Children and Young People (Safety) Bill

Committee Stage

In committee (resumed on motion).

Clause 29.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 11 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 24, lines 5 to 26 [clause 29(1) to (4)]—Delete subclauses (1) to (4)

Ms SANDERSON: The only question I have noted down is to ask for an explanation for what the intention of removing that is, if you could explain that.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: This is a consequential amendment from amendment No. 10. In deleting clause 29(1) to (4), they have already been subsumed into clause 28A.

Amendment carried.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 12 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 24, lines 27 to 29 [clause 29(5)]—

Delete 'the Chief Executive determines that it is' and substitute:

, following an assessment of a matter under section 28A, the Chief Executive determines that it is more

This is another consequential amendment, again consequential on amendment No. 10.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clause 30.

Ms SANDERSON: I move:

Amendment No 9 [Sanderson–1]—

Page 25, lines 6 to 13 [clause 30(1) and (2)]—Delete subclauses (1) and (2) and substitute:

(1) Subject to this Act, the Chief Executive must cause an investigation into the circumstances of a child or young person to be carried out—

(a) if a report is made under section 28 and the Chief Executive suspects on reasonable grounds that the child or young person may be at risk; or

(b) if the Chief Executive issues an instrument of guardianship or a restraining notice in relation to a child or young person; or

(c) in any other circumstances where the Chief Executive suspects on reasonable grounds that the child or young person may be at risk.

This is another controversial area where the chief executive currently 'may cause', and what I am proposing is that the chief executive 'must cause' an investigation into the circumstances of a child or young person to be carried out. Several groups have been in favour of 'must' versus 'may', not only but including the Deputy Coroner in the Lewis McPherson case. I will read from section 12.8:

I have seen recent media material lamenting the possibility that proposed legislation that would replace the existing Children's Protection Act 1993 would alter the mandatory nature of the exercise of the Chief Executive's powers that exist under section 19 of the current Act and would provide the Chief Executive with a discretion to cause an investigation and assessment of a child at risk. This does appear to be the case when one peruses clauses 30 and 31 of the Children and Young People (Safety) Bill 2017. This alteration would be a clear error. From the analysis below it is highly probable that in respect of Liam Humbles, the exercise of the Chief Executive's mandatory powers under section 19 of the existing legislation would have saved Lewis McPherson's life, and would have done so by virtue of the fact that they are mandatory.

The Deputy Coroner goes on to make recommendation 12:

I recommend that in the proposed new children's protection legislation, currently contained within the Children and Young People (Safety) Bill 2017, that the powers of the Chief Executive in relation to children at risk be maintained as mandatory powers.

It is on that basis, and on the basis of several other stakeholders recommending it, that on behalf of the Liberal Party I would like to amend 'may' to 'must' to protect the children.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: We oppose this particular amendment for the reasons I outlined earlier. First of all, going back to the royal commission report, recommendation 63 says to amend section 19(1) of the existing act, by deleting 19(1)(b) thereof, to provide that if the chief executive suspects on reasonable grounds that a child is at risk the chief executive must cause an assessment of, or investigation into, the circumstances of the child to be carried out.

The question is where 'must' cuts in. We are saying that the wording picked by the member for Adelaide would oblige an investigation in every single case, notwithstanding whatever other information might be available and notwithstanding whether or not it might, in all the circumstances, appear that an investigation was warranted.

We are saying that we have already provided a mechanism whereby every report must be actioned and there must be a record of what action was taken and why. We are just saying it is fine to say that the chief executive must turn his or her mind to each matter. We are quite fine with that. We are also fine with the notion that the chief executive must report, in a record form so that it can be later on audited and examined, what they did and why.

What we are saying we should not have to do is have a hardwired response in there, and in this case the hardwired response is a hardwired investigation. Basically, for that reason, because it would mean the department would be obliged to have an investigation for every complaint, in effect, notwithstanding the detail of any complaint, notwithstanding whether or not there had already been an investigation, notwithstanding whether or not any other number of events had occurred, we are just saying that is hardwiring and unreasonable—and ultimately wasteful in terms of a public resources process into the system.

We do not disagree with the general idea that the chief executive must turn his or her mind to each matter that is the subject of a complaint. We have embraced that in amendment 10, new clause 28A. We have picked that up but we do not agree with this particular proposition, and it is not consistent with the recommendations of the royal commission.

Ms SANDERSON: Could the Attorney-General outline to me the difference in the process between an assessment which we have just changed to 'must' as in the CE must assess, and the difference between the process for an investigation? When does it stop being an assessment and become an investigation?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: That is a very good question and my answer to that is—and if I am straying from the path of accuracy, there are at least three pairs of arms that will start waving shortly—an assessment means the chief executive must turn their mind to the fact of there having been a report. The chief executive must look at that report in its context and the chief executive must consider whatever other information the chief executive might have about the particular child who is the subject of the report. That is what I call an assessment.

An investigation would be a step farther than that. It would be that the chief executive then must commission one or more officers of the department to go out, in effect, and investigate in a very direct sense that particular child's circumstances. All we are trying to say is that that may not be the necessary or appropriate response in every situation. We do not argue with the fact that the chief executive should turn his or her mind to it. We do not have a problem with that. It is just that to say that, notwithstanding whatever comes from the assessment or the turning of the mind to that issue, the result will always be an investigation. That is the bit we are taking issue with.

It may be an investigation, but we are saying that it should not necessarily always be an investigation. It should be left to the chief executive to make a determination as to what the appropriate response is, and they must record what their response is and they must record in effect their reason for doing whatever they do. Looking at it through the rear vision mirror some years down the track, if we were concerned about a particular child, we would have a documentary record of when that complaint came in, when it was received by the chief executive, what assessment the chief executive undertook and what decision the chief executive took in terms of the response to that assessment which may or may not include an investigation.

