Contents
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Commencement
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Parliamentary Procedure
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Ministerial Statement
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Question Time
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Bills
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Answers to Questions
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Independent Commission Against Corruption (Conditions of Appointment - Integrity Measures) Amendment Bill
Second Reading
The Hon. K.J. MAHER (Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Attorney-General, Minister for Industrial Relations and Public Sector, Special Minister of State) (16:54): I move:
That this bill be now read a second time.
This bill, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (Conditions of Appointment—Integrity Measures) Amendment Bill 2025, amends the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 2012 to (1) provide for the entitlement of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption to a pension that closely aligns with judges' pension entitlements under the Judges' Pensions Act 1971 and (2) fix the salary of the ICAC commissioner to that of a puisne judge of the Supreme Court. This bill was introduced by the Deputy Premier in the other place due to its status as a money bill. I will now set out the origins and provisions of the bill in much the same way as the Deputy Premier did in another place.
On 12 December 2024, Her Excellency the Governor in Executive Council appointed Ms Emma Townsend as the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption for a term of five years, commencing on 3 February 2025 and expiring on 2 February 2030, pursuant to section 8 of the ICAC Act. Prior to her appointment as the Commissioner, Ms Townsend served as Director of the Office for Public Integrity and before that as a prosecutor in the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Ms Townsend is well qualified to serve in the important role of Independent Commissioner Against Corruption, and I am sure all members will join me in wishing her well as she takes up that task. However, Ms Townsend is the first person to hold this role who is not a former judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia. An analysis of ICAC commissioner equivalent roles around the country has shown that approximately 50 per cent of these are held by former judges, with the approximately other 50 per cent comprising other backgrounds. While the appointment of Ms Townsend therefore marks a departure from the practice to date in South Australia in appointing former Supreme Court judges as ICAC commissioner, it is in step with other jurisdictions.
In appointing someone who is not a retired judge and therefore not otherwise entitled to the judicial pension, the government considered that it was important to enshrine in the legislation an entitlement for the commissioner to receive a pension that closely aligns with the entitlement for judicial officers under the Judges' Pensions Act. This entitlement is intended as an integrity measure to reflect the independence of the commissioner and acknowledge that previous commissioners have been similarly entitled to a pension by virtue of their status as former judges of the Supreme Court.
Accordingly, the bill amends the ICAC Act to provide that the ICAC commissioner is entitled to a judicial pension by applying the provisions of the Judges' Pensions Act 1971. To reflect the initial maximum fixed term of seven years and maximum total appointment of 10 years of an ICAC commissioner under the ICAC Act, the new commissioner's pension will apply as follows:
The pension entitlement is to accrue after five years of service.
After five years of service there is an entitlement to a pension of 50 per cent of salary, with incremental progression of 1 per cent for each additional six months of service up to 60 per cent of salary at a maximum 10 years of service.
A period as acting commissioner under section 11 of the ICAC Act is to count as service for the purposes of calculating the pension entitlement.
The pension entitlement is not to be paid out until the commissioner reaches 60 years of age (consistent with how the Judges' Pensions Act applies to judges).
Spouse or domestic partner entitlements and child entitlements are to apply as for judges under the Judges' Pensions Act but with any necessary modifications to the application of that act to tailor it to the bespoke accrual and qualifying periods for the commissioner pension. For example, this will entail a different calculation of a notional pension under the Judges' Pensions Act since there is no relevant retirement age in the case of the ICAC commissioner.
If the ICAC commissioner is suspended under section 8(10) of the ICAC Act, the time under suspension is not to count as service for the purposes of the pension.
The pension is not payable, unless the Governor otherwise directs, if the commissioner is removed from office by the Governor.
If a commissioner is later appointed as a judge, any pension payments from their appointment as commissioner cease upon the appointment as a judge. However, previous service as commissioner is to be counted as judicial service for the purposes of the judge's pension (and if a former commissioner is appointed to a judicial office with a salary less than that of a puisne judge of the Supreme Court, they will be entitled to the more generous pension at the salary of Supreme Court judge).
