have been held up by a specific, time-limited investigation, where the investigator feels that they need to deliver one report. An ICAC could have dealt with them as separate references and delivered them as separate reports. An ongoing body would have that flexibility.

Thirdly, an ongoing ICAC would have, in the Burnside context, had momentum. It would already have been set up so that on 22 June 2009, when the minister for local government decided an investigation was warranted (or for that matter, on its own motion), an ICAC would have been set up, ready to go to get on with the job. Instead, the minister had to decide she was going to have one; she had to find an investigator, get the staff, get the resources, presumably had speak to the Treasury about the funding and time was lost, if you like, in that process in and of itself.

Fourthly, if we had had an independent ICAC operating in June last year, we would not have lost the time that we have lost through the lack of established processes and protocols. The minister has repeatedly told us that the natural justice period has started. No, I withdraw that. I can only recall on one occasion that she told us that it had started. That was on 31 March, four months ago. She has constantly told us that it is about to start but still, apparently, it is yet to start.

If we had an established ICAC, if on 22 June last year an ICAC could have taken on that role, the ICAC would have already had established policies and protocols in relation to how matters were going to be dealt with, including natural justice periods. So, instead of losing months as the government, the investigator and crown law discuss how best to implement a natural justice period, we could have actually got on with the job. Instead, here we are; what was meant to be a 12-week inquiry is now a 12-month inquiry.

I just want to make sure that I do not lose track of the numbers—I think this is point No. 5. I also submit that an ICAC would have been more economical. This inquiry is going to cost us $1 million. For a government that can make rash costings on stadiums and add a hundred million there and a hundred million there, $1 million might sound awfully humble.

I just remind honourable members that the Ombudsman's office, one of the most valued public accountability mechanisms in this state, I would say, costs this state $1.6 million a year; in other words, only 60 per cent more than the Burnside investigation is going to cost us. I submit that an ongoing ICAC would have done as good a job as Mr MacPherson I am sure will do. It would have been able to do so more efficiently, demonstrated by the fact that the Ombudsman's office can manage to run all of its references for the 2009-10 year for $1.6 million.

I apologise to those crossbench MPs who inquired as to how long I was going to speak. I gave them a much shorter estimate, but I would claim provocation. I would now like to conclude by saying that the government is putting forward a range of bills at the moment which it says are the fulfilment of election commitments. There is a touch of humility there.

Last parliament, the government continued to talk about fulfilling its mandate. In fact, it was threatening to abolish this council because it was so determined to fulfil its mandate and it felt that we were getting in its way. Thankfully, we do not hear the mandate word anymore and nor should we, because they have lost their mandate.

At the last election, the Liberal Party won 51.6 per cent of the two-party preferred vote. I would remind the government that the overwhelming majority of voters supported parties—in other words, any party other than the Labor Party—who named an ICAC as a central policy. The mandate for this piece of legislation goes far beyond the Liberal Party. It goes far beyond anything this government has been able to achieve.

I ask the government to get out of the way and give the people of South Australia what they want. They want an ICAC which is effective, to deal with any issues of corruption as they arise, but also, to make South Australia a healthy, resilient community, that is robust against the onset of corruption, wherever it may emerge.

Bill read a second time.

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