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Legislative Council - Fifty-Third Parliament, Second Session (53-2)
2015-06-02 Daily Xml
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Judicial Conduct Commissioner Bill

Introduction and First Reading

Received from the House of Assembly and read a first time.

Second Reading

The Hon. G.E. GAGO (Minister for Employment, Higher Education and Skills, Minister for Science and Information Economy, Minister for the Status of Women, Minister for Business Services and Consumers) (17:22): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

I seek leave to have the second reading explanation inserted in Hansard without my reading it.

Leave granted.

This Bill concerns the establishment of a transparent, formal and partially independent mechanism for dealing with complaints made against a judicial officer, be they derived internally or externally to the judicial system. There is no current system at all to deal with these matters, the only recourse being correspondence with the head of the jurisdiction of the judge in question. This has been justified in the past in the name of the undoubted constitutional principle of the independence of the judiciary. That argument can be taken too far. While it is absolutely clear that the functions of the judiciary, as a decision-making institution, should not be subject to the will of the executive, it by no means follows that any individual member of the judiciary should be immune from examination as to performance or examination as to conduct in the performance of their duties—or in their extra-judicial behaviour—that does not relate directly to the performance of the judiciary as an independent arm of government.

New South Wales has a large Judicial Commission, established in 1987 by the Judicial Officers Act 1986, and having a budget of about $6 million. The Commission consists of the heads of the NSW jurisdictions ex officio, and 4 appointed lay members. The Commission has a major function of dealing with complaints against the judiciary, but also has major functions in terms of developing sentencing statistics, compiling and up-dating a judicial 'bench book' and dealing with major aspects of judicial education.

Complaints are dealt with by the Conduct Division of the Commission. A Conduct Division is appointed by the Commission itself to hear each particular complaint. That Division will consist of 3 people—2 judicial officers and 1 lay member.

The Federal Court has a system of dealing with complaints against judges of that court by the establishment of ad hoc judicial commissions to deal with each case. This is to be found in the extensive and detailed provisions of the Commonwealth Judicial Misbehaviour and Incapacity (Parliamentary Commissions) Act 2012. The Commissions are Parliamentary Commissions in the sense that each is established by resolution of both Houses of Parliament, but the membership is judicial, not Parliamentary.

The Australian Capital Territory has the Judicial Commissions Act 1994. The scheme is one for the examination and determination of complaints against judicial officers and is generally very similar to that in the Federal Court, but the Commission is appointed by the Attorney-General and not the Parliament.

There was published a Victorian Judicial Commission of Victoria Bill 2010 under the then Labor Victorian Government, but it was never enacted. It was very similar to the New South Wales scheme.

This area of policy was examined by the Western Australian Law Reform Commission in 2012. The Commission broadly recommended a New South Wales scheme for Western Australia. Its recommendations have not been enacted. The report of the Law Reform Commission is an excellent source for the position in relation to complaints about judicial conduct in comparative jurisdictions.

This model exists for comparable jurisdictions overseas. For example, the United Kingdom has a system constituted under the Judicial Discipline (Prescribed Procedures) Regulations 2006 made under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.

It seems clear that to say that the principle of judicial independence insulates judicial officers from the independent and transparent examination of complaints from the public or other judicial officers is not a defensible position. The truth of this remark is fortified by the progressive establishment of judicial commissions to take on that task both in Australia and overseas.

There are not the same, or even similar, numbers of judicial officers across Australia. In late 2012, the Western Australian Law Reform Commission attempted a count. NSW had 300. Victoria had 243. WA, for whom a NSW system was to be recommended, had 135. SA had 84.

A full Judicial Commission on the NSW model, with corresponding expense, is not warranted on those numbers. The New Zealand model of a single Judicial Commissioner as enacted in the New Zealand Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004. This model provides a starting point us.

There will be a Judicial Conduct Commissioner, appointed by the Governor. The Commissioner will hold office for a term of 7 years and may be renewed up to a maximum term of 10 years. It is contemplated that the Commissioner will be either a very senior lawyer or a retired judicial officer. The usual formula for this is a practitioner of at least 7 years standing. The appointment must be scrutinised and approved by the Parliamentary Statutory Officers Committee. These provisions mirror those in the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012.

The Commissioner can only be removed by address of both Houses of Parliament, and will be free, by statutory statement, from any direction by any person. He or she will, in other words, exercise his or her functions as an independent statutory officer. The principal function of the Commissioner will be to deal with complaints made against judicial officers in accordance with the scheme laid down by the Act. The Commissioner will have all of the powers necessary to carry out his or her function.