There is relevant precedent for applying the Judges' Pensions Act to other, non-judicial, statutory office holders, including with modifications:
Pursuant to section 10 of the Solicitor-General Act 1972, the Judges' Pensions Act applies to the Solicitor-General as if they were a judge under that act and their service was judicial service.
The Judges' Pensions Act may also be applied by the Governor to the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Judicial Conduct Commissioner by instrument in writing at the time of appointment, under the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 or the Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act 2015 respectively. The relevant provisions in those acts allow conditions or modifications to the application of the Judges' Pensions Act as it applies to those officers.
While this is a relatively minor reform, the government considers it an important integrity measure that will safeguard the independence of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption. I commend the bill to members and seek leave to have the explanation of clauses inserted in Hansard without my reading it.
Leave granted.
Explanation of Clauses
Part 1—Preliminary
1—Short title
2—Commencement
These clauses are formal.
Part 2—Amendment of Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 2012
3—Amendment of section 8—Commissioner
This clause inserts new subsection (1a) which entitles the Commissioner to salary and allowances at the rates applicable to a Puisne Judge of the General Division of the Supreme Court.
4—Insertion of section 9A
This clause inserts new section 9A as follows:
9A—Pension rights—Commissioner
This section applies the Judges' Pensions Act 1971 to and in relation to the Commissioner as if the Commissioner were a Judge as defined in that Act and service as the Commissioner were judicial service as defined in that Act. The section establishes that only a person who has completed 5 years of service as Commissioner is entitled to a pension under the Judges' Pensions Act 1971 by virtue of this section and makes provisions in relation to the rate of the pension and when the pension becomes payable. The section also provides that application of the Judges' Pensions Act 1971 to the Commissioner operates subject to modifications to that Act specified by the Governor by instrument in writing or necessary or convenient to give effect to section 9A.
5—Amendment of section 10—Pension rights
This clause makes consequential amendments.
Schedule 1—Transitional provision
1—Transitional provision
This clause sets out a transitional provision which provides that new section 9A only applies in relation to a person holding or acting in the office of Commissioner immediately prior to the commencement of that section or a person appointed to be the Commissioner on or after the commencement of that section. In the case of a person holding or acting in the office of Commissioner immediately before the commencement of section 9A, the section will be taken to have applied from the day on which the person was appointed to be, or to act as, the Commissioner.
The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD (17:00): I rise briefly to speak on behalf of the opposition to indicate that we are in broad support of this proposed legislation. This bill, as members would be fully aware, seeks to amend the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 2012, to provide for the entitlement of an Independent Commissioner Against Corruption to a pension that closely aligns with a judge's pension entitlements under the Judges Pension Act 1971, and to fix the salary of the ICAC commissioner to that of a sitting judge of the Supreme Court.
The impetus for the introduction of this bill is of course the appointment by Her Excellency the Governor in Executive Council of Ms Emma Townsend as the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption on 12 December last year. Ms Townsend, who previously served as the Director of Public Prosecutions and as a prosecutor in the Office for Public Integrity, is the first person in our state to fulfil the role of ICAC commissioner who is not a former judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia.
I note that half the equivalent roles to that of the ICAC commissioner in other jurisdictions are held by former judges, with the remaining positions being occupied by those from other backgrounds; that is, that they were not judges in the past. The provisions in this bill will therefore essentially bring South Australia into line with the rest of the nation. It is sensible; not every one of the people appointed to be the ICAC commissioner will be a former judge. Hence, there needs to be some sort of adjustment in this regard.
The opposition agrees with the state government that it is fitting for those who are appointed to this important role and yet are not recipients of a judge's pension entitlement—usually because they have not been a judge—to be in receipt of a comparable benefit as an integrity measure to reflect and safeguard the independence of the commissioner. The opposition takes this opportunity to wish Ms Townsend all the best in her tenure as the ICAC commissioner as she endeavours to uphold transparency and accountability in our state. We support the bill.
