Animal Welfare Bill

Second Reading

Adjourned debate on second reading.

(Continued from 12 November 2024.)

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE (Port Adelaide—Deputy Premier, Minister for Industry, Innovation and Science, Minister for Climate, Environment and Water, Minister for Workforce and Population Strategy) (15:40): I am pleased to close the debate on the Animal Welfare Bill, a fine piece of legislation I hope will be considered today and become law before too long. It is a piece of legislation that will make a significant difference to the welfare of animals in this state and to bring ourselves into much greater line with the expectations of our community. I look forward to the committee stage.

Bill read a second time.

Committee Stage

In committee.

Clause 1.

Mr COWDREY: Minister, in my second reading contribution I outlined to an extent some of the things that we are looking to explore as part of the committee process for this bill. Obviously, a significant amount of the operational impact of this bill is going to be borne out through regulation, as opposed to the legislation itself. I think there will be a level of wanting to get some level of guidance from you in terms of what you see the shape of the regulations to be, where some of those issues are borne out.

One of the things I also foreshadowed in the second reading speech was my interest in understanding one of the eight areas of reform that were identified by the government that they were seeking to address as part of this animal welfare reform originally. I am not 100 per cent certain but, as I understand it, the consultation process did include this aspect as well.

This area is in regard to shelter licensing. Are you able to explain to the committee why that discrete part of the reform was removed or annexed from this particular bill and where the government currently are in terms of preparation for a bill in regard to reform of that issue, and when we should expect that to be coming to the house?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: I understand that there will be questions that relate to regulations and we will get to those as they come, but I am sure the member appreciates that it is challenging for us to be overly definitive about the regulations but we can certainly share to the extent of our thinking at this stage. The question of where the eight areas came from is really as a result of the extended consultation process that we have undergone to prepare this legislation.

First of all, we went out with an open review of the act: what do you think of the act, how is it working, what do you like, not like, what do you want to see? From that emerged the themes of the changes that we have made. We then went out with a discussion paper: this is what we have heard, these are the areas that appear to be of interest to people, and these are some considerations with each of those. Then we have subsequently gone out with a draft bill which reflects those.

While the government has certainly been actively engaged in creating the policy, it has nonetheless been substantially driven by that open question of the review process. You have also asked very sensibly about the question of the shelters and why that has been detached. That was originally part of the election commitment, that we would look at the ways in which shelters are licensed and how they are run. Initially, of course, the intention was that that would all be done at the same time as looking at the act itself.

What we determined was is that there is an enormous amount of quite detailed consultation that needs to be gone through with the shelters, and the shelter sector generally, to understand exactly how to do this in a way that achieves good public policy. We did not want to slow down the act being updated to do that one small part so it made it quicker for us to detach it. We expect to get that done during next year.

The question about shelters for me has always been that, on the one hand, there are very well-established shelters—obviously the Animal Welfare League and the RSPCA are the ones that most people would think of when they think about large shelters—but there have been questions from some parts of the community about the way in which they manage animals that cannot be rehomed and the extent to which euthanasia occurs under those conditions. That is a segment of the population that has raised those questions, and they are legitimate questions, although I think in a very meaningful way what we ask those shelters to do is to tidy up after our collective failure to sufficiently well look after animals, and to attach then the blame exclusively to them is unfair. That is one element.

The other element of the shelter question is when you have people who say, or even just act as if they are running shelters, 'You know, you can come and bring your stray animals here, the animals that you find on the road, damaged animals, bring them here and we will look after them.'

At times, the organisations or the humans, the people who are running those, are not well equipped to manage those animals which is really addressing the welfare needs of those animals. There can be, although not always, a blurred line between some entities that think of themselves as shelters, and people who are actually what we would think of perhaps as hoarding animals, just having too many animals to look after.

Because of the delicacy of understanding that—the complexity of working out how we get a good public policy outcome for animals that the community expects and not do unnecessary harm to people who are trying to do the right thing by rescue animals—at the same time, we are addressing some of those welfare concerns that can occur. That is why this is quite a difficult policy, or at least a complex part of policy if not difficult, and that is why we have separated it out. As I say, we expect to be able to come back next year.

