Matter of Privilege

Matter of Privilege

The SPEAKER (17:37): I rise to make a statement regarding the matter of privilege raised earlier this morning in regard to the member for Lee. I make the following statement with regard to the matter of privilege raised by the Attorney-General in this house earlier today. However, before addressing that matter I wish to outline the significance of privilege as it relates to this house and its members.

As we have heard in the past, privilege is not a device by which members or any other person can seek to pursue matters that can be addressed by debate or settled by the vote of the house on a substantive motion. As we have heard, McGee in Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, in my view, makes the test for whether or not a matter is a matter of privilege by defining it as a matter that can 'genuinely be regarded as tending to impede or obstruct the house in the discharge of its duties'.

Generally speaking, any act or omission which obstructs or impedes the house in the performance of its duties, or which obstructs or impedes any member or officer of such house in the discharge of his or her duty, or which has a tendency, directly or indirectly, to produce such a result, may be treated as a contempt and therefore be considered to be a matter of privilege even though there is no precedent of the offence.

I refer to the matter of privilege raised by the Attorney-General made in relation to an allegation of misleading of the house that has been made in relation to the member for Lee's grievance debate in the house yesterday concerning question time. I quote that part of the member for Lee's grievance which is the subject of this matter of privilege:

Today, we had the Deputy Premier repeatedly refusing to answer questions by bogusly claiming that the questions were being put in a manner to threaten some sub judice behaviour of this parliament. That is just wrong, and we know it is wrong because the Deputy Premier herself put these same questions to a government during a question time previously in regard to the Hillier matter.

The Attorney-General asserts that the member for Lee has misled the house by the use of the words, 'That is just wrong,' when those words are deemed either to relate to rulings by the Speaker on matters of sub judice or to reference questions asked by the member for Bragg of the previous government.

I have carefully read the Hansard from yesterday, perused questions asked by the member for Bragg to the then attorney-general of the former government on the Hillier matter and had the opportunity to consider an explanation provided to me by the member for Lee. In respect of the first assertion, that the words 'That is just wrong' were directed to the rulings by the Speaker on matters of sub judice, I find it difficult to accept that the words 'That is just wrong' were to be interpreted to apply to the rulings of the Speaker and I therefore reject that assertion.

In respect of the second assertion, I am of the view that the member for Lee was making a reference to questions that related to the behaviour of departments and government agencies. In support of this view, I quote the member for Lee:

Well, today there was question after question after question about what the department of corrections had done, what the Parole Board had done and what other agencies of the government had done, namely, the Attorney-General and the Minister for Police—for the short time that he was here.

It is clear to me that the member for Lee was making a connection between a line of questioning concerning the behaviour of departments and government agencies in the current instance with that same line of questioning asked of the former attorney-general on the Hillier matter.

In the Chair’s opinion, this is not a matter of privilege for the reason I stated above. In the Chair’s view, the conduct complained of cannot, to apply the test, 'genuinely be regarded as tending to impede or obstruct the house in the discharge of its duties'. Therefore, I decline to give the matter the precedence that would allow the Attorney-General to immediately pursue the matter. However, my opinion does not prevent any member from pursuing the matter by way of substantive motion.