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House of Assembly - Fifty-Second Parliament, First Session (52-1)
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CRIMINAL LAW CONSOLIDATION (MEDICAL DEFENCES—END OF LIFE ARRANGEMENTS) AMENDMENT BILL

Standing Orders Suspension

Mr WILLIAMS (MacKillop—Deputy Leader of the Opposition) (10:42): I move:

That standing orders be so far suspended as to enable me to move a motion without notice for the rescission of a vote of this house on this bill forthwith.

The SPEAKER: I have counted the house and, as an absolute majority of members is not present, ring the bells.

An absolute majority of the whole number of members being present:

Motion carried.

Second Reading

Mr WILLIAMS (MacKillop—Deputy Leader of the Opposition) (10:44): I move:

That the vote on the second reading of the bill be rescinded.

Motion carried.

Second reading.

Mr HAMILTON-SMITH (Waite) (10:45): I rise to speak on this bill with a heavy heart because I can well imagine circumstances where the terminally ill would seek relief and circumstances in which they would seek assisted suicide as a pathway from their pain. I think every member of the house can envisage circumstances—and many will have been personally engaged with those circumstances—where, as an act of compassion, one might wish upon a loved one a passing, if only to relieve them of their agony and suffering.

The Hon. R.B. SUCH: Madam Speaker, can I just seek—

The SPEAKER: Order! Is this a point of order?

The Hon. R.B. SUCH: Point of order. Can I seek a clarification? Given the process that has happened, can people who spoke before in the second reading speak again?

The SPEAKER: No, that is not possible. We have gone back to the second reading stage, but if you have spoken that is it.

Mr HAMILTON-SMITH: Having said that, I signal that I will be opposing the bill because I think it opens a Pandora's box. I have spoken on this matter in regard to an earlier bill on 17 May 2001. I do not want to repeat the arguments I raised on that occasion, but I will make a few points. Firstly, I draw the house's attention to the declaration on euthanasia adopted by the 39th World Medical Assembly in Madrid, Spain, in October 1987, and also the 44th World Medical Assembly in Marbella, Spain, in September 1992, which stated the following—

The SPEAKER: Order, member for Waite! There is too much background noise and it is very difficult to hear the member, and this is a very serious issue, as we have taken a serious step. Can we have less noise, please.

Mr HAMILTON-SMITH: I quote:

Physician-assisted suicide, like euthanasia, is unethical and must be condemned by the medical profession. Where the assistance of the physician is intentionally and deliberately directed at enabling an individual to end his or her life, the physician acts unethically. However the right to decline medical treatment is a basic right of the patient and the physician does not act unethically even if respecting such a wish results in the death of the patient.

I also draw the house's attention to references to this matter in the House of Lords, in its session of 1993-94, and the Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics, Volume 1—Report, page 10, and later debate within the House of Lords on the subject. I again draw the house's attention to the Australian Association for Hospice and Palliative Care and its comments on the matter that have been made in the past.

I can envisage a multitude of circumstances where one might seek assisted suicide. First, as has been pointed out during this debate, there are circumstances in which people find themselves in extreme pain and find they are undergoing extraordinary suffering with inadequate palliative care and medical relief, and they simply feel they cannot go on. This is acute and concerning and would strike at the heart of every person here.

But the bill ultimately suggests that the way out of that situation is assisted suicide. I think there are other alternatives. I think advancements have been made and that further advancements can be made in palliative care, but I think, too, that these are matters largely for families and the suffering to address, not the parliament.

A second reason why people might want to commit suicide is that they feel alone. They feel unloved, they feel unvalued, and they feel as though they are a burden on their family. They feel as though the world would be better if they were not still in it, that there is no point in going on. Again, I think these situations are best left in the hands of families.

A third situation may be that they wish to commit suicide because they feel clinically depressed. They feel that their family, as I mentioned, would be better off without them, that they have fallen into a state of complete and absolute despair and that they are putting their loved ones through a unendurable ordeal and that the world and their family would be better off without them. Again, I feel these are circumstances that are best dealt with by families and not by this parliament.

