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Legislative Council - Fifty-Third Parliament, Second Session (53-2)
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Emergency Management (Electricity Supply Emergencies) Amendment Bill

Second Reading

Adjourned debate on second reading (resumed on motion).

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS (19:46): I rise on behalf of Liberal members to address the second reading of the Emergency Management (Electricity Supply Emergencies) Amendment Bill 2017. As has already been publicly indicated by the Liberal leader Steven Marshall, I indicate that the Liberal party room has resolved not to oppose the legislation, so its passage is assured or guaranteed through the parliament this week. However, as the Liberal leader and shadow energy spokesperson, Mr van Holst Pellekaan, have indicated, there is considerable scepticism from Liberal members and a number of stakeholders in the community who have been consulted that this piece of legislation will do everything that the government has claimed that it will do.

This bill is based on the huge belief that the Hon. Tom Koutsantonis—the world's most notorious hoon-driving Treasurer, someone who has helped create the crisis that we currently confront, someone who has driven the economy into the ground, someone who was caught up in the Gillman scandal and someone who, frankly, I would not trust to run a chicken shop—somehow is now going to be the person who can run the National Electricity Market better than anyone else, without creating a disaster by himself. Put simply: give me a break! Good luck with that particular assumption upon which this legislation is based.

During the committee stage of the debate we will look at some of the statements and claims that have been made, the detail of the legislation and the nature of the advice that the government was receiving during some of the recent emergencies, and seek some indication from the government and its advisers as to the government's response.

We have seen many of the government's claims in relation to the legislation that we have before us and the government's energy plan. I noted that the Hon. Tom Koutsantonis, on 11 April this year, said that if these powers had existed last year the statewide blackout could have been avoided by reducing reliance on the interconnector and calling on more generation in South Australia. Yet, this is the same Treasurer who, on 29 September last year, said:

I have to say that there is no politician anywhere in the world who can guarantee any type of infrastructure to deal with that kind of natural event, and anyone who says that [then they are] lying.

Out of the mouths of babes. The same man who in September of last year said nobody could do anything about the circumstances with which we were confronted and anyone who says that they can is lying, in April of this year is now saying, 'Look, if these powers had existed it would have all been hunky-dory and I would have been able to fix the problem.'

The other claims that have been made, many of which are in the government's energy plan, 'It's time to take charge of our energy future', relate to the impact the government says it will have on prices. I quote from that document under 'Message from Jay', where he states:

The privatisation of our State's energy assets has placed an enormous amount of power in the hands of a few energy companies.

These factors, together, have led to too little competition in our national energy market…

Today in South Australia, that all changes.

As a result of this piece of legislation and the other four or five elements of the government's plan, all of this is changing. We have seen claims made by the Treasurer on Twitter. In essence, he says that his legislation now will see the end of privatisation. He says, 'Will Rob Lucas allow his legacy to be unwound by giving power of direction over generation assets back to South Australia?'

In that statement and a number of others, the Treasurer has indicated, in terms of the legislation that we have before us, that the government is saying that the era of privatisation is over. The Treasurer—who will know better than anybody else in the country or in the world, in terms of running a complex national electricity market—he and he alone will be able to single-handedly run the market and run it better than anybody else. He claims that he will be able to unwind the problems of privatisation through the legislation and the other elements of the plan that we see before us.

So, clearly, the ball is now in the government's court. After all this publicity, after this plan and the legislation is passed, if the plan has been publicly unveiled and $1 million-plus is spent on advertising it—after all of this, if the public of South Australia, between now and early next year, still see massive price rises in electricity, if the public of South Australia still see blackouts occurring between now and early next year then the game is over. The Hon. Tom Koutsantonis and the Premier—Jay, as he likes to be called—have said they have the solution, they have the plan, they are going to be able to put downward pressure on prices and they will be able to stop the blackouts.

It is going to be a simple test and that is why this legislation is going to pass through parliament. It will be a very simple test for the people of South Australia. Will they see prices coming down as a result of this legislation and the government's plan? Will they see no more blackouts between now and early next year? Because Tom Koutsantonis is single-handedly going to be able to run this market in emergencies and he would have been able to prevent the statewide blackout of September last year.

This man and this man alone has the capacity, so he says, to be able to single-handedly run this National Electricity Market, take advice, and fix all the problems for the people of South Australia. Let me just say that I am sceptical. I have my doubts that the Hon. Tom Koutsantonis, who, as I said, has that catalogue of sins on his CV already, is in any way likely to be able to do all that he claims he is going to be able to do. So, there will be no excuses. It is a simple test and we look forward to seeing whether or not the government and the Treasurer achieves all that they say they are going to achieve from what they claim to be the solution.

The hypocrisy of this government and the Treasurer is well known. I outlined in a speech to this house on 29 November last year the hypocrisy in relation to privatisation. I placed on the record statements made by the Hon. Trevor Crothers to me that the Hon. Tom Koutsantonis had urged him to cross the floor and vote for the privatisation bill. I indicated in that particular speech for the second time that the Hon. Terry Cameron was aware of the encouragement from the Hon. Tom Koutsantonis to the Hon. Trevor Crothers and to the Hon. Terry Cameron to support the privatisation bill, yet of course, now that it suits him, the Treasurer portrays himself as the opponent of the privatisation of the National Electricity Market.

I remind members again, as I did in that particular speech, that contrary to the claims made by the Treasurer, the Premier and others, the National Electricity Market was actually created firstly by a federal Labor government under Paul Keating, and a state Labor government under Lynn Arnold. It was not created by federal Liberal and state Liberal governments. It was supported by subsequent federal Liberal and state Liberal governments, as it has been by subsequent federal Labor and state Labor governments, but the National Electricity Market in the early nineties was actually conceived under Labor administrations, both federal and state.

In that contribution in November, I highlighted, and I will not again, those particular facts in relation to the National Electricity Market. I place on the record the most recent statement made by the Treasurer immediately after the statewide blackout last year on 28 September. What did the Treasurer say about the National Electricity Market after the statewide blackout? The whole state had been blacked out the night before. The Treasurer said in parliament, in Hansard, as follows:

We are the lead legislator for the National Electricity Market. We have a lot of in-depth, in-situ advice given to us constantly by world experts based here in South Australia—people whose lives have been dedicated to the management of the National Electricity Market and its establishment…

We have designed it, we have built it…and it's worked and served us well.

This is the Treasurer, the day after the statewide blackout last year, saying, 'We created, we designed, we have built the National Electricity Market as the lead legislator, and it's worked and it's served us well.' Not only did he say that, he went on further:

As inconvenient as it was yesterday—

that is all he can put on it. It was 'inconvenient' to have a statewide blackout. This is the day after the statewide blackout—

the system worked as it was designed to—it protected itself.

This is the Treasurer. These are his own words in Hansard congratulating himself and his government on being the lead legislator, on having designed the National Electricity Market rules, having led the debates in relation to it, and saying that yesterday's events—the statewide blackout—were inconvenient, but that is how the market was meant to operate, and it worked well. It protected itself. It worked, and served us well. What arrant, rank hypocrisy from Treasurer Koutsantonis. It is simply unbelievable. I am not sure sometimes how he keeps a straight face, if that is indeed a straight face we see on television each night.

I am not sure how he keeps a straight face when he speaks now, having been on the record straight after the blackout saying that clearly. The political opinion polling came in over Christmas and New Year and absolutely belted the Treasurer, the Labor Party and the Labor government. Labor members know that, prior to the last state election, their internal market research, the same as the internal market research for the Liberal Party, showed that the most despised politician in South Australia was the Hon. Tom Koutsantonis. He had the highest negative rating of any politician, Labor or Liberal, in South Australia. That is a pretty fair record, and he is building on it. He has built on it since 2014.

The Hon. P. Malinauskas: How did you come up?

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Much better than the Hon. Tom Koutsantonis, but humility prevents me from revealing the numbers.

Members interjecting:

The PRESIDENT: Order!

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: What happened over Christmas and New Year was that the market research came to the hardheads in the Labor Party and said, 'The Hon. Mr Koutsantonis, this sort of line you are running on the National Electricity Market, that you designed it and you have taken credit for, that it has worked well and it was just inconvenient for us to have a statewide blackout, ain't going down too well with the punters out there. You are going to have to come up with some taxpayer money to spin and sell an electricity plan or an energy plan or something. Anything is better than what you have been selling for the last three years.'

Members interjecting:

The PRESIDENT: Order!

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: It is good to see the frontbench squealing like stuck pigs. We know the leader did not want to be here tonight. He wanted to be on a basketball court somewhere. He is a bit grumpy. Mr President, I am happy to go along with the interjections as long as you permit them to go on; they are not going to divert me. The more we hear the members of the frontbench squealing like stuck pigs, we know the message is hammering home in relation to this particular issue.

That is why we have the plan that is now being launched. That is why we have $1 million-plus of taxpayers' money being spent, with Premier Weatherill—Jay, as he calls himself—front and centre in paid television advertising. It is contrary to all the pre-existing government advertising guidelines that said as soon as you see a politician in a government-funded advertising campaign, it is party political—straight out of the words of Mike Rann, the former leader of the Labor Party. The pre-existing guidelines explicitly banned that. There was an Auditor-General's report, but the government has either got its way around that or simply ignored it on the basis that, even if the Auditor-General were to report, they would just ignore the report and deal with that, potentially after the next election.

Let me finish that particular quote, because I was diverted by unseemly and injections by the Leader of the Government. On 29 September last year, the Hon. Tom Koutsantonis finished his answers in question time by saying:

As I said, the entire framework for AEMO's operation, for the operation of the National Electricity Market, is based in this parliament. In bipartisan ways, we have built the National Electricity Market in this chamber and in the other chamber by bringing amendments and bills here to this parliament on behalf of all other Australian parliaments, and we voted on them.

That indeed was the claim made by the Treasurer. There are many other aspects of the energy plan that have been touched on in part by speakers in the second reading debate. There have been passing references to the government's broken election promise of 2002 to build the Riverlink interconnector.

We know, before this plan was launched late last year, the government's first attempted plan was to say it was going to spend half a million dollars on a business case for a new interconnector. Now that this plan has come out, there are many stakeholders who are arguing that this plan in itself makes it harder for any interconnector to be ultimately passed by the national regulatory authorities in the immediate or short term, and that is why it does not feature. The government does not want to talk about interconnectors. It promised one in 2002, and 15 years later it has still broken its promise.

Members interjecting:

The PRESIDENT: Order!

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I am very happy to talk about the interconnector any day of the week. If young pups like the Hon. Mr Malinauskas want to come in and lead with their chin and talk about a 2002 election promise (when he was probably still in school), that was a promise made by his former Premier and his government, who fought an election in 2002 on promising that they would build an interconnector into New South Wales. Fifteen years later, where is that promise? It is as broken as most of the other promises of this Labor government, this broken, decrepit, dilapidated excuse for a government, sort of scrambling to the line for the election in March 2018.

They are desperate to cling onto power and will use any device, any taxpayers' money that they can get their grubby little hands on: a spare $1 million here for the Job Accelerator Grant Scheme; $1 million plus for the advertising of their energy plan, or Jay's energy plan. They will fund their advertising campaigns, not through the Labor Party, but using the taxpayers' money because there are probably people a little wary about giving them money, other than the good old shoppies union, because they know that if they keep pouring millions into the Labor Party they will keep control of the Labor caucus, keep control of the preselections and they will be able to stop the shop trading hours legislation, which they have pledged, forever and a day, to oppose.

The other aspects of the plan that, as I said, we will not have time tonight to go through in any great detail is the new gas-fired plant, which is $360 million, and there are many who are already raising very significant questions about the cost of that particular plan. We had the incredible set of circumstances on radio in the last week where the simple question was put to the Treasurer, 'Well, what's it going to cost to actually run this plant?' The Treasurer was like a wide-mouth grouper. The mouth went open and closed, but nothing was coming out. It was one of those embarrassing moments on radio and the Treasurer had no idea at all on what it would cost to run his $360 million gas-fired power station. He had no idea at all and yet he is asking for the people of South Australia to endorse this gas-fired plant, and he has no idea—

Members interjecting:

The PRESIDENT: Order! Will the Hon. Mr Maher desist. Honourable minister, desist. I have given you the warning. Allow the Hon. Mr Lucas to continue unabated.