Ms SANDERSON: So that I can get a clearer understanding of this, say in the Humbles case, if the chief executive had done an assessment—looked at the case, made an assessment that there was no investigation required—and a child ended up dying, and in hindsight the Coroner or the Deputy Coroner had said, 'Why didn't someone do anything about this?', what would be the consequences of the CE making that decision not to investigate because it is their choice now because you are making it a 'may' rather than a 'must'? If they have chosen not to take it further, what would be the consequences of that?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: In the hypothetical that the member for Adelaide has given, the consequence would no doubt be that the Coroner would reflect on whether or not the judgement exercised by the chief executive in the context of that assessment proved, with the benefit of hindsight, to be a correct judgement. If the Coroner was of the view that the judgement had not been a correct judgement, presumably the Coroner would make adverse comment about the judgement of the chief executive—which, I imagine, would be a matter of some concern to the chief executive.

The converse problem is: what if the Coroner determined that in that case the chief executive could not even get to make an assessment about this matter because they were too busy investigating 1,500 other matters that had landed on their plate earlier and they had no alternative but to investigate each and every one of them and had not got to this one?

I am totally in agreement with the member for Adelaide that what the chief executive does in respect of each complaint should be transparent, it should be recorded and we should all know what it is so that there is no question about whether it fell through the cracks or something. There should be accountability for what they do. However, ultimately it is not possible for the parliament, without command of all the individual facts of each case, to say with any confidence that an investigation is warranted in every case.

It is a bit like saying that every time a police officer or a police station receives a complaint from a member of the public about somebody else, no matter how superficially unreliable that might appear, the police are nonetheless obliged to go through the process of investigation into each matter. That is the sort of idea we are trying to pick up. We are not trying to get away from the chief executive being accountable: quite the contrary, we are actually saying that the chief executive is going to be accountable because there is going to be a written record, a documentary record, of the fact of their having turned their mind to the matter and what they decided to do. We are just saying that it may not be that in every case an investigation is the necessary, automatic response.

It might be, in some cases, that it is so obvious, on the face of the assessment, that the thing to do is just send the team out and intervene and take the child away. In other cases, it might be that they have a serial complainer, one who is known by everybody to be an unreliable person, possibly a person who is mentally unwell, the sort of person all of us occasionally entertain in our electoral offices, who is not a credible person. You would not want a whole bunch of investigations triggered in those circumstances either. We are just saying that we should let the chief executive bring judgement to that decision, but that they should be accountable for what they decide.

Ms SANDERSON: I guess my only issue would be that that would work if the CE had years and years of experience on the ground, or they may have a social work degree and they worked their way through the department. However, if you brought someone over—for example, the deputy commissioner of police became your CE, or someone from an education background who had only ever worked in schools, but you bought them in from England, or they were not from our country and they became the CE—how can they make that assessment? That is my issue.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: This happens in every department. Obviously, within the administrative structure of this department there would be a series of experienced people upon whose advice the chief executive would rely. There would probably be a set-up of delegations, that certain types of matters could be delegated by the chief executive to certain key experienced people. I think that is a matter that the Public Service has to cope with across the public sector, so I do not think that in itself is necessarily a problem. I am sure the administration of the department would be capable of making sure that either the advice coming up to the chief executive or the delegation down from the chief executive to the relevant officer would be appropriate to that problem.

Amendment negatived; clause passed.

Clause 31.

Ms SANDERSON: My amendment No. 10 on schedule (2) is consequential, so I will dispense with that.

Clause passed.

New clause 31A.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 13 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 26, after line 4—Insert:

31A—Chief Executive may direct person to undergo certain assessments

(1) If the Chief Executive reasonably suspects that a child or young person is at risk as a result of the abuse of a drug or alcohol (or both) by a parent, guardian or other person, the Chief Executive may, by notice in writing, direct the parent, guardian or other person to undergo an approved drug and alcohol assessment.

(2) If the Chief Executive reasonably suspects that a child or young person is at risk as a result of a lack of parenting capacity on the part of a parent, guardian or other person who has, or is responsible for, the care of the child or young person, the Chief Executive may, by notice in writing, direct the parent, guardian or other person to undergo an approved parenting capacity assessment.

(3) A person must not refuse or fail to comply with a direction under this section.

Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 6 months.

(4) A notice under this section must set out the information required by the regulations for the purposes of this subsection.

(5) The regulations may make further provision in relation to assessments under this section (including, to avoid doubt, provisions requiring the results of an assessment to be provided to the Chief Executive or some other specified person or body).

(6) For the purposes of this section, a reference to an approved drug and alcohol assessment will be taken to be a reference to a drug and alcohol assessment of a kind approved by the Chief Executive by notice in the Gazette.

(7) For the purposes of this section, a reference to an approved parenting capacity assessment will be taken to be a reference to a parenting capacity assessment of a kind approved by the Chief Executive by notice in the Gazette.

This amendment seeks to insert new provisions that give the chief executive power to direct persons to undergo prescribed assessments for the purpose of the act. This arises from the royal commission recommendation 60. Under the provisions of the current bill, the power to order drug assessments currently rests with the Youth Court. This amendment will give the function to the chief executive, in addition to the ability to direct a person to undergo a parenting capacity assessment.

Equipping the chief executive with these powers will contribute to the efficiency of the system, which can only be of benefit to the child or young person on whose behalf the department is acting in order to keep them safe. Subclause (3) of the amendment also creates an offence that 'a person must not refuse or fail to comply with a direction under this section'. At the moment, Madam Chair, if you are going to have to go through the Youth Court to get one of these directions—

The CHAIR: I am too old for that, I believe.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: If one were—not you, but if one were—seeking to go through the Youth Court to do this, it is both expensive and time consuming. We have to fit into the time lines of the Youth Court. That is not to say that the Youth Court does not make good decisions but, if this were a time sensitive matter and it were an obvious proposition that this sort of assessment were needed, we should not have to go through that process just for the sake of that process. In effect, we are actually streamlining the process to enable the chief executive to undertake these activities.

Ms SANDERSON: I believe that this new clause was in the original draft that went out to consultation, then it was removed and then it was put back in. Why is that?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Yes, the original iteration of the bill contained a version of this which did not include parenting assessments. I think it is fair to say that we listened to feedback about this and, as a result of the feedback, it has been returned to the bill with the addition of parenting assessments as well. So, it is actually broader than the original proposition in the draft bill.