There are no right or wrong answers to this terrible question, but I would say simply this: in my own family experience, I have seen, on the one hand, suicide, and, on the other hand, a teenage cousin within a week of death from leukaemia suddenly go into remission. She is now a happy mother with two children and living a bountiful life but, had this act been passed prior to her condition reaching that extreme point, I am quite certain she would be dead. Everyone has their own stories to tell in regard to this matter.

I am also very concerned about efforts a parliament might take to codify this question of assisted suicide. I know advocates of the bill do not like the term 'suicide', but that is what we are talking about; we are talking about assisted suicide. If you codify these things you take away whatever discretion exists at present under current arrangements.

No-one is talking about turning the machines off and letting nature take its course. We are talking about active intervention, and just like a bill of rights, just like attempts to change the constitution, once you codify things if it is not in there then it is out. If it is not legalised by the law, then it is outside the law. You bog down and clog up whatever fluidity there is in arrangements between families and the medical profession at the moment to make compassionate decisions on behalf of their loved ones who are in such agony.

The other thing is that my experience as a lawmaker tells me that once you open this threshold moral issue and legalise assisted suicide and murder, you will start the path down a slippery slope. Soon people will be arguing on the basis of discrimination that their mental illness or their condition is equally painful and equally distressing as that determined by the bill at the outset, and they will be saying that they are discriminated against, that they have their right to select and opt for suicide just like the other person who is in agony. You will get into all these arguments about what does or what does not constitute a medical condition or a mental condition sufficient to require or enable legalised suicide.

It is a slippery slope. I do not know where it ends. I do not know whether it ends in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, I do not know whether it ends in a place where other regimes have taken us in the past in history, where we seek to get rid of the mentally ill, the physically deformed, and those who are not fully fit and well: the Spartan ethic. I do not know where it takes us, but I do not want to start a legislative process that ends at that point.

Claims for popular support for this measure, I think, are thin. I doubt if this issue would survive a national referendum once the electorate was fully informed. I would say this: society already authorises killing. We understand that at times it is necessary for our soldiers to fight on our behalf, to fight for freedom, and to kill. We have just had Corporal Robert Smith awarded the VC and describe his acts of killing on our behalf serving his country. This parliament and other parliaments in this country already endorse murder in certain circumstances and that is one. However, it is another step to authorise legalised suicide.

I read in the paper today the story of Mr Ramazan Acar, who killed his beautiful daughter, Yazmina, with a knife for the purpose of getting even with his wife. This man is scum. I will never introduce legislation into this place to authorise the death penalty, but I hope that no-one else does because, when I read cases like this, I would be challenged to vote against a death penalty bill because I think there are circumstances where, as with our soldiers, we might authorise the taking of a life to eradicate this community of evil.

I will not be introducing a bill, and I hope that no-one else does because I do not want to have to make that terrible decision. To me, however, this is a separate issue: authorised suicide. It is a moral dilemma. I suspect many of the advocates of this would oppose the death penalty while supporting euthanasia. I understand the compassionate basis upon which this bill has been introduced, but I will be opposing it with a heavy heart.

Mr GARDNER (Morialta) (10:56): I have been thinking long and hard about this bill, as I am sure all members have. This is the third bill introduced into the parliament since my election in March last year that has sought to allow for a process under which someone in suffering may be able to access euthanasia. Whichever way any of us votes on these matters, we will disappoint as many people as we will satisfy.

I know that I will disappoint a number of people when I say that, while there may be value in exploring issues at the committee stage, I cannot see myself at this stage supporting the bill as it stands at the third reading. The focus of this contribution is to put my views on the record for the benefit of those of my constituents who might be interested. I will do so in relation to the broader issue of euthanasia as well as this specific bill.

We are obliged on matters of conscience to consider all the arguments at length, to listen to the views put to us by our constituents, as well as anyone else who takes the trouble to approach us in good faith to put their case, and we must reflect on our own principles. I would like to begin by thanking the many constituents and others who have taken the time to contact me to share their views on the matter. I have read many compelling arguments.

