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House of Assembly - Fifty-Fourth Parliament, First Session (54-1)
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Bills

Statutes Amendment (Screening) Bill

Committee Stage

In committee.

(Continued from 2 May 2019.)

Clause 9.

The CHAIR: Welcome to today's committee. It looks as though we got part of the way through clause 9. Are there any further questions on clause 9?

Ms HILDYARD: My question is: what strategies will be employed to ensure that people know about the 28-day requirement?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Firstly, the proposed details will be on the website once the bill is passed, eventually; secondly, there will be a communications program; and, thirdly, there will be an information pack that goes out at the time of a volunteer check being done.

Ms HILDYARD: Following that answer, will the communication of information about the maximum penalty of $5,000 be included specifically in the communication?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: That has been finalised at this point, as to the content of it, but it would be very unusual for the particulars of a penalty to be outlined in relation to a matter. The presumption usually is that people know what the legal position is, but it may well be one that is worthwhile adding in so that we make it absolutely clear. Thank you for the suggestion.

Ms HILDYARD: Given the incredible volume of generous volunteers here in South Australia in an incredible volume of organisations, how much will the communication effort cost?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I am not sure whether that has been designed at this point. I will just add to the last answer that what is most important is that, in these circumstances, the expectation is that there will be an expiation fee of $315. That may also need to be added.

The CHAIR: Last question, member for Reynell.

An honourable member: She has had three.

The CHAIR: I know she has had three. I am going to speak about that in a moment, but I will let her ask this one.

Ms HILDYARD: In relation to clause 9, but on a different matter, I know plenty of sporting, recreation and other clubs and organisations where people's volunteering will sometimes be rewarded with a range of things—perhaps a dinner at the club or a voucher for club apparel, etc. Where exactly will the line be drawn between a volunteer being thanked or rewarded for their efforts with some sort of gift, voucher or whatever it might be, and being paid for work undertaken?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: They are not in employment. That would be part of an honorarium, which is specifically excluded under the volunteers law.

Ms WORTLEY: My question is in relation to new section 33A(4). Would an expiation be issued as soon as the 28-day period under subsection (3) was breached? Would the person receive information with regard to that?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: As with other noncompliance obligations, if the noncompliance is reported, it would need to be investigated and assessed, and the expiation would be issued after that time. That is the same with any noncompliance or offence process, that that would need to be undertaken first.

Ms WORTLEY: Can you guarantee that a person will receive a warning or a notice from the department that they are required to pay the department back? Could the department receive a flag that someone with a free screening has now undertaken a day of paid employment, but that person not be notified about the 28 days and immediately an expiation fee be issued?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: No.

Ms WORTLEY: 'No' is your answer to that. Clarifying that, can a person who is covered by a free volunteer check undertake an hour of paid employment that requires a working with children check each month for seven months and then, should they undertake a further day of employment, have to notify the department within 28 days or be issued with an expiation fine of $315?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Correct, as has been outlined numerous times in this committee.

The Hon. Z.L. BETTISON: I have a question in regard to the expiation. If they fail to comply, they are guilty of an offence with a maximum penalty of $5,000 and an expiation of $315. How does that compare with other areas of policy legislation? It seems to me that it is quite a significant fine. How does it compare with other areas?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Consistent with what is applicable with expiation fees, the fee is close to $108. This is three times that, which is commensurate with the allocation of an expiation fee of this kind.

The Hon. Z.L. BETTISON: My question is about recording and recognising the number of expiation notices on an annual basis. Where will we have access to that? How transparent will it be for us to see how many volunteers have now got work but have not paid for their screening and have been fined? How will we know how many people have been fined?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: It is in the police data.

Clause passed.

Clause 10.

Ms COOK: Could the Deputy Premier please explain the rationale of the changes that clause 10 countenances?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: This is an existing provision in relation to the records management system, which simply makes clear that the central assessment unit is in possession of the relevant information. In other words, you are not expected to go out and search it; it is to be made available as per the model that already exists. This is just a minor amendment.

Ms COOK: Can the Deputy Premier clarify who actually has access to that record system?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The unit is responsible for that, but I am advised that the 2016 legislation allows for public access to information that is already in situ.

Ms COOK: You said the public have access to it. By what method? How are the public able to access that?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I am advised that, in relation to employer, employee and volunteer, they will have their own identifier number to access that information. Generally, in relation to the public who are seeking information regarding prohibited persons, there is a process for that. They do not get immediate direct access to it; they get information once they have established their cause.

The CHAIR: Member for Hurtle Vale, given that you sought clarification to the previous question—

Ms COOK: Yes, it was clarification.

The CHAIR: It was? I will allow this one.

Ms COOK: Thank you. My final question on this clause is: is the information we are discussing in relation to clause 10 all part of the live update system? Is it all part of that new interface where any information will immediately change what is stored at that level?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I am not sure that clause 10 will help you with that. In relation to the central assessment unit, which is having a minor change here, I think what the member is getting at is in relation to access to that. I am advised that in relation to that, as I say, it is not within the provision that is seeking to deal with that, but there is a process already in place to enable continuous updating to occur. The process of how it is going to be available is yet to be fully fleshed out, but this clause does not help you in that regard.

Clause passed.

Clause 11.

Ms COOK: Again, this is a very broad question. Can the Deputy Premier explain the rationale of the changes that are contained within clause 11 and how they are countenanced.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I think these are all in the explanation of clauses but, for the benefit of the member, I indicate that section 38 of the prohibited persons act provides:

A court that finds a person guilty of a prescribed offence must ensure that the prescribed information relating to the finding of guilt is provided, in accordance with the regulations, to the central assessment unit.

Clause 11 makes a consequential amendment for that purpose.

Ms COOK: In respect of people who have committed offences or have been charged with offences, during the last period of questioning I recall the Deputy Premier clarifying for us that somebody who worked with a child—I believe the example was at a place like a McDonald's; they worked alongside a young person at a place like McDonald's—was not required to have a screening undertaken because they worked alongside, or with, or next to, rather than actually working with the child, which I understand to be delivering some kind of service to the child.

Is there any concern regarding people working next to children, that is, supervising the child, as opposed to working with the child? They do not have to be screened, versus these people who do have to be screened. So somebody could be working with a child in a workplace who has an offence, or has committed an offence, but they are not screened. Are there any concerns about the risk around that?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I expect these are all matters that were raised at the time of the development of the screening laws, including by the previous government. One of the things to balance here is the opportunity for young people to have a job. The last thing we want is for industries that are providing employment to young people to be so overloaded with requirements in relation to the rest of their workforce that they say, 'We're not going to take on 16 and 17 year olds.' That would be a disaster. Clearly, they are matters that were under consideration under the previous laws developed by the previous government, and we are continuing it.

Clause passed.

Clause 12.

Ms COOK: Again, I am seeking clarification around the rationale of changes that clause 12 countenances.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I refer to my previous answers to questions from the member for Torrens and the member for Ramsay.