Ms SANDERSON: I have a question regarding new clause 31A(3). What were your thoughts behind the imprisonment for six months? Did you consider the possibility of drug rehabilitation or education? Were there other things that you looked at because obviously removing a parent from their children causes a lot of distress to the child? They can also then connect to another family and then they are removed. It makes it very difficult for everyone to remove a parent for six months if there are other alternatives available.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: That is a very good question and we did think at some length about this. Ideally, the last thing we want to do is to go through a criminal process in the context of child protection if we can avoid it. That said, if we simply had a provision in here that said, 'Parents who are given a direction by the chief executive must do X and Y,' and there was no consequence for not doing it, we would have no means of actually expecting people to comply because their view would be, 'Well, if I don't comply, what are you going to do to me?' That provision is there not because I actually expect it to be resorted to ever but because, if we do not have some sanction for noncompliance, the message will get out there very quickly, 'Look, just ignore them because, whatever they say to you, they can't do anything to you anyway.' That is why it is there.

As to the six months, that is a maximum term. Even if one of these were prosecuted, the chance of anybody being imprisoned at all would be small, and to get anywhere near a six-month term they would have to be a serial offender who has repeatedly refused to comply. This would be an extremely rare thing, if it happened at all. But if we do not have a sanction in here, what do we say to these people whose attitude is, 'Well, come on. Make me do it. You can't touch me'? We do need them to take these directions seriously, otherwise the directions are just empty words.

Ms SANDERSON: Would you ever consider mandatory drug treatment rather than prison for adults or under 18s where it is endangering a child's life and their own potential to be a parent?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Mandatory drug testing did you say or—

Ms SANDERSON: Mandatory drug treatment—going to a facility.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: The mandatory drug treatment is really a matter for the courts. They have drug treatment programs. My knowledge of those is not detailed, but I can tell members that there is considerable controversy about whether mandatory drug treatment works. It is much like any other thing where you compel a person. The literature is very split. In fact, as best I understand it, the literature leans towards the proposition that compelling people to undertake this sort of treatment is actually counterproductive. You get passive resistance. They go through the motions, but it does not make any difference and there is a resentment aspect to it.

Examples around the world where courts have become involved in drug treatment tend to show that the participants who volunteer, in effect, to submit to the drug treatment are the ones whose outcomes are more likely to be positive. The courts have a process at the moment which I think they refer to as a Griffiths remand. If somebody who has a drug problem comes before the court for a criminal offence, the court can say, 'If you want to participate in this treatment program, you go away and participate in the treatment program and then come back. We will sentence you after the treatment program, and we will take into account how well you have performed in the treatment program in determining what your ultimate sentence might be.'

In that circumstance, the person says, 'I can go off and participate in rehab and if the rehab report is really positive I can show that to the court.' The court is likely to say, 'Having regard to your cooperation with rehab, we're going to give you a very light sentence or we'll put you on a bond by reason of you having demonstrated your commitment to getting better.' That happens now, but the idea of compulsorily putting people into treatment programs is another one of these things about hardwiring things in. You would hardwire in a whole bunch of people going to programs they did not want to go to, which would cost the community a lot of money, and it is very debatable whether even a small fraction of the people who are inducted into a program that way would actually improve.

Ms SANDERSON: Is there any research or are there any studies that show that sending someone compulsorily to prison does anything for drug treatment? How many are off drugs or rehabilitated when they come out? Are there any comparisons between those who were sent to mandatory drug treatments for six months or a year and those who went to prison? I am not sure that sending them to prison has a better outcome than mandatory drug treatment, because they are both mandatory.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I understand the point. As to figures on how many people enter prison as a drug-addicted person, and how they perform by the time they leave, I do not have those at my fingertips. I could certainly ask the corrections minister to see if he could give me some information about that.

I emphasise again, in this case, that the idea of a person being imprisoned at all would be an exceptional, rare circumstance where somebody has repeatedly ignored directions. It would be very, very unusual. Again, I am not sure whether there are studies on compulsory treatment orders for drug addiction administered by courts. We do not do that here to the best of my knowledge. They are always court ordered as opposed to hardwired in by the parliament. My preference is to leave it with the courts. They do have experience of trying to manage people with drug problems, and let them make the determination on each case as it comes before them about how best to deal with these folks.

Ms SANDERSON: Part 6 states:

For the purposes of this section, a reference to an approved drug and alcohol assessment will be taken to be a reference to a drug and alcohol assessment of a kind approved by the Chief Executive by notice in the Gazette.

Could you give me an outline of what you propose. Obviously, at the moment we have swab tests that you can do by the side of a road when the police pull you over. At the airport, many people have a swab done on their clothing and they get a result very quickly.

My experience over the Christmas break was that we had a father who took his twins to see their mother and she kept them. I had a copy of the safety plan that clearly said the mother had tested positive to five drugs, that under no circumstances should she be left with those children, and I had two letters from the department stating drug use and substantiated neglect over feeding the children, yet I could not get the department to remove those twins over Christmas. We were forced to wait until the courts opened to get a court order to have those children removed from the mother.

I asked the department and they did a safety visit. They deemed that the mother was safe. I asked, 'Did you do a drug test?' and they said, 'No, it doesn't work that way. We have to send her to DASSA.' I said, 'Did you book it in when you where with her?' 'No, we didn't. We have to get back to her and book it.' The process at the moment seems slow and cumbersome and it is not done immediately, as you would on the side of a road.

These children are potentially in danger right at that second, so the quicker we can get drug tests done and a result and action the better. If we can do it for the airport, and we can do it for drug and drink drivers, why can we not do it to keep our children safe? Those children were left there for weeks, and the father was beside himself. I had rung everybody possible to try to have those children removed, and it was horrifying worrying about that every day over the Christmas break until the courts opened. How do we fix it with this legislation?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Again, that is a very good question. I think the short answer is that we are now into operational aspects, in other words, things that would be part of the day-to-day administrative activity of the department. That said, what I would imagine we are talking about here with approved drug and alcohol assessment is that it would go to both the testing regime, and possibly the assessment tool, that is applied over the testing regime.