The Hon. D.W. Ridgway: If you name him tonight, we are with you.

The PRESIDENT: Yes, I know you are, that is why I probably will not name him.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: He probably wants to go home.

The Hon. D.W. Ridgway: Have some courage.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: There is also then the unknown cost—again, which the government and the Treasurer has no idea of—of the diesel-fired plant that is going to be required because everybody knows, contrary to the vague assurances from the government that maybe it might be available for this summer, that this gas-fired plant has two chances of being ready by this summer: none and Buckley's. There is just no prospect at all of this $360 million gas-fired plant being ready to tackle the problems of this particular summer.

In fact, should we be in the unfortunate circumstance of a Labor government being re-elected, there is considerable doubt as to whether it would actually even be ready for the following summer as well. As I said, there are many other aspects of that plan, but tonight I just want to look at this particular aspect, which is the emergency management bill that we have before us.

Again, I repeat the claims that are being made in relation to the legislation I referred to earlier. In a recent interview with the Treasurer on 10 April this year, he claimed as follows: 'These powers'—he is talking about the legislation—'undo a lot of that legacy.' That is, the legacy of the privatisation of ETSA. 'These powers give South Australians back the power that they had when we owned our assets.' That is the claim that is being made about this legislation. The government is claiming that this is going to undo all of the issues in relation to the privatisation: 'These powers give South Australians back the power that they had when we owned our assets.'

As I said earlier, we will be able to see over the coming 11 or 12 months whether that particular claim is correct or not, but that is the claim that is being made by the Treasurer in relation to the legislation. He also said on ABC News on 28 March that:

Again, he repeated his claim that if he had had those powers in September the statewide blackout could have been avoided, Angelique Donnellan reports.

Further on he said, 'We would have constrained the interconnector in the morning.' I will come back to that later in this contribution. He said, 'We would have constrained the interconnector in the morning.' So, before 12 o'clock in the morning he would have constrained the interconnector 'as I asked AEMO and there would have been more South Australian generation on.' That is his claim in relation to the legislation.

Then he says further on, 'We will never have idle generators sitting by, seeing prices spike by creating scarcity.' That is the claim in relation to the legislation that we are about to pass. Not in certain circumstances in relation to emergencies, but he is saying, 'We will never have idle generators sitting by, seeing prices spike by creating scarcity.' The stakeholders and observers who have seen those particular claims laugh at their accuracy.

On 28 March this year, he told reporters that the ministerial directions would need to be followed on pain of massive fines. I will be exploring that later on in this speech and also in the committee stage. Then, he said:

Koutsantonis said the new powers would prevent future blackouts and force generators to turn on when the state requires energy. 'We will never have idle generators creating scarcity', he said.

Again, replicating the previous statement that he put on the public record. Then again, on 28 March, this time in the press release that he and the Premier issued, he said, 'Under these new laws we would have the power to step in and direct available generation on within minutes.' 'Within minutes' is the test that he will now be judged by because that was the official press release put out by the Treasurer and the Premier. Sorry, let me qualify that. That was actually a claim made, on that occasion, by the Premier. Then, the Treasurer said:

For the first time, since the previous Liberal government sold ETSA, South Australians are going to have control over their energy supply.

So, the test in relation to this legislation is that, for the first time since 2001, South Australians are going to have control over their energy supply. There will never, ever be generators standing idle, and all of those other claims that the Treasurer has made in those particular statements that I have put on the record.

In looking at this particular legislation and comparing it to the two pieces of legislation that already exist, the Essential Services Act 1981 and the Emergency Management Act 2004, even the Treasurer, during the debate on this particular bill in another place, conceded the following, 'I have to say that I already have the powers I am seeking now if an emergency is declared.' So, contrary to the public claims he has made that this is going to wind back privatisation, we are going to go back to the circumstances that existed prior to ETSA, he then says in the house, completely contrary to those particular public statements:

I have to say that I already have the powers I am seeking now if an emergency is declared. I can actually intervene, declare a state of emergency and, of course, have these powers. It only makes common sense, given what we have been through, to now say, 'Do we require these powers to avoid heading into a state of emergency?' It is not as simple as saying that the Governor must obey whatever the executive tells him in Executive Council. The Governor must be satisfied, and we, as his ministers, must be truthful in advising him. If there is no emergency as defined under the act, we cannot call a state of emergency. We need to be able to satisfy ourselves that emergency has occurred.

As I will point out later, the latter part of that is simply incorrect, but the first part of that is a statement of fact; that is, by and large the minister is acknowledging that the government does have these powers already in two existing pieces of legislation, and the overblown, hyped, publicly funded claims that are being made about the legislation do not bear too much scrutiny. But, as I said, there will be a simple test about whether or not this particular plan has worked. So, that is the Treasurer indicating that he already has the existing powers. Further on he said—and I will draw attention to this during the committee stage:

I had no power to intervene, other than to call a state of emergency, but of course a state of emergency did not exist, so I could not have called it and used any of those powers as this was before the storms wreaked any havoc and before there was any damage done to property.

I will be considering that further on in this contribution and also during the committee stage of the debate. He also said, again during the House of Assembly debate, as follows:

…if I had the power before the emergency was there I could have used that power to, at the very least, constrain the interconnector so that losing it would not be a credible contingency.

He then went on to make some of the same public statements he has made in relation to being able to prevent the statewide blackout on 28 September. I will refer later in my contribution to the advice the minister was receiving that morning.

If I turn to the existing Essential Services Act 1981, this act gives the power to the Attorney-General. as opposed to the Minister for Energy. Under section 3 of the existing act, the government, but through the Attorney-General, has the power to declare periods of emergency. It provides:

Where, in the opinion of the Governor, circumstances have arisen, or are likely to arise, that have caused, or are likely to cause, interruption or dislocation of essential services in the State, the Governor may by proclamation—

(a) declare a period…to be a period of emergency…

Under the Essential Services Act, there is the existing power, and the Treasurer acknowledges that during the debate in the other place; that is, he or the government (it is not really him, although he says it was him), through the Attorney-General, had the power to do so.

The claim that the government is making is that, to use the power to declare a state of emergency, it is a longer and more cumbersome process. In one of the quotes I referred to earlier, the Treasurer refers to the fact that you have to go to the Governor and convince the Governor about the proposal for a state of emergency.

As everyone knows in drafting, we have any number of references to the involvement of the Governor and, under our system of government, under both Labor and Liberal, the Governor operates under the advice of the executive arm of government, and that is the Premier and the cabinet. Appointments are made by the Governor, a whole variety of decisions are taken by the Governor, but they are not taken by the Governor—they are actually taken by the cabinet and the advice goes to the Governor and the Governor signs off on it.

It is technically correct that a Governor could refuse to, and we have seen a circumstance at the federal level with the Governor-General, but I am not aware of any circumstance on the South Australian scene when that has occurred. Under Labor and Liberal governments, governors have taken the advice of the executive arm of government, particularly if it was an issue of a state of emergency being declared. The government's claim is that under the bill we have before us you will not have to have the involvement of the cabinet and the Governor. It will be a decision to be taken by the Treasurer or the Minister for Energy alone, the Hon. Tom Koutsantonis, in these circumstances.

The other thing the government argues is that under section 3 there is a harder test, in some way, than the test that is going to be in the emergency management act. The test in section 3 of the Essential Services Act to declare a state of emergency is simply:

…where, in the opinion of the Governor, circumstances have arisen, or are likely to arise, that have caused, or are likely to cause, interruption or dislocation of essential services in the State.

The government is arguing that is a tougher test or a higher threshold than the proposed bill, which provides:

If it appears to the minister, on reasonable grounds, that the supply of electricity to all or part of the South Australian community is disrupted to a significant degree, or there is a real risk that it may be disrupted to a significant degree, the minister may declare an electricity supply emergency.

At least one lawyer I have spoken to has a slightly different view from crown law advice to the government. As a non-lawyer, I do not proffer a legal opinion, but he is not convinced of this particular claim of the government; that is, under this particular provision the minister has to on reasonable grounds, and there has to be a real risk that it may be disrupted to a significant degree before you can declare. Under the existing act, the Essential Services Act, it is simply the opinion of the Governor—you can insert the executive arm of government, the cabinet—where circumstances have arisen, or are likely to arise, that have caused, or are likely to cause, interruption or dislocation of essential services.

I will be wanting to explore that with the government advisers in the committee stage because their advice to me, and the minister's advice publicly, has been that it was a tougher test to get this through and a more cumbersome process. We have considered the issue about the cumbersome process, and I am now talking about the toughness of this particular test. I have placed on the public record the government's legal advice in relation to this because I guess we will not ultimately know until it is tested in a court of law somewhere.

The advice I was given in relation to comparing the Essential Services Act and the bill we have before us—and again, I seek clarification from the government and its advisers in the committee stage—is that, essentially, once you have a state of emergency the powers of the minister to direct are essentially the same. That is, this bill is not giving the Minister for Energy any increased powers. If you have a state of emergency, you have passed the test and you have got whoever it is to have made the decision, what you can do in terms of directing AEMO or generators or retailers, in particular, is no different to the Essential Services Act.

That is the advice we got in the informal briefing from crown law advisers, and I will be seeking to put that on the public record and have it confirmed that that is, indeed, the advice that was given to the government. Essentially, it is not giving any additional powers at all, and, as I said, the Treasurer sort of conceded that during the debate in the House of Assembly when he said, 'Look, I've already got these powers, but the process is more cumbersome in terms of being able to activate them.'

The other point to note is that under this bill, if it were to be passed in the parliament, we were advised that the Essential Services Act remains. So, if this bill passes we will have the Minister for Energy with the power to declare a state of emergency, but there will still be the power for the Attorney-General to declare a state of emergency under the Essential Services Act. We will need to confirm that with the government's advisers, but it appears that the Attorney-General would still have the power to declare a state of emergency as well as the Minister for Energy under this particular act. Why that should be the case is a question the government needs to address.

The other act that exists is the Emergency Management Act 2004. This introduces even more elements of intrigue and confusion, because under this act the state coordinator, who is the police commissioner, has extraordinary powers to declare, in essence, states of emergency. There are three different levels under sections 22, 23 and 24. The first is section 22—Identified major incidents, the second is section 23—Major emergencies and the third is section 24—Disasters. Again, we will seek confirmation during the committee stage, but this decision is entirely one for the for the police commissioner to take, and the police commissioner alone. Subsection (1) of section 22—Identified major incidents, provides:

If it appears to the State Co-ordinator—

that is the police commissioner—

that the nature or scale of an emergency that has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur is such that it should be declared to be an identified major incident, the State Co-ordinator may declare the emergency to be an identified major incident.

There is a separate provision in section 23 which says that the state coordinator can declare a major emergency and, in section 24, declare a disaster. If you look at that particular provision, which already exists, the police commissioner does not have to have what the Treasurer and the government have referred to as 'the cumbersome process of going to cabinet', 'the cumbersome process of going to the Governor for approval' and what the government claims is 'a cumbersome process of convincing the Governor that a state of emergency or an identified major incident should be declared.'

The advice given to me is that the police commissioner acting alone, without cabinet or the Governor, can declare, in essence, a state of emergency under these three definitions. When you look at what is the test—because this was the issue the government raised earlier in relation to comparing the Essential Services Act with this new bill—the test that the state coordinator has to meet would appear to be a very easy test.

The state coordinator just has to satisfy himself that the incident or the scale of the emergency is such that it should be declared to be identified a major incident. It is his judgment and his judgement alone in terms of declaring the emergency to be identified a major incident. It would appear to be either no threshold at all or a very low threshold when compared to the threshold under the Essential Services Act and the one that is being inserted into this legislation, because in this legislation the notion of reasonableness has to be included and there also has to be a real risk, which is included in the test under clause 27B of the bill before us.