Mr PICTON: I would like to ask a question in relation to clause 12, which I understand puts the onus on the Commissioner of Police to inform the central screening unit of any prescribed charges that have been laid. What work has been done with the police in terms of making sure that their systems are going to be up to date, in order to make sure that that can happen in a timely way.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: A lot.

Mr PICTON: Perhaps the Attorney-General could elaborate slightly in terms of the work that has been undertaken and also in terms of what the expected time frames are. The proposal under the bill is that it be done as soon is reasonably practicable after the person is charged. What does that mean in terms of the time frames that would be happening under this clause?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I am not quite sure how much the previous government did in the two years that they were trying to deal with this matter and not completing it, so I cannot answer for that period of time. I can only answer for the last 14 months or so of our continuing to do the work that had already been passed in relation to this. That is already operational and, yes, the police have been a party that has been continuously consulted throughout the development of the regulations and the necessary amendments for that purpose.

Mr PICTON: I restate the second part of my question, which is that the bill talks about that this should be done as soon as reasonably practicable after the person is charged. What does the Attorney see to be reasonable in the circumstances of how quickly the central screening unit should be advised of charges laid under this section?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: We are already doing it. I imagine it depends on the amount of information that they get within any time period, so it would vary. This has been operating for some time and entails the obligation of the police to provide them in real time, which is already operational.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: My understanding of clause 12 is that it requires the Commissioner of Police to advise the unit of a presumptive disqualification offence. My recollection, from the brief time that we had canvassing this bill last sitting week, was that in new section 26A we included the presumptive disqualification offence at 26A(4), so this will be a new thing for the Commissioner of Police to be advising the unit of those presumptive disqualification offences.

I am not sure that the Deputy Premier's advice to the committee that they have been doing this for some time—advising the unit of those who have been found guilty of a presumptive disqualification offence—might actually stand up. The Deputy Premier has just advised the committee that South Australia Police have done a lot of work on this to make sure that they can adequately, accurately and quickly communicate to the unit those people who have been found guilty of a presumptive disqualification offence. My question is: can she detail to the committee the work that has been done by South Australia Police?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: It is all consistent with continuous monitoring now. Those items that are now in the presumptive category are actually already material that the police currently provide. I do not know how much clearer I can make that. Obviously, in relation to the process, it is already occurring. This formalises it in relation to the presumptive obligations but those offences that are currently to be captured under the new prescribed offences or in the presumptive disqualification is actually information that is already being provided by the police to the unit.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I must admit that I am somewhat confused by the Deputy Premier's answers. In answering the member for Kaurna's first question about what work had been done by South Australia Police and the commissioner in order to prepare for this new requirement that the legislation confers upon him, she said that a lot of work had been done. The evidence to the parliament now seems to have changed to all that is being done, in effect, is what has already been done in police communications to the unit.

That would then mean that there has not been a lot of work that has been done; in fact, it is conceivable that no additional work has been done by South Australia Police to prepare for both new 26A, which is to be inserted into the act by virtue of clause 8, and indeed the new requirement under the current clause we are discussing, that is, clause 12. So can I ask the Deputy Premier: what has occurred, for the purposes of this particular clause in this particular bill, for South Australia Police to be better prepared to communicate this information to the screening unit?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I refer you to my previous answer.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I am not surprised that we have no further particulars from the Deputy Premier. Perhaps it would seem obvious to the casual observer to this exchange that the Deputy Premier shot off an answer half-cocked to the member for Kaurna's first question about a lot of work having been done by the police commissioner; then her subsequent advice was that no further work has been done and all that has been happening is a continuation of past—

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: A point of order, Chair: that was a most offensive and rude statement by the member in relation to South Australia Police. I urge the member to review the actual question of the member for Hurtle Vale in relation to this matter as to the work done for the police, on not just this clause but all the regulations and reforms in this area, and not to make such disgraceful allegations about the police.

The CHAIR: Attorney, you are suggesting that it was an offensive remark.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: And I ask him to withdraw it.

The CHAIR: Was it offensive to you as the member?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Yes, indeed.

The CHAIR: The Attorney finds your comment offensive, member for Lee. Are you prepared to withdraw it?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I have to beg your indulgence, Chair, because the offence that the Deputy Premier seeks to take from my remarks she tells us was in relation to my recollection of her response to a question that the member for Hurtle Vale asked. Unfortunately, what I had been raising was a response that she gave to the member for Kaurna, so perhaps the Deputy Premier needs to review the comments that she has made to this house, lest she be inadvertently causing an offence by genuinely impeding the business of the house by wilfully misleading us.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I seek an apology from the member forthwith.

The CHAIR: The Deputy Premier has indicated she finds the words offensive. We need to get on with this. I ask you, member for Lee, to withdraw your comments.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I would be more than happy to withdraw but I am genuinely confused about what I have done.

Mr Pederick: No, just withdraw. That's what you were asked.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I was asking a question about what the member for Kaurna had asked and she took offence to something in relation to the member for Hurtle Vale, so what have I offended? Please just explain to me what I have offended and I will withdraw it. Just explain what I have done and I am happy to withdraw it. I am happy to do so, sir.

The CHAIR: There is no need for us to spend any more time or expand on this, member for Lee. The Attorney has found your comments offensive and I ask you to withdraw.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: For whichever comments I made to offend the Deputy Premier most recently, I withdraw fulsomely, unreservedly and apologise.

The CHAIR: Thank you. Are you getting to your question?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: As I was saying, we had a response to a question to the member for Kaurna where the Deputy Premier said a lot of work had been done by the police to prepare the commissioner for his new responsibilities under this section of the bill where he will be responsible for telling the screening unit of those people who had been deemed guilty of a presumptive disqualification offence—a new offence that has been inserted in the course of the previous discussions on this bill for 26A under clause 8 of the bill.

My question, by which I inadvertently grievously offended the Deputy Premier, was that her response seemed to be at odds with her subsequent advice to the house that, in fact, what was occurring was just the continuation of the current practice of the commissioner advising the screening unit of offences that they were aware of. It is not clear from the Deputy Premier's advice whether she is mistaken between those two different responses in either of those responses or, indeed, if she is saying that the current process by which the Commissioner of Police is communicating offences to the screening unit will effectively be replicated for the communication of these new presumptive disqualification offences. If that is the case, can the Deputy Premier confirm that?

Secondly, could she also provide some advice, rather than cursory reference to her previous advice to the house, which did not get to the root of these questions, about how exactly the Commissioner of Police is communicating these offences to the screening unit? How much effort is going into this? What is the consumption of resources by South Australia Police in conferring this advice to the screening unit? How many pieces of advice, or how many offences, are they reporting to the screening unit, and how many do they anticipate reporting to the screening unit under the terms of this clause?

The CHAIR: I think, Attorney, there are about four questions.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: In relation to the numbers and the consumption of resources, I do not have the answer to that. That will be a matter that the member can direct to SAPOL, but we have had no indication that it is going to be prohibitive for the purposes of them undertaking their responsibility. I confirm that a lot of consultation has occurred with SAPOL in relation to the development of these amendments, the regulations, the continuing obligations that they will have and what has been formalised in the new presumptive disqualification process, which happens to cover information about which, I am advised, they are already currently advising the unit. I hope that is crystal clear for the member.