I am also grateful to those whom I have sought out, particularly from the medical and legal professions, as well as some of those who ply their trade in this building and others, who have been willing to give me the benefit of their expert advice and answer some of my questions.

Our core beliefs in relation to these matters cannot help but be shaped by our upbringing. I grew up in a family that placed great value on personal sovereignty, freedom of choice and scepticism of any government intrusion into one's own decisions. If euthanasia was a topic for discussion at the dinner table, there was never any question from my parents that individuals should not be forced to suffer the indignity or the pain of an intolerable death if that was not their wish.

In my late teens, I came to Christianity, or perhaps that is the wrong way round: it is better to say that I was found. I was baptised in the Lutheran Church and exposed to the argument that the immutable sanctity of human life should supersede one's personal choice about how one's own life might end. In relation to these bills, some have approached me on the basis that, because the church to whose theology I subscribe is opposed to euthanasia, I therefore should necessarily vote against any voluntary euthanasia legislation in this place.

In my maiden speech, I explained that my faith is a personal matter and that I abhor any suggestion that the government would ever seek to stop me or anyone else from practising their faith or from living life by any other principles they hold dear. In the debate on the euthanasia bill that was unsuccessful in the other chamber late last year, the Hon. Stephen Wade articulated the point well in explaining why he was not universally opposed to any such legislation, although he was voting against that particular bill for a range of reasons. He said:

While my Christian faith teaches me that it is not an option that I should see as available to myself, in a pluralist society and as a Liberal I accept that others make other choices so, I do not rule out euthanasia being made legally available to South Australian adults...

Most members who have spoken on this issue have very appropriately shared with the house their own personal experiences that have informed the views they hold about matters to do with the end of life. I am very grateful that I have never had to, as others have, suffer the incomparable pain of losing a parent, sibling or a child. I have lost my four grandparents across the decades of my life.

Delivering the eulogy at my grandmother's funeral was a much more difficult speech than any I will ever deliver in here, and we lost my dad's dad at the beginning of last year in the weeks before the 20 March election. Grandpa was strong willed and opinionated. Some called him obstinate. He was passionate and courageous. Starting from a modest background, he worked as a policeman in England and he served in the Second World War. After the war he brought his family to Australia to build a new life in a brave young country.

He lived to what some might term the ripe old age of 95, although particularly for the last two or three years of his life he did not call it living as his body refused to cooperate with his strong mind. He received excellent treatment for a wide range of problems. He felt little physical pain as his body deteriorated, but he suffered mental anguish of great duration. Other members of my family have agreed that he would have been pleased for me to talk about him in the context of framing my views in support of the principle of this sort of legislation.

It was barely a week after his passing that I and other candidates from Morialta who were present at the candidates forum at Campbelltown City Council were asked what our views were on the issue. As I recall, the Greens candidate expressed his firm support, and the then Labor member expressed her heartfelt opposition to any such legislation, instead arguing in a most compelling manner for a greater focus on palliative care.

At that forum I gave much the same description of my position as I am giving today. I also pointed out the importance of appropriate safeguards necessary to ensure that the legislation is not open to abuse. This sort of legislation would be much easier to deal with if there were not those in our society who are willing to act in appalling ways.

I agree with the Minister for Health, who made an excellent contribution to this debate in preferring a model that allows for a statutory defence under the criminal law rather than the more bureaucratic statutory voluntary euthanasia schemes that have also been proposed, although I do not necessarily rule them out. Minister Hill describes them as 'the establishment of a state mechanism which would be appointed by the health minister and which would be responsible to the health minister'.

But a statutory defence proposal should include significant safeguards such as would ensure that some of the nightmare scenarios that have been suggested could not take place. The law should also be clear in order to provide clarity for the courts and those who serve in them, including the juries. I am not satisfied at this stage that the bill in front of us delivers in relation to that aspect. If we reach the committee stage I will listen to the ensuing debate about those matters and any potential amendments, but this is the basis of my objection to the bill.