The remaining issue then is: what are the powers? The advice that was given to me when I put the question was: what power does the state coordinator have (the police commissioner) once he has declared an identified major incident, a disaster or a major emergency? The crown law advice to me was, 'It's arguable that he has the same powers as the minister will have under the bill.' But, in terms of the bill, the government was arguing, 'We just need to make it quite clear that we have the powers.' The government's advice is that it is arguable that the police commissioner and the state coordinator has those powers, as follows:

When you look at the functions and powers of the state coordinator, he has the following functions: to manage and coordinate response and recovery operations in accordance with this act and the SEMP; if an identified major incident, a major emergency or disaster is declared under this act, to ensure the SEMC is provided with adequate information in order to fulfil its monitoring functions under this act; and to carry out other functions assigned to the state coordinator under this act.

When you look at the management of emergencies and the various other powers that may be exercised powers of the state coordinator, under section 25, he has extraordinarily wide powers. He can:

(d) direct the owner of, or the person for the time being in charge of, any real or personal property to place it under the control or at the disposition of a specified person;

In essence, he can direct anybody to place the control of their power plant, their asset, their building or whatever it is under the disposition of himself or, indeed, of anyone the police commissioner nominates. Under section 25(2)(i), he can:

direct a person who is in a position to do so—

(iv) …to perform any operation in relation to any plant, equipment, apparatus or device;

Again, that would appear to give the police commissioner the power to direct anybody to do anything in relation to plant, equipment, apparatus or device—that is, anything that operates a power plant, for example. Subsection (2)(m) provides:

direct, insofar as may be reasonably necessary in the circumstances, any person…to assist in the exercise of any power under this section;

The powers that the state coordinator has appear to be extraordinarily wide and significant. As I said, the crown advice given to me in the briefing was that it was arguable that the police commissioner does have the same powers as will be given to the Minister for Energy under the bill but, to put it beyond doubt, the government wanted to be explicit in terms of the bill we have before us. We therefore have two existing bills and I am advised—and, again, we will have to explore this in the committee stage—that it is proposed that the police commissioner will continue to have these wide powers even once this bill is passed.

Whilst the Minister for Energy will have the power to declare, in essence, an electricity state of emergency, the police commissioner will still have this power as the state coordinator to declare a state of emergency and would have the power to impose all those powers, except that there is to be a restriction that, if the Minister for Energy uses his powers under this act to direct the generator, the state coordinator will not be allowed to use his powers to direct the same generator.

You will not be able to have conflicting directions by two different people under the Emergency Management Act to a generator under the government's proposed amendments to the bill. Nevertheless, there will be a set of circumstances where, if the Minister for Energy does not declare a state of emergency, it would still be possible under this legislation for the state coordinator, the police commissioner, to declare a state of emergency or, as I said, for the Attorney-General under the Essential Services Act to declare a state of emergency.

Under the government's arrangements, we will still have three separate individuals—an attorney-general, a police commissioner and a minister for energy—who, in differing circumstances, can all declare varying levels of states of emergency with varying powers in the future. Again, I think it is incumbent on the government in the committee stage to explain why this set of circumstances remains as a result of the amendments we have before us and whether or not they see any potential conflicts.

I will now look at the bill and how it might have applied to the 28 September statewide blackout. As you know, I placed on the record that Treasurer Koutsantonis has said that, if he had had these powers, he single-handedly would have been able to prevent the statewide blackout because he single-handedly would have been able to run the complicated National Electricity Market better than anyone else and he would have been able to take action.

What do we know about the circumstances that occurred on that particular day? I am indebted to the government advisers. I put some questions to the government advisers and they were able to provide a number of responses that answered at least a number of those questions. We know that the system black event occurred at 3.48pm Australian Central Standard Time on 28 September. Seven minutes later, AEMO suspended the operation of the spot market.

Between 4 o'clock and 5.30, we know that the Emergency Management Council and the cabinet were meeting concurrently in nearby rooms or wherever they happened to be, so that cabinet ministers could go from Emergency Management Council to cabinet, or whatever happened to be required by the laws that were operating at the time. Within the next 90 minutes, we know that parliament was closed down. The minister said that they had to go off to Emergency Management Council meetings and to cabinet, and those meetings were going on.

We know that at 5.30, so in essence 90 minutes later, the legislation and the process that was used by the government was that the police commissioner was used as the State Co-ordinator, under the Emergency Management Act, to make a declaration of identified major incident pursuant to the Emergency Management Act. The essential services legislation was not used at that time, which is the power that the Attorney-General has to issue directions.

The police commissioner, acting alone, without the advice of cabinet or having to take the advice of cabinet, and without having to go to the Governor, issued under section 22 of the Emergency Management Act a declaration of an identified major incident. That is the lowest level. The next level is emergency, and the highest level is disaster. He issued a declaration of identified major incident and had all the powers that I outlined he had during that particular period.

Given that the Treasurer is saying that he single-handedly, if he had these powers, would have been able to prevent the statewide blackout on 28 September, and given that crown law has conceded to me that it is arguable that the police commissioner did have the power as the State Co-ordinator to direct generators, retailers and AEMO and all this bill was doing was putting it beyond doubt and giving it to the Minister for Energy, given that the crown law advice was that it is arguable that they had that power, did the government consider using that power? If they did consider it, why did they not take up that particular option at the time, given that Treasurer Koutsantonis is saying that if he had had these powers back on 28 September, he single-handedly would have been able to solve the problems of the statewide blackout?

We know that an identified major incident was declared under the Emergency Management Act. We know that crown law advice to me is that it is arguable that the police commissioner had the power to direct generators and AEMO in relation to constraining the interconnector. If indeed that is the case, what did the government consider at that particular time if, as I said, the Treasurer is now claiming that, if he had had these powers, he would have been single-handedly able to do a better job than anybody else in the nation or the world in terms of preventing the statewide blackout on 28 September?

The following night, at 8.09 Australian Central Standard Time on 29 September, AEMO received a ministerial direction issued by the South Australian government to suspend the market in the South Australian region until the direction was revoked. That direction was issued by acting attorney-general Snelling using the essential services legislation. On the night of the blackout on the 28th, the Emergency Management Act was used with the police commissioner, who acted alone, and did not need cabinet or the Governor.

Just over 24 hours later, using the Essential Services Act, the acting attorney-general, I assume having gone through cabinet, got the advice of the Governor and, having it signed off by the Governor, issued the direction to AEMO in relation to suspending the market in South Australia. Those are the circumstances that have been outlined to us by the government's advisers. There are many questions that arise from that chronology that the government advisers have provided to us, which, as I said, we will need to explore in the committee stage of the debate.

This now comes to the issue of the Treasurer's claim that he would have been able to solve all the problems. The issue now comes to the nature of the advice that the Treasurer was receiving on that day. A number of questions were put to the Treasurer in the House of Assembly debate by my colleagues, the members for Bragg and Stuart, who said, 'Okay, if this bill passes, you're going to have the power. Who is going to be advising you in relation to the exercise of these considerable powers?'

A lot of the advice is going to come from senior officers in the energy and technical regulation division of the now Department of the Premier and Cabinet, including Mr Vince Duffy, a long-serving and respected public servant, and Mr Rob Faunt from the Office of the Technical Regulator, which I am advised is part of the energy and technical regulation division, although it has a separate statutory function, and they have respective roles. The advice that the Treasurer gave in the House of Assembly debate is that he would be taking advice from Mr Duffy, Mr Faunt and other officers within those units.

I am not sure (tongue in cheek) of the extent of the meteorological expertise of Mr Duffy and Mr Faunt. I do not know Mr Faunt, but I do know Mr Duffy, and I suspect his meteorological knowledge is about the same as mine: we are very interested but we would not proclaim to be experts. The issue with these particular powers is that the minister, in terms of predicting storm events and potential emergencies, will in essence set himself up to second-guess the advice that is being provided to AEMO and the other market operators.

It is sensible to be saying that the Treasurer said, as I took one of the quotes, that on the morning on the 28th—that is, before lunchtime—he would have constrained the interconnector. We know through freedom of information documents provided by the member for Stuart about the nature of the advice the departmental officers and his ministerial advisers were providing the Minister for Energy, Mr Koutsantonis. The most senior and significant one was provided at 11.06am, just before lunchtime. What was the advice to the Treasurer and Minister for Energy, Mr Koutsantonis, on that particular day? There is an email from chief of staff Jarrad Pilkington at 11.06 on 28 December that states, 'Even with the weather conditions, we don't expect this to be an issue'—this being concern about the electricity system.

According to the Minister for Energy, Mr Koutsantonis, questions were being asked directly to AEMO executives. Mr Duffy and Mr Faunt were having their discussions with National Electricity Market operatives—people from AEMO and others—in terms of, 'Hey, we've got a big storm coming. There are all these particular problems. Are we going to have problems? Should we constrain the interconnector?' The advice coming from AEMO, which is now being criticised, was, 'No, there won't be any concern'. As it turned out, it was wrong advice. That is the advice they received.

However, what was the advice the Minister for Energy, Mr Koutsantonis, was receiving? He was receiving exactly the same advice. By 11.06am, Jarrad Pilkington, his chief of staff, had consulted with the senior advisers within the Department of the Premier and Cabinet and the Office of the Technical Regulator—all of the gurus that the government uses to provide advice. The same advice was given to the Minister for Energy, and let me quote it again: 'Even with the weather conditions, we don't expect this to be an issue.'

Yet, of course, with the political spin, the million-dollar advertising campaign, this particular problem that the government has in terms of managing electricity, minister Koutsantonis says, 'In the morning, I would have constrained the interconnector and solved the problem.' He says he listens to the people who advised him, yet all his advisers were saying, 'Don't do that, there is not a worry', which is the same advice that came from AEMO. Yet, he says publicly and in the parliament, 'In the morning I would have constrained the interconnector and I would have had extra thermal generation going.' That is just errant, palpable nonsense; it is garbage.

Sadly, that is the sort of garbage we have to listen to, the sort of claims that the Treasurer and Minister for Energy has been making in relation to his own supposed magnificence in terms of being able to single-handedly run a national electricity market better than anyone else in the world and single-handedly protect the state from that particular statewide blackout.

The challenge is back to the government and its advisers in this particular chamber to rebut the freedom of information documents. It is clear advice from the minister's chief of staff, his most senior adviser, saying, 'We don't have a problem. Houston, we don't have a problem.' Yet, the minister is now saying that in the morning he would have made the decision to constrain the interconnector and prevent the statewide blackout.

The final issues I want to address in the second reading—and, again, we will need to explore them in greater detail in the committee stage—I was advised in the briefing that essentially, under the bill that we have before us, there are two proposed models of action that the government will have available to it. One is that the Minister for Energy will have the power, if there is to be this electricity state of emergency, to directly direct AEMO, and that AEMO would then direct the generators and retailers in terms of what needed to be done.

The other alternative was that the minister could bypass AEMO, in essence, and direct the generators and retailers directly himself. So, there were two particular models. In terms of what model the government might follow, the minister made that pretty clear during the debate in the House of Assembly. He said:

It is very hard to give these hypothetical scenarios the justice the house deserves because every scenario is different. In my mind, and I think in the agency's mind, the main powers would be to direct AEMO to direct generation on or to suspend the spot market in the case of something potentially occurring or to direct generation on.

The two models, which essentially the bill allows, are either directing the generators and retailers directly, and bypassing AEMO, or directing, under this legislation, AEMO to then direct the generators and retailers. The Minister for Energy made it quite clear in the House of Assembly that, in his mind and in the agency's mind, the main powers would be to direct AEMO to direct generation in relation to that.

That then raises some significant questions in relation to compensation and various statements that have been made about compensation. I refer to a briefing paper, Operation of the intervention price provisions in the National Electricity Market, effective date 10 March 2011. These were provided by the government advisers and they advise me that these are the current provisions which relate to compensation. On page 6 of that particular briefing paper from AEMO, it makes it clear as follows:

Compensation—Intervention pricing does not trigger compensation directly. If any scheduled generating units, scheduled network services (such as Basslink) or scheduled loads (apart from those subject to a direction or reserve contract) are dispatched to different targets or settlements residue distributions are directly and materially changed because of the intervention, then AEMO [then] determines the compensation to be paid by or paid to each Affected Participant. Affected participants may make submissions to AEMO claiming additional amounts taking into account direct costs such as fuel, incremental maintenance and manning costs, energy and ancillary service payments at the regional reference price.