The Hon. A. KOUTSANTONIS: What is the penalty for not informing the unit of a police officer laying a charge of a prescribed offence or a presumptive disqualification for SAPOL?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: It is not an offence for a police officer not to provide it under this law, in the penalties that are there. There are very often obligations of a mandatory nature for members in the public sector to undertake certain duties. It may well be some potential breach in relation to their code of practice as to their own operation, but there is nothing in this act.

The Hon. A. KOUTSANTONIS: I understand that you have been previously asked this, but I was just hoping that perhaps between the houses you could provide the committee or the house, on notice, the cost to SAPOL of this new requirement, created by the deletion of the former clause.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I would be happy to get that if in fact they were going to be doing any extra work on it. What they are advising us and what I am advised here again today is that they are already providing this information to the unit as the types of offences that have been referred to. There is an obligation going into this legislation for them to cover the presumptive disqualification matters, but I am advised that, of those offences, they are already providing that information to the unit.

We have not been informed of any indication by SAPOL that under the obligations of this legislation—that is, to formalise, in this instance ,a continuing practice—there are any extra costs or resources required (a 'consumption of resources', as referred to by the member for Lee) so I am assuming that, if there are any, they will be absorbing them.

The Hon. A. KOUTSANTONIS: I always get concerned when we take out broad references in legislation. In the section that is being deleted, where the Commissioner of Police will provide information to a central assessment unit, paragraph (b) provides:

(b) may disclose to the central assessment unit any information on any matter relevant to the operation of this Act.

That is being deleted from the bill and in its place a very prescriptive series of prescribed offences is being inserted. I am wondering whether the Attorney has received any advice about the narrowing of the scope or the freedom for the commissioner to provide information to a central assessment unit on a broader range of topics.

For example, perhaps someone who has not been charged but is under current police surveillance—perhaps a suspect in a criminal investigation, someone who perhaps has had complaints made against them but there is no formal charge pending as yet—would enable the commissioner, under the old section, to inform the central assessment unit that, 'Despite person A having no charges laid against them, they are under a long-term investigation, and I am informing you that this person should not be given a clearance to work with children.'

But, under the new clause—and I could be wrong, perhaps the Attorney has an answer to this—the narrowing of scope takes that freedom away from the commissioner or any police investigative unit to inform the central unit that would be issuing these clearances of information that may be pertinent or not as to whether this individual should be working with children. Off the top of my head, obviously active investigations are one of them, and closed investigations could be another.

Often police investigate, I would imagine, child sex offences or other matters involving children where no charges are laid because a lack of evidence does not justify a charge but police have very serious concerns or suspicions. An investigating officer may want to inform this unit of a person, even though that person was not charged.

I assume the reason we had paragraph (b) in the old clause was that it allowed police to inform this unit that there should be some caution taken toward whether or not this person should be allowed to work with children or given a clearance. I ask the Attorney if she could clear that up for the house because I imagine all members would be very concerned if we narrowed the scope of the ability of the police and the commissioner to inform the unit we trust to make sure our children are safe.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I would urge the member to review, in clause 15, new 42B(1)(c), which covers that.

Members interjecting:

The CHAIR: The Attorney referred the member for West Torrens to a particular clause to give an answer to the question. Could you repeat that, please?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Clause 14, 42B(1)(c), which we are yet to deal with. The council has split those obligations but they are still there.

Ms HILDYARD: Attorney, can you please elaborate on discussions between SAPOL, the NDIS commission and the government about how this provision will work in terms of its alignment with the provisions relating to reporting to the NDIS commission?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I will start by saying that in the two years since the commencement of the arrangement and the development of the NDIS matter, which has of course been over a period of time prior to the new government, I cannot account for what discussions took place in that period. But, in the last 14 months with the acuity of ensuring that these obligations are in place, given the urgency and desire from everybody to progress the NDIS obligations, discussions have been considerable and ongoing because the regulations are now proposed to incorporate that. There has been a very considerable team of people working on that and this screening bill of course is complementary to the concluding of that obligation.

Ms HILDYARD: That does not really answer my question. I appreciate that there have been discussions between SAPOL, the government and the NDIS commission, but my specific question is about the content and any agreements and conclusions as a result of those discussions about how the reporting requirements to this central screening unit will align with the reporting requirements to the NDIS commission.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Consistent with, I understand, national proposed practice in this regard, the information goes to the unit and the unit then gives the advice to the NDIS.

Ms HILDYARD: Are you saying, in that answer, that this clause somehow negates the requirement for a report to be simultaneously made to the NDIS commission?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: No, the information that is given from the unit—because I think that was the question asked—

Ms HILDYARD: No, it was not.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Well, let me clarify that. The information that goes to the unit—if somebody has not had a screening test who should have, then the unit advises NDIS. If there is other information you are asking about, could you indicate what it is?

Ms HILDYARD: Just to be really clear, you are saying that this clause results in the unit being required to make reports to the NDIS commission.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: To be clear, clause 12 does not deal with that issue, but as you have asked the general question we will get the answer anyway so that the member can be reassured on that. I hope this assists because, while this piece of legislation does not deal with that issue at all, I am able to inform you that my understanding, on the information I have regarding how the NDIS commission ultimately gets information about some risk, is that the police report to the unit, the unit conducts a risk assessment and the unit may decide to refer this matter nationally—and there is a national process for that.

Under the NDIS law—which is not what we are dealing with today, to be clear—there are a number of people under that legislation who have obligations, including employers and people who are service providers, etc., even people who are bound to have a screen. That is a different process.

What it culminates in—and I hope I am saying this correctly—are three things: the leftover check process for the purposes of child protection, which has one origin of law; the NDIS new regime that is coming through as to how that is going to have some application; and, thirdly, overlapping that, the volunteer process. So the origins of obligation and who is responsible for that for the reporting process is within the NDIS law.

The CHAIR: Member for Reynell, you have had three questions and in my assessment—

Ms HILDYARD: There is one spontaneously arising from—

The CHAIR: Member for Reynell, I am speaking. Your most recent question was more relevant, to my mind, to clause 13 than to clause 12 really. If you have another question—

Ms HILDYARD: Not if you understand the provisions of the NDIS act, it is not.

The CHAIR: That is my reading of it. Do you have a final question on clause 12?

Ms HILDYARD: Arising from the Attorney-General's answers, when the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission was set up there was a focus on ensuring that screening and reporting met a national standard for NDIS workers and people receiving services and support through the NDIS. Can you assure the house that, through this particular provision, the alignment of national standards around reporting happens?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: In relation to this, I am advised that, as this bill relates to the protection of children, it really is a question on an entirely different subject matter. However, the NDIS rules and the intergovernmental agreement make that provision. In fact, only last week I was visiting the Public Advocate's office—the commission is in the same building and operates there—and I met with the new advocate for disability. He is obviously working through the process in conjunction with the commission. Nothing has been reported to me that indicates that there is any problem there, and it is entirely independent of what we are actually canvassing in clause 12.