The principle of judicial independence, properly so-called, is to be preserved. It will not be the function of the Commissioner to call into question any judicial decision in any form given by a judicial officer in relation to judicial proceedings. The Bill makes that clear at several points.

In general terms, the complaints scheme works as follows. Once a complaint is received by the Commissioner, the Commissioner will conduct a preliminary examination of the complaint. This is a winnowing process. If the complaint is one to which the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 applies, the complaint must be referred to the Office for Public Integrity and all further action suspended until that process is complete. The Commissioner must notify the relevant head of jurisdiction or senior judicial officer of any complaint received by his or her office.

The Commissioner may take no further action on the complaint if the Commissioner is satisfied, for any reason at all, that further consideration of the complaint cannot be justified. Examples of this may be that the complaint has already been resolved in some way, the complaint is based on a misunderstanding or the complainant has not co-operated to the satisfaction of the Commissioner.

The complaint must be dismissed at this stage if it is frivolous, vexatious or not made in good faith, if it is not within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, if it is trivial, if it is an attempt to relitigate the merits of some litigation or if it has already been dealt with. That should not be considered an exhaustive list. The Commissioner has a discretion to proceed further with a complaint even if it is not made in accordance with the Act on the basis that technicalities should not necessarily bar justice.

If a complaint passes these hurdles, then it may be classified as more or less serious. If it is less serious, the Commissioner may refer it for action to the senior judicial officer of the jurisdiction of the judicial officer in question. Senior judicial officers are to be given extensive powers to act upon and resolve such complaints. The Commissioner may recommend that the senior judicial officer take action in a particular way.

The Commissioner must make the relevant jurisdictional head aware of most complaints and may recommend that the jurisdictional head take specified action. It is contemplated that, outside of the formal language of an Act of Parliament, the functions and powers of the Commissioner and the functions and powers of the jurisdictional head should operate co-operatively in the best interests of judicial independence on the one hand, and justly dealing with a bona fide complainant on the other.

The Commissioner has the power to report a complaint to the Parliament in limited circumstances if the Commissioner thinks that course is warranted, and the judicial officer concerned is subject to removal by address of both Houses under the Constitution.

If the Commissioner thinks that the course is warranted in light of the possibility that the removal of the judicial officer concerned may be at stake, the Commissioner may recommend to the Attorney-General that he or she appoint a Judicial Conduct Panel to hear the matter. The Attorney-General must consult the Chief Justice about the composition of the panel. In general terms, the panel will consist of two senior judicial officers and one lay member who is neither a judge nor a legal practitioner. The panel has the powers of a Royal Commission. It will report to the Attorney-General.

The Panel will have no independent powers to dismiss or discipline. Some judicial officers (such as Magistrates) may be removed from office by the Governor. In such cases, the report of the Panel, if in favour of removal, will go to the Governor. Some judicial officers may only be removed under the Constitution. In such cases, if the report is in favour of removal, the constitutional process will be invoked. That process will be begun by report by the Commissioner to the Parliament.

The Commissioner will be required to make a detailed annual report to Parliament.

Certain other amendments must be made. Many are consequential. For example, judicial review should not go in the ordinary course to a single judge of the Supreme Court. That could result in the invidious position where one judge is required to rule on the case against a fellow judge. Instead, judicial review should go to the Full Court.

There will be consequential provisions dealing with mechanical matters such as the service of documents, the protection of the contemplated process from obstruction or abuse and the confidentiality of reports and documents created in the course of the process. The general principle so far as the latter is concerned is that all documents and reports should be confidential by law unless released by the Commissioner.

There will be a strong provision designed to prevent information about the complaint from being published in the media or any medium of communication with the public generally at the discretion of the Commissioner. It should be borne steadily in mind that there is less need for wholesale protection, like that in the ICAC Act, here—complaints of, for example, judicial rudeness to a litigant or counsel are hardly the stuff of reputational breaking. Furthermore, judges have tenure—they are, rightly, secure in their position except in the most extraordinary of circumstances.

Consequential amendments to other Acts are required to acknowledge and bolster the new role and powers of the Commissioner. Two of these require detailed explanation.

The Solicitor-General has advised that the provisions of the Constitution that deal with the removal of judges require amendment. Sections 74 and 75 of The Constitution Act 1934 say:

74—Tenure of office of Judges

The Commissions of all Judges of the Supreme Court shall be and remain in full force during their good behaviour until their retirement according to law.