That provision makes it quite clear that, if AEMO is directing generators to do things that might not be in their commercial interest, compensation is payable. There is a complicated process, which the government advisers sent me, in the national electricity rules in terms of the formulae that are to be used in terms of how much can be claimed and determined. There can be an independent arbitrator for the interminable arguments that will go on should there be these circumstances, but the national electricity rules clearly countenance, under the government's proposed course of action, compensation being potentially payable. Clause 8 of the briefing paper, Compensation Recovery, states that:

Any compensation that AEMO pays due to intervention in the market is recovered from Market Customers in the regions benefiting from the intervention (i.e. direction or reserve contracting). Compensation payments and recovery amounts are shown on preliminary and final settlement statements for the billing week in which the compensation determination is published to the market.

Put simply, what that means is that compensation can be paid to the generators or retailers, and then it will be the customers in South Australia who will have to pay through increased prices. That has not been the statement made by the Minister for Energy when he has been asked the question about compensation.

I place on the record, and I will be placing on the record during the committee stage, the advice given to me by crown law and government senior electricity advisers, and from these documents that have been sent to me, that it is quite clear that, given the government's clear intention to go down the process of directing AEMO—as the Treasurer, or Minister for Energy, indicated in the House of Assembly debate—under these particular provisions compensation would be triggered and those additional costs would be payable by the consumers in South Australia.

The final issue I want to raise, and again I will seek a response during the committee stage of the debate, is that under the essential services legislation, which as I said is not going to be changed by the government so you will still have the power under the Essential Services Act, there is a provision under the Essential Services Act that if the government, through the Attorney-General, fixes a state of emergency and directs retailers and generators under that particular provision, that the minister may, by notice published in the Gazette, fix maximum prices in relation to the sale of specified goods or services during a period of emergency.

The reason this question has been raised with me is that this power has existed for quite some time but it has never been utilised, and operators in the National Electricity Market and others have contemplated the rules that existed, and government intervention would only occur in exceptional circumstances. People are now saying to me and to others, 'Clearly, the rules have changed, and this particular government is rewriting the rules in terms of this particular legislation, so where does this particular power now sit?' That is—and I will be asking the questions—is it correct, as has been advised to me, that if the government, at some stage, was to use this particular provision, that it has the power, whilst the market is suspended, to fix the maximum prices for a period of time of an emergency during that particular period.

I do not know the answer to that, but the minister will have crown law advisers available to him and we will be seeking to get those answers placed on the public record and some assurances given to people who have been raising these particular questions. There are countless other minor issues in the bill that will be raised during the committee stage; I do not intend to pursue those during the second reading. I again indicate that the Liberal parliamentary party room's position has been to support the second reading and to not oppose the passage of the legislation.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY (Leader of the Opposition) (20:54): I rise to make some brief, but not too brief, comments about the government's Electricity Management (Electricity Supply Emergencies) Amendment Bill. As my colleague the Hon. Rob Lucas has put on the record, the opposition will be supporting this bill. I thought earlier that maybe I would not speak, as we are obviously after dinner and the government wants to rush this through. I asked the messengers for a copy of the bill, but it has been so rushed that we do not even have a Legislative Council copy. I have the House of Assembly copy, which is one of the rare times in this place when we have seen things rushed to this extent. Of course, we did give the undertaking that we would pass it this week, but we are doing it here this evening. As I said, I was not going to talk about this bill.

We are in a First World, modern, sophisticated society, and I have recently had the opportunity to travel to other parts of the world. We claim, and I think rightly so, that Adelaide is one of the best cities in the world, and Lonely Planet says that we are one of the best places to visit. I think Adelaide Oval is in line, or hopefully in line, to win some world award for being a great place. We are constantly being told that where we live—Adelaide in South Australia—is one of the best places in the world.

Yet if I look at the little journey I have been on in my lifetime, Mr Acting President—and I can be so rude to say that probably your lifetime is a little longer than mine, but not as long as some of those opposite, who are quite young and wet behind the ears—I can remember that, as a small child, my family's farm embraced renewable energy. In fact, I could not have a bath at night if we had not had wind for two days because the windmill that pumped out of the underground tank and filled the high tank to give us water in the house would be empty.

This is very sophisticated: we then went to what I think was a small Dunlite generator, which was a little windmill in the backyard that charged some batteries, and that of course was very good renewable energy. Then we became even more sophisticated. We had a Lister diesel engine and some batteries with 32-volt electricity, so we went from no electricity to 32-volt electricity. I can recall that when I was about five or six years old we went onto mains electricity.

The Hon. J.E. Hanson interjecting:

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: An interjection from Mr Hanson. I did not hear that, but obviously it was a sensible interjection.

The ACTING PRESIDENT (Hon. J.S.L. Dawkins): It was out of order.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: The local Bordertown electricity house had a small generator that supplied electricity, so we had very unreliable renewable electricity and a very unreliable diesel generator with batteries. We had a better system with a local electricity provider, and then, of course, Sir Thomas Playford brought all those small units together to form ETSA. As the Hon. Rob Lucas said, it was a federal Labor government, supported by a state Labor government, that formed the National Electricity Market.

Every time we stepped down the journey, we became more connected to more generation and more capacity. Our system became more secure, and so a National Electricity Market was created. Overseas, in some of the European countries they have a very high penetration of renewable energy. The reason they are so well organised in Europe is that they have a very high level of interconnectivity. If something goes down, the wind does not blow, the sun does not shine, the generator collapses or whatever, there is such a high level of interconnectivity.

That is the journey we have been on in my lifetime. Now we are going the other way. This government's current plan, and this bill, is to remove themselves from the national market, to be an island, if you like, an independent. Everybody is being encouraged to have batteries at home, and some people are talking about diesel generators. In fact, the other day I was speaking to somebody who was building a house, and he talked to his builder in Malvern about putting solar panels on his roof. He said that he has had three people ask him whether it was viable to put diesel generators in their backyards in the suburbs of Adelaide.

Such is the journey we have been on: we have gone full circle. Why have we gone full circle? As the Hon. Rob Lucas said, this government, the members opposite, were sitting there squealing like stuck pigs earlier. You just have to look at the journey we have been on. Fifteen years ago, I was elected to this place. The premier at the time, Mike Rann, promised to build an interconnector to New South Wales. This lot opposite often say that could not happen because of something they claim the previous Liberal government had done.

If that were the case, why would you not start the plan we have seen? I know that they have a very expensive communications plan, this plan they have here. We normally get this stuff posted to us—his good friend Martin Hamilton-Smith sends us his export plan with a glossy—

The ACTING PRESIDENT (Hon. J.S.L. Dawkins): The Hon. Martin Hamilton-Smith.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: I struggle with that. The Minister for Trade sends us a glossy document. I am surprised—

The Hon. K.J. Maher interjecting:

The ACTING PRESIDENT (Hon. J.S.L. Dawkins): Order! Will the Leader of the Government please be silent.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: Chuck him out. I am surprised that they have not actually sent us a copy of it. If the interconnector was so important and it was the previous government that thwarted it, why does this plan not have an interconnector? Why did you not start earlier? That is the joke of this government: they have sat on their hands with their head in a bucket of sand for 15 years hoping that these problems would never arise, yet they got warning after warning that it was likely to happen.

It is interesting that they are happy to quote what the previous Liberal government did, but I remind them that the warnings started back in 2003 when, well before they were ministers, the Hon. Gail Gago and the Hon. Tom Koutsantonis were on the ERD Committee. The Hon. Gail Gago rose to be the third most important person in the government, a senior member of cabinet, and the Hon. Tom Koutsantonis still is. I remember that in 2003 Mr Lew Owens, the head of ESCOSA, gave the following evidence:

As you start to increase the quantity of wind power coming into the system up to 100 megawatts, 200 megawatts or whatever, you start to cause instability in the rest of the system. For example, if you had 1,000 megawatts of wind energy coming in, most of the base load stations in South Australia would be required to shut down and then to start them up again is a 10-hour operation.

This was 12 years ago. He went on to say:

There are technical problems and limits with having large amounts of wind power in our distribution and transmission system.

I was on the committee at that time, as I said. Apparently, this warning fell on deaf ears. The Hon. Patrick Conlon, in a submission to the ERD committee in September 2003, said:

To set a state-based renewable energy target may result in higher energy costs for South Australia compared to other states.

The Electricity Supply Industry Planning Council gave the following advice to ESCOSA in April 2005:

Wind development SA at 800 megawatts and at 1,000 megawatt cases pose significant risks to the reliability and security of the South Australian power system.

In 2005, ESCOSA stated:

The reliability and security of the South Australian power system was at significant risk in the absence of upgraded conditions for network connections, high-quality wind forecasting and the proper arrangements to integrate wind generators more fully into the NEM.

And it goes on. The next warning is from the National Institute of Economic Research, in advice to DPC in May 2009:

Limitations on wind power output to ensure South Australia's grid stability is estimated to be associated with about 20 per cent limit on wind capacity.

The view of ESCOSA in 2009 was, as follows:

The commission remains concerned with the long-term safety and reliability of the electricity system in South Australia with 867 megawatts of wind generation.

On 22 June 2011, the then premier Mike Rann said:

We face a number of challenges. Some of these relate to the intermittent nature of wind generation.

A joint AEMO and ElectraNet study in October 2014 stated:

Having a high proportion of wind and photovoltaic generation can present a risk to South Australia if the Heywood interconnector link to Victoria is disconnected at a time when all local conventional synchronous generators are off-line.

Here is another warning from AEMO in October 2015:

The intermittency of wind generation, leading to sudden changes in supply and demand balance, makes managing the power system more challenging.

Finally, a joint AEMO and ElectraNet report in February 2016 stated:

Withdrawal of synchronous generation and the growth of wind and rooftop photovoltaic generation in South Australia is making the power system more susceptible to rapid changes in frequency and to larger frequency deviations following a separation event.

The first of those quotes is from 2016 and last one is from February 2016—over 13 years, the government had all these warnings. I think the people of South Australia are asking themselves: why did we have to fly off the cliff or run into the wall with our power security now, in February 2017, when there were warnings given for the last 13 years?

They claim that they could not build the interconnector because of something the former Liberal government had done before the 2002 election, but they had had warning after warning, and now we see this plan, with batteries, gas-fired power stations and backup diesel generation, which I will come to shortly.

Why have you not done it earlier? Governments are elected to look after and protect the interests of South Australians. The question you have to ask yourself is: why are we now in this set of circumstances where we need emergency legislation to give the minister powers? My colleague, the Hon. Rob Lucas, has quite extensively covered whether we really need them. Of course, the minister claimed that if he had these powers he would have been able to stop the blackout in September last year. However, the question you have to ask yourself is: why did they not do it earlier?

They have all the advice. The advisers are sitting here waiting to try to help the minister answer questions that will be asked of him shortly. There is a lot of advice. There is a lot of expert advice. During question time today, there was some interjection—out of order, I know—about the expert advice they had been given in the preparation of the plan. Where was the expert advice? I have just listed 10 or a dozen occasions where they were told, in the last 13 years, that the system we had was under threat. Why did they not take some measures?

I am not attacking renewable energy per se but, if we are going to go on a journey with a large amount of renewable energy, we need to have a better system to manage it, and we simply have not done that. It is interesting that we currently have a select committee—it may be out of order to refer to select committees in debates—but, in my recollection, I do not think ESCOSA has ever been asked for advice by the government in relation to their renewable energy policy. They have never been asked to comment. The Essential Services Commission of South Australia (ESCOSA) looks after the reliability, price, frequency and supply of essential services, yet they have never been asked.

