Bills

Electoral (Legislative Council Voting Thresholds) Amendment Bill

Introduction and First Reading

The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD (16:11): Obtained leave and introduced a bill for an act to amend the Electoral Act 1985. Read a first time.

Second Reading

The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD (16:12): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

I rise to introduce a bill to amend the way in which members are elected to the Legislative Council for the consideration of this place. There can be no doubt that sophisticated preference harvesting strategies employed at election time have brought about surprising results leaving voters unable to fathom what has taken place.

Following the last federal election in particular, political commentators have noted with concern the potential to strategically manipulate the ticket voting system by engaging in preference harvesting to secure election with a very small number of first preference votes. Political consultant Glenn Druery was reported to have advised some 30 to 32 micro parties about harvesting preferences in the last federal election and claims success at getting numerous people elected with this method.

The most obvious and frequently cited example of preference harvesting, as it is called, is that of Senator Ricky Muir, and I mean no disrespect to the senator, of the Australian Motoring Enthusiast Party. Senator Muir received a primary vote of just 0.51 of 1 per cent but, due to cleverly negotiated preference deals, he was able to secure election over better known candidates and parties. In Western Australia it was reported that up to 10 of the 77 candidates for the Senate re-election were not even residents of the state. Accordingly, allegations of deliberate 'front' for feeding preferences to parties were made, alleging that they were running for preferences alone.

After the federal election, allegations arose of systemic exploitation by parties which were created solely for the purpose of deliberately manipulating the distribution of preferences. Further to that, a frequent criticism was that parties which had opposing policies actually banded together to share preferences with each other. For example, some parties which supported mining were reported to share preferences with those who opposed mining.

The Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters of 2014 noted that a threshold could be implemented which would provide a solution without requiring any other changes to the current system whatsoever. Clearly, this also would be true of the South Australian system. The simplest and most easily understood response to the issue of preference harvesting is to introduce a minimum voting threshold into the Electoral Act in South Australia, and I believe federally.

The public do not want to see a system which would allow strategic preference deals to take place over primary votes. From Family First's perspective, this is not a good outcome and members elected to the parliament should have at least a minimum level of support in the voting community.

A primary vote threshold would eliminate election predominantly by the trading of preferences. By implementing a formal threshold, we will ensure that candidates are elected only when there is clear community support for the party on which their platform runs or which they support as an Independent. We are certainly not about disenfranchising smaller parties, and we do not believe that its implementation will prevent minor parties from being elected. However, we do believe that the deliberate harvesting of preferences and the manipulation of the electoral system must be rectified in order to ensure voter confidence in our democratic process.

A simple system of operation must be engaged so that South Australian voters, whether politically astute or not, are able to understand what happens to their vote. Family First believes that creating a fair and democratic system is what is most necessary for voter confidence and the wellbeing of this state, and the integrity of the electoral process of this chamber.

The bill I am proposing is operationally the same as the bill I introduced last year with, however, the minor change in the threshold. This bill creates a minimum threshold of 2 per cent by which a person or party can be elected. Only primary votes will count towards the meeting of that threshold. A party, group or individual that does not reach the mandated 2 per cent simply cannot be elected to this place. In instances where someone is not elected—that is, they receive less than 2 per cent of the primary vote—their preferences will be distributed normally, exactly as is currently the case.

The threshold for this bill has been adjusted from my previous bill at 2.5 per cent to 2 per cent based on information received during the consultation period. I point out that I am not wedded to the figure of 2 per cent; however, it seems to be the one that most people I have spoken to agree on. It must be pointed out that it is rare for someone to get elected here in South Australia with less than 2 per cent and, as such, we believe that this is a suitable threshold that would have community support. We believe this is a fair and achievable target, even for very small parties who are serious about being elected to the South Australian parliament but who do not have the benefit of being in the major parties—or, indeed, what you might call the major minor parties such as Family First and the Greens.

As I have mentioned previously in this place, thresholds have been used for some time in other jurisdictions, so this is not a new concept. By way of example, Sweden has a threshold of 4 per cent, Israel has a 2 per cent threshold, and thresholds also exist in New Zealand, Turkey and Germany. The threshold of 2 per cent that we are proposing is in line with what other countries have implemented. It is certainly achievable for very small parties, and we strongly believe it will provide assurance to the public that those people they vote for in substantial numbers will actually form the parliament and be elected to this place.

Further, we are attracted to this model because it ensures that no-one's vote is wasted, if you like, because votes do not exhaust. Rather, they continue to flow via preferences. Under an optional preferential system, for example, should a voter select 11 candidates (if that is the model that was determined) and none of those candidates were directly elected, then that vote is exhausted and has essentially been wasted. Under a threshold system, every vote counts every time.

Additionally, a change in the voting system to optional preferential voting is significantly different from what the public is used to. They are not conditioned to vote in this manner and would require considerable education. The model I am proposing is very simple and easily understood; nothing changes except the simple fact that someone cannot be elected to this place unless they achieve at least a minimum 2 per cent of the primary vote. Family First believes this simple change will prevent the harvesting of preferences so that it is reflective of the intentions of the voters on the day of election. Furthermore, we believe this will have very strong widespread support throughout the electorate for the simple changes, and it will be easily understood by the electorate.

As I said during my contribution, I repeat that we are not necessarily wedded to the figure of 2 per cent and are happy to discuss what it should be with other members of this place. I think it is about right. One of the reasons that was fed back to me that that was the appropriate level was that the now Senator Nick Xenophon was elected on 2.6 per cent, as I recall, and it was suggested to me by a well-known political commentator that a threshold should not be set above the level at which someone like that was originally elected to this place. I am inclined to agree with that; we should not be seeking to shut the gate on Independents or very small micro parties, as they are called, and I do not seek to do that.

However, I do believe that the public has had enough of what they see, and what has been reported to me, as a rorting of the system and a manipulation of the voting process. A situation that sees parties (as I gave in my example), one of which may be opposed to mining and one of which may support mining, actually preference each other in order to use those preferences to get one of them elected really is an abuse of our system and should not continue. I commend the bill to the house. I will be bringing it to a vote in the future, and I look forward to some debate and discussion on these topics so that we can find a way through this once and for all.

Debate adjourned on motion of Hon. J.M.A. Lensink.