The Hon. F. PANGALLO (17:01): I rise to speak about this bill, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (Conditions of Appointment—Integrity Measures) Amendment Bill 2025. It relates solely to the judicial pension conditions of the ICAC commissioner:
1. There is current provision in the act that allows the ICAC commissioner to receive an optional judicial pension at the behest of the government in negotiations.
2. This new bill will make it mandatory that all ICAC commissioners receive the judicial pension.
3. It puts into law that they will receive the judicial pension on the following conditions:
(a) five years' service, equivalent to 50 per cent of salary as judicial pension over 60;
(b) every six months after that to a maximum of 10 years' total service, equivalent to 1 per cent extra. Essentially, at 10 years of services as ICAC you receive 60 per cent of the salary as a judicial pension;
(c) under five years equals nothing; and
(d) these are better conditions than judges, who only get 40 per cent at five years' service.
4. This means that the new commissioner, Emma Townsend, will receive at minimum 50 per cent of her salary in perpetuity from 60 years old, even if she does not get a second term as commissioner.
5. The government argues this brings the commissioner into line with the unique aspects of the role that are similar to being on the bench.
6. They say other jurisdictions offer this.
7. When questioned by my adviser Hugh Salter, a criminal lawyer, they said that:
(a) they have not consulted the judiciary or the Law Society, or anyone for that matter;
(b) this did not come around because of negotiations with Ms Townsend, they just decided to give it willy-nilly;
(c) they are giving it out because of the unique scenario that a statutory officer like the ICAC commissioner is put in—essentially to investigate those who put her there. As such, at the end of her tenure she may be unable to find employment due to the nature of her investigations as ICAC;
(d) I am unclear whether any other members in this place have had a close look at this or have consulted with the legal fraternity about its implications.
I know that many in the legal fraternity who I know have expressed their bewilderment about this. I do not know Ms Townsend personally, nor do I know much about her legal professional background, unlike her predecessors who had distinguished careers on the bench before their appointment. Obviously, the Attorney-General's Department believes that she can capably carry out the duties, and I will be interested to see what changes she brings to the role.
However, it is bewildering that a career government candidate who does not have anywhere near the experience or competency of former judges Vanstone and Lander, and who went from being a manager at DPP into OPI, should suddenly receive a substantial salary package that includes a generous judicial pension after just one term of service, when she is then free to go back to working anywhere of her choice.
The reason the former ICACs had the judicial pension is because they received it, deservedly or not, from their previous employment as a judge, as it was a type of integrity and anti-corruption measure. If the ICAC is not a former judge, why should they receive payments in perpetuity like a judge? Perhaps that is a question for the Attorney-General in the committee stage.
I do hope Ms Townsend does a much better job of administering such a complex and challenging integrity agency than her predecessors. Under Mr Lander, former inspector of ICAC Philip Strickland SC made an adverse finding against the agency for systemic maladministration, that it was a basket case where unacceptable errors were made, particularly the investigation into former Renewal SA boss John Hanlon, and another executive, Georgina Vasilevski.
The conduct was mirrored in several other cases of failed prosecutions which I have spoken about so many times in this place, and I will not need to mention them again. There was also the final report of the Select Committee on Damage, Harm or Adverse Outcomes resulting from ICAC Investigations, which I had chaired.
Under previous regimes at ICAC there was also an unexplained high turnover of staff, the ratio believed to be among the highest in the South Australian public sector. Does this reflect on management and workplace practices and culture, and does it need to be fixed? Should there be an independent review undertaken, as there was with the very troubled Office of the DPP? It is going to be a challenge for Ms Townsend to turn around the public's perception of the agency, and I do wish her every success. It might be refreshing not having a judge with a brilliant legal mind but with no people management skills in the chair, as had happened previously.
But there have been some concerning goings-on behind the scenes with staff movements which have not had the benefit of proper parliamentary scrutiny and whether the various pieces of legislation covering the agency, OPI, the inspector and their appointments have been followed judiciously. I have been given a copy of a submission by a retired barrister of some legal acumen, who has taken a particular interest in the operation of ICAC and the act which governs it.