75—Removal from office of Judges

It shall be lawful for the Governor to remove any Judge of the Supreme Court upon the address of both Houses of the Parliament.

The general effect of the advice is that these are two separate modes of dismissal. Put another way, dismissal under s 75 is not limited to the ground of failure to be of good behaviour and dismissal under s 74 does not require an address of both Houses of Parliament. Under s 15(1) of the District Court Act 1991, a District Court Judge may only be removed from office on address of both Houses of Parliament. It follows that, on current law, it is harder to remove a District Court Judge than a Supreme Court Judge. This is not sensible. The Constitution will be amended so that both may be removed only on an address of both Houses of Parliament. This can hardly be controversial as it increases constitutional protection for senior members of the judiciary in a principled way.

Second, jurisdictional heads will be given formal, statutory and extensive powers to direct the conduct of their jurisdictions and members of them in matters that do not impinge upon the principle of judicial independence. These powers are modelled on those contained in s 15 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976.

There are also regulation making powers. Most of these are very general in nature and follow routine practice. The exception is that there is power to make regulations to confer functions on the Commissioner relating to education and training or judicial officers and members of the legal profession. The reason for this is that, while the office of Commissioner is being set up in the first instance with a limited role in view, it may be that, in the future, it will be agreed to be expedient that the office of Commissioner take on a formal role in judicial and professional education akin to that undertaken by the more expansive Judicial Commission of New South Wales. A statutory reassurance is given that any such decision will be subject to the condition of consultation with the Chief Justice and, where appropriate, the Chief Judge and Chief Magistrate.

I commend the Bill to Members.

Explanation of Clauses

Part 1—Preliminary

1—Short title

2—Commencement

These clauses are formal.

3—Objects

This clause sets out the objects of the measure.

4—Interpretation

This clause defines certain terms used in the measure and specifies that, for the purposes of the measure, 'conduct of a judicial officer' includes any act or omission whether occurring in the course of acting as a judicial officer or not and whether or resulting from an illness or incapacity.

5—Application of Act

This clause provides that the measure applies in addition to (and does not derogate from) other relevant Acts or laws.

Part 2—Judicial Conduct Commissioner

6—Functions and powers of Commissioner

Subclause (1) sets out the functions of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner (the Commissioner), being to receive and deal with complaints made in accordance with the measure in relation to the conduct of judicial officers as well as any other functions prescribed by the regulations or by another Act. The Commissioner is not subject to direction in the exercise of these functions. Subclauses (4) and (5) deal with the powers of the Commissioner.

7—Appointment of Commissioner

This clause provides for the appointment of the Commissioner for a term not exceeding 7 years. A person is only eligible for appointment as the Commissioner if the person is a legal practitioner of at least 7 years standing or a former judge of the High Court of Australia, the Federal Court of Australia or the Supreme Court or any other court of a State or Territory of the Commonwealth. A person who is a judicial officer or member of an Australian Parliament is not eligible for the appointment. A person may be reappointed but may not hold the office for more than 10 years in total.

The Governor may suspend the Commissioner from office for contravention of a condition of appointment, misconduct or failure or incapacity to carry out official duties satisfactorily. If this occurs the Governor must lay before both Houses of Parliament a full statement of the reason for the suspension and either House of Parliament may present an address to the Governor requiring the Commissioner to be restored to office. If neither House of Parliament presents an address to the Governor within 20 sitting days, the Commissioner is removed from office.

This clause also provides for the circumstances in which the office of Commissioner becomes vacant.

8—Pension rights

This clause provides a power to apply the Judges' Pensions Act 1971 to, or in relation to, the Commissioner as if the Commissioner were a Judge as defined in that Act and service as the Commissioner were judicial service as defined in that Act.

9—Acting Commissioner

A person may be appointed by the Governor to act as the Commissioner during any period for which no person is for the time being appointed as the Commissioner or the Commissioner is absent from, or unable to discharge, official duties. The terms and conditions of appointment are to be determined by the Governor, except that the person may not act as the Commissioner for more than 6 months in aggregate in any period of 12 months.

10—Staff

The Commissioner may engage employees on terms and conditions determined by the Commissioner. The Commissioner may also, under a Ministerial arrangement, make use of the services or staff of an administrative unit of the Public Service.

11—Delegation

This clause provides that the Commissioner may delegate a function or power of the Commissioner except a prescribed function or power.