Not only did the government not heed the warnings from dozens and dozens of experts that the system they were presiding over was at risk and needed some intervention, until we fell off the end of the cliff, but even ESCOSA was never asked. You really have to ask yourself: where on earth has this government been for the last 15 years? Of course, what has happened is that their failure to act and listen to advice and their arrogance in not actually asking ESCOSA has cost every business. I think the cost that Business SA placed on the statewide blackout was some $400 million. That is $400 million that businesses will never, ever get back. It has gone. It is a loss.

We had a significant storm event and minister Koutsantonis says that, if he had had these powers, he would have been able to prevent that blackout. However, at the end of the day, why have we got ourselves in this situation? It beggars belief that we have a modern First World economy—we are sophisticated, well educated and smart people who are proud of our great state—yet we are now in a situation where we are laughed at by the rest of the nation because we have not managed the transition properly.

I know that there was a whole discussion around the power station at Port Augusta. It could have been kept open for another 18 months or so. The government knew about Alinta's plans and knocked them back, yet we only had the crisis plan in February and they started acting on it. Once they knew they could not do a deal with Alinta, why did they not start on the plan at that point? But they did nothing. You have to ask yourself the question: why have they never acted? At the end of the day, it is clearly either arrogance, stupidity, that they just did not understand or, as I suspect, that they just thought, 'We'll just gamble on the future of South Australia and hopefully we will get away with it.'

There are a few questions I would like to ask in the committee stage of the bill regarding the six-point plan that the government released. We know that a $360-million gas generation plant will not be built before this coming summer, as the Hon. Rob Lucas says, and maybe not even before the next summer. Tragically for South Australia, I suspect that if the current government is returned, they may not even build it. Who knows? They cannot even open a hospital that has cost twice as much. How do we know that it is going to be $360 million?

I note in their plan that their final costings and details will be released in the budget. This government has a track record where every project they have ever touched has been more expensive and taken much longer to deliver than planned. In fact, like the hospital, they have not been able to deliver it as yet. I will be interested to see over time the evolution of this $360 million gas plant in the next 340-odd days before the next election.

I am also interested that one of the interim measures is to put diesel generators in our suburbs, in substations near every one of these people in this chamber, everybody who came in today to view in the gallery. A diesel generator is coming to a substation near you. One of the questions that I will be posing to the minister during the committee stage will be about how Tasmania did that when Basslink went down.

What was the cost per megawatt hour of energy produced by diesel generators during the Basslink outage? We know it cost about $50 million to lease and put into place the 200 megawatts of diesel generation, and we think that it was about $14 million in operational costs every three months thereafter. But I want to know the cost per megawatt hour, because in the end that is what is passed on to the consumer. Then, of course, we have a battery system that the Premier says will be the world's largest battery system, and I will have a range of questions in relation to the battery when we get to the committee stage.

I have on my iPad here in the chamber the National Electricity Rules Version 90. I am not sure whether the minister will be able to answer it but I will flag it now so that the adviser knows. They say here that this is the latest electronically available version of the National Electricity Rules, dated 6 April 2017. There are a number of references on the front page to South Australia having amended them and other states having followed, so we all know that we are the lead legislator in this particular case.

If you look at all the warnings the government was given over that 13-year period, couple that with the fact that we are the lead legislator, I think it is a bit rich for the minister and Premier to say that the market is broken, the rules are broken, when we have been at the forefront of it. We have been the lead legislator. There are 1,500 pages or so of them, and I have not had time to read them this afternoon, but in relation to those rules, how do we change them?

The Treasurer and energy minister says the rules are broken and the system is broken. I would like to know how complicated it is to change those rules because clearly if we had had issues along the way, why would we not have been adjusting the rules to match our generation circumstances and these rules so that we were not left exposed, then having to have the issues we have now with this bill and now, as a state, wanting to remove ourselves from the national market and be islanders?

With those few words, I look forward to the committee stage. As I said, I will be interested in looking at how the rules are made and changed and the process we go through for them, and also some of the issues around the cost per megawatt hour of the diesel generators that were available in Tasmania. I am sure in the expert advice that the minister has alluded to during question time, they will have canvassed that, so they will know the sorts of prices they will be exposing the South Australian people to.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER (Minister for Employment, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation, Minister for Manufacturing and Innovation, Minister for Automotive Transformation, Minister for Science and Information Economy) (21:13): I thank honourable members for their contributions. I note the guarantee that has been given by the member for Dunstan, the Leader of the Opposition, that this bill will pass this chamber today. I note that it took some in this chamber by surprise. It appears that no-one from the leader's office had informed anyone in the Legislative Council. Nonetheless, that is sometimes how the opposition operates. I am glad that the message has finally got through and that we are going to be considering this bill tonight. I look forward to the committee stage.

Members interjecting:

The ACTING CHAIR (Hon. J.S.L. Dawkins): Order!

Bill read a second time.

Committee Stage

In committee.

Clause 1.

The ACTING CHAIR (Hon. J.S.L. Dawkins): There are 11 clauses and there are no indicated amendments. Obviously we were made well aware in the second reading debate that there will be questions. Minister, have you got some answers to provide?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I have got advisers coming in now.

The ACTING CHAIR (Hon. J.S.L. Dawkins): So, at clause 1 you will bring some answers back.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: Well, I do not want to particularly for specific questions, but I am happy to take questions.

The ACTING CHAIR (Hon. J.S.L. Dawkins): The Hon. Mr Lucas.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Mr Acting Chairman, consistent with what the minister has just said, given that the timetable has been shortened somewhat, the simplest thing might be that we do the majority of questions perhaps on clause 1. It would make it easier, given there are only a relatively few number of clauses anyway. I was offered a briefing yesterday afternoon. My briefing at 11 o'clock finished a bit after 12 o'clock today. At that stage I had been working under the misapprehension that we were going to get the bill through by Thursday, so I have not had the capacity to tidy up my questions into the appropriate clauses. Consistent with what the minister has just said, if we do a good chunk of them at clause 1, it will probably reduce the amount of time later in terms of repeating questions that might need to be followed through.

There were a number of things that I wanted to place on the record because, given the shortness of time, the minister has not had the capacity to get a written response at the second reading stage to provide answers to questions that I was provided privately by government advisers. I want to get that advice placed on the public record in terms of the operation of the bill and the existing powers within the act.

I start with the existing powers under the Emergency Management Act and the existing powers under the Essential Services Act. I do not think there is anything wrong with the minister having both a legal adviser and a technical adviser there, rather than them having to get up and down all the time, although I am not sure whether the clerks would be happy with that. I will try to direct my legal questions firstly, and work through the others. In relation to some of the legal issues, can the minister confirm, firstly, that the Essential Services Act will continue even with the changes to the Emergency Management Act that are contemplated here?

The ACTING CHAIR (Hon. J.S.L. Dawkins): We will be bringing the other adviser out so that we do not have to be jumping up and down. We are getting another chair. Minister.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I thank the honourable member for his question. My advice is, yes, that act will remain in place. However, in response to some of the preamble the honourable member has placed on record at the start of his question saying he was only offered a briefing yesterday, I need to correct the record. That is just not the case. I have in front of me an email to his office offering a briefing a week ago on Tuesday 4 April, which was not responded to. It was followed up diligently by the energy minister's office yesterday, six days later, saying, 'Would you like the briefing? This is going to move forward.' It is a half-truth to suggest a briefing was only offered yesterday; a briefing was offered a week ago.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I am happy to stand corrected on that. As I said, the bill had not even been introduced in the Legislative Council. I tend to take the briefings as the bills arrive on our agenda. It was not on the agenda.

An honourable member interjecting:

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I am happy to stand corrected. There was evidently an earlier email that I did not respond to. I responded to the one yesterday, when I was advised that we received the priority list from the minister's office which indicated the number one priority of this week was going to be the bill, which was not actually even on our Notice Paper at the time.

However putting all that process issue to the side, in relation to the Essential Services Act, the minister has confirmed it will continue, so the government will still have the power to allow the Attorney-General to declare periods of emergency under the essential services legislation. Why, given the proposed changes to give the Minister for Energy powers over the emergency management act, does the government believe the Attorney-General needs to continue to have powers to declare periods of emergency?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that this may be a misunderstanding. Under the Essential Services Act it is not for the Attorney-General. Division 3 talks about 'in the opinion of the Governor', so it is not the Attorney-General but the Governor.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Give me a break. A significant number of pieces of legislation provide that the Governor shall issue proclamations, or whatever it is, on the advice of the executive—

The Hon. K.J. Maher: It is not the Attorney-General then, is it?

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: No; the legislation—

The ACTING CHAIR (Hon. J.S.L. Dawkins): Order! There is one member on his feet and he will get the call. The minister has the chance then to get on his feet and respond. The Hon. Mr Lucas.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Is it correct that the Essential Services Act is committed to the Attorney-General?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: The act, in its entirety, is committed to the Attorney-General. Acting under what the honourable member is talking about must be done where it is satisfied that in the opinion of the government the circumstances have arisen.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: In terms of the opinion of the government, does the minister concede, based on legal advice, that the Governor takes advice from the executive arm of government, which is the cabinet?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: Yes, and it does so in an Executive Council meeting, but that is very different from the Attorney-General directing, which is what was being put forward before.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Given that the Attorney-General has the passage of the legislation, that is, that the act is committed to the Attorney-General, would it be correct that under cabinet processes it would be the Attorney-General who would take the cabinet submission to cabinet, to Executive Council, in terms of a recommendation to the Governor?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that as a general matter of practice that is likely, but it is not inevitable that that is the case.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Thank you, that is a longwinded way of getting exactly to the point I am making: that the act is committed to the Attorney-General, the Attorney-General in the normal process of government—and I think the minister needs to realise I have actually sat at the cabinet table for a longer period than he has—would take the recommendation to the cabinet, and if the cabinet agreed it would go to Executive Council, and then the Governor. So, it is not the Governor acting independently taking his or her own advice separate from the executive arm of government, it is a process understood by most people in terms of how governments operate.

In relation to the process under the essential services legislation, my question is: given the changes that are to occur with the emergency management act, where the Minister for Energy will be given the power to declare a state of emergency, why does the government believe the remaining powers in the Essential Services Act should remain under the process I have just outlined?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that the Essential Services Act applies across a whole range of circumstances not just the electricity circumstances that we are contemplating now.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I accept and understand that but did the government and its legal advisers contemplate carving out the electricity in the National Electricity Market, so that the particular powers to direct generators, retailers and AEMO would be constrained within the new amendments to the Emergency Management Act, and be left with the Minister for Energy, and for other emergencies and disasters to be constrained to the Essential Services Act?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that it was not considered necessary to take any powers away when creating this new power.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: One of the questions I raised in the second reading and I will repeat now to get the government's response, relates to some of the statements the minister has made publicly, and in the advice that I have received, when compared to section 27B(1) of this new bill. Section 27B—Minister may declare electricity supply emergency—states:

If it appears to the Minister, on reasonable grounds, that the supply of electricity to all or part of the South Australian community is disrupted to a significant degree, or there is a real risk that it may be disrupted to a significant degree, the Minister may declare an electricity supply emergency.

It was argued to me, and the minister has argued publicly, that this will be an easier test to meet than under the Essential Services Act where the government (and the Governor, but ultimately the government) meets the test which in the opinion of the Governor are circumstances that have arisen or are likely to arise that are likely to cause interruption and dislocation of essential services.

Can the minister, based on the advice he will receive, put on the record what the government's position is as to why they believe the test that the minister must meet under 27B(1) is, in essence, a lower threshold than the test that the government must meet under section 3(1) of the Essential Services Act?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that, under the Essential Services Act, it contemplates that circumstances have arisen (so they have already actually arisen) or are likely to arise, such as a storm event being more likely than not to arise, whereas in the bill that we are contemplating at the moment under section 27B(1), it is that there is 'a real risk' rather than 'is likely to arise'. For example, a 45 per cent of a storm doing great damage might not constitute 'likely to arise' but it may constitute 'a real risk'.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: So, the minister's legal advice is that, essentially, 'a real risk' is a lower threshold than 'likely to cause'?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised, yes.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: The other issue that was raised in the briefing that I had was in relation to the issue of powers. I asked the question: will the powers the Minister for Energy will have under the proposed bill to direct generators, retailers and AEMO be any stronger or any different than the powers the Governor or the government (depending on however you want to construct this) would be able to have under section 3 of the Essential Services Act?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that the new bill puts beyond doubt a power to direct AEMO. There is no express power to do that under the Essential Services Act.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Can I have that clarified because that was certainly the answer given to me when I asked the question about the Commissioner of Police as the state controller, and I will come to that in the Emergency Management Act, but that was not my recollection of the advice that crown gave me in relation to the Essential Services Act.