There has been no noteworthy challenge to any of the legally framed criticisms Mr Michael Fuller has made in the past. In this submission titled 'The shambles that is ICAC/OPI under your management', Mr Fuller takes aim at the Premier, the Hon. Peter Malinauskas, and the Attorney-General, the Hon. Kyam Maher, who he refers to as 'M&M'. The submission is allegorical and contains some wit, yet it is serious enough, considering what he describes as shambolic dysfunction; the scrambling to fill vacancies arising from the mysterious departure of the former short-lived deputy ICAC Paul Alsbury, which has never been fully explained save for the obligatory 'personal reasons'. Like many previous submissions he has made, Mr Fuller says he fully expects not to get a satisfactory response from the Premier or the Attorney-General, if he gets one at all. Just to save some time, I seek leave to have Mr Fuller's submission inserted in Hansard without me reading it.
The PRESIDENT: The Hon. Mr Pangallo, you are tabling that submission, it is not being inserted into Hansard without you reading it apparently.
The Hon. F. PANGALLO: If it is not going to be inserted into Hansard, I will stand up and read it.
The PRESIDENT: You can table it, the Hon. Mr Pangallo, but you cannot insert it into Hansard.
The Hon. F. PANGALLO: I will read it then, Mr President. It states:
Submission to the Premier and the Attorney-General
(M&M)
Re: The shambles that is ICAC/OPI today under your mismanagement
The Story:
Once upon a time, a very long time ago 2012 in fact, the people had a Commissioner ICAC, a Deputy Commissioner ICAC, and a Director OPI and the people were content.
Then on 19 of March 2022 along came M & M.
A new Government was formed and most of the people were pleased.
Soon thereafter, 30 June 2023, the Deputy Commissioner ICAC, Paul Alsbury, disappeared without any public announcement by M & M then or since.
A mystery! Which then became the M & M secret.
The mystery was concealed by M & M announcing the appointment of an Acting Commissioner which seemed good and the people were pleased because The Commissioner, Ann Vanstone, was on leave and unable to attend to her duties.
The secret was kept from the people.
And they, the people, verily, believed all was true that M & M said, and nothing was hidden from them.
But they were deceived!
A little while later Commissioner Vanstone grew tired of M & M for not listening to her and she resigned effective 6 September 2024 leaving M & M much embarrassed, because now they had no Commissioner and no Deputy Commissioner.
She of course knew the secret and the potential embarrassment to M & M if she decided at a time of her choosing to reveal it. She likely calculated that by her resignation the secret might be revealed.
In the end the secret was kept from the people with the active cooperation of Commissioner Vanstone and was not revealed even upon her resignation, because then M & M appointed an Acting Commissioner again, and all appeared good to the people.
The secret had been actively suppressed by ICAC and its former Commissioner Vanstone since 1 July 2023 and even today by its newly appointed Commissioner Emma Townsend as I reveal later in this story.
In the manner of her going Commissioner Vanstone rendered the office of Commissioner ICAC a poisoned chalice from which no eminent person would likely drink.
So it came to pass and M & M were much discombobulated. No eminent person applied for appointment as Commissioner.
In extremis M & M offered the chalice, although poisoned, to the Director of OPI, Emma Townsend (who almost to the point of certainty knew the secret), who was much used to the workings of M & M and had some immunity to the poison of governance.
She was granted a judge's pension although never a judge and from who knows what starting date?
So like a dutiful and seasoned (20-plus years) public officer, a keeper of the secret, and much pleased with her Judges pension she drank from the chalice.
Now there was no Director of OPI and M & M in their haste to hide the secret from the people that there had not been a Deputy Commissioner ICAC since 1 July 2023 found themselves without a suitable candidate to appoint as a replacement Director OPI.
M & M not discouraged, resorted to trickery and announced that 'OPI assistant Director, Vanessa Burrows, will act as the Director of the OPI while a recruitment process is undertaken for the role.'