Mr COWDREY: In regard to the consultation process that has been undertaken by the government to get to this point, the minister stepped through the various phases of the consultation, for lack of a better term. There has been a headline number in terms of total responses that has been provided by the government to this point. I am keen to get more information, though, in regard to responses on the draft bill in particular. If the minister can provide information to the committee in regard to, in particular, the organisations that made a representation or responded to the consultation around the draft bill.

On top of that, were there any secondary responses to anything that the government perhaps responded to in the first instance? If possible, could you provide a list of the organisations or the names of the organisations that responded specifically to the draft bill and, in addition to that, an understanding of the organisations that engaged on more than one occasion in response to the draft bill?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: We do not have the total number. We will give that between the houses, so we will take that on notice very quickly in order for you to be equipped with that. We will also check on ones that we know we have engaged with more than once, but I will give you a rough answer in order to help with this committee stage.

We went out with a review of the act. We then invited the people who had responded to that review. We said to them, 'We now have a discussion paper,' and to the people and organisations that responded to the discussion paper we said, 'We now have a draft bill,' so in that sense there was a repetition to make sure that those who responded to each one did not lose the thread of the fact that the next version was available.

We then engaged also more specifically and, therefore, presumably repeatedly, although how many times I would not be able to tell you, with the major organisations involved: as you would expect, the RSPCA, because they run the inspectorate; Primary Producers SA as themselves and also their subsidiaries or their allied organisations, being Livestock SA, the dairy people who were in the old chamber last night, Pork SA; also Greyhound Racing, because there is a small element that relates to greyhound racing; and the Office for Rec, Sport and Racing. They are the kinds of organisations that you would expect might have a view more than a passing interest but also part of their own work that we did have repeated interactions with. We can give a more detailed response on notice, but I hope that gives you enough of the shape of the kind of consultation process that was undertaken.

Mr COWDREY: If you are happy to take on notice not just the number but the names of those particular organisations, that would be appreciated; thank you for confirming that. The other area of particular interest in the consultation was perhaps the next level of organisation in terms of the more community oriented—say, dog ownership groups, dog clubs.

In particular, I am interested to understand the interaction that has occurred with council as well through the consultation process and whether that was predominantly driven through the LGA or if you are able to provide any advice on whether there were particular councils that had significant involvement in the consultation process.

I understand obviously, to a degree, there is a role in all of this with local council as well, but I am also interested to understand the impact around particular animal ownership groups, whether that be Riding for the Disabled through to Thoroughbred Racing through to any of those other groups involved in not just sporting endeavours with animals involved but also ownership groups or clubs, for lack of a better overall term.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: I think when we are able to give you the complete list between the houses that will help clarify all of the organisations that were engaged and perhaps also then engaged with us. We wrote to a lot of organisations who did not necessarily then choose to engage, but we made sure that they were aware of what we were doing. With local government we essentially used the Local Government Association for the interactions. We did not get anything from individual councils, other than Ceduna council who has a couple of inspectors as council staff, so we reached out to them, but there was no engagement then back from them.

Horse SA, Racing SA, those kinds of organisations were on the list that we approached, but we did not necessarily have anything coming back from those organisations. They may have, but we will just check through exactly which organisations we simply wrote to and which ones we had back-and-forth with so that you are aware.

What we would say in summary is that the department very clearly attempted to make sure that any organisation that might have an interest was at least aware that this work was occurring and, should they then engage, there was a degree of back-and-forth, and particularly, as I said in answer to the previous question, there are those organisations that very much have taken an interest, such as Primary Producers and their affiliate groups, such as the RSPCA.

Clause passed.

Clause 2.

Mr COWDREY: I think this one would obviously be expected, but, in terms of the proclamation date for operation, I know there had been discussion about particular parts of the act potentially being operable before others. Are you able to provide an indication to the committee of how commencement of the bill and operation is intended to be rolled out as of now, with an indication of timeline?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: The aim is that the legislation will become functional in the second half of next year. There are fairly substantial amounts of regulations that are required and we will do those as quickly as we can, of course, and have it come live as fast as we can. Particularly part 4—licences, permits and registered activities—requires significant regulation, and also part 7 which relates to the Animal Welfare Fund, so they will, in particular, be potentially out of step with the rest of the commencement of the act.