I think I incorrectly referred to section 3 of the Essential Services Act. Under section 5, the minister 'may take over etc the provision of essential services', section 6 provides for the power to require information and section 4 relates to directions in relation to proclaimed essential services. Can I just clarify this, and I will repeat the question. In relation to the powers to direct a generator, retailer or AEMO, which are proposed in the bill, do those powers exist in the Essential Services Act if that act were followed?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that it is arguable that they do under the Essential Services Act, in relation to AEMO. The Essential Services Act of course was passed in 1981, before AEMO was created or really even contemplated, so that my advice is that it is arguable that they might under the Essential Services Act but this bill makes it abundantly clear and puts beyond any doubt that AEMO is what is contemplated.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Again, I find that strange because, as I outlined in the second reading debate, the government actually used the Essential Services Act to direct AEMO to suspend the spot market. I am not sure that it is an issue of 'arguable'. The government's legal advice, as confided to me in a private briefing, and the action on 29 September, was that the Essential Services Act was used to direct AEMO and there has not been argument about that at all. I am not sure why the argument is that it is arguable: the government actually used the power on 29 September.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: We think this act is broad enough, but we want to put it beyond any doubt, which is why we are specifically putting it in the bill that is before us now.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Again, the advice I had from the Crown in the private briefing more particularly related to the concerns about the police commissioner, which I will turn to in a tick. It was not raised with me that there was an issue that there might not be the power under the Essential Services Act to direct AEMO, generators or retailers. As I said, the answer to the question I was given was that they had the power. When I got some of the answers back at 3 o'clock this afternoon, they made it quite clear that it was the Essential Services Act that was actually used to direct AEMO and not any other piece of legislation, so I do not think there is any doubt.

It has not been challenged and it appears quite clear in terms of the advice I have had that the powers exist. I will not go through all the sections in detail but under the Essential Services Act, you can essentially do whatever it is you wish in a state of emergency. It would certainly cover directing AEMO, as you have done, or a generator or a retailer. Can I clarify this point. Section 5 and other sections provide that the minister may take over the provision of essential services. Given the discussion we had earlier, is it not correct that the Attorney-General is the minister who takes over the essential services under the essential services legislation?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: Under the Essential Services Act, I am advised that, yes, in the circumstances outlined in this question, the Attorney-General is the minister referred to.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I just return to the unproductive debate we had at the start when we had the difference of opinion about the Governor. It is not the Governor. As the act outlines, once you have declared this, it is the Attorney-General who has the power under this particular act and will continue to have the power under this act to do things in states of emergency. Indeed, after the 28 September blackout, it was the acting attorney-general who issued the direction to AEMO in relation to the spot market.

In relation to the Emergency Management Act, which we are seeking to amend as I outlined in the second reading debate, again, I want to have the answers placed on the public record. In relation to the powers under the Emergency Management Act for the state coordinator who is the police commissioner to declare under sections 22, 23 and 24 various levels of states of emergency—an identified major incident under 22, a major emergency under 23 or a disaster under 24—can the minister confirm that it is the government's proposal that those powers for the state coordinator or the police commissioner will remain?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: The answer to that is yes.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Regarding the additional power that is now proposed to be given to the Minister for Energy in relation to the National Electricity Market to direct AEMO generators and retailers, did the government contemplate carving out, from the powers of the police commissioner, responsibilities in relation to AEMO generators and retailers? If it did, why did it consider it did not need to?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that that is in effect what this bill does. Clause 7 provides that if an electricity supply emergency has been declared under division 6—that is division 6 of the bill before us—then no direction may be given under this division of a kind that could be given under division 6. In effect, in terms of the Emergency Services Management Act, I think it carves that out so that this is the direction that is the one that overrides or has primacy.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Can I have confirmed again the question I asked of the crown law advisers. It is possible, if this bill passes, that the powers still remain; that is, the Minister for Energy can initiate the provisions under the act that will apply to the Minister for Energy for an electricity state of emergency and have the powers, but it is possible that the Minister for Energy does not but that the police commissioner could use his powers to declare the three levels of emergency, and in those circumstances the clause 7 you are referring to would not operate. The police commissioner would be the one capable of directing AEMO, the generators and the retailers.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: As I understand the question—and if I have not understood this properly, I am sure I will be corrected—if no declaration has been made under the bill that we are contemplating now, then declarations could be made under the Emergency Services Act. The answer is self-evidently yes.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: The police commissioner could direct.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: Well, could direct anything that he can currently do under there, then of course that is the case.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: That is my question. I understand the provisions of clause 7; that is, if the Minister for Energy has declared an electricity state of emergency, the police commissioner cannot override the directions to generators, retailers and AEMO. Why does the government believe that you need to leave open the circumstances where, if the Minister for Energy does not do it, the police commissioner as the state coordinator can still do it and direct AEMO generators and retailers?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: My advice is—and it is probably best demonstrated in an example—that there might not be an emergency that is contemplated in the bill we are talking about now, but there might be some other emergency as contemplated under the Emergency Management Act that is much wider than that but incidentally, as part of whatever that emergency is, there may be a need to disconnect something to stop flammable liquid or cause any supply of fuel, flammable liquid, gas or electricity or material to be connected, reconnected, disconnected or shut off, which may give rise to doing some of the things that affected the electricity market.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Can the minister place on the record the government's advice in relation to the following question about clause 22 of the Emergency Management Act, which we are seeking to amend. As we have just conceded, the state coordinator, the police commissioner, will still have the power in certain circumstances to declare identified major incidents, major emergencies or disasters. Remembering the 28 September blackout, it was the police commissioner who declared it an identified major incident under the Emergency Management Act. Can I clarify that the process the police commissioner takes in relation to that does not require him to take advice from cabinet or to go through any process with the government; that is, the police commissioner can act alone in implementing that particular function.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: My advice, in answer to that question, is yes.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Clearly, the reason why, at whatever time it was (5 o'clock or 5.30 on the 28th) the police commissioner acted meant that the government, through the police commissioner, was able to identify it as a major incident and declare a state of emergency. Can I also have confirmed on the public record that, in looking at section 22(1) of the Emergency Management Act, the police commissioner's test is almost the lowest threshold? We have talked about the threshold the executive arm of government and the Governor have to apply, and we have talked about the threshold the minister for energy under the proposed bill will need to apply. The Emergency Management Act provides:

If it appears to the State Co-ordinator that the nature or scale of an emergency that has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur is such that it should be declared to be an identified major incident...

There is no definition of an identified major incident in the act. It just says 'see section 22', which is the bit I just read. As long as the police commissioner is prepared to call something an identified major incident—and I am not suggesting that the police commissioner would ever treat this in a cavalier fashion—there is no test. The minister for energy, for example, has to go through real risks and reasonableness. The Attorney-General and the Governor's process is that they have to go through cabinet, and the government has to go through a process of 'likely', and we talked about that earlier. The test for the police commissioner has the lowest threshold of the lot. That was the question I asked of the crown law advice, and my recollection is that they agreed with that.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: My advice is that it is difficult to categorise this as a lower or higher threshold in relation to the other two examples we talked about. Section 22 of the Emergency Services Act talks about 'should be declared an emergency', and the definition section refers to an emergency as an event. It relates specifically to an event and not to a risk that 'might' happen. My advice is that it is very difficult to use that and compare apples with apples in terms of judging a threshold and whether it is higher or lower, when this refers to an event rather than, as other legislation states, a risk.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Can I challenge that. Section 22(1) talks about 'the nature or scale of an emergency that has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur'. You are not talking about an event that has occurred or is occurring. You might be talking about something that is about to occur, which of course you cannot say has occurred. You have to make a judgement, and the police commissioner makes a judgement that something is about to occur.

I am surprised that the minister, given the crown advice that is available to him, is not prepared to concede—I thought he was prepared to concede in the discussion we had privately—that, of the three tests, from a legal sense, this would seem to be the lowest threshold test that needs to be met. In other words, the police commissioner has to jump a lower threshold and a lower hurdle than the Minister for Energy, the Attorney-General, the government and the Governor through the other process.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: My advice is that it is difficult to talk about it in the abstract, but there may be circumstances where, yes, this would be a lower threshold. That might not hold true in all circumstances where we are comparing events that have occurred or are going to occur with risks that are prevalent.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: On 28 September, the Emergency Management Act was used and at 5.30 the police commissioner issued an emergency, declared it to be an identified major incident and therefore enacted all the powers that existed under the Emergency Management Act. The government's advisers have agreed that it is a very streamlined process because the cabinet and the Governor does not have to be involved.

I think we have eventually reached the stage where, in certain circumstances—but I think in virtually all circumstances—the test the police commissioner had to use was a lower test than the other two. If we put that to the side, the commissioner met that test and he declared it. What crown law said to me was that it was arguable that, under the Emergency Management Act, AEMO, generators and retailers could have been directed, so why did the government choose not to use the powers under the Emergency Management Act, via the police commissioner, to issue the directions that the Treasurer has been talking about?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: My advice is that, under the Emergency Management Act, it is the police commissioner acting independently, it is not the government directing the police commissioner. It gets back to the question we talked about with the Essential Services Act, that, although we think it can be done, there is no express power in either of the other two acts that already exist in relation to AEMO. So, out of an abundance of caution, I think it is responsible to make sure it is in the act that we are talking about.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: From my experience with the Emergency Management Council process and the advice I received from the government advisers, the Emergency Management Council was meeting contemporaneously with the cabinet, in either adjoining rooms or wherever it might happen to be, between 4 o'clock and 5.30, or maybe even after that, on the evening of the blackout.

The police commissioner clearly took advice from the Emergency Management Council. It was ultimately his decision as to what he would do, but the police commissioner does not go off, lock himself in a room and not listen to anyone. The police commissioner listens to the senior advisers, I assume the electricity people, the water people, the emergency services people, traffic controllers and others who would have been represented on the Emergency Management Council, saying, 'Hey, we have these problems, we need to do this, this and this.'

The police commissioner then uses the powers that he has, having listened to the advice, to do it. There is nothing that prevents the Minister for Energy and the senior electricity people saying, 'You have the powers to direct AEMO and the generators and the retailers.' My question is: why was that advice not given, or was it given and not accepted by the police commissioner?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I thank the honourable member for his question. In relation to what occurs between cabinet and the Emergency Management Council, obviously I am not going to go into details about that. Also, in terms of what the legal position is, that is not something that we are going to canvass in the chamber today. However, as a very, very broad generalisation, it is possible that there could be powers under the Emergency Management Act but, again, it does not directly mention AEMO. We think it is necessary to directly mention the power to direct AEMO and to have the powers contained in the bill that is before us.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I think the minister's non-answer is illuminating in and of itself, so I will not delay. These are some of the questions, given the proposed legislation, that stakeholders and others have raised with the opposition and with me. As I said, the Treasurer has conceded in the other house that the powers exist under the existing legislation; he has just argued that there is going to be a less cumbersome process to go through and maybe a lower threshold, although I think that is not necessarily correct in relation to the police commissioner.

Putting that to the side, there is this unanswered question with the minister claiming, as he has just done, that he cannot reveal the discussions that went on at the time: that there were the powers available to the government to have directed in the way the minister says that he would have, even in the morning of that particular day. However, I will not delay the committee any longer on that particular issue.

Can I have confirmed that the crown advice to the government is that, under the existing two pieces of legislation that we have now been through in detail, when we speak about the 28 September event or some similar event, either the government, the Attorney-General, the cabinet and then ultimately the Governor, using the Essential Services Act, or the police commissioner, using the Emergency Management Act, does have the power to, in essence, take action prior to the blackout or the state of emergency.