The bill also deals with issues of aiding and abetting, and providing support and civil liability, but in the brief time available I will focus on the guts issue: the proposed framework between doctor and patient. The bill essentially lists four safeguards in a new section 13B of the act, which reads:

Criminal liability in relation to end of life arrangements:

1. It is a defence to a charge of an offence against this division, arising out of the death or intended death of a person, if the death resulted or was intended to result from the administration of drugs to the person by the defendant and the defendant proves, on the balance of probabilities, that:

(a) the defendant was at the time of the conduct to which the charge relates, a treating practitioner of the person;

(b) the defendant believed, on reasonable grounds, that the person was an adult person of sound mind who was suffering from an illness, injury or other medical condition that irreversibly impaired the person's quality of life so that life had become intolerable to that person (the qualifying illness);

(c) the conduct to which the charge relates occurred at the express request of the person; and

(d) the conduct to which the charge relates was, in all the circumstances, a reasonable response to the suffering of the person.

The Law Society and others have expressed some serious concerns about terms like 'reasonable grounds' in paragraph (b) in relation to both the finding that the patient must be of sound mind and that life was intolerable. They also expressed concerns about the use of the term 'reasonable response' in paragraph (d)—that 'the conduct to which the charge relates was, in all the circumstances, a reasonable response to the suffering of the person'.

These are subjective terms and ones which provide too much ambiguity about the sort of process that we are proposing that the courts should allow. The bill also falls down on what is a threshold issue for me, in that it does not require that a second opinion be sought about either the diagnosis or treatment of the qualifying illness, in order to establish the irreversible impairment that is required; and nor is any psychological assessment demanded to ensure that the apparently intolerable quality of life afforded to the patient is not the result of a treatable state of depression.

Finally, there is the issue of consent. This is an issue on which I would not have thought ambiguity was an option, yet the obligations on the doctor to demonstrate that the conduct to which the charge relates occurred at the express request of the person are undefined. I imagine that these questions may be approached in the committee stage, along with many others, and I look forward to the responses to the bill's proposals. However, as I have said, at this stage I will not be voting for this bill in this form at the third reading.

I look forward to hearing the contributions that other members have to make. I have been informed somewhat in my own deliberations by the contributions made so far. I believe they have been made in the best of spirits and I appreciate the contributions of those members.

The Hon. T.R. KENYON (Newland—Minister for Recreation, Sport and Racing, Minister for Road Safety, Minister for Veterans' Affairs, Minister Assisting the Premier with South Australia's Strategic Plan) (11:06): I welcome the opportunity to speak on this bill and I thank the members for Ashford and MacKillop for their organisation and cooperation. I will say at the very start that I have no doubt at all about the goodwill and intention of everybody involved in this debate—and the compassion of those involved in this debate. This debate is being approached from both sides by people of goodwill and good intention and compassion, and I do not have a problem with that. It will not come as a surprise to anybody at all in this house that I will be opposing the bill. I do oppose the bill and come down on that side of the bill, but I want to say very firmly at the outset that I accept the goodwill on both sides.

The first point I want to make very clearly is that this is a euthanasia bill. There has been some attempt to say that it is not, that it is a change to the criminal code and so on, which it is, but let's be quite clear that this is a euthanasia bill. A patient can ask a doctor to kill them, and that is euthanasia. So let's have the debate—we are having the debate—but let's be clear about what we are debating. We are debating euthanasia. Let's not pretend otherwise. Let's not get into semantics; let's not have a debate about dictionary definitions. This is a euthanasia bill. This is a bill allowing people, with the assistance of their doctor, to kill themselves.