Mr COWDREY: When you say 'potentially', in terms of the public communication to this point, my understanding is that it is essentially to be implemented in stages through to as late as the end of 2026. Is there an indication from the government in terms of when the expectation is for the entirety of the act to be operable, and do you have a timeline for those particular sections that you have outlined in regard to the fund and the licensing arrangements?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: I should not have been so loose as to use the word 'potentially'. The intention is that everything except the shelters and part 4 and part 7 will be commenced in the second half of next year. We will work as fast as we can to make that as soon as we can, and then parts 4 and 7 and also the shelters we are expecting for the second half of 2026. With the shelters, I note the degree of complexity associated with that, but we will be coming out next year with much more detail about how that is going to work.

Mr COWDREY: Finally on this clause, regarding the second half of next year, are you able to provide any more clarity? Are we expecting a 1 July start, for instance, just to provide some level of understanding in terms of whether we are operating to a financial year here? Is there a guideline that you would like to at least put on the record of when there can be an expectation that this will be underway?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: I am so wary of hard and fast deadlines. I would love it to be in July. It would please me if it were in July because I am very keen for this piece of legislation to commence. I understand that many things can happen, particularly in the final legislative year to deliver the very substantial commitments that we have made, so I do not want to hold the department to any sense of having missed a deadline if they do not make July, but I would certainly prefer that it were then.

Clause passed.

Clause 3.

Mr COWDREY: One of the primary changes contained in the bill is obviously the change of definitions, in particular around the definition of 'animal'. I would appreciate it if you could talk through how the government arrived at the current definition, whether there were any other versions of that definition that were countenanced or looked at by the government and what they were, and why those other definitions—should there have been any—were dismissed in favour of where you have landed in the bill.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: We were hoping to have a handy table contrasting the definitions in other states, which is why there was a bit of a delay there, but I will do my best. Essentially, South Australia was on its own in not defining 'fish' as being animals for the purposes of animal welfare. In Western Australia, it is done slightly differently to the rest of the country in that, while fish are not included in their Animal Welfare Act, the welfare of fish is included in their fisheries management, so effectively it is the same thing.

We have long been out of step with the rest of the country in the inclusion of fish for the purposes of considering the legal understanding of the definition of 'fish' as being part of an animal welfare consideration.

We then looked at the other kinds of species that we currently do not include that some other states do. Cephalopoda are included here for scientific purposes because they are included nationally for research purposes, so they are already covered in South Australia by virtue of national law. Some other states include Cephalopoda as animals as if they were a fish as well.

New South Wales includes decapods, which are lobsters, when it relates only to the restaurant trade, but our view was that there was not unanimity of view around the country about animals other than fish and of course the animals that were already covered—birds, mammals and reptiles, the ones that we had already included. Other states were consistent on the subject of fish, so we decided we would adopt the nationwide consistent approach by including only fish and Cephalopoda just because they are already covered by national legislation so there might as well for completeness be a recognition of that.

There were various views expressed in the consultations. The only consistent view was the recognition that fish ought to be recognised given that they are elsewhere and given that all of the recreational fishing and commercial fishing operates without trouble interstate even though they have long had fish recognised as animals so we knew there would not be any traps that we would be uncertain of in understanding what the implications were by including fish and that is why we reached this definition.

Mr COWDREY: Given the reference to the national framework and that a level of consistency within that was sought within the definition, I will take the opportunity to ask a broader question in regard to the reform more generally in relation to where we sit within the national framework now.

There are several things that are contained in this bill that are perhaps now a step in front of the national framework. Are you able to provide some level of reasoning as to why, in some circumstances, the government seems to have decided to align itself with the broader national framework and in others it seems to have stepped ahead of the rest of the national framework?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: I appreciate that this strays slightly from the definition, but I opened the door and I am very happy to have this conversation as well. Essentially, this legislation largely brings us into line with the national view of how we do animal welfare. The only area where we are at the front, or near the front, is the level of the penalties included.

That is for two reasons. One is that community standards and expectations of the way in which cruelty to animals can be punished—obviously there is always a sliding scale—in egregious circumstances has changed over time. Largely the community expects egregious cases of animal cruelty to be dealt with harshly and, in the election commitment we gave, we were very clear that we wanted to meet community expectations.