In other words, could you confirm that, under the Essential Services Act 'where, in the opinion of the Governor, circumstances have arisen, or are likely to arise...or are likely to cause'—that is, there is the power under that particular provision prior to the actual statewide blackout—if the advice had been received, it could have been actioned?

Similarly, the Emergency Management Act, which we have just been through, states 'is about to occur'. Should the Commissioner of Police have got the advice, he did have the power under the act to have acted earlier than the actual statewide blackout, if he got the advice. I am not saying that he did. I am just saying that there is the power within both pieces of legislation, as they exist at the moment, for action to have been taken prior to the actual blackout.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I can confirm that, in a very broad sense, it is theoretically possible that, under the two existing acts, there could be action taken beforehand. Again, I highlight all the things that we have talked about under the Emergency Management Act and the higher threshold, talking about 'likely' rather than what we are proposing in this bill.

Under that act also, as the honourable member has helpfully stated, there is the much more complicated train of events: the AG taking something to cabinet, cabinet making the decision, cabinet advising the Governor, and the Governor issuing a proclamation. All those steps are much more cumbersome than what we are talking about now. Also, there is the caveat that we have already canvassed tonight, which is it is arguable that it could relate to AEMO but, in an abundance of caution, we want to make absolutely sure that there is no wiggle room and no cause for doubt.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: The other issue I raised in the second reading was that, again, I did not agree with the Minister for Energy's claim that he would have, on the morning of the 28th, acted to constrain the interconnector, but put that to the side. What is on the public record is that an email from the minister's chief of staff at 11.06 on that morning stated, 'Even with the weather conditions, we don't expect this to be an issue.'

Vince Duffy, Tom Koutsantonis, Rebecca Knights, Paul Heithersay and Don Russell were all copied into that email. Can I have confirmed that the advice of the experts within the department prior to 11.06 on the morning of the 28th was accurately reflected by chief of staff Jarrad Pilkington; that is, 'Even with the weather conditions, we don't expect this to be an issue'?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: Can you just repeat the line—

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: The line or the question?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: What you are saying the email says exactly.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Sure. The email says exactly, at 11.06 from the chief of staff, 'Even with the weather conditions, we don't expect this to be an issue.' There is an email trail that had gone on. This is just one element. Discussions were going on with AEMO about the electricity system. Copied into that particular email were Vince Duffy, Tom Koutsantonis, Rebecca Knights, Paul Heithersay and Don Russell.

All I am asking is: given that Mr Duffy is here, is the advice from Jarrad Pilkington, as quoted in that email, an accurate reflection of the advice that the government advisers had in the period leading up to 11.06 on the 28th? It may well be that the government's advisers' position is that Jarrad Pilkington got it wrong, and his advice to the minister did not accurately reflect the advice. My question is: did it accurately reflect the advice that Mr Duffy and others were giving the government in the period leading up to 11.06 on the morning of the 28th?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I think this might be a case, if I am to be completely generous, of him misunderstanding the complete intent of that line of the email. I am being generous and, as we are here at a late hour, I will continue to try to be generous. As I am informed, there is a question mark at the end of that sentence. 'We don't expect the weather conditions to be an issue, question mark.' So, it is not a statement in the positive that we do not expect the weather conditions to be an issue, but it is actually the complete opposite of how it has been represented because it is a question mark, which rather negates the idea that it is a positive statement that we do not expect it to be.

It is, in fact, asking the question which makes it, rather, the opposite of what is being portrayed in this line of reasoning. I am informed that later down the email trail it makes it abundantly clear that that is the case when the responses are that they will check with AEMO about that. So, to suggest that the chief of staff was making the positive statement that, 'We don't expect the weather conditions to be an issue,' is just not anywhere near a proper representation. It is, in fact, completely the opposite representation.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I cannot pursue that. I am just going on the transcript of Hansard from the House of Assembly, which does not have a question mark at the end of the quoted email. The shadow minister, the member for Stuart—

The Hon. K.J. Maher: You have been inadvertently misled by your shadow minister.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: No, you might have been inadvertently misled by the advice that you have just been given. You have been given advice, I have read the transcript of Hansard—

The Hon. K.J. Maher: I would trust these blokes more than I would trust the shadow minister.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Well, let us leave that debate for another day, but, as I said, given that neither of us has the actual email in front of us, I will not pursue that particular issue. If that is the advice that is now being given to the minister on behalf of the government, is it, in essence, that at that time government advisers were expressing concern to the minister and to the government in relation to whatever it is that AEMO was proposing to do?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that, yes, the government advisers contacted AEMO and ElectraNet to ask them if there was more that could or should be done.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I understand, clearly, that people were asking questions whether more should be done or not, but my question specifically is—and Mr Duffy and his officers were kind enough to what their responsibilities were. Mr Hughes is the jurisdictional designed officer (JDO) and the responsible officer for the SAN region under the NEM memorandum of understanding on the use of emergency powers, and Mr Faunt is the jurisdictional systems security coordinator pursuant to section 110 of the National Electricity Act 1996, and there is other detail about what their formal responsibilities are.

So, I am aware that they were having discussions with AEMO and ElectraNet and various others—they would have been negligent if they were not—my question is: is it the government's advice that, as of the morning of the 29th, that is, before 12 o'clock on that morning, the government representatives, through Mr Duffy or Mr Faunt, or indeed anybody else, were urging AEMO to actually take any different action to action that ultimately AEMO took?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that the answer to that is yes.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: What were the government designated officers asking AEMO to do, which they did not do, as of the morning of the 28th?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that the question being asked by our government advisers was: did AEMO need to constrain the interconnector down to be more conservative in the operation of the market?

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Again, a sensible question to be asked, and, clearly, I assume the advice from AEMO was no. Once the government advisers received that, did they provide at any stage advice to the minister to say that they believed that the interconnector should be constrained prior to the event occurring at four o'clock (approximately) that afternoon?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: My advice is that the state government's advisers asked for AEMO's advice, and AEMO's advice was that it was not a credible contingency.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I understand that. That is not my question. My question is: once the officers asked for and got that advice from AEMO, who said, 'Don't you worry about that, it's not a credible contingency' (to use their language), did the government officers then advise the Minister for Mineral Resources and Energy that they thought the interconnector should be constrained, or not?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that they accepted AEMO's advice because there was not an alternative way to deal with the situation at that time.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I make no criticism of the government officers; I would expect that that would be the case. In essence, AEMO has been asked a question. They have all the expertise and advice available to them, and they made a judgement and that judgement was accepted by the government advisers.

The issue then remains that, ultimately, under this bill, it is going to be the government and the minister who are going to have to set themselves up as alternative experts or judges in relation to whether the interconnector should be constrained or not. It is not going to be an issue of accepting or not accepting the advice of AEMO; it is going to be an independent judgement of the Minister for Mineral Resources and Energy under these powers that will exist. So, what is it that will be different under these powers in terms of the government's advice?

I just highlight that I asked the government advisers about the staffing or resource component in government. I am told that the Office of the Technical Regulator has 47.4 full-time equivalent staff, but that covers electricity, gas, water and plumbing. I assume it is only a component of the 47.4 staff who actually relate to electricity and have any knowledge. A number of those, I suspect, would be people who go out and inspect plumbing, gas and water installations and whatever else it might be. So, the number of electricity experts and market experts in there might be small.

The remainder of the energy and technical regulation division, which is Mr Duffy's area, has 38.8 staff. I am not sure how many of those are experts on electricity or whether there are people who are divided into gas and various other areas as well. Putting that aside, the issue is going to be where the Minister for Mineral Resources and Energy is going to get his independent advice to second guess or better guess AEMO and the national regulatory authorities.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: My advice is that the minister can seek advice from as wide a range of parties as he chooses. You would expect, of course, that these would include his departmental officials, but it could extend to industry participants or any other person whom he seeks advice from.

While I am on my feet, I might be able to clarify for the benefit of the chamber that there was a debate about a question mark and how that influenced a sentence earlier. I can now say I have seen the actual line from the email. I know that the honourable member said before that neither of us had the benefit of looking at that email. I have now been able to see the email and there is, in fact, that question mark which makes it a very different proposition than how it was relayed in the House of Assembly that the honourable member had relied upon.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I thank him for that. The minister might like to get his colleagues to seek to insert a question mark into the Hansard transcript, however that might be done. In relation to the Office of the Technical Regulator in the Energy and Technical Regulation Division, is the government's advice that additional resources, expertise and capacity will need to be provided to those areas to enable sensible use of the new powers that will be available to the Minister for Energy?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that that area of government, if it is needed, will seek additional resources.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I thank the minister for that. I note that the minister, when asked if he would consult industry participants and others in relation to the exercise of advice, said, as the Hansard transcript records, that no, he would not be listening to those people. The minister here says, of course, he would be listening to—

The Hon. K.J. Maher: That's not what I said. I said that is the range of—

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Who he could go to, yes.

The Hon. K.J. Maher: I didn't say he would at all. That is not true whatsoever.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Well, he was very dismissive of actually—

The Hon. K.J. Maher: Half-truth, Rob. Fake news.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: No, not fake news. I am just recounting what the minister actually said in the House of Assembly debate. In relation to the operations on the day of the 28th, in the discussion that I had with government advisers this morning, I asked a question because the minister had said that if he had had these powers on the 28th he would have constrained the interconnector on the morning of the 28th.

I asked the question as to what level the interconnector was operating, and with the greatest of respect to Mr Duffy, he said he did not really know but he thought it was operating at about 400 megawatts at that particular time. He undertook to check. When the answers came back this afternoon, he has given me that at 4.18 in the afternoon, just prior to the trip of the Davenport-Belalie and Davenport-Mount Lofty transmission lines, it was 525 megawatts. That was not really my question, so I am wondering whether either Mr Duffy, the government adviser, through you, has the answer to the question. That is, at what capacity was the interconnector running at during the morning of the 28th, and if he does not have that answer now whether, through you, he would be prepared to take that on notice and provide the answer in writing?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I can advise that I do not have that answer now but I am happy to have that taken on notice and bring back a reply. Just so that I am clear on what I am bringing back, it is during the morning of the 28th? An average during the course of the morning or a particular time in the morning?

The Hon. R.I. Lucas: The average through the morning of the 28th.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I will bring that back.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: As I said, I am not seeking to delay the proceedings of the committee; I am happy to receive that by way of a letter from the minister or the minister's officer or somebody. As to the issue in relation to compensation I raised in the second reading debate, I just wanted to place on the record again the information the crown law advisers and the government advisers gave me. Can I just have confirmed that the AEMO rules—I should not say AEMO rules; the minister will jump up and down that I have misdescribed it—the AEMO briefing paper, 'Operation of Intervention Price Provisions' of the National Electricity Market, which was sent to me by the government advisers, are they the current provisions that relate to the payment of compensation potentially in the circumstances we are talking about, in particular clauses 7 and 8?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that these were the ones that were off the website for this, so I presume that is the case, yes.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I am relying on the government adviser's advice. It says the effective date was 10 March 2011, but it was in response to the question I asked, so I place on record that I have relied on the information provided by the government advisers. I take it from the response that that is their advice that that is the compensation.

Can I confirm that I have accurately interpreted the information from government advisers and placed on record during the second reading, and that is that, potentially, in circumstances that could eventuate as a result of the use of the powers in this bill under the compensation arrangements in clause 7, there are complicated provisions as defined by the national electricity rules where generators and/or retailers, if they felt that they had lost money, could seek compensation through these particular processes?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that that is the case.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Can I also confirm that my interpretation of the provision 8, 'Compensation Recovery', is correct—that is, should they meet those tests for compensation in emergency circumstances and AEMO calculates that there is compensation payable. Clause 8 states, 'Any compensation that AEMO pays due to intervention in the market is recovered from Market Customers in the regions benefitting from the intervention.' Is my interpretation correct that, in envisaged circumstances where the South Australian minister has given directions on behalf of South Australians, it would be South Australian consumers who would have to meet the cost of that compensation?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: My advice is that, yes, it can be recovered from retailers. How retailers recover that depends on their contractual terms with customers.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: It is quite clear where the retailers would get it; it would be from the customers. Putting that to the side, specifically the region here would clearly be the South Australian region. We could not spread that—or AEMO would not spread that—to Victoria or New South Wales. It would have to be South Australia as the benefiting region.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: Can you repeat that?