M & M did not tell the people that there was no statutory office under the ICAC Act of OPI Assistant Director or Acting Director and that OPI was without a Director in office and thereby rendered legally functionless until such time as an appointment of a Director was made by them.
All appeared good to the people because they had a commissioner of ICAC again. The people still did not know the secret that had impelled M&M to resort to deceive the people into believing once again that all was well with ICAC OPI.
Little did the people know that M & M had by their machinations also rendered the new Commissioner ICAC unable to function because although as Director OPI she had been able to mix with the people and hear their complaints, as the newly appointed Commissioner ICAC, she was no longer able to mix with the people and hear their complaints.
She was on high at ICAC and only able to listen to the Director of OPI of which there was no one.
Much mischief to the people was wrought by M & M thereby.
The people were still happy because they thought all was still good in the land. The appearance of regularity at ICAC/OPI that M & M had conjured by trickery fooled the people.
They still do not know the secret that M & M and Commissioner Townsend are even now keeping from them.
This tale may with public airing expose M & M, Commissioner Townsend, and before her Commissioner Vanstone for deceiving the people.
All is not well at ICAC/OPI.
The story is not yet finished, as I the teller of this tale of public woe am personally impacted.
I have in recent days caused to be delivered to OPI a complaint of corruption in public administration concerning officers of the regulatory services and the CEO of Norwood, Payneham and St. Peters Council.
I have addressed my complaint to Vanessa Burrows whom M & M have in their deceitful way described as 'assistant Director' and 'acting as Director'.
I recite my introductory assertions to Vanessa Burrows exposing the deceit:
'For the reasons advanced below however, neither you nor any assessor at OPI is competent at this time to assess and/or refer this complaint pursuant to Sects. 18E and 18F ICAC Act.
REASONS:
1. There is presently no Government appointment of a Director to replace the vacancy caused by the recent elevation on 12 December 2024 of Emma Townsend to Commissioner of ICAC.
2. The title of 'acting as Director' apparently conferred on you by the Government in the same announcement of Emma Townsend's elevation to Commissioner ICAC has no statutory force or effect under ICAC Act.
3. Part 3 Divisions 1 to 4 of ICAC Act do not create any statutory office in OPI other than the Director.
4. Sect 17(2) of the ICAC Act establishes OPI as comprising the Director and Public Service employees assigned to it (underlining again for emphasis).
5. Sect 18F(3) ICAC Act makes it perfectly clear that the making of an assessment and/or referral is 'at the absolute discretion of the Director of OPI'.
So it is near, but not quite, the end of this sorry tale of deception of the people by M & M with the continuing cooperation of Commissioner Townsend, and of much discomfort to me who knows the secret, but is unable to inform the people (except by this tale told on my behalf by the Hon. Frank Pangallo MLC) because the Press is cowed into silence by, and much in awe of, M & M.
I requested the Hon. Frank Pangallo to deliver my complaint to the office of OPI with his personal endorsement of it. This he did on 13 February 2025.
Following delivery of my complaint the Hon. Frank Pangallo received an unauthored acknowledgement and advice of intended action on OPI letterhead dated 13 February 2025.
This unauthored communication was forwarded to me by e/mail on 17 February 2025 on OPI letterhead (again unauthored) following an e/mail from me to OPI addressed for the attention of Vanessa Burrows 16 February 2025 to which I attached an office copy of my complaint (without annexures).
I responded personally to the unauthored communication from the office of OPI to the Hon. Frank Pangallo 13 February 2025 and to me of 17 February 2025 by two e/mails of 17 February 2025 marked for the attention once again of Vanessa Burrows.
My point about the inadequacy of process at OPI upon receipt of a complaint is expressed in my two emails on 17 February 2025 marked for the attention of Vanessa Burrows. To her credit Vanessa Burrows did respond personally to me on 18 February 2025 and acknowledged receipt of my complaint and my subsequent emails. I replied to her the same day pointing out to her the precarious position she was in if she continued to direct the processes of OPI without power. I suggested she should seek a specific direction from the Attorney-General to absolve herself of personal liability. Of note is that she signs off her letter, 'Acting Director'.