Ms Hildyard: That's a bit worrying. It's completely separate.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: You asked questions. I was happy to give you an answer and I have done so for two questions, but clause 12 has nothing to do with the obligation in that regard and I hope you are reassured by that. If you need some more information about the national commission, which, as I say, operates here in Adelaide and has an office here, then perhaps we can organise a briefing

Clause passed.

Clause 13.

Ms COOK: Where the act requires reporting bodies, as defined by the new section, to notify the central assessment unit if they suspect a person with whom the body is dealing to pose an unacceptable risk to children, how is the report documented and progressed?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: New section 39A is designed to ensure that both the Teachers Registration Board and the Education Standards Board SA—and any other governing bodies, because a reporting party is referred to in that section—have the capacity to share information. This is what this is really all about. It is a new obligation. It has the data anyway, but it is going to be obliged to report that information, and it will be capable of doing that because of the other restrictions.

Ms COOK: I think I missed the first one. You said the Teachers Registration Board and the—

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The Education Standards Board.

Ms COOK: Is there a comprehensive list of the organisations that are obligated to do this reporting process?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: They will be created under regulations, and those are the two that we intend to regulate.

Ms COOK: If somebody is reported to the unit by one of these bodies and that process is undertaken because they are suspected of being a risk to children but that is then overturned due to an investigation process or further information, what is the process for that to be overturned?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I am not entirely sure whether you are asking about the screening or the disposal of the information.

Ms COOK: You are not entirely sure whether I am asking about what, sorry?

The CHAIR: Could you clarify the question, please.

Ms COOK: In terms of the information that is disclosed or reported to the unit, because of a predicted or an unacceptable risk assessment, and then suddenly retracted, changed or altered, what process is undertaken to change or remove that information trail?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: There is no destruction of the information, but I will refer the member to the Freedom of Information Act, which I am sure she will get used to in opposition and which allows parties to make an application for the correction of records, and that might give some answer to that. We are not in the business of destroying information. Information is presented, and if in fact there is no consequence as a result of the assessment that there is no longer unacceptable risk, the information is there but it is not progressed for the purposes of arguing that somebody needs to be excluded from either employment or work.

Ms COOK: Just to clarify, the information, once presented, remains within the system. So if Joe the goose gets accused of doing something inappropriate in front of a minor, or with a minor, and that gets reported through to the unit and then Bill the goat says, 'I made it up because Joe the goose nicked five bucks from me and I wanted to get him back,' all that information stays there and Joe the goose has a notation within the record-keeping system; it does not get deleted. Is that what you are saying?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Correct.

The Hon. A. KOUTSANTONIS: Clause 13 requires bodies to make declarations to an assessment unit. Does that include ICAC?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: No.

The Hon. A. KOUTSANTONIS: Can I ask why it does not include ICAC?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: In relation to this legislation, it does not, but, as the member would be aware—he probably knows the ICAC Act better than most people here—as public authorities and public officers, there are obligations to report certain information in respect of suspected corruption and/or maladministration or misconduct. They have obligations under different laws, but this is not relevant to that.

The Hon. A. KOUTSANTONIS: I will put to the Attorney-General where I think this clause lacks in not including the ICAC. The ICAC has extraordinary powers of coercion. If they are investigating, for example—

Members interjecting:

The Hon. A. KOUTSANTONIS: If the deputy leader was confronted with this, I think perhaps the ICAC should be considered as a reporting agency. Given what the Attorney has said, I think what she is telling the house is that the ICAC has other ways of reporting these measures. For example, if something was discovered on a computer or through the course of its investigations they make other notifications and those other bodies are then notified—it could be SAPOL, for example—they would be required under this act to then report that to the central assessment unit. But often ICAC does not report these matters to SAPOL until their investigation is concluded.

The Hon. V.A. Chapman interjecting:

The Hon. A. KOUTSANTONIS: The Attorney-General says, 'No, that's not correct,' that they report as they go along. That is not right.

The Hon. V.A. Chapman interjecting:

The Hon. A. KOUTSANTONIS: It is great that you are disagreeing with me under your breath, but it is rather disorderly, while we sit quietly and listen to her explanations, for the Attorney to interrupt while I expand on a clause.

The CHAIR: Well, I am not hearing what the Attorney is saying, member for West Torrens.

The Hon. A. KOUTSANTONIS: That is unfortunate, sir.

The CHAIR: I am not able to hear that, so you continue and work towards your question.

The Hon. A. KOUTSANTONIS: My point is this: if the ICAC uses coercive powers to investigate a public officer and in the course of that investigation finds other criminal activity, there is no requirement under this legislation that the central assessment unit be informed, but the ICAC may make its own determination to inform SAPOL at a later date. In the meantime, if the person who is a person of interest under ICAC makes an application for a clearance to work with children and the state—and the ICAC is a member of the executive—has information that this person would be inappropriate, this act does not require the ICAC commissioner to provide that information to the central assessment unit.

The question I have is: why not? Why would you not want every agency that has coercive powers and is able to look at an individual's conduct, if they uncover something that would render them incapable or suggest they should not be working with children, to inform the central assessment unit immediately upon learning it? Under the old act, police could inform a central assessment unit on the basis of an investigation, not a charge—that has been removed. I do not accept the Attorney's argument that it is being dealt with later, after having read it more clearly.

Now we have the ICAC, which is not required to report to the central assessment unit. I suppose the fundamental question is: why would you not want every agency that uncovers information to have a legal requirement to report this as quickly as possible in order to keep our children safe?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: If information came to the attention of the Teachers Registration Board or the Education Standards Board, which are the proposed parties here as to reporting of unacceptable risk to children, that uncovers material that they consider would be of interest to ICAC, and as a public officer they would have some obligation under different laws, that is a matter for them. As to the rest of the diatribe, I did not understand it; it seemed completely nonsensical.

Ms HILDYARD: Attorney, how will data received by the central assessment unit about persons who pose or potentially pose an unacceptable risk to children be shared with the NDIS commission?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I am advised that once the unacceptable risk has been assessed in the positive, that is, that they are, then the screening is revoked and the commission is advised. I do not know whether it is by email, letter, courier pigeon or whatever, but they will be advised. It is by data transfer.

Ms HILDYARD: Thank you; that is helpful. Given that nexus between this new provision in the bill, how will the intergovernmental agreement on the NDIS be impacted by this bill being passed, given what you have just said?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: This is the bill that enacts the obligations under the intergovernmental agreement. Is there anything in particular? We are still talking about child protection at this end, but we will get to the NDIS shortly.

Ms HILDYARD: That is right, so I am asking what is the impact in terms of any changes needed to the intergovernmental agreement as a result of these new provisions. The intergovernmental agreement was agreed some time ago.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: This is designed to meet the obligations under the agreement.

Ms HILDYARD: So, there is nothing that is new or different or alters any of those obligations under the intergovernmental agreement in relation to the NDIS?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I will make it clear. These terms are to implement the obligations under the intergovernmental agreement. We do not have some separate model in South Australia; these are under the terms of that agreement. My understanding is that that will be national, if it is not already.