For example, it would cover off what form of prescribed swab. I assume that there are many manufacturers of this type of stuff out there. It would say test A or test B, much as we have with driving where there is a prescribed breathalyser unit. If your reading is not from a prescribed unit, it is not a valid reading for the purposes of the act. That is the first bit of it: it would specify what sort of measurement tools are approved for the purpose of the act. The second thing it would probably do is have some assessment tool because purely and simply because you return a positive for cannabis would not in and of itself necessarily mean that you were then obviously completely incapable of being in control of a child.

I think there are two bits to it. One bit is what sort of equipment you use to measure these things, and the second one is some sort of matrix that you then apply to the circumstances of the individual to make a risk assessment. In my mind, that is what we would be talking about putting in the regulations. Hopefully, that would deal with the sort of situation the member for Adelaide raised about this circumstance over Christmas. That is, as I understand it, the intention here.

Ms SANDERSON: In section 20, part 2, if the chief executive of the current bill suspects drug use they must offer an assessment. However, if it was not being used and now it has been for the last two years and they have had over 1,000 drug tests, does this require that they must? Is there any requirement that something happens if it does come back positive?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: The wording of this says that they 'may direct' one of these texts. There is a passage from the royal commission report that I think is relevant. I am reading from page 200 of the royal commission report, about halfway down the first column on the left-hand side. The royal commission, talking about a drug assessment, states:

However, it is unrealistic to prescribe by legislation when such an application should occur. This is a matter for professional judgement by trained, experienced practitioners under ongoing clinical supervision and supported by clear organisational policy as to the importance of responding to protect children from all types of abuse and neglect. A legislative mandate would mean that workload management efforts would focus on the need to comply with legislation to address particular kinds of risks, potentially neglecting other, equally serious types of risk.

What I am interpreting the royal commission as having said there is, again, that if you hardwire something in as a hardwired response you will devote a lot of resources to that thing, but it may not be that every single case in which those resources are applied is a useful application of the resources, and, in doing that, those resources are then not available to be applied somewhere else where they might be more usefully applied. I think that is absolutely consistent with what we are attempting to do here.

Ms SANDERSON: To clarify, does that mean instead of the CE making that decision, as is currently required in section 20, part 2—and she must—that it is going back to the front-line staff who are working on the case, as in the Chloe Valentine case, where they decided not to go ahead with the drug test? Are these the people who now will be making that same decision on whether a drug test goes ahead rather than the CE compulsorily having to?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: The answer to that is that the chief executive would be, for the purposes of the act, doing it, but it would be done by a delegation to the appropriate on-the-ground people. For example, elsewhere in this legislation we contemplate the notion of establishing these networks or hubs that would be placed around the city. It would be my expectation that the chief executive would have a delegate in that network or hub who would be their authorised eyes and ears in that place when these sorts of things come by so that they would be able to exercise that power on behalf of the chief executive. From a purely legal point of view, it is the chief executive's power, but the law does enable the chief executive to delegate that power to appropriate officers who are on the ground so that you can have that very short distance between the child and the decision-maker.

Ms SANDERSON: So, it would not necessarily be the caseworker. You would envisage it would be like the manager or supervisor of that CFARN or hub or whatever we are setting up, rather than just a front-line staffer, as in Chloe Valentine's case.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Again, this is ultimately a decision for the chief executive, but my observation of delegations within government is that they are normally delegated to a managerial level. Unless they are very simple delegations, they are not normally delegated right down to the very bottom level. When I say 'bottom', I do not mean that in a pejorative way. I mean literally down to the coalface.

You would normally expect the front-line worker to have to check with somebody further up the pyramid to get the authorisation to do these things. We see examples of this all the time, for example, with police. The police can order all sorts of things, but the constable on the beat usually has to go to either a charge sergeant or a person of the rank of inspector or above before they can do whatever it is they want to do. My expectation is that is how the department would do this.

New clause inserted.

Clauses 32 and 33 passed.

Clause 34.

The CHAIR: Do you want to continue with your amendment No. 12 schedule (2) member for Adelaide, or have we exhausted all the permutations of the chief executive and minister? Do you want to continue to move that?

Ms SANDERSON: I believe that the Attorney-General's amendment No. 14 will cover the definition of 'home', and there is no need for the rest of mine.

The CHAIR: So, you are going to withdraw that one?

Ms SANDERSON: Yes.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 14 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 27, line 5 [clause 34(a)]—Delete 'home' and substitute:

to the custody of a parent or guardian, or delivered into the care of a person determined by the Chief Executive,

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 35 to 39 passed.

The CHAIR: We are looking at your amendment No. 14, member for Adelaide, which you would like to move, inserting a new 39A; is that correct?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I think this is rendered unnecessary by reason of an earlier amendment to clause 6 in our bundle, because we have already traversed this area.

Ms SANDERSON: I agree. I believe that 39A and 39B have been covered and the implementation sections are still to come.

The CHAIR: So, we are not going ahead with those two?

Ms SANDERSON: No, but I would like to seek advice about 39C because that is an action section that is not covered by the government's amendment.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I am advised that we are doing this in clause 44, so we are picking this up.

The CHAIR: She is just getting that advice. If someone can tell the member for Adelaide that, that would be fair and good.

New clause 39C.

Ms SANDERSON: My advice is that whilst the upcoming government's amendments go a little bit further towards what I am trying to achieve, my clause (which would have to be renumbered, but we can do that between the houses) is really to give more powers to police officers so that they can seize a passport. It is actually actions—so that they can enter the premises; they can inspect premises, vehicles, vessels; they can use reasonable force; and they can take photos. It is quite similar, in fact, to the powers that were given in the Housing Improvement Bill, in case you think someone's fence or chimney might fall on you. I did debate against the point that that seemed a bit excessive, in that instance, when we leave children in danger.

However, my amendment was meant to give as much protection and power to the police and the people who can go in and protect a child from genital mutilation or forced child marriage. Let's give the police that power as soon as possible. My amendment goes a lot further than the government's amendment, so I would like to move the amendment in relation to new clause 39C:

Amendment No 16 [Sanderson–1]—

Page 29, after line 31—Insert:

39C—Police officer may seize passport etc.