If you are going to have a euthanasia bill, it seems to me that this is the very worst sort of euthanasia bill you could have because it essentially has no regulation whatsoever. The house should be quite clear: it would not matter if it came in a very well regulated euthanasia bill, I would still oppose it. But if you are going to have one, it should be well regulated. I think that is a fair point to make. You could argue very clearly that there are varying degrees of effectiveness and varying degrees of public good in different bills, and a bill that has no regulation or very little regulation is, in my opinion, going to be a lot worse than a bill that has a much greater and more rigorous regulation.

I think the problem with regulation is that it gets overly bureaucratic, you have basically a death committee who would then feel it is their duty to work out whether people can live or die, but we will get to that when we get to another bill because I am sure there will be another bill at some point. The second point I wanted to be very clear about is that this is a euthanasia bill that has almost no regulation, almost no control about it.

The doctors' defences are fairly open. There is not a lot required for them to mount their defence, so essentially it can come down to a matter of a doctor's word against someone who is not there any more. In fact, it could be the doctor's word against someone who may not have even been in the room. You come down to taking the doctor at their word that the patient was of sound mind, that they were a treating practitioner which could be, for the purposes of this, someone just saying, 'Yes, I asked him to treat me yesterday.'

The situation could arise where 'I know that doctor will give me the injection I want, therefore I asked him to treat me, therefore he is my treating practitioner.' There is not a lot of beef behind any requirements or any defence that is required. In the event that it even goes to court—which I think this bill makes a much less likely scenario—it is going to be, 'Were you the treating practitioner? Yes. Were they of a sound mind? Yes. Did they request it? Yes.' Who can dispute that? It would be a very difficult thing to do.

It should go without saying that human life is incredibly important. One of the key roles of a state—which it accepts through a number of other statutes, most notably the murder laws—is to defend and protect life and to protect the safety of people in this state. When we start introducing laws like this, it waters down the commitment of the state to protect life. That is an important point for this house to consider. Do we want to water down the role of the state in protecting life?

Many people argue that this happens anyway. In fact, I have been talking about euthanasia with a young doctor. I said, 'What worries me is that this will make it easier for doctors to kill patients so they can get the bed that they need for another patient.' He said to me, 'We do that all the time already.' That is one doctor in conversation with me. Maybe he was being a smart-arse—it would not be the first time that I have been involved in a smart-arse conversation—but anything that makes it easier is wrong.

We have seen incidences of doctors who can be quite callous about these things. The most egregious example, of course, was Dr Death. Obviously he was out killing people. It is much easier for a prosecution to say that he was out there to kill people, because he killed so many people. You could quite possibly have someone out there—a doctor—killing patients and then saying that they asked for it, and it would be very difficult to prove otherwise. So, this is a concern. The other concern is about medical practitioners. It is probably my own ignorance of the bill but, on my reading of it, it does not need to be a medical doctor for those purposes. Does it say that?

Members interjecting:

The SPEAKER: Order! Can the speaker get back to his comments, and members on my right, please behave.

The Hon. T.R. KENYON: It was actually very useful, Madam Speaker. They clarified the point that I was about to make; it would have been erroneous. I read minister Hill's description of the death of his sister. Without dwelling on his personal circumstances too much, his argument, to me, seemed more like an argument for increased or improved palliative care. When she actually received some decent palliative care, she was much happier, much more comfortable and it was actually, in fact, a beautiful death—the so-called beautiful death that euthanasia seeks to be.

Even minister Hill himself mounted an argument for better palliative care, and I would very happily support any move for greater and better palliative care that might come before the parliament. I come back to the point that I am trying to make: this is an unregulated euthanasia bill. It is a bill that puts doctors in a position I do not think they should be in. I do not think it should be the role of doctors to kill people; it should be the role of doctors to protect life and make people comfortable.

I am comfortable with people withdrawing medication. I am comfortable with people making the decision to receive no further treatment and letting the natural processes take their course, but I am not comfortable with allowing doctors to administer a lethal dose to patients to whom I believe they have an obligation to try to improve their life and their lot. The most notable and most effective way of doing that is through palliative care.