It is also true that in South Australia we do not have a unit method of calculating fines and penalties, so they do not update until we update a piece of legislation. Because this has not been updated for a long time we are taking the opportunity to update the penalties, and they will then stay in place for a long time again. I am advised that is really the only area that would be regarded as being at the front, or even ahead, of the other states.

Otherwise we have largely paid attention to what occurs interstate and have looked for best practice and consistency. I appreciate they are not identical, but we are looking for the best ways in which areas are dealt with. For example, we decided we would include fish as being defined as animals in a nationally consistent way. In how we make sure that fishing is able to continue as is we adopted the Victorian model, which was regarded by commercial fishers, PIRSA and RecFish as a preferable version to the Tasmanian version, by which, as we will get to, we recognise that it will be under fisheries legislation that any standards would be set, not under the animal welfare legislation.

We have done our best to make this a modernisation of the act. Certainly, because of the age of this act it is a great leap forward for us, but it is really a great leap forward up to being part of the way the rest of the country manages animal welfare.

Mr COWDREY: The other issue, in terms of interpretation, that I think is important in regard to this particular bill is around the definition of ownership. Obviously there are circumstances we can all imagine—and we have slightly touched on some already—in terms of welfare shelters or people coming across animals that are in distress, whether that be the side of the road or in any other situation, in a paddock or elsewhere.

The definition in terms of custody, care and control could be interpreted reasonably widely, depending on how that is necessarily defined. For the benefit of having it on the Hansard, I think it is important to get a view as to the government's broader interpretation of what is inside the interpretation and what is outside of it. If someone happens to come across an animal, while not necessarily being the owner in any formal sense, in a situation where they are hurting or otherwise, what are the parameters in terms of ownership that are captured within this definition and what sits outside? If you could provide a couple of practical examples, perhaps, for the committee in terms of what would sit inside and what would sit outside.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: There has been very little change to the definition from the existing practice, but there is a slight change. Importantly, the common understanding of the definition of 'owner' remains relevant to this understanding. The inclusion of having care in relation to an animal does not mean that there is suddenly a duty of care for all of us for every animal we happen to see, and that the word 'owner' is still doing legal work in this definition.

If you were to walk past an injured possum or a lost dog, you do not suddenly have a duty of care to do something about that animal and you are not held legally responsible under this act for anything that has occurred to that animal.

The definition is important in understanding the various layers of responsibility that sit where responsibility ought to lie. If you think about an organisation that takes in animals—a shelter of some sort—and it has a board, the board has some responsibility because it is purporting to run that organisation, and if something occurs within the way in which that organisation is established to run then the board has some responsibility. People who are working or volunteering within that organisation, who might step out of what they have been asked to do and cause harm or cruelty or affect the care of that animal, can be held liable in a way that you would imagine in a commonsense understanding of who is responsible.

In the end, if there is any lack of definition, naturally there are courts that determine and they always determine on a test of reasonableness. But, as I say, this definition is largely that which has operated for a long time in this state. It reflects the responsibility in relation to an animal if you have care of that animal but, as I said at the beginning, it does not suddenly exist for each of us with every animal that we might happen to see.

Mr COWDREY: I have a very small point of clarification. I certainly understand that in walking past an injured animal there would not suddenly be an obligation on that person to take action. I think that is—

The CHAIR: Member for Colton, you have asked three questions already.

Mr COWDREY: Yes, I just sought a point of clarification if that is alright.

The CHAIR: You are actually working on my good—okay, I will treat it as a supplementary on this occasion.

Mr COWDREY: Walking past an injured animal, I think everyone would be of the understanding that there would not suddenly be an obligation arise that action would need to be taken. However, if that good Samaritan, for lack of a better term, was to take into their care that particular animal, not being experienced and not understanding what particular courses of action were best for the animal, and perhaps did something untoward without intention, would that person have technically, in taking that animal into their care, a duty arise? These would be actions that perhaps they would not necessarily be aware were not in keeping and at the heart of where we are going here in terms of animal welfare, at the core of the changes, but would simply be taking possession of that animal, for lack of a better term, into their care.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: If they are bringing an animal in, they are effectively taking care and control of that animal. If they take them home, then they are the person who is choosing to take care and have responsibility for that animal. If they decide to take the animal in and deprive them of water for a week, then that is cruelty. Should that be something that came to the inspectorate's attention, the inspector may well wish to pursue that as an act of cruelty, and I think a lot of people would think that that would be reasonable.