(1) A child protection officer who is a police officer may, without a warrant, if the police officer believes on reasonable grounds that a child or young person is at risk of removal from the State for female genital mutilation or marriage, do 1 or more of the following:

(a) enter (including breaking into) and remain on any premises, place, vehicle or vessel (and for that purpose require a vehicle or vessel to stop);

(b) inspect any premises or place, vehicle or vessel;

(c) use reasonable force to break into or open any part of, or anything in or on, any premises, place, vehicle or vessel;

(d) take photographs, films, audio, video or other recordings;

(e) seize, using such force as may be reasonably necessary, any passport issued in the name of the child or young person;

(f) give such directions as may be reasonably required in connection with the exercise of a power conferred by a preceding paragraph.

(2) Subject to any order of the Court, a passport seized under this section—

(a) may be held by the Commissioner of Police for the period prescribed by the regulations; and

(b) must, at the end of the period, be dealt with in accordance with the regulations.

(3) A police officer may, in exercising powers under this section, be accompanied by such assistants as are reasonably required in the circumstances.

(4) A person must not, without reasonable excuse, refuse or fail to comply with a requirement or direction under this section.

Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 1 year.

(5) To avoid doubt, this section does not limit any other powers conferred on a child protection officer or police officer by any other provision of this Act or any other Act.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: My tentative advice is that clause 139 of the bill basically does all this. I will oppose it now on the basis that we already have it, but I am happy to keep talking to the member for Adelaide; if it turns out that there is some material omission, I am happy to talk to her about it and we can sort it out between here and elsewhere.

New clause negatived.

Clause 40 passed.

Ms SANDERSON: Amendment Nos 17 to 21 are consequential.

Clauses 41 to 43 passed.

Clause 44.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 15 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 32, after line 32 [clause 44(1)]—Insert:

(ca) in the case of a child or young person who is at risk of being removed from the State for a purpose referred to in section 15(1)(ba)—such orders as the Court thinks necessary or appropriate to prevent the child or young person from being so removed, including (without limiting the generality of this paragraph)—

(i) an order preventing a specified person from removing the child or young person from the State; or

(ii) an order requiring that the child or young person's passport be held by the Court for a period specified in the order or until further order.

That includes passport seizure and whatnot. It is one of the examples of where I think we probably have covered off what the member for Adelaide is on about, but we will check between the houses.

Amendment carried.

The CHAIR: Amendments Nos 22 to 24 [Sanderson-1] are therefore consequential.

Clause as amended passed.

Clauses 45 and 46 passed.

Clause 47.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 16 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 34, after line 16—Insert:

(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to a child or young person to whom the order relates.

This is an amendment to protect children and young people who are subject to proceedings under this legislation from the possibility of criminal prosecution should they have been served personally with an order made under clause 47, for whatever reason, and failed to comply with it. It is not the government's intention to capture those children or young people, many of whom are obviously vulnerable. This amendment makes sure that that unintended possibility does not occur.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 48 and 49 passed.

Clause 50.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 17 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 34, after line 25—Insert:

(a1) This section applies to proceedings on an application to the Court for orders relating to a child or young person who is, pursuant to an order of the Court, under the guardianship, or in the custody, of the Chief Executive or another person or persons.

Obviously the government has been meeting a number of groups in the last few weeks. The onus of proof has been one of the issues that has been the subject of some concern. In order to address those concerns, we are proposing an amendment to clause 50. At the moment, the way the bill reads actually reverses the onus of proof in all proceedings under the bill. The exception to this is the Crown and the child or young person to whom the proceedings relate.

This amendment seeks to draw a line in the sand by distinguishing between those proceedings where the child or young person has not yet been the subject of a custody or guardianship order and those where they have. In respect of those children who have not been the subject of a guardianship or custody order, the Crown will continue to bear the onus of proof. In other words, if the Crown determines it needs to take a child away from a family, then the Crown bears the onus of convincing the court that it is appropriate for that to happen.

In that circumstance, to be more particular, the parent, parents, guardians or whatever of that child are not placed in the position where the onus is against them. They are in a position where the Crown must prove to the satisfaction of the court that the child is at risk and that it is appropriate for the child to be taken away. That is the concession we are making, which is, I think, in all the circumstances a fair and reasonable point that is being brought to the government's attention. Frankly, our original intention was not to make it easier for the Crown to confront that particular court process, nor was it our intention to disenfranchise or unfairly disadvantage a parent or parents of a child.

Having said that, however, once such an order has been made, then the child is presumed to be at the centre of all future proceedings, and anyone seeking to upset the apple cart for the child bears the onus of proving that it is in the child's interest to do so. For example, a child is removed and placed in foster care. The onus of taking the child away in the first place is borne by the Crown, but once the child is placed in a stable foster care situation, if the birth parent or parents then seek to disturb that, we do not go back to even stevens and the onus, in effect, is on the child to prove they should not be disturbed.

We start from the proposition that the child has already been through a process where their parent or parents have been found to be so lacking in competence that the child has had to be removed to this foster arrangement. If we are going to disturb that foster arrangement, anybody wanting to disturb it better have a damn good reason for disturbing it. What we have seen in the past is quite a bit of churn where kids are taken away and then in the not too distant future a parent or parents bob up and say, 'We would like them back, please,' so then they are sent back.

Then there is another failure, and they are taken away again and put somewhere, and the parent bobs up again and says, 'I want them back,' and they go back. What we are saying, and commissioner Nyland was very clear on this, is that children deserve to be in a position where they have some stability and some opportunity to form an attachment in a particular stable environment. The idea of the children being constantly disrupted after having been removed is completely at odds with that.

The other point about it, too, is that we have been advised—and I firmly believe this to be true—that one of the things that is acting as a significant disincentive to foster parents coming forward at all, or if they do come forward being prepared to take more children, is the notion that at any moment in time there will be a knock on the door and somebody will say, 'We are here. You are back in court. That child might be removed from you,' and quite often the child is. The foster parent, who invests all that effort and all that commitment into that child, does so at the moment in the knowledge that at any moment in time that can be disrupted by somebody outside of that relationship just popping in and saying, 'Hello, I'm here. What about me?'