Mrs VLAHOS (Taylor) (11:15): I had not expected to speak on this bill today but, as I will be away on the next sitting week, I will place on the record my thoughts on this topic. When I was younger and in my 20s, I took the view that euthanasia should be legalised. I have changed my views over a period of 20 years with the more life experience I have had and with both relatives passing and seeing partners' parents die slow and torturous deaths, sometimes through their own choices about medical treatment or non-medical treatment. I will share some of those today with you.

I will be opposing this bill, and the other bills before the house on this topic, for many reasons. Firstly, I trained in health administration and coded the death and cancer records of many patients as a health information manager—a record coder in both public and private hospitals in the state—before I became involved in politics and worked in this area. I saw the treatment regimes, and I have seen the changes that palliative care has effectively made to people's lives and how it has improved their experiences. Over time, palliative care has become more sophisticated, it has become more compassionate, and it has been a good thing for many families, not just the individual.

The second reason I will be opposing this bill is that I have a deep and underlying concern that the growth of individual desire to control everything in society and everything in one's life is a risk to the broader society. Sometimes an individual's desire to end their own life through assisted suicide does not take into account the people surrounding them. I think people are also prone to being influenced in an untoward way, and I am particularly concerned about elder abuse.

I have spoken to many people and thought about this topic long and hard, particularly since I was elected in March 2010, because I knew this topic was likely to emerge in this parliamentary sitting period. The issue of elder abuse, particularly, was raised with me by a cancer specialist, and I have spoken to several specialists. I have visited palliative care sites and heard about the difference that palliative care makes to people at the end of their life.

The one underlying concern I had when I spoke to this person—who had no particular religious perspective and did not work at a palliative care hospital that was of a religious nature—was his view that there are relatives and friends involved in people's lives at these very difficult, end of life transition points, who say 'I am going on a holiday.' I know this sounds simplistic, but this person actually thought it was true, and I sincerely believe—when I see some of the constituents in my electorate who are vulnerable in their caring positions—that people may wish to say, 'Well, this is the day that this is going to happen.'

I do not think our society should be comfortable with that. There are frail and elderly people. I would much prefer our society discuss the end of life matters with advanced directives, improved palliative care and a more humane and civil way of actually protecting people who are in vulnerable situations. That is the way I will be voting on these matters before the house. For the record, I lay on the table that I am a Christian, but that has not come into my decision in this matter.

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING (Playford—Treasurer, Minister for Employment, Training and Further Education) (11:19): I think it will come as no surprise to the house that I oppose this piece of legislation. I want to address a few issues that have arisen over the course of the debate and the wider debate on the issue. The first thing I want to take issue with is this claim that euthanasia is something that is happening anyway: the doctors are doing it but in a completely unregulated way without oversight and, whatever the numbers are, many hundreds of people are euthanased by their doctors unlawfully all the time. That is an absolute nonsense.

The fact is that in the 1990s the previous Labor government introduced legislation which provided doctors protection should they administer palliative care and pain relief and as a foreseen but unintended side effect the person died. For many years—in fact, even before the legislation—it was always considered not to be murder: but, nonetheless, the law has been crystal clear in South Australian legislation that a doctor can quite lawfully administer pain relief to a patient in the knowledge that that pain relief might be administered to the extent that the patient may die and, if the patient does die, that is not considered homicide or murder under South Australian law.

That practice of providing pain relief, even up to the point where it might kill the patient, and in that knowledge, is all part of good clinical practice and good palliative care. It is not new and it has long been an understanding in the law, certainly since the 1990s. In fact, it came about as a result of a very far-reaching inquiry into death and dying that was chaired by my former employer, Martyn Evans, who went on to become a minister for health, and it is all part of good clinical practice.

The report that the select committee came up with was a far-reaching report into all the issues associated with death and dying. It resulted in an excellent piece of legislation, and members should go back and look at that report and piece of legislation, which addressed many of these issues very well and in a very well-thought-out, well-considered manner. The simple fact is that to claim that administering pain relief to the point where it kills someone is somehow akin to euthanasia is completely wrong and a complete misunderstanding of the true nature of palliative care.