If they take an animal in and are poor in their treatment of that animal, they try to treat a broken limb but do not do it well and cause more pain and distress, that really is a matter of such individual circumstance that I could not, in guiding this legislation through, be definitive about what the consequences would be. I think we would expect again the test of reasonableness, that if someone was in the habit of picking up koalas, not looking after them properly, setting their bones poorly, and purporting to be looking after them but actually causing them more pain and distress, and if that was something that they continuously did and came to the attention of the inspectorate, we might well want something to be done, at the very least for that person to cease taking in animals that they are unable to care for.

If something happened and it is one animal and they misunderstand how to look after that animal, the chances of that turning into a cruelty case would be reasonably remote, but I would not be able to be definitive, as I say, because one would need to understand all of the circumstances. But this legislation is not intended to go hunting for people who have accidentally done something that is not perfect. I do not want to use this analogy too often because I think it is not helpful in most cases, but if someone comes across a child who is hurt and they take them home, if they lock them up, do not feed them, do not tend their wounds, we would probably want something done about it. If they put a pretty poor bandaid on that does not really work and causes more infection, it is not going to end up with welfare services.

Again, I do not always want to get into the human/animal analogy, but just that idea that this legislation is not intended to be overly punitive and to deter people from trying to exercise care for animals—quite the reverse. It is about guiding how the best welfare of animals can be looked at and if necessary a punitive regime for those people who cause harm.

The range of ways in which this can be managed by the inspectorate and by any possible prosecution, but also by being able to have orders to prevent people from holding animals, all of that, is intended to give a very subtle and supple approach to dealing with different circumstances in the best interests of animals rather than as some kind of attempt to be overly harsh. It is stepping away from, in fact, always putting that response into the realm of the criminal and being able to be much more sophisticated in the way in which we respond to, for example, people just not being able to have animals anymore and being able to go to a magistrate to make that case.

Clause passed.

Clause 4.

Mr COWDREY: Clause 4—I think this is probably one of the times that perhaps, for the sake of clarity, for the record and any misunderstanding in terms of the interpretation between this bill and fisheries, if we start there, if you are happy to just put on record for absolute clarity for everybody involved, everybody listening, for all members in this place in particular as well, and just talk about the intersection between the fisheries act, continued practice and the Animal Welfare Bill.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: I will, once we get to clause 14, talk a little bit more in detail about the interaction with the fisheries act, but this clause is very clear that, if you are doing something that is legal under another act, then it cannot be the subject of the regime under this act. So the fact that you can do duck hunting under the National Parks and Wildlife Act means that the fact of duck hunting is not in itself regarded as an act of cruelty in this act.

There are also codes of practice that exist that are then added as regulations to this act, but, with the codes of practice for animal husbandry, if you are acting in accordance with the code of practice that has been defined for that industry—pork, anything to do with dairy, abattoirs—then the codes of practice that exist mean that you cannot be subject to the general provisions that, 'Well, I regard that as cruel, so you can't do it.' That is why this clause is important, and then, again, we are very specific about the way in which that works for fisheries. Also, there are, at the end of the Animal Welfare Act, the codes of practice that are attached to that act in order to recognise that they are the guide for how that activity occurs.

This is important because animal welfare can be a very emotional issue and people have very strong views. There will be people who do not think that there should be such a thing as the pork industry or do not think there should be any hens in cages. They cannot use the provisions of this act to say that that is by definition in their view cruelty because they are legally entitled to run those in those ways, either through whole pieces of legislation or through codes of practice that are then recognised by this act.