Ms HILDYARD: Given that, can the Attorney guarantee that all the provisions of this bill absolutely accord with the provisions of the intergovernmental agreement in relation to screening?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: My understanding is that the proposals in this bill are entirely to implement the obligations under the intergovernmental agreement. I am advised that there is some movement in relation to how that is going to play out because, of course, it is still a new system that is coming in. For example, in South Australia the offence of bestiality is currently in the prescribed list, and it is being proposed in this bill to move to the presumptive on the basis of what is currently being discussed nationally. That particular issue may not currently be in the agreement because that is moving along. So we are agreeing, I suppose, to assume that responsibility.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I draw the Deputy Premier's attention to new section 39A(2):

A notification under subsection (1)(a) must be made in a manner and form determined by the central assessment unit.

As we have canvassed previously, we are seeking to cast the net a little wider beyond the responsibilities of the Commissioner of Police to other agencies. In what manner and form does the central assessment unit require this information to be provided to it?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: My understanding is that, in respect of these two boards, which is what we are talking about, it will be agreed by the central assessment unit as to how that data is going to be transferred and transmitted—standard form, email or whatever the process is that they determine is going to be both consistent and effective.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: It is the last word of the Deputy Premier's response that is of particular concern to me, and that is how effective the communication is. Understanding in what form this information is communicated to the central assessment unit and whether it is readily appreciable by the person who receives that information, that there is something about a person who has been informed about that makes it absolutely clear that there should be some sort of disqualification, for want of a better term, of their ability to have a role which allows them to interact with children. That is why I am seeking the information about the form in which this information is to be communicated. I am interested as to whether it can be emailed, etc., but what is actually required to be spelt out in the communication?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I think that will change from case to case. In the form, it is expected to be in writing—that is, it will be transmitted via the electronic system—but obviously what is the content of that information will depend entirely on what information each of the boards may be given for the purposes of them making the assessment that there is an unacceptable risk and having the obligation to report it. That will vary depending on the case that comes before them. But the expectation is that this will be in writing and it will be transmitted electronically, bearing in mind that it is the unit that then conducts the assessment.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I appreciate that that will be the requirement, and that is of course necessary and proper. For consistency's sake and for ease of the recipient's use, is there some proforma or some electronic form, or is there some consistent basis by which somebody must provide information to the screening unit so that when the person receives that information they can look at a particular part of that communication and make a very quick assessment that, yes, this is something that needs to be actioned to ensure that that person is no longer able to interact with children? If there is a proforma, is it possible, but perhaps not right now, for that to be provided?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I am advised there is a form in the system, but at this first instance the monitoring notification may be transmitted not necessarily in the form but in writing.

Clause passed.

Clause 14.

The CHAIR: Any questions on clause 14?

Ms Stinson: I had some for 13, but I was not asked.

The CHAIR: Nobody came to their feet.

Ms Stinson: You did not call for any. She had not finished answering the question.

The CHAIR: What you need to do, member for Badcoe, is stand when you seek the call. I was not aware that you were looking to ask a question. My apologies. Clause 14, any questions? Member for Hurtle Vale.

Ms COOK: Thank you, Chair. In regard to bodies that may need to access information, other than those covered already in subsection (3)(a), do you imagine that there are any bodies that need to access information?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I think we are back on No. 13. I indicated that there were two boards that are intended to be incorporated in that, and they are the only two boards at this point.

The CHAIR: Any further questions on clause 14? Member for Elizabeth.

Mr ODENWALDER: Attorney, I have come a little late into this debate, so I apologise if I am taking you over old ground. I draw your attention to 42B(1)(b), where it states that the Commissioner of Police is authorised to disclose information related to criminal history. Could you expand upon the scope of 'criminal history' in that section and whether it is defined anywhere? For instance, does it include just convictions? Does it include charges? Does it include allegations without any charge or conviction? Can you give us an idea of the scope of that criminal history?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I will add to this, because it is helpful, in a moment. My understanding is that it would have the date and particulars of the offence and of convictions, and it may well have some of the sentencing details. I will just check in relation to charges that are formally withdrawn and/or dismissed.

Mr ODENWALDER: Attorney, are there any limitations on the types of offences? I understand what you are saying about charges, and charges withdrawn and so on, but is there any limitation on the types of offences? It seems to indicate that it is not limited to offences that are directly related to the act, but are there any limits to those offences?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The member is correct: it does not have to be restricted to just child protection offences or child exploitation charges. In response to the earlier question, I am advised that they do from time to time identify areas where charges were laid and, for whatever reason, there was no prosecution ultimately recorded. Obviously, that may assist in the assessment, particularly if there is some pattern of behaviour.

Mr ODENWALDER: Sorry to drill down a little bit further into this—and I understand your point and thank you for making it—but would the definition of criminal history also include allegations made that were never brought to charges? Do you understand what I am saying?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I do not think I do.

Mr ODENWALDER: There is a police report and then it is dismissed before it reaches the point of charge.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I do not know the answer to that question, but I would certainly expect not. Bear in mind that, if the police are asked to investigate these matters further—because, obviously, as a result of information that comes through this process they may be looking for somebody of interest who needs to be considered for the purpose of prosecution—I have no doubt that they would continue, under the obligations that we have already referred to in this committee, to refer those back.

To some degree, it is a two-way street: to assist in the screening for the purposes of quarantining, as much as possible, vulnerable children from exploitation and also to alert the police, when looking at the criminal history, as to what the information might glean for the purposes of any investigation they might either be undertaking or continuing to undertake.

Another thing to be cognisant of in this whole division 5 is that it is about information sharing. That is largely to ensure that there is a legislative provision to comply with the Intergovernmental Agreement on National Exchange of Criminal History Information for People Working with Children (ECHIPWC) agreement. I have no idea what that says, but I am sure it is for the benefit of what we are trying to achieve here.

Mr ODENWALDER: This last question is just for clarification really, and I apologise if it is old ground that you have been over, Attorney. In the case of the Commissioner of Police sharing criminal history information with the agencies, disclosing information to those listed agencies, who makes the determination about what the appropriate type of information is? The request comes to the Commissioner of Police. Does the Commissioner of Police have any discretion about what information to disclose or what not to disclose?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: If you are just talking about the criminal history, then that is a matter entirely at the discretion of the police. They are obliged to satisfy the obligations under that rule, but that is more in relation to clause 12, which we have already canvassed. Here their obligation is a clause designed under 42B to give other intergovernmental agreed agencies—that is, similar assessment units—access to the police information.

However, if you want to go back to the obligation of the police, that is under clause 12, and the clause I also referred to in addition to that which, going back to the original legislation, I think was under section 42 as it currently stands. In any event, the police make that judgement. When we were canvassing that in the committee—that is, this obligation of what the police have to provide—there is an obligation for certain material that they must provide and there is an obligation for what they may provide. They may well consider in their discretion that there is information that would assist in that assessment.

Ms HILDYARD: My question is in relation to clause 14, new section 42B(2)(b). Does the mention of an interstate screening agency contemplate the NDIS commission and, if not, given the scope of the NDIS, the desire for national standards in relation to NDIS worker screening and the clear nexus between this bill and the NDIS Act, why is the NDIS commission not specifically named in this clause?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: In short, the answer is that the commission is not an interstate screening agency under (2)(b), which you referred to.