Part 3—Complaints

12—Making of complaints

This clause provides that a person (other than a person prohibited from instituting proceedings under section 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935) may make a complaint to the Commissioner about any conduct of a judicial officer. The clause provides for the form and content of an application. The Commissioner must give notice to the judicial officer and the relevant jurisdictional head of a complaint made.

In addition, the clause provides that the Commissioner may receive referrals relating to the conduct of a judicial officer from the Attorney-General or a jurisdictional head. The Commissioner may also on his or her own initiative, treat as a complaint any matters concerning the conduct of a judicial officer.

13—Preliminary examination of complaints

This clause provides for a preliminary examination of each complaint by the Commissioner conducted in any manner the Commissioner thinks fit (but in accordance with the principles of procedural fairness).

14—Request to postpone consideration of complaint

This clause allows a judicial officer to whom a complaint relates (being a compliant made during the course of a hearing conducted by the officer) to request that the Commissioner postpone consideration of the complaint until the hearing is completed, and further requires the Commissioner to grant the request if the hearing would be adversely affected by considering the complaint.

15—Referral of complaint to OPI

If the Commissioner is of the opinion that a complaint relates to conduct that may comprise corruption in public administration within the meaning of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012, the Commissioner must refer the complaint to the Office for Public Integrity to be dealt with under that Act and consideration of the complaint by the Commissioner is postponed.

16—Power to take no further action

This clause provides that the Commissioner may take no further action in respect of a complaint if satisfied that further consideration of the complaint would, in all the circumstances, be unjustified.

17—Dismissal of complaint

This clause provides that the Commissioner must dismiss the complaint if he or she is of the opinion that—

the complaint is not within the Commissioner's jurisdiction; or

the complaint has no bearing on judicial functions or judicial duties; or

the complaint has been made for an improper purpose or is otherwise frivolous, vexatious, or not in good faith; or

the subject matter of the complaint is trivial; or

the complaint is about a judicial decision, or other judicial function, that is or was subject to a right of appeal or right to apply for judicial review or dealing with the complaint would otherwise require the Commissioner to challenge or call into question the legality or correctness of any instruction, direction, order, judgment, or other decision given or made by a judicial officer in relation to any legal proceedings; or

the person who is the subject of the complaint is no longer a judicial officer; or

he or she has considered or previously considered the subject matter of the complaint and has decided to take no further action or has determined that the subject matter of the complaint could not, if substantiated, warrant action under clause 18, 19 or 20.

18—Referral of complaint to relevant jurisdictional head

The Commissioner must refer a complaint to the relevant jurisdictional head before taking other action under the measure (other than a complaint that has come from that jurisdictional head) unless the Commissioner—

exercises his or her power to take no further action in respect of the complaint; or

dismisses the complaint.

The Commissioner may, on referring a complaint, recommend that the relevant jurisdictional head take specified action in relation to the complaint or may advise the relevant jurisdictional head that the Commissioner is of the opinion that the complaint is not able to be satisfactorily dealt with by the taking of any action by the relevant jurisdictional head and that the Commissioner intends to make a report on the complaint to the Parliament or make a recommendation to the Attorney-General to appoint a judicial conduct panel. The relevant jurisdictional head must give the Commissioner written notification of any action taken by the relevant jurisdictional head in relation to the complaint. The Commissioner may make reports to the Attorney-General in relation to action taken under or in connection with the section

19—Immediate report to Parliament

This clause provides that the Commissioner may make a report on a complaint to the Parliament in certain circumstances (and provided that the judicial officer is subject to removal on an address from both Houses of Parliament).

20—Recommendation to appoint judicial conduct panel

The Commissioner may recommend to the Attorney-General that he or she appoint a judicial conduct panel to inquire into matters concerning the conduct of a judicial officer if of the opinion that an inquiry is necessary or justified and, if established, the conduct may warrant consideration of removal of the judicial officer.

Part 4—Judicial conduct panels

21—Appointment of judicial conduct panels

This clause provides for the appointment of judicial conduct panels by the Attorney-General (on the recommendation of the Commissioner) to inquire into, and report on, any matters concerning the conduct of a judicial officer. A judicial conduct panel will consist of 3 members comprised of 2 eligible judicial officers and 1 lay member.

22—Dissolution of panel if member unable to continue

If a member of a judicial conduct panel is unable to continue, then the presiding member must dissolve the panel and the Attorney-General is to appoint a new panel.