The government does not think, and the royal commission did not think, that was in the interests of the child. What is in the interests of the child is that they are as stable and settled as possible. What we have done here in relation to the onus is that we have acknowledged the initial decision to take the child away. Yes, the Crown bears the onus to prove that that is in the interests of the child, that it is necessary in order to protect the child. Fine, no problem.

Beyond that, if somebody wants to disturb whatever the settled arrangements are for that child with a foster carer, the onus is on the person seeking to disturb the stability of the child's environment to prove that it is better for the child that that happens, not that the child has to prove all over again that their new environment is where they should be. It is putting the child at the centre and it represents a modification of the original proposal, but I think it strikes the balance. So, the Crown bears the onus of the original removal, but thereafter the child's stability becomes the number one overarching concern.

It also puts foster parents in the game. At the moment, quite frankly, they are not. Foster parents are not really in a position of any influence for that matter. I have heard shocking stories of foster parents actually not even being permitted to be heard in relation to some of these attempts to remove the kids from foster environments. So, we are trying to stabilise that once the child, unfortunately, has to be taken away.

Ms SANDERSON: My reading and understanding of the royal commission recommendation was that the reversal of onus of proof was only in regard to the Other Person Guardianship. What made the government decide to take that further to include the removal stage? Even though you are saying now that you are getting rid of that, you have expanded the other side to have, in the instance of an Other Person Guardianship, which was one of the issues when the foster parents applied to be Other Person Guardians, that the birth parents would be contacted. They had the right of refusal and you had to prove why they were not suitable.

So, you have reversed that, which is in keeping with the royal commission but, firstly, I would like to know why you ever included it at the removal stage even though it was in a recommendation, and why you are now expanding it. I imagine the other things that could happen would be adoption, there are also other instances, not just Other Person Guardian, which was recommended. I would like to know why you are doing that.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: The original motivation for this was, and remains, that we have to put the child at the middle of the whole thing. Everything is about the child. My observation of the present system is that—and these are my words, not the royal commission's words—the present system is a bit schizophrenic. It is attempting to be all things to the birth parents, pays lip service to a whole bunch of other things, but ultimately it does not provide a completely central unequivocal focus on the child.

We started off from the basic premise—and commissioner Nyland embraces this in her report—that if a child has to be taken away, there are some things that are almost truisms about that. First, if they have to be taken away the sooner you take them away the better, because the longer you leave them there the more damaged they are going to be by being there. That is pretty harsh but it is the truth. If it is bad enough that you need to take them away, the sooner you bite the bullet and take them away, if it is that bad, the better. That is point No. 1.

Point No. 2 is that once you have taken them away and you have found a stable place for the child to be, it is overwhelmingly the evidence of the people who write learned things about this that in order for the child to grow up to be a well-adjusted individual, their having a sense of place, belonging, and a sense of being settled somewhere, a sense of attachment, is absolutely critical to that child's healthy development. Starting from those two simple propositions, we have said that we are going to examine everything that is a threat to those things in a way to say, 'Let's minimise the threat to that stability for that child.'

We accept, as result of the consultation, that the drafting in its original form meant that would have even gone to the original threshold question of whether the child should be taken away. Having reflected on the feedback and having listened to people, the government accepts that it is reasonable for the onus to remain as it is in that context, and we have amended it accordingly. However once you get past that point, every piece of advice I have seen, all the comments made by the royal commissioner, all suggest that we want children to be in a stable circumstance.

We want foster carers to feel confident that they are not going to have their relationship with these children disrupted, and the reversal of the onus is meant to underscore the point that once these children have been put into a placement—whether it is called Other Person Guardianship or whatever—it should not be lightly disturbed. That is the point.

Ms SANDERSON: From that, I gather that, although this bill was drafted in response to the royal commission, and the royal commissioner only recommended that the onus of proof be reversed in the case of Other Person Guardianship because there were issues around stalling and not many guardianship orders being made, the government decided to protect children by allowing them to be removed more quickly, by reversing the onus of proof. Just on that note —

The Hon. J.R. Rau: That is what we changed, though, the removing them. We have changed that. We have accepted that proposition.

Ms SANDERSON: But you decided to change it on your own; it was not a recommendation. When it went out to consultation, there were 62 submissions, including from the Law Society (this was a submission based on the draft bill), where this was included:

The Law Society is also strongly opposed to the onus of proof being placed on parents to show why children should not be removed from their home. 'Many families subject to application orders are severely disadvantaged,' Mr Rossi said. 'Forcing parents to bear the onus of proof will only exacerbate the stress and disadvantage. This will have a particularly devastating impact on Aboriginal families who are grossly overrepresented in the child protection system and would have to bear the extra burden of opposing departmental orders when they should in fact be receiving greater family and cultural support.'

'If the Department is seeking to remove a child from parents and it is opposed the Department should have to prove why the court should endorse its position.'

This was also opposed by the Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement, but I will not read all of that into Hansard. However, I will read into Hansard the number of applications lodged and how many were dismissed. I only have the figures up to 2013-14, but for the previous years, starting in 2011-12, the number of care and protection orders lodged was 384 with zero dismissed; in 2012-13, there were 397 with zero dismissed; in 2013-14, there were 338 with zero dismissed.

I am unsure what issue the government felt it had, given that all the orders it has applied for have actually been upheld. I am glad that you have reversed it, but I am unsure why you put it there in the first place. You then ignored the Law Society, the Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement and many other people who were against it in your final bill. It took not only your first draft but then your second lot of amendments to your amendments, because you withdrew your first amendments, before you actually listened to the people. I am glad that you finally have, but I wonder why it took so long.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: The first and the really happy point about this—let's start on the high note—is that we have listened. We have listened and we accept that they made a good point. The only thing I can say to you is that I think to some degree we were actually speaking at cross-purposes for some of this time. The Law Society's original proposition was, 'We are opposed to the reversal of onus, full stop.' I think it took a bit of time for us to tease out what they meant and for them to tease out what we meant.

It turns out that the Law Society was particularly opposed to the reversal of onus at the beginning, that is, on the initial decision to remove the child. Once we were clear that that is what they were on about and not the whole reversal of onus argument I was very sympathetic to their point of view and we have accepted it. However, the way their original proposition was crafted, they were opposed to the reversal of onus in general terms.