Ms HILDYARD: Why not?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The reason it is not, if I can just take that as the second part of the question, is that under the intergovernmental agreement the states each have responsibility to investigate these matters and make the assessment, and then, under NDIS law, they have an obligation to report to the commission. The national commission is not an investigative unit. It is not a screening agency or an assessment unit: it is a commission that has a different role under the NDIS law.

Ms COOK: Going back to questions regarding police disclosure and information, does this insertion retain—

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Which insertion?

Ms COOK: After section 42, we are inserting these parts here. Does this maintain the obligation for reporting by SAPOL in its previous form?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: No, this is not an obligation for SAPOL to do anything other than, in a reporting sense, make it available to certain entities, and they are the interstate screening agencies, the central assessment unit, etc. It is not an obligation on them to provide information. It gives them permission to give information.

Ms COOK: And it maintains that integrity.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Yes.

Ms COOK: In regard to the other jurisdictions, are there currently provisions to enable the disclosure of information gathered by the screening unit to other jurisdictions? If somebody applies for a working with children check and the department does not issue it because there are risks identified, could that refusal as such be shared with other jurisdictions?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Yes.

Ms STINSON: So the answer is yes; it can be shared?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Yes.

Ms WORTLEY: Attorney-General, the member for Elizabeth asked a question, on new section 42B(1)(b) I think it was, in relation to allegations being made but no charges being laid. The question was in relation to whether that constituted criminal history. You said that you did not know the answer to that question. I am just wondering if you are able to follow through on that and provide a definitive—

The Hon. V.A. Chapman interjecting:

Ms WORTLEY: Pardon?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: In short, whilst this clause does not have anything to do with what the police's obligation is to provide information—this is in relation to who else gets access to that information—in the course of the member for Elizabeth's question he was specifically asking what the content of that is in relation to what the police are actually obliged to provide and what they do provide in it. I answered that there was the list of convictions and dates of offences but, in respect of the charges that did not culminate in a conviction, I would get some further information. The member might like to look at Hansard, but in the subsequent question I clarified that to say that is not usually provided but it can be, and that is a matter for the discretion of police.

Mr Odenwalder interjecting:

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Yes, and in answer to a further question I also went on to say that in relation to other information the police may have, they may provide that; that is a discretion for them that we dealt with back in clause 12.

The CHAIR: Thanks for your indulgence, Attorney. I remind members on the other side to stand when they are seeking to ask a question or get the call.

Ms STINSON: Looking at 42C(2), which talks about relevant offence, referring to 'a prescribed offence, or any other offence declared by the regulations to be included in the ambit of this definition', could the Attorney provide a list of what offences might be included in the regulations?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I refer the member to my previous answer in which I listed all the prescribed offences and presumptive offences. I will see if I can find it for the member.

Ms STINSON: Thank you. That would be helpful if you can provide that. That is obviously something that has escaped me. New section 42D—Disclosure of information to prevent harm—talks about the disclosure of information to an appropriate person or body at the judgement of the central assessment unit. Could you detail some examples, at least, if not a list, of who you might see as an appropriate person or body under that section?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Could you just repeat the question?

Ms STINSON: Section 42D—Disclosure of information to prevent harm—talks about the disclosure of information to, and I quote, 'an appropriate person or body' and that is at the assessment or judgement of the central assessment unit. Could you give some examples or a list, if one is available, of who might be envisaged as being an appropriate person or body under that section?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: What is expected to apply there is if, for example, information came forward that needed some urgent attention. It might be that an appropriate person may be a police officer or a member of the MAPS program, which, as the member might be aware, is a coordinated group targeted at dealing with families that are identified and other child protection matters. They are the sorts of circumstances where I would expect it to be applied.

Ms STINSON: Following on from that answer, could it, for example, be a school or parents who might have children in their custody or who are maybe in a position to intervene? I imagine that this clause would be applied in some sort of emergency situation; therefore, one might reasonably expect that those closest to a child who might be at risk might be schoolteachers, someone at a day-care centre, someone at a sporting club or, indeed, their own parents or guardians. Does this clause contemplate disclosing information to non-legal or non-statutory individuals or bodies?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I do not expect so, and the reason is that to advise a parent, guardian, foster carer, neighbour who might have supervision of a child or even a teacher in a school may well impede an emergency situation. The child protection areas around this are very clear: it is very important that, if a child is at risk, the people who are authorised, experienced and trained are the people who progress the intervention and address it in a way that the child is kept as safe as possible.

It is also important, as the member may be aware, to ensure that evidence obtained during the process of an intervention (i.e., the separation of a child) or a prosecution is kept uncontaminated as it is important to preserve the best chance of a successful prosecution if someone is guilty, that is, not impede the police action but also act to protect the child. So, no, I would not expect that information obligations from this go to the layperson, but obviously, in the course of acting, a child protection worker or police officer or health professional may well act to advise other relevant parties in the reasonable sphere of that child or children.

Ms STINSON: Could the Attorney elaborate on that because the clause is, as it is constructed at the moment, I would contend, considerably vague and does not actually specify that a layperson might not be informed under this. In fact, if you read it, it really gives free rein to the central assessment unit to inform any appropriate person or body that they may see fit to pass on information.

While I accept what you are saying, in terms of the practicalities and risks to an investigation by informing laypeople of a risk, this clause does not say that. It does not restrict the passing on of information to public office holders and, from what I can see, as it is written it provides licence for the central assessment unit to provide information to anyone it sees fit. Could you explain why this clause has been drafted in the way it has, in those very broad terms, if your assessment is that information would not be passed to laypeople.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The only situation where I could see that it would not be appropriate to refer to an appropriate person or body, such as the police or child protection, but to a layperson—

Ms Stinson: Yes, but it doesn't say that.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I am just trying to explain it to the member, as she seems pretty vague. I think 'child protection officer' or 'police officer' is pretty clear. The only circumstance where I could see it going to an individual person who has no professional responsibility in relation to the child—that is, they might be a neighbour, a friend or whatever—is in an isolated region scenario, for example. It may be that information could be conveyed to someone who is in the proximity of that child because it is necessary to prevent harm being caused to the child. It may be so regionally remote that there is no proximate police or child protection service.

So, yes, there could be circumstances, which is why it is as general as 'an appropriate person or body'. I indicate to the member that this is not designed to be to 'a person' but to 'an appropriate person'. In these circumstances, 'appropriate' means someone who is vested with the responsibility, the necessary powers and the necessary experience to deal with the protection of a child. I indicate to the member that that is most likely to be the police or a child protection authority. It may go as far as a medical person, or it may sometimes involve a member of teaching staff, but I would suggest that it is in that order.

The CHAIR: I am not going to call the member for Badcoe. I bring members' attention to standing order 364, which states:

In Committee…

1. a Member other than the Member in charge of the Bill, motion or amendment may not speak more than three times on any one question…

Clause 14 is a large clause. Because of that, I have allowed the member for Elizabeth a point of clarification and also the member for Badcoe four questions.