23—Functions and procedures of panel

This clause provides that a judicial conduct panel must inquire into, and report on, the matters concerning the conduct of a judicial officer referred to it by the Attorney-General and may inquire into, and report on, any other matters concerning the conduct of the judicial officer that arise in the course of its dealing with the referral.

Subject to the measure, the procedure for the calling of meetings and for the conduct of business is determined by the panel but the panel must—

act in accordance with the principles of procedural fairness; and

hold all meetings in private; and

call meetings and conduct business in accordance with any guidelines approved by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

24—Powers of panel

This clause provides that a judicial conduct panel has the powers of a commission as defined in the Royal Commissions Act 1917. Specifically, the clause provides that a judicial conduct panel may require a judicial officer to undergo 1 or more medical examinations for the purpose of assisting in determining whether proper cause exists for removing the judicial officer from office.

25—Report by panel

This clause provides that a judicial conduct panel must, at the conclusion of its inquiry, provide a report to the Attorney-General which must set out—

the panel's findings of fact; and

the panel's opinion as to whether removal of the judicial officer is justified; and

the reasons for the panel's conclusion.

The Attorney-General must cause a copy of the report to be laid before each House of Parliament.

26—Removal of judicial officer

This clause provides for the removal of a judicial officer from office. If the judicial officer is a Judge who is liable to be removed from office (pursuant to the Constitution Act 1934 or any other Act or law) on an address from both Houses of Parliament, the Judge may be removed from office on such an address. In any other case, a judicial officer may be removed from office by the Governor if a judicial conduct panel concludes that removal of the judicial officer is justified.

Part 5—Miscellaneous

27—Commissioner's annual report

The Commissioner must, before 30 September in each year, prepare a report on the operation of the measure.

28—Attorney-General may request information about complaints

The Commissioner must, at the request of the Attorney-General, provide the Attorney-General with information about the exercise of the Commissioner's functions under the measure.

29—Judicial review

This clause provides that any application for judicial review of a decision under the measure must be made to the Full Court of the Supreme Court.

30—Immunity from liability

This clause provides that no liability attaches to the Commissioner, any member of the Commissioner's staff or the members of a judicial conduct panel for any act or omission in good faith in the exercise or purported exercise of powers or functions under this measure or any Act.

31—No obligation on persons to maintain secrecy

This clause is designed to enable a person to disclose information to the Commissioner or a judicial conduct panel despite the provisions of any other Act or common law relating to confidentiality. This would extend to confessional disclosures and medical disclosures but does not extend to secrecy regarding informants.

32—Confidentiality, disclosure of information and publication of reports

It is an offence for a person to disclose information obtained in the course of the administration of the measure except in the circumstances set out in subclause (1). Subclause (2) allows the Commissioner to authorise disclosure if of the opinion that it is in the public interest. If information is passed on, the person to whom it is passed on is bound by the same rules of confidentiality. Subclause (3) allows the Commissioner to publish reports if of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so.

33—Publication of information and evidence

This clause provides that a person must not, except as authorised by the Commissioner or a court, publish, or cause to be published information or evidence relating to a complaint if publication of the information or evidence is prohibited by the Commissioner. Information is published if it is communicated to the public as defined in the clause. Breach of the clause is an offence.

34—Other offences

This clause provides 2 further offences in relation to the administration of the measure which each carry a maximum penalty of $10 000 or imprisonment for 2 years.

Firstly, a person must not—

prevent another person from making a complaint under the measure; or

hinder or obstruct another person in making such a complaint.

Secondly, a person must not—

hinder or obstruct the Commissioner or a judicial conduct panel in the exercise or performance of powers or functions conferred by or under the measure; or

refuse or fail to comply with a lawful requirement of the Commissioner or a judicial conduct panel under the measure; or

make a statement that is false or misleading in a material particular (whether by reason of the inclusion or omission of a particular) to the Commissioner or a judicial conduct panel acting in the exercise of powers under the measure; or

make a complaint knowing that there are no grounds for the making of the complaint.

35—Service

This clause provides for the manner of service of a notice, report or other document required or authorised to be given to or served on a person under the measure.

36—Regulations

This clause provides a regulation making power.

Schedule 1—Related amendments

Part 1—Amendment of Constitution Act 1934

1—Amendment of section 74—Tenure of office of Judges

This clause amends section 74 of the Constitution Act 1934 to clarify that the section does not give rise to a separate power to dismiss a Judge of the Supreme Court. The power to dismiss a Judge of the Supreme Court is contained in section 75 of the Constitution Act 1934.