Eliminated from the organisational structure depiction of ICAC is the statutory office of Deputy Commissioner as though such a position was not a statutory office mandated by ICAC Act to be maintained at all times in its organisational structure. This depiction now includes immediately below the Commissioner a CEO, not a statutory officer capable of acting as Commissioner when and if Emma Townsend is unable to discharge her official duties.
I refer to section 9(1) ICAC Act, which requires that 'there is to be a Deputy Commissioner responsible for assisting the Commissioner as directed by the Commissioner.' The importance that there be a Deputy Commissioner is reinforced by section 9(6) ICAC Act, which provides that the Deputy Commissioner may act as Commissioner when there is no person for the time being appointed as Commissioner, or the Commissioner is absent from, or unable to discharge official duties. The same website contains a schematic representation of 'Our Values'. The representation includes segments notated as 'Integrity', 'Independence'.
I seek leave now to table the ICAC website announcement referred to above.
Leave granted.
The Hon. F. PANGALLO: To continue:
I say to the people, how is it that this ICAC and its newly appointed Commissioner can publicly profess such values and at the same time in this publication practice deceptive and misleading conduct (conduct in this case meaning by deliberate omission)? Answer—not possible consistent with honesty and integrity.
So has the maintenance of the secret by M & M and act of political suasion upon the appointees to office in ICAC from time to time by M & M caused the malignancy of corruption in public administration to infect ICAC itself.
M & M, in order I say, for you to suppress the fact that no eminent person had applied for appointment as ICAC, announced in the media release of 12/12/24 of Emma Townsend appointment as ICAC. 'This appointment now sees a majority of anticorruption commissions across the country being led by individuals who are not former judges.
So it is now that you M & M:
1. Have elevated to office as Commissioner ICAC Emma Townsend, formerly Director of OPI, a career public administration lawyer (mostly at DPP) of no particular accomplishment.
2. In doing so left vacant the statutory office of Director OPI.
3. Appointed from within ICAC Ben Broyd for a fixed time as Acting Commissioner of ICAC (another career public administration lawyer including at DPP), again of no particular accomplishment.
4. Now have passed over him for permanent appointment as Commissioner ICAC in favour of Emma Townsend.
5. Having failed to appoint a Director of OPI as a replacement for Emma Townsend, announced instead the appointment of Vanessa Burrows (described in the organisational structure on OPI website as Assistant Director OPI) as 'acting as Director' in place of Emma Townsend.
6. Vanessa Burrows is yet another career public administration lawyer (mostly at DPP), again of no particular accomplishment.
It goes on:
There was no public announcement of the fact of Paul Alsbury's resignation at all by you M & M coincident with and in explanation of your announced appointment of an 'Acting Commissioner'.
Paul Alsbury had been involved immediately prior to his resignation as a key witness to matters concerning complaints about ICAC misconduct at the time subject to review by then ICAC Inspector Strickland SC (see Strickland SC report on the reference of the 'Hanlon matter'),
None of the usual explanations for early resignation 'personal reasons' etc. were offered.
20. A combination of incompetence and egregious deceit is the label most fitting to you M & M and all of the dramatis personae I have critiqued in this my story.
21. My intuitive reasoning for what has happened overtime is that you M & M hid the truth from the people at the time when truth was paramount and for political reasons only.
22. Political reasons because you well knew that to have stirred public controversy during the conduct of reviews of ICAC referrals to the ICAC Inspector would have brought undone the processes of review then underway and caused great embarrassment to your government.
23. A sorry tale, but not yet the final chapter I hope, if the Press would set aside its awe of you M & M and seek answers from you about the circumstances of Paul Alsbury's resignation.
24. The secret you have so long maintained in denial of the right of the people to know the truth.
25. The secret having been kept by you M & M in denial of the people's right to know, if now exposed to the light of day, so powerful in its impact as to potentially unravel your government.
[signed] Michael Fuller—teller of the story this 28 day of February 2025 and one of the people.
There is a postscript to the submission:
I start with a question.