Ms Stinson: I have had three.

The CHAIR: Well, to my mind you have had four, member for Badcoe. I ask any other members who have further questions on clause 14 to stand and seek the call; if not, the question before the Chair is that clause 14 stand as printed.

Clause passed.

Clause 15.

Ms COOK: I ask again for a description of the rationale of the change, that is, the insertion of that paragraph.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: As we have just passed clauses that relate to the provision of information or documents, we are adding into the regulation power regulation capacity in those areas.

Clause passed.

Clause 16.

Mr SZAKACS: Attorney, I draw your attention to new section 8B, the transitional provisions insofar as they relate to certain emergency service workers. I note that this clause seeks to define an emergency service worker as a member of the SAMFS, SACFS or SASES. The Fire and Emergency Services Act does not seek to define an emergency service worker. My question is in respect to the definition of an emergency service worker. Does the bill seek to define a member of one of those three organisations as both a remunerated employee and a volunteer member? If so, are workers under that definition caught only by virtue of their being employed under the Fire and Emergency Services Act or also the Public Sector Act?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I advise that the purpose of this clause is to give members of the emergency service worker class—which, under that definition, include more than the three you have mentioned—a three-year transitional process. As I understand it, the question is: where is the definition of SAMFS, etc.? No. The member is shaking his head. Perhaps he could repeat specifically what he would like to know about those, because my recollection is that they are in the principal act.

Mr SZAKACS: I am happy to repeat the question. The definition, for the purposes of the bill, provides that an emergency service worker is a member of the SACFS, the SAMFS or the SASES.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Plus the other two.

Mr SZAKACS: Yes, but I was referring specifically to those categories under the Fire and Emergency Services Act, under which those three organisations are defined and created. The Fire and Emergency Services Act does not seek to define a worker, therefore we default to this bill to define what a worker is pursuant to the membership of those three organisations. My question is: does the bill seek to define a worker, for the purposes of this clause, as both a remunerated worker and a volunteer member of those three organisations? Further to that, insofar as a remunerated worker is concerned, is that a worker employed under just the Fire and Emergency Services Act or also the Public Sector Act?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Emergency service workers include paid and unpaid persons. The second reference, if I understand this correctly, is whether these MFS workers who do the emergency work are defined under their own specific legislation or whether they include those employed in these services who are employed under the Public Sector Act. It appears that unless they are engaged in emergency service work—that is, under the Fire and Emergency Services Act—they would not be referred to in the bill.

Mr SZAKACS: I seek to clarify this. A member—and I use the word 'member' even though it is not well defined by any other piece of legislation, but is the key word in this clause—of the CFS, MFS or SES can undertake a function of fireground command and control and a function of air support for fire danger days, but if a member of the CFS, SES or MFS, who is not employed under the Fire and Emergency Services Act, which is the way those categories of employees I have just listed are employed, undertakes a function in the emergency call centre (the 000 call centre), the bill does not seek to categorise them as emergency service workers.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Correct. I will repeat what I said before. On the advice of parliamentary counsel, they have to be employed under the fire and management legislation, not under the Public Sector Act.

Mr SZAKACS: I note that the SES is listed as a category of emergency service organisations and that the Attorney's previous answer specified that not just paid workers but also volunteers in those organisations would be covered under this section. I note that this section ceases to apply when, and I quote, 'the person ceases to be an emergency service worker'. Can the Attorney clarify whether the various categories of members of the CFS, including non-operational, non-uniformed or in fact honorary members, are covered by the emergency service worker definition under the categories of this clause?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I hope this is helpful to the member. You would need to go back to the principal act in relation to the Fire and Emergency Services Act, to be able to identify that. Just so we are clear here, this whole division, I suppose, is the transitional provision allowing for the three years for what is already defined under the principal law, which is scoped out in the regulations and which has now been given a three-year transition period.

The CHAIR: Member for Hurtle Vale. Member for Cheltenham, you have had four questions now.

Mr SZAKACS: Four?

The CHAIR: You have already. I concede that one of those at least was for clarification, but you have had four. You will have the opportunity, if you have further questions, to pass to your colleagues. I might suggest you consider that. Member for Hurtle Vale.

Ms COOK: Thank you, Mr Chair. In regard to clause 16, is a driving instructor or a driving assessor required to complete a working with children clearance under the child safety act that is commencing on 1 July?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Yes.

Ms COOK: Is the minister able to indicate a specific clause that provides that authority?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The definition comes as a result of them being within the definition of working with children. They have to be working primarily with children. Obviously, if they are giving driving instruction and assessment and they are working with children as part of that purpose then they have to do that. It does not mean that if they are only dealing with or offering a service for adults. However, if they are working with children that is what scopes them in.

Ms COOK: Based on the information given by the minister, the Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure (DPTI) is a stakeholder in the context of this bill. It has been mentioned previously that no stakeholder raised any objections in the government's consultation on the bill. Was DPTI consulted on the bill and, if so, how?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: There is no new provision in relation to putting these people in. That was done in 2016 under the previous government, and as best we know there was no complaint about that at the time. All this is doing is giving them a three-year transition period. I think they might only get one year in this section and three years in the previous section. It is three years for emergency service workers and one year for the rest, as I understand it. It is twelve months from the commencement of the section, under new subsection (3)(b). Does that make it clear? This is no new obligation. They are already in there. We are just giving them a transition to be able to come into the new regime.

Mr BOYER: Attorney, I draw your attention to new section 8B(5)(a) and note that there is no mention there of Surf Life Saving South Australia. Can you tell us why they are not included in any of these definitions of emergency service workers?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The decision for emergency service workers to have three years was a policy decision. Surf Life Saving are really at a much higher level; that is, they are people who work regularly with children and the expectation there is that they do not get a three-year transitional clause. That is why they are not in there. The three years is, I suppose, more lenient in allowing that to be transferred in those categories.

Mr BOYER: Attorney, on the same clause, was consultation done with Surf Life Saving South Australia about them being treated differently from other emergency service workers as part of this clause?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Again, these people, under the existing law that was substantially rewritten in 2016, are already under the obligation to have their checks, so this is not new for them. What was determined was that there were, in the consultation, real questions raised about if a member of the CFS should be under this category: they might be rescuing children, they might be evacuating kids out of schools or giving training in relation to that, so lots of questions were raised about this.

Ultimately, the policy determination was that the people in this category be given three years to transfer and everyone else is under exactly the same regime. In this instance, people who work in surf lifesaving circumstances where they are regularly exposed to children have a very significant threshold of obligation. They are not being given this three-year period and, to the best of my knowledge, there has been no complaint about this from them.

Mr BOYER: As one final question on the new section 8B(5) in its totality, do any of the provisions or definitions in there include volunteers with St John Ambulance?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Similarly, St John do not get the exemption. It is only these people who are in the statutory bodies as defined here that get the three years. Everyone else has to do as they are ordinarily doing now. Under the current law, they do not get a three-year transition period. They have very high obligations now and, quite frankly, why would they seek relief from that? They know what their obligations are and they do it willingly.