I want to make clear that we still are of the view that, once a child has been a removed and is in a settled position, that child should not subsequently be disturbed without very, very good reason. In the end, after discussing it with the Law Society, I understand what they were on about and I think they understand what I am on about. When I last spoke to them, I think we came to a position where we were on the same page about this. Anyway, it is my amendment, I am happy to do it and I am happy to accept that the consultation process has improved the bill in this respect.

Ms SANDERSON: While I will be accepting the amendment, I hope perhaps for future bills that, when you put a bill out for draft consultation, that would be the time to work out whether or not you are at cross-purposes with the Law Society and you make the final amendments so that the final bill is your best bill, not nearly there, then we get amendments, then a few weeks later we get some amendments to the amendments. It seems like a very poor way to write legislation.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I could not agree more with the member for Adelaide.

The CHAIR: There is nothing more to say, is there?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: There is a bit because I want to say that, in the circumstance where one is trying to put legislation through and one puts out a comment and says, 'Look, can everybody please get back to me within three weeks, four weeks, five weeks or 10 weeks'—it does not matter what it is—there is something out there where, for whatever reason, people do not focus on it until week 10 or they spend a very long time mulling it over.

I am not a betting man, but I bet the member for Adelaide an orange juice that, whatever date you set as the date when we are going to put the bill in and finish it on this day, in every single case where you do that there will be not just one but a number who, for whatever reason, cannot meet that deadline. If they have come up with something really good, you are forced into the position of reconsidering your bill later on.

I am not saying everything we did was perfect, but I promise you that there are people who work on different time lines to the ones that we are trying to work on and, if they come in late with something or if they refine their position late, we are stuck with dealing with it as and when it comes in. In a perfect world, I could not agree more with the member for Adelaide. That is legislating at its best.

Ms SANDERSON: I absolutely agree that there will be cases. This was not one of those cases because this was clearly identified in the draft bill and clearly ignored in the final bill.

Amendment carried.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 18 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 34, line 26 [clause 50(1)]—Delete 'under this Act' and substitute 'to which this section applies'

Amendment carried.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 19 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 34, lines 29 and 30 [clause 50(2)]—Delete subclause (2) and substitute:

(2) However, subsection (1) does not apply where the person objecting to the making of the order is—

(a) the Crown; or

(b) if the Court is satisfied that the child or young person to whom the proceedings relate is not being unduly influenced by any person to object to the making of the order—the child or young person.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 51 to 53 passed.

Clause 54.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 20 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 35, line 14 [clause 54(1)]—After 'must' insert:

, to the extent that it is consistent with the legal practitioner's duty to the court to do so,

Amendment carried.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 21 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 35, lines 30 to 34 [clause 54(2)]—Delete subclause (2)

Ms SANDERSON: I would like an explanation why the amendment proposes to delete subclause (2). I am not sure what the intent is.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I am advised that this amendment arises from further consultation with the Law Society in the last fortnight or thereabouts to ensure that legal practitioners acting in this capacity—that is, as a legal representative of a child or young person who might be the subject of an order—nevertheless maintain their ability to comply with the Legal Practitioners Act. We are trying to make it clear that this does not cut across their role as an officer of the court. They still have an obligation to discharge themselves as a legal professional person, consistent with their representation of the child. This is something they wanted and we are happy with it.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clause 55.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 22 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 36, after line 19—Insert:

(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to a child or young person to whom the interim order relates.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 56 to 61 passed.

Clause 62.

Ms SANDERSON: I move:

Amendment No 4 [Sanderson–2]—

Page 38, line 5 [clause 62, penalty provision]—Delete 'Imprisonment for 2 years' and substitute '$10,000'

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clause 63.

Ms SANDERSON: I move:

Amendment No 5 [Sanderson–2]—

Page 39, line 2 [clause 63(6), penalty provision]—

Delete 'Imprisonment for 12 months' and substitute '$10,000'

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 64 and 65 passed.

Clause 66.

Ms SANDERSON: I move:

Amendment No 6 [Sanderson–2]—

Page 39, line 37 [clause 66(1), penalty provision]—Delete '$50,000' and substitute '$10,000'

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 67 to 99 passed.

Clause 100.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 26 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 56, lines 18 and 19 [clause 100(4)]—Delete subclause (4)

Ms SANDERSON: Can I have clarification on why that is being removed?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: This amendment seeks to amend clause 100, which sets out a complaint mechanism to the chief executive for either a child or young person being cared for in a facility, or a parent or guardian of such a child or young person. Specifically, this amendment seeks to delete:

However, the Chief Executive need not investigate a complaint that is, in the opinion of the Chief Executive, frivolous...

The consequence of this amendment is that there will be no ability for the chief executive not to investigate a complaint received. That is, every complaint received pursuant to clause 100 as amended will now be investigated by the chief executive. I think that is as a result of some feedback that we received, but it is a very circumscribed area.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clause 101.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 27 [ChildProRef-2]—

Page 56, line 27 [clause 101(1)]—Delete 'at the request of a' and substitute 'in relation to each'

Ms SANDERSON: This seems to be grammatical. What is the substantial change of that amendment?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Again, it is pretty technical. Clause 101 concerns the assistance to be provided by the chief executive to persons leaving care. Currently, clause 101(1) of the bill is drafted in a way that would require the child or young person who is lawfully leaving the care of the person whose guardianship or custody they have been placed under the act to request a transition plan. This amendment quite rightly ensures that no such request is required. They do not have to ask for a transition plan; it is part of what is expected of the chief executive, to provide them with a transition plan.

Ms SANDERSON: I think that is a very good idea.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 102 to 134 passed.

The CHAIR: Member for Adelaide, your amendment No. 59 in schedule (2) inserts new clause 134A. Are you still going ahead with that?

Ms SANDERSON: I believe that, whilst I still like the idea of this amendment, I am happy to consider it between the houses, as I believe it refers more to early intervention and prevention, which you may be putting in another bill. We will withdraw it at this stage.

Clauses 135 to 147 passed.

Clause 148.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 28 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 81, line 33 [clause 147(4)]—Delete '14' and substitute '28'

This is just to change a period from 14 to 28 days. It gives a little bit more time.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 149 to 155 passed.