Mr COWDREY: I asked the question in this way obviously providing the opportunity to have a lead-up discussion around fisheries for the purpose of understanding, and perhaps there can be a level of guidance provided as to why fisheries was singled out and specifically excluded in the bill whereas the other industries that you have just referenced were effectively a capture-all through this clause as opposed to specific references. Was there a reason the government decided to specifically address fisheries through a separate clause, and a more explicit clause, whereas other industries were left effectively with this capture-all?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: The reason is that all of the other animal husbandry industries are already in the act, either as regulations on their own because they have become standards that are then attached to our act as a regulation, which means that anything you are doing in accordance with that standard cannot be subject to the general provisions of this act, or they are model codes of practice that are then recognised within a regulation that says model codes of practice are recognised for the purposes of exclusion from the general provisions of this act.

Fisheries does not have that. There is no national code of practice for fisheries. As I mentioned earlier, in discussing with primary industries and with fishers, commercial and recreational, how do we best make sure that you feel confident that we are not attempting through this act to change your practice as it currently stands, they preferred the Victorian model, which was to say that they have their own act and we would recognise that that act is responsible for fisheries rather than have this piece of legislation attempt to then set up a code of practice ourselves. That is the reason why it is treated differently to the rest, because they do not have that national code of practice or that national model that all of the others have.

Clause passed.

Clause 5.

Mr COWDREY: In regard to the principles and the objects of the act, obviously one of the changes—and, again, this was something that has been referenced as part of the changes, in particular clause 5(1) around sentience. I am just keen to understand what underpinned the decision for the inclusion of that, whether it was particular science, and if it is the view of the government that all animals captured by the Animal Welfare Bill meet the sentience objective that is outlined in the bill as it is before us today. Was there a particular driver in terms of a change in scientific approach or paper or view, or was it based more largely on the responses that were garnered through the consultation process?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: Clause 5(1), although referred to as the sentience clause, does not actually use the word sentience. It talks about the recognition of animals being 'living beings that can feel, perceive, and experience positive and negative states', which we have overwhelming scientific evidence for being true of all of the animals that will be captured by this act. All other states either have a clause like this—I think maybe only two use the word sentience—or are in the process of updating their acts and have proposed to include clauses like this.

Even our own act in a meaningful way assumed that this is the case, although we are including it as a principle of the act in the sense that we recognise that a form of harm can be psychological harm, which presupposes that there is harm that can be done to how an animal feels. I think anyone who is involved in animal husbandry or has a companion animal would accept that animals can experience positive and negative states. There is sound national consistency argument for it. There is sound scientific argument for it. There were also overwhelming requests that this be considered as we reviewed the act and the positive response to our discussion paper that suggested that we would like to include this concept.

There was some disquiet from primary producers, who we think probably were concerned that it implied some kind of active duty to provide enrichment, for example. It does not. When we engaged with them and explained the way in which this was intended and the language that we wanted to use, I am advised that they were substantially comfortable with that. It does not in any way trouble their code of practice in the way in which they manage their animal husbandry.

What it does is help with one of the underlying themes of this act, which is to head off harm before it occurs. The balance of the way in which the current act operates is that you have to wait for something bad to happen to an animal before the inspectorate can do anything about it. We are now flipping with this idea of duty of care that you ought to look after your animal. You ought to provide water and feed the animal rather than wait for it to be dehydrated or starving. You ought also to treat the animal as if it is capable of feeling.

While the animal husbandry is taken care of through the codes of practice, if you have a dog that is shut in a room all day howling, and the neighbour is complaining, the neighbour would like the inspectorate to be able take account of the fact that that animal is clearly suffering.

Mr COWDREY: I think the rest of the clause speaks for itself. It is reasonably straightforward in terms of the overall objectives of the act. The part of the minister's answer that I am seeking slightly more clarity on is acting in advance of something occurring. It is very difficult, as I understand it, even in the circumstance that the minister has just described, there clearly already having been an act of harm imposed—perhaps it had not manifested to the point of there being significant injury or significant malnourishment, but the act itself had already occurred.