The Hon. Z.L. BETTISON: Can I move to clause 16, new section 8B(4). My questions are around the unique identifier. Who has access to the unique identifier and what level of confidentiality have they agreed to to have this access?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The central assessment unit itself and, of course, the person who is issued with the unique identifier. I have referred, in some previous answers, as to how that is actually utilised when the individual has to use it to access information. That information is provided to them.

The Hon. Z.L. BETTISON: Can I seek a clarification, as I just want to be clear here. From a human resources point of view, if someone is a registered organisation—in this case, an emergency service organisation—would not the person onboarding this or looking at the human resources aspect be checking that every person on their team has been screened and therefore would they not have to access to their unique identifier?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: We will just check with how they get it. Obviously, they do need to be able to do that check, but whether they get access to the unique identifier or not is another matter. They may be provided that information directly. We will just check on that. Again, this is just the transitional thing, but I think you are asking generally in relation to who gets access to this information.

The unique identifier is provided to the employee, as I have indicated. In the process of the checking of that information, as you know, the whole of the child protection law is centred around ensuring that employers themselves check that their employee or volunteer, according to their requisite obligation, actually has their screen test. That employee can then provide that to the employer for the purposes of accessing and checking that information. Remember here that the obligation in relation to screen testing, generally, is on the employee and the employer. In fact, there are very severe penalties for anyone employing either paid or unpaid employees in these circumstances.

The Hon. Z.L. BETTISON: Following that situation, obviously there is a person within the organisation who has access to the unique identifier. My question was around the confidentiality but more so whether there is a process to audit inappropriate use. There is significant value on this unique identifier, so what are the processes around auditing this?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: As the member would be aware, there are obligations in relation to the confidentiality of information in different aspects of the public sector and there are significant penalties if they are breached by someone in the public sector. There are obligations to audit, to have plans and protocols around a lot of these things. So, yes, there are levels of confidentiality in relation to this information, and there are penalties and offences where there has been a disclosure.

Under the privacy board, there are also acts to investigate matters and grant approval for the release of information in certain circumstances. That board continues under this government and has a role in relation to that, often approving information to go to universities for research and things of that nature. I hope that is helpful.

The Hon. Z.L. BETTISON: To clarify, how many officers from the screening unit will be allocated to audit inappropriate use?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Is that in relation to the central assessment unit or the screening unit?

The Hon. Z.L. BETTISON: Obviously, the central screening unit, which is part of the office of screening as it is called now. This is important to me because a huge percentage of the South Australian population has one of these working with children checks and there is an enormous amount of confidentiality around this unique identifier. While we have systems in place, maybe within the public system, there are obviously not-for-profit groups here, volunteer organisations, private companies. Do we have officers who will be auditing this?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: As the member might know, having been a former minister, there is an internal audit unit and there is also an investigation management unit. You will be pleased to know that under the new government we have continued those, so they have a role in relation to that. I think the tail of your question indicated how the information is kept confidential once it has gone out to other individuals or private organisations.

The member might know that there is no tort law in South Australia for privacy. We do not have a state privacy act, something that was consistently resisted by the previous government, so I cannot answer that in relation to any tortious liability. Certainly, a number of those people may be in positions where they have obligations of confidentiality under public sector obligations if they are undertaking work, for example, in an NGO. Again, I cannot answer the question specifically without a particular area or example.

Ms STINSON: I refer to 8B(5)(a). This is the section that the member for Cheltenham was asking questions about earlier. Would a volunteer of the Volunteer Marine Rescue service, which is under the command and control of the Chief Officer of the South Australian SES, be defined as an emergency service worker even though that agency is not noted here and of course is independently incorporated?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I would expect so. As the member may be aware, the state SES is an organisation which had its origins and charter within South Australia Police. It was a unit established to seek missing people and find dead persons, and so on—a rather unsavoury task, actually. Divers in particular units, for example, are often involved in a search in those circumstances. It had a more expanded role once it became a state emergency service, but it works in conjunction with other agencies, sometimes helicopters, sometimes diving, sometimes marine vessels, etc., so I would expect so.

Ms STINSON: Mr Chair, I draw your attention to the state of the committee.

A quorum having been formed:

The CHAIR: We are in committee on clause 16. Are there any further questions on clause 16? The member for Badcoe.

Ms STINSON: Again, I refer to 8B(5)(a). I want to seek clarification from the Attorney about the answer she just gave. My understanding is that the Volunteer Marine Rescue service is separate from the SES, although of course there is a reporting line through the Chief Officer of the SES. My understanding of what the Attorney was just saying is that she is confident that, therefore, the Volunteer Marine Rescue service—

The Hon. V.A. Chapman interjecting:

Ms STINSON: That is exactly what I am trying to clarify. Would the Attorney mind clarifying what her position is as to whether the Volunteer Marine Rescue service is included as an extension of the SES or whether indeed it is seen as a separate body and is therefore not covered under the Fire and Emergency Services Act?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I will check that, and I am happy to do that, but it will be in the principle act. We will get back to you on that.

Ms STINSON: So you are happy to take that on notice?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: That is what I said.

Ms STINSON: Thank you very much.

Ms WORTLEY: I want to seek clarification in relation to new section 8B(5)(b) and the question asked by the member for Wright, specifically in relation to why St John Ambulance is treated differently. It is not included in this clause.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Correct.

Ms WORTLEY: My point of clarification is in regard to why St John is treated differently from SA Ambulance and not included in this clause.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: For exactly the same reasons I gave earlier; that is, only these agencies have been given provision for a three-year transition and everyone else has to comply with the general obligation. That is the reason: a policy decision that only these people have that benefit.

Ms WORTLEY: Attorney, I understand what you have said but my question is: why is St John Ambulance treated differently from SA Ambulance in this instance?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Because in the ambulance sector, only the SA Ambulance Service has been given this benefit. Nobody else in the Ambulance Service, for the picking up of people, is covered. That is a policy decision to enable there to be an orderly transition of a very large cohort of people who are in these categories, and they have been given this extended time to do so. Everyone else is expected to comply with the law as it is and has been since 2016.

Mr HUGHES: How did the government come up with the three-year figure in 8A(1)?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: On the advice that we had during the course of the consultation on this matter, it was clear, and probably clear to the previous government, that the very substantial expansion of obligation in this area, largely arising out of the Nyland commission, was one in which there would be literally tens of thousands of people who were going to be covered. So that there would be some orderly management of this, we have done two things: firstly, got on with this process; and, secondly, made sure that we do it in such a manner so that we do not get inundated on day one by literally tens of thousands of people. This is a cohort of people who, whilst very large in number relative to other agencies, it was felt should have that opportunity.

Mr HUGHES: Could you give me a summary of the consultation process, and were the unions consulted during this process?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I do not believe that the unions of these agencies were consulted on having a transition. That was agreed to by the government to enable them to have the benefit of a transitional period, so, on that aspect, I do not believe so.

Clause passed.

Progress reported; committee to sit again.

Sitting suspended from 12:58 to 14:00.

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