My concern, of course, is that, like the Minister for Recreation and Sport, I am an opponent of euthanasia, full stop; and it would not matter how good the regulations were able to be formulated in a piece of legislation because I would always oppose the legalisation of the killing of South Australians. However, my greatest concern about this piece of legislation is that it removes any safeguard whatsoever. I acknowledge that, at least in previous legislation that has been introduced both by the member for Ashford and the member for Fisher, and other legislation that has been introduced in this house previously, there has been an attempt to provide a regulatory framework in which euthanasia might occur.

The Minister for Health (and I think the member for Ashford had a part in it as well) quite correctly identified how difficult and, I think he would argue, impossible it is to come up with a regulatory framework to provide for euthanasia with all the necessary safeguards, and I completely agree with the Minister for Health on that point. It is incredibly difficult, and that is one of the big reasons why many members of parliament over the years, while in principle supporting the personal autonomy arguments with regard to euthanasia, nonetheless have voted against it, making the argument that it is impossible to provide an adequate regulatory framework for euthanasia that provides all the requisite protections for the most vulnerable in our community. The Minister for Health, I think, correctly identified how difficult that was and the problems with the regulatory framework that was being put forward in the member for Ashford's previous piece of legislation, as well as, I think, the member for Fisher's previous piece of legislation.

However, in identifying the difficulties in that, instead of saying, 'Well, I don't think it's a good idea that we have euthanasia because it's too difficult to regulate,' what he suggested and put forward was, 'Well, look, this is too difficult an issue. Let's have euthanasia but without the regulation. In fact, let's leave it to the court to decide what might be the appropriate conditions upon which euthanasia might be lawful.' This piece of legislation essentially provides a defence to doctors who perform euthanasia, so that should a doctor be charged with a homicide, having given a lethal injection to a patient who was in the final stages of a terminal illness, that doctor would be provided in a court with some form of defence.

The problem with that essentially is that, if we were to pass this piece of legislation, we would be ignoring our responsibilities and leaving it up entirely to a court to make a determination about the circumstances in which euthanasia might be lawful and the circumstances in which it might not, and I think that is entirely unsatisfactory.

As the member for Newland, I think, correctly pointed out, if we must have a euthanasia bill, if we must debate a euthanasia bill, if we must pass a euthanasia bill, at least let the parliament decide what the conditions might be in which euthanasia might be lawfully administered. Let us not just leave it to a court and the personal predilections of an individual judge to make decisions which are going to be incredibly profound for South Australia as a whole.

We should not just be leaving it to the personal predilections of an individual judge to make such a determination and to make important decisions about the circumstances in which euthanasia might be lawful and the circumstances in which it should not. That is the reason for which we are elected, and we should be making determinations about those sorts of conditions that might apply.

But, having said that, of course I will always oppose any piece of legislation which attempts to make lawful the killing of South Australians. Essentially, this piece of legislation, I believe, is dangerously open-ended, and we really do not have enough before us in order to make an informed decision about which way we might vote on this piece of legislation. This piece of legislation, I believe, is dangerously open-ended.

Having spent some time on the specifics of this legislation, I will just address the issue of euthanasia overall and why, in principle, I think that euthanasia should continue to remain unlawful in this state. The proponents of euthanasia argue essentially from a principle of personal autonomy; essentially, 'It is my body, I should be able to decide what I want to do with it. If in certain circumstances I am threatened with a painful death, well, then, I should have the right to request a doctor to administer me with a lethal dose.'

I should point out that what we are talking about with euthanasia is not suicide. Suicide for many years has not been unlawful in this state. What is unlawful is for a person to assist someone in a suicide in some way; and, of course, what is unlawful is for someone to commit a homicide by administering some sort of lethal injection. We should make sure that we distinguish between suicide and euthanasia. Suicide, of course, can be prevented, but people who attempt to commit suicide, thankfully, are no longer prosecuted. The reason why I—

Time expired.

Debate adjourned on motion of Ms Thompson.

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