So, in seeking to provide an opportunity or the door to be opened for the capturing of behaviour prior to a particular outcome being achieved based purely on the perception of a negative experience, I am keen for the minister to outline that in a little bit more detail for me. It does not necessarily make logical sense in terms of the example that was given where, if through hearing over a fence or understanding mistreatment is being enforced on an animal—clearly, there has been a level of malnourishment or a level of mistreatment or a level of injury that has already been received by that animal. In terms of a negative connotation, in advance of an action happening, I am just keen to understand more of what the minister was trying to outline.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: The idea of duty of care is to provide a positive requirement for a dog to be looked after to its base needs, as opposed to a negative penalty which waits for all of the consequences of that to have occurred before you are able to prove that harm has resulted. So, if you see someone's pony that has not been ridden for a long time, left in the paddock and is not being well fed but is not yet clearly starving, but it is evident that they are not providing sufficient food, then you do not have to wait for them to become starving to prove that there has been harm caused. So the general duty of care is you have a positive duty to provide for that animal that is under your care and control, and you do not have to wait for all of the manifestation of not doing that before an inspector can say, 'You do realise that you need to be feeding and watering that animal.'

Mr COWDREY: That makes more sense to me now in the way you have articulated it, in that essentially we are just talking about levels of misfortune or, for lack of a better term, the manifestation of the outcomes of behaviour.

The final question is just in regard to (c) and (d) perhaps of subclause (3) in relation to the principles of the act. While I understand these are largely consistent with what had been in the previous iteration of the act, are there any clear deficiencies that the minister identified in the preparation of this bill, particularly in relation to those two principles, where the minister believes that there was not appropriate advice being provided to her in regard to animal welfare matters, or is there a view from the minister that community awareness about the responsibilities of animal ownership was not at the requisite level?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: Of course, we did not have principles and objects before, just a long title, so in assembling principles and objects—which is just one of the examples of why this is quite an old act that we are updating—(c) and (d) have roles to play: (c) is particularly about giving us room for the creation of the fund and how that can be spent, and (d) has really come out of the section that referred to the Animal Welfare Advisory Committee that was already in the legislation. We have pulled that in to being one of the objects of the act in order to have the Animal Welfare Advisory Committee as being one of the things that is delivering the objects of the act, so it is really more a construction of the legislation.

There are no particular examples that I would want to point to of either (c) or (d) being deficient leading up to this. It is more that this is the way we could best structure this piece of legislation.

Mr BASHAM: I have a quick question partly about the principles and how the act works, but also in the context of how this was put together. Back in my previous life in the dairy industry, I chaired animal health and welfare nationally for the dairy industry. South Australia was very much the lead state at that point in time in developing animal welfare legislation, and there was a consensus that working with industry and governments that we had to harmonise legislation. Is this keeping with that desire to have harmonised legislation across the states?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: The short answer is yes. Of course, for the dairy industry and for all the other animal husbandry industries their codes of practice, which are nationally derived, remain untouched by this legislation. They remain attached to the act as a regulation that gives exemption to the general provisions. When updating the legislation, as I have mentioned, we have been very aware of working to the best practice national harmonisation that we can. We had fallen significantly behind just because it is an older piece of legislation.

Clause passed.

Clause 6.

Mr COWDREY: This is where the rubber starts to hit the road in terms of the duties that are required of owners, as have already been discussed. The key here is appropriate in the circumstances, effectively, to condense the issue down to as few words as possible. We have the codes of practice in regard to particular industries, so I think this issue is far more straightforward when it comes to a dairy cow versus a pig in a piggery or any of those animals that are captured by particular codes of practice.

However, it is less so, perhaps, with the divergence of different animals and the different circumstances in which they are housed, homed or used—the difference between a working animal that is not necessarily captured by a particular code versus a pet in a suburban setting versus an animal in a shelter, perhaps, noting that that is obviously going to be captured in separate legislation, I assume, that will then be captured potentially by clause 4 that we have already gone past.

But in terms of what is appropriate in a particular circumstance, and obviously that is a subjective test to a degree, how does that play out operationally in terms of the different expectations and is there going to be a way that somebody in a particular circumstance is able to get some sort of guiding clarity in terms of level of expectation in one situation versus another?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: As I was explaining earlier, this provision is the flip of what had been regarded as 'if you have not done this then you will be punished' or 'if you have mistreated the animal you will be punished' to 'you have an obligation to treat the animal appropriately'. So the language otherwise is something that people would be familiar with.

Asking for any kind of definitiveness is difficult, as we described before and as you put so well in your question. The diversity of different animals and their needs and their circumstances in which they are living makes it impossible for me to assist too much putting on