Clause 156.

The CHAIR: Deputy leader, your amendment is to clause 156, which is on page 85, lines 35 to 38. You are deleting subclause (1), if you get your way.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: So that the deputy leader does not get herself too consumed, I indicate that we are accepting this, so she cannot do better than a yes. If she says anything, she might go backwards from there, but at the moment she has a yes.

Ms CHAPMAN: I move:

Amendment No 1 [Chapman–1]—

Page 85, lines 35 to 38 [clause 156(1)]—Delete subclause (1)

It is necessary for me to thank the Chair for bringing to my attention my amendment, which has the effect she has outlined. I thank the government for indicating their agreement to it. I indicate that they need to be on clear notice that if they pull this sort of stunt again, trying to exempt themselves from liability in this way, it will continue to be exposed. It is the most disgraceful conduct that I have seen, especially dealing with children's care.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 157 to 162 passed.

Schedule 1.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 30 [ChildProRef–2]—

Page 88, lines 5 to 31—Delete Schedule 1 and substitute:

Schedule 1—Repeal of Children's Protection Act 1993

1—Repeal of Children's Protection Act 1993

The Children's Protection Act 1993 is repealed.

Very briefly, this is to do with matters of the intersection between the Family Law Act and this legislation. This is to do with the current referral of powers that restrict a jurisdiction to the Family Court where the child is the subject of orders. This amendment seeks to delete the amendment, and the government has determined that further consideration of this matter with the commonwealth will be separately pursued at a later date.

Ms SANDERSON: Are we not just repealing the old act to enable the new act? That is what it looks like.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Yes.

Ms SANDERSON: Okay, that is fine.

Amendment carried.

Ms SANDERSON: I move:

Amendment No 61 [Sanderson–1]—

Page 88, after line 31—Insert:

Part 4—Amendment of Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935

4—Amendment of section 5AA—Aggravated offences

Section 5AA(1)(e)(i)—after 'Part 3' insert:

Division 8A or

5—Insertion of Part 3 Division 8A

After Part 3 Division 8 insert:

Division 8A—Child marriage

34—Interpretation and application of Division

(1) In this Division—

child means a person under the age of 18 years.

(2) Nothing in this Division is intended to limit the operation of the Marriage Act 1961 of the Commonwealth.

34A—Bringing child into State for marriage

(1) A person must not bring a child into the State, or arrange for a child to be brought into the State, with the intention of causing the child to be married.

Maximum penalty:

(a) for a basic offence—imprisonment for 15 years;

(b) for an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 19 years.

(2) In proceedings for an offence against subsection (1), if it is proved that—

(a) the defendant brought a child, or arranged for a child to be brought, into the State; and

(b) the child, while in the State, went through the form or ceremony of marriage,

it will be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the defendant brought the child, or arranged for the child to be brought, into the State (as the case may be) with the intention of causing the child to be married.

34B—Removing child from State for marriage

(1) A person must not take a child from the State, or arrange for a child to be taken from the State, with the intention of causing the child to be married.

Maximum penalty:

(a) for a basic offence—imprisonment for 15 years;

(b) for an aggravated offence—imprisonment for 19 years.

(2) In proceedings for an offence against subsection (1), if it is proved that—

(a) the defendant took a child, or arranged for a child to be taken, from the State; and

(b) the child, while outside the State, went through the form or ceremony of marriage,

it will be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the defendant took the child, or arranged for the child to be taken, from the State (as the case may be) with the intention of causing the child to be married.

34C—Consent no defence

This Division applies irrespective of whether the child concerned, or a parent or guardian of the child, consents to the marriage.

The idea of this is to make it an offence to remove a child regarding child marriage. It is illegal to remove a child for the purpose of FGM, and whilst child marriage has been put in this bill as a risk and a harm, I believe it should also be a criminal act so that there are further powers.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: At this stage I am not convinced that this is necessary, but I am not fundamentally opposed to obviously dealing with this issue to the extent that it is going on, and it needs to be looked at. As a matter of formality, can I presently oppose this thing here, but indicate to the member for Adelaide that I am very happy to have a talk with her about this and the other matters that we undertook to speak about between here and somewhere else. It might be that we have an agreement about this.

Ms SANDERSON: I am happy to discuss it between the houses.

Amendment negatived; schedule as amended passed.

Title passed.

Bill reported with amendment.

Third Reading

The Hon. J.R. RAU (Enfield—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General, Minister for Justice Reform, Minister for Planning, Minister for Industrial Relations, Minister for Child Protection Reform, Minister for the Public Sector, Minister for Consumer and Business Services, Minister for the City of Adelaide) (17:21): I move:

That this bill be now read a third time.

I would like to thank the member for Adelaide for the way in which she has dealt with this matter, and I commit again to having further discussions with her between here and elsewhere, if there are things that we can sort out. It is always good to work on legislative change in a way that is cooperative, to the point and not discursive and littered with other unnecessary artefacts. I am very grateful for the way in which the member for Adelaide has approached this.

Can I also thank all the officers who worked extensively on this: parliamentary counsel; legislative services in the Attorney-General's Department; Brett, who started this process as a very close adviser of mine and has since moved on to bigger and better things. I could not keep her no matter how much I tried. There is a story there, but I wish her well in her new endeavours and she has done a terrific job. I am just sorry, Brett, that we could not provide sufficient attractions to keep you where you were.

Can I say to all of you who have helped in this that you have done a terrific job. It has been a very big job, and I know it is not over yet. I know there is more to come, but this bit of it at least is over. I also wanted to thank Susan and her office because we have worked very closely with them and her department and with Cathy, the new chief executive. A lot of people have put a lot of time and effort into this, and I sincerely thank all of them.

I also thank all those people who took the trouble to make submissions. Hopefully, this process, although frustrating I know, demonstrates that we do actually pay attention. We may not have accepted every single proposition put forward, but hopefully people with goodwill will see that we have listened and that we have attempted to accommodate concerns where that has been possible. Thank you to all concerned, and I hope that when this bill finds its way into another place the people there are impressed with all the work that has gone on here today and will just say, 'If they like it, that's good enough for us.'

Bill read a third time and passed.