2—Insertion of section 75A

This clause inserts new section 75A to provide that nothing in Part 4 of the Constitution Act 1934 affects the operation of the measure.

Part 2—Amendment of Courts Administration Act 1993

3—Insertion of Part 5A

This clause inserts new Part 5A into the Courts Administration Act 1993 which provides that the jurisdictional head of a court is responsible for ensuring the effective, orderly and expeditious discharge of the business of that court. Court, for the purposes of the Part, includes a tribunal or other body the functions of which include the exercise of judicial powers. The clause provides matters which constitute functions of a jurisdictional head and also provides matters that a jurisdictional head may do in respect of the management of a court and in respect of judicial officers for the purposes of ensuring the effective, orderly and expeditious discharge of the business of the court. The clause provides that the jurisdictional head may take any measures that the jurisdictional head believes are reasonably necessary to maintain public confidence in the court.

Importantly for the measure, this clause provides for action that a jurisdictional head may take in relation to complaints referred to the jurisdictional head under the Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act 2015. If a judicial officer refuses or fails to comply with a requirement made by the jurisdictional head in response to a complaint referred under the Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act 2015, the jurisdictional head must, by notice in writing, report that refusal or failure to the Attorney-General and to the Judicial Conduct Commissioner (and the report to the Judicial Conduct Commissioner will be taken to be a referral under that Act). A jurisdictional head of a court must also give notice to the Judicial Conduct Commissioner of any complaint made to the jurisdictional head in relation to the conduct of a judicial officer of the court.

Part 3—Amendment of District Court Act 1991

4—Amendment of section 15—Removal of Judges and Masters

This clause amends section 15 of the District Court Act 1991 to provide for the removal of a Master under that Act by the Governor in accordance with the Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act 2015 in addition to the current manner of removal.

Part 4—Amendment of Equal Opportunity Act 1984

5—Amendment of section 87—Sexual harassment

Section 87(6b) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 currently provides an exception to sexual harassment by a judicial officer of a non-judicial officer or a member of the court staff of a court under section 87(6a) of that Act. The exception will apply in relation to anything said or done by a judicial officer in court or in chambers in the exercise, or purported exercise, of judicial powers or functions or in the discharge, or purported discharge, of judicial duties. This clause provides that conduct to which the exception applies may nevertheless be the subject of a complaint under the Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act 2015.

Part 5—Amendment of Freedom of Information Act 1991

6—Amendment of Schedule 2—Exempt agencies

This clause amends the Freedom of Information Act 1991 such that the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and a judicial conduct panel under the Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act 2015 are exempt agencies for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 1991.

Part 6—Amendment of Judges' Pensions Act 1971

7—Substitution of section 13

This clause substitutes section 13 of the Judges' Pensions Act 1971 to provide that unless the Governor otherwise directs, a pension under that Act is not payable to, or in relation to, a Judge who has been removed from office (whether pursuant to the Constitution Act 1934 or otherwise under an Act or law).

Part 7—Amendment of Justices of the Peace Act 2005

8—Amendment of section 9—Tenure of office

This clause is consequential.

9—Insertion of section 10A

This clause inserts a new provision dealing with suspension and removal of special justices (because special justices will be judicial officers for the purposes of the measure, whereas ordinary justices will not)

10—Amendment of section 11—Disciplinary action, suspension and removal of other justices

This clause is consequential to clause 9.

Part 8—Amendment of Magistrates Act 1983

11—Repeal of section 8

This clause repeals section 8 of the Magistrates Act 1983 because it will be unnecessary if proposed Part 5A of the Courts Administration Act 1993 is enacted.

12—Amendment of section 9—Tenure of office

This clause amends section 9 of the Magistrates Act 1983 to provide that a Magistrate, when removed by the Governor, is to be removed in accordance with the Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act 2015.

13—Amendment of section 10—Suspension from office

This clause amends section 10 of the Magistrates Act 1983 to make a consequential amendment and to provide that a magistrate may only be suspended from office under that section.

14—Repeal of sections 11 and 12

This clause repeals sections 11 and 12 of the Magistrates Act 1983 which provide for the removal from office of magistrates.

Part 9—Amendment of Ombudsman Act 1972

15—Amendment of section 5—Non-application of Act

This clause amends section 5 of the Ombudsman Act 1972 to provide that it does not apply in relation to any complaint to which the Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act 2015 applies or any matter to which that Act would apply if the matter were the subject of a complaint under that Act.

Debate adjourned on motion of Hon. D.W. Ridgway.

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