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I will read the provision again. I think it is quite clear. Certainly in the discussion I have had with others, they agree with the interpretation, that is, 'Compensation Recovery':

Any compensation that AEMO pays due to intervention in the market is recovered—

and then there is a sub-note 18—see rule 3.15.8, which refers to national electricity rules—

from Market Customers in the regions benefitting from the intervention (ie direction or reserve contracting). Compensation payments and recovery amounts are shown on preliminary and final settlement statements for the billing week in which the compensation determination is published to the market.

In the brief discussion I have had with one stakeholder, they have agreed with the interpretation I have put on the public record, which is that it is clearly South Australia. I am just seeking confirmation that that is the government's understanding, if we got to those circumstances.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: Very generally, that would likely be the case, but doing these things without a specific circumstance in mind, I am advised, is very difficult. As a general rule, yes, that is what the rule contemplates.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Let me leave the invitation open without delaying the committee. It clearly would apply to South Australian customers, but maybe it might be smeared to another state. When other information comes back about the interconnector, if the government advisers can think of a set of circumstances where it would not apply, I would be interested to see that.

The other question I raised in the second reading was in relation to section 7 of the Essential Services Act that the minister has agreed, on advice, is going to continue. Under the Essential Services Act, using that particular process—which is still possible for this government or a future government—the minister, and in this case it is the Attorney-General, has the power to fix maximum prices for, one would assume, just the period of the duration of the declared emergency, so in essence, fix maximum prices, may fix differential maximum prices, etc. There are various provisions that relate to that; it is under the clause on profiteering.

Given that this power has existed but, I assume, has never been used in relation to electricity—I assume it has possibly been used in relation to other essential services, I do not know, but putting that to one side—now that the government is potentially intervening to a greater degree in the National Electricity Market, people are saying, 'Well, there is this power.' You have confirmed now, on behalf of the government, that you intend to keep the Essential Services Act as it potentially applies to the electricity industry, and concern is being raised with me about what the minister may or may not do should this particular clause be activated.

Can the minister's legal advice give any clarification on whether there is any restriction on the capacity of the government to use this power? Clearly, it is theoretically possible, but there is a degree of discomfort from at least one or two people who have raised the issue with me.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that what we are doing in this bill will change absolutely nothing about what can potentially happen under the Essential Services Act. It changes nothing about what can happen under that act. Again, on its face the section being referred to does not talk about AEMO. It changes nothing about what that act contemplates. It remains the same. It is not changed at all by the bill before us now.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I thank the minister for that. I know that we confirmed before that the Essential Services Act is not being changed by this, so that is taken as fact and I accept that, but that is the question now being raised. They have said to me, if that is the case, the government will have the power through the Attorney-General, if it activates these particular provisions, to fix maximum prices in the electricity market.

That was theoretically possible before—that is, the government's answer, 'Hey, we've had that power before,'—but people are now saying, 'Yes, that was before, but before you didn't actually have the government saying it was going to intervene in the market, it was going to wind back privatisation, it was going to do this and that. There is a changed policy approach from the government and they are saying that this power potentially allows them to fix maximum prices for electricity. Is there a restriction on it?'

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: The government has talked about what it will do and may be able to do under the bill before us. I am not aware of any statements, and I would be keen to hear if the member has any statements, about whether the government has said that it may seek to act under the Essential Services Act, the profiteering power that has always been there. I do not think there have been any statements that the government is contemplating doing that. Certainly, what we have been talking about is intervention under the bill that is before us.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: To use the minister's words, that is fake news. I never said that. That is nothing like what I said.

The Hon. K.J. Maher interjecting:

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: No, I never said the government said that. You are misquoting what I said, to use your phrase. I do not take as much offence as you seem to. That is not my question. My question was not that the government had said this. The government has now said that it is going to intervene to a greater degree in the National Electricity Market through the emergency management provisions, which we have all conceded, and the government has tonight conceded that the Essential Services Act is not going to be changed, so the powers remain there.

Questions have been raised with me, not on the basis that the government has said publicly it is going to use clause 7 of the profiteering provisions of the act at all. People have raised the question with me and said, 'Okay, now the government has this new approach to intervening in the National Electricity Market with the emergency management powers, the energy plan and those sorts of things, what capacity could a government with that mindset have in terms of using clause 7 of the Essential Services Act?'

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I think I understand the honourable member's question and I might be able to help him out and provide some advice. The honourable member might like to get all these people who have been raising this particular concern with him, sit down at a table in a room over a nice cup of tea and let them know that the government has not said anything about using the provisions of the Emergency Services Act, and it has always been there; there is no change. The honourable member might be able to convince people to have a nice cup of tea and a good lie down and not worry so much about it.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I understand the point the minister makes, but the issue is that, if we had gone back three months ago, the same people could have been told that the government has never intervened in the National Electricity Market, it has never proposed to own a power station, it has never proposed to do a whole range of things, where it changed its policy position significantly. The minister may not have heard the quotes that I put on the record of the minister saying, in September last year, the day after the blackout, that the National Electricity Market was a creation of him and the government, it had worked wonderfully well, etc.

The government's position has changed significantly since September, so let me assure him that, if I were to sit down and have a cup of tea with these people and say, 'Don't you worry about it; the government has not said anything about doing these sorts of things,' I do not know that they would be comforted by that particular position.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: I have a few questions. For the benefit of the minister's advisers, there will be a couple of questions around the rules, some questions around the diesel generators and then a little on the batteries in the proposed plan. As I said in my second reading contribution, I was interested to know about the process to change the rules and the time frame. Does the legislation that we are passing today have any impact on the rules? Given we are a lead legislator and we are legislating to give these special powers to the minister, are there any flow-on effects that other states need to legislate to reflect what we are doing here tonight?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I thank the member for his question and his second reading contribution where we heard about his memories of taking the bus as a child, which was very good and illuminating. The advice is that this bill today does not require any changes to any of the legislation that governs the national energy market.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: The first question I asked is: how do you change the rules? If the rules ever need changing, aside from this legislation—we have heard the minister say that we are the lead legislator, that this is our system and he is very proud of it—how does a jurisdiction go about it and roughly how long does it take? What is the process?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: Are you asking about rules or legislative change?

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: Rules.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: My advice is that the rule changes are delegated to the Australian Energy Market Commission, that a proposal would be put in for a rule change and the Australian Energy Market Commission would consider it.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: The minister could perhaps ask his adviser, in his experience, how long does that take? I guess some rules are more complicated than others but, as a general estimate, if you are going to change the rules is it one week, one month, six months or one year? What is it?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that it is in the order of a year or more.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: You and your colleagues bragged in question time today about the expert advice you had taken in the development of the plan. I am interested to know the cost per megawatt of the electricity provided to Tasmania when they used diesel generation to support their network when Basslink was down? Clearly, that is where we are going as an emergency situation if we do not have gas or battery in place before this summer.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: We do not have exact figures now. As with one of the questions from the Hon. Robert Lucas, I am happy to take that question on notice and bring back a reply.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: I do hope that that is in some reasonable time frame. I know it is getting late. I am interested in the batteries. In the 2016 AEMO National Electricity Forecasting Report, there is some discussion about batteries and the technology. I was reading earlier today in that report that they thought it would probably be about mid-2020s before we have technology in batteries that would be suitable to use in the National Electricity Market. We are in 2017, not the mid-2020s, and that was only last year's report. Is the expert advice that the technology is sufficiently advanced that the 100 megawatts of battery storage will provide some security for us?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that yes, the technology is there to do that.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: What has changed since that was written in 2016? We are only in April 2017. Has the technology leapt so far forward in what could only be four or five months?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that, as of today, grid-scale storage is being used around the world. PJM—Pennsylvania, Jersey and Maryland—have such grid-scale storage, and it is being deployed in the UK. The technology exists and is being used in jurisdictions around the world.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: Am I right to say that the Premier said that the 100 megawatts the government is proposing would be the largest in the world?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that it will certainly be the largest in Australia and, depending on the exact configuration in the end, possibly the largest in the world.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: The report I was referring to talked about efficiency or losses. I am not a technical person but, basically, you can only ever actually recover 90 per cent of the energy that has been stored in a battery. If it stored 100 megawatts, you could only get 90 megawatts out of it. Are the specifications that the government has gone out to market with for 110 megawatts so that we actually get 100 into the system, or is it for 100 and we will only get 90 into the system?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: My advice is that it is a whole lot more complicated than that, but if we could boil it down to very simple terms, that would be the amount that can go out of the battery, if we can put it in the terms that I think the honourable member is looking for.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: So, there will be 100 megawatts of power available out of whatever the storage system is. Whether it is 90 per cent or 80 per cent, there will be 100 megawatts. I can accept that. Let us say it is 100 megawatts. If we have a deficiency of 100 megawatts it will take in the system, it will take an hour to discharge that, I assume.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: There are various ways that a battery might operate, but yes, that is how we are specifying in what we are going out to tender with.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: So, if we had significant deficiency—let us say 500 megawatts—it will last for 12 minutes before it will be gone?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: Again, that is, I am advised, an exceptionally complicated question. It is a 100-megawatt hour of battery. I can seek further advice if it is possible on whether you can directly translate that into a shorter amount of time with greater output, but I am advised that it is an extremely complicated question, so I am happy to take it on notice.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: This will probably be too simplistic for the experts, but if you have a mobile phone battery, eventually it does not hold the charge. We have heard that these things will be worn out or not work to their normal efficiency over a period. In what time period do you expect that this battery would need to be replaced, refurbished or whatever you do to big batteries to keep that sort of level of performance?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: What is the lifespan of the battery before it deteriorates?

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: Yes. Then you have to go and buy another one.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: My advice is that it is a good question and quite a reasonable question. That is part of the process of evaluation of the tenders that will come in. There is not a definitive answer that all batteries will last 10 years or 30 years. This will be part of what is assessed as part of the tender.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: I assume their life is dependent on how often they are charged and discharged, so if you keep them full of juice they will last longer than if you are constantly charging and discharging them?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that no, that is not necessarily the case. It depends on the technology that is used.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: How are batteries looked at in the context of the rules? Where do they fit in? I searched chapter 5 of the National Electricity Rules, Network Connection, Planning and Expansion. The word 'battery' does not appear anywhere. 'Storage device' does not appear. Storage talks about pumped water. Where do batteries fit in to our national rules?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: My advice is that in terms of national rules there will be both a generator and a customer.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: So, there will be no actual changes to the rules required to have a battery of the magnitude we are talking about in the national market?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: My advice is that what we are contemplating for a battery in South Australia will not need changes to the rules yet, but, of course, rules will change over time to reflect how the electricity market both generates and distributes electricity.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: How do you mean rules will change over time? I searched all 1580-odd pages of the national rules and, again, the word 'battery' does not appear. I am intrigued if over time we have to change them, how does that impact on—

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am advised that there are no rule changes required for a battery to be part of the South Australian energy system, but some of the additional services that batteries can provide are likely to feature in rule changes in the not too distant future.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: Is it accurate that, for some of the companies that are looking to supply this battery, one of the issues that they have been raising with the government is the negotiation around the rules and how batteries fit into the National Electricity Market? That is advice that I have been given in the last 24 hours. They do not just plug in like a battery that you stick into your torch; there is a complicated arrangement. Your advice in answer to most of my questions has been that the answer is too complicated, so can you guarantee that this battery can be plugged into the national market straightaway, that it will not require any rule changes whatsoever?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: My advice is that there are no rules that will prevent a battery plugging into the system.

Clause passed.

Remaining clauses (2 to 11) and title passed.

Bill reported without amendment.

Third Reading

The Hon. K.J. MAHER (Minister for Employment, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation, Minister for Manufacturing and Innovation, Minister for Automotive Transformation, Minister for Science and Information Economy) (22:42): I move:

That this bill be now read a third time.

Bill read a third time and passed.

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