What do you call integrity bodies constituted by many lawyers including their leaders each of which publishes information to the public and complainants contrary to their respective statutory charters?
Answer: ICAC/OPI SA.
Let me explain.
As part of the communication to the Hon Frank Pangallo 13 February 2025 from OPI (unauthored) was an information advice comprising 4 pages. This communication has been tabled.
The text includes the following heading which I now recite and underline some words for emphasis of the point I am about to make:
'Am I allowed to talk about my complaint or report?
No. It is against the law to disclose or publish certain information about a complaint or report to the OPI.
Breaching this obligation is a criminal offence under the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 2012.
You must not publish, including on social media, that you have made or intend to make a complaint or report to the OPI or the IIS.'
The Hon. R.A. SIMMS: Point of order: on the basis of relevance. The bill before us relates to the conditions of appointment, and I urge the honourable member to refer to that.
The PRESIDENT: I am sure the Hon. Mr Pangallo is pulling it back to that.
The Hon. F. PANGALLO: I continue:
This cautionary advice is 'in terrorem', an advice calculated to scare the pants off any average person and render them afraid to talk to any confidant or friend even.
When the actual provisions relating to confidentiality as expressed in Sect 54 [of the] ICAC Act are considered this advice is a scandalous demonstration of ineptitude in action by the combined intelligence gathered together in ICAC/OPI.
The provisions of Sect 54 [of the] ICAC Act only apply to operatives in ICAC/OPI or third persons to whom information may have been disclosed by operatives of ICAC/OPI.
A legislated assurance to any complainant that confidentiality in relation to a complaint or report will be maintained by the Commissioner [of] ICAC and Director [of] OPI and their respective operatives.
In context, in case it might be thought that Sect 50 [of the] ICAC Act is somewhat problematic in its application, the obligation imposed there is of general application i.e. to all persons at large to keep secret the identity of an 'informant'.
That being so, it has no impact by way of reading down the specific obligations on operatives etc. of ICAC/OPI imposed by Sect 54 [of the] ICAC Act.
Then there is Sect 6 [of the] ICAC Act preserving Parliamentary privilege!! What is a communication to or by The Hon. Frank Pangallo if [it is] not subject to Parliamentary privilege?
The result of incompetence in action by the massed minds (having legal qualification) at ICAC/OPI is that what is expressed in clear terms in Sect 54 [of the] ICAC Act as a constraint upon the Commissioner [of] ICAC, the Director [of] OPI, and their respective operatives by way of assurance to a complainant that disclosure will not be made by them (without consent of complainant) is perverted and weaponised to put fear into a complainant.
The publication which includes the quotation above is clearly a standard format issued as a matter of course to each and every complainant.
Woe to the people who have complained to OPI upon receipt of this publication!!
Instead of receiving a warm and comforting assurance there is a gag on free speech and even the threat of imprisonment!!
Really!!!
Emma Townsend, Ben Broyd, and Vanessa Burrows are identifiable as having oversight of ICAC/OPI with legal qualification and experience in the practice of the law and therefore responsible for this fiasco of incompetence writ large.
Such power these people wield to impose on the liberty of the individual! Coupled as this power is with the gross incompetence on display in its writings, the duopoly of ICAC/OPI as presently constituted, presents as a clear and present danger to the life, liberty, and wellbeing of the people.
So much harm to the people you have wrought M&M by incompetence in political oversight. If all was revealed to the members of both Houses of Parliament, a Motion of No Confidence in your Government would be likely, and only be defeated by the self-interested support of the members of your Government.
If each of them, the lawyers at ICAC/OPI was a lightbulb, they would be of such low wattage, that if I was in a darkened room with them and switched all of them on, I would not be able to read the daily paper. I repeat, what a shambles M&M you have made of ICAC/OPI
A judicial enquiry into the workings of ICAC/OPI under your stewardship is the only solution to safeguard the people from harm.
[signed] Michael Fuller 28 day of February 2025.
I conclude.
Debate adjourned on motion of Hon. I.K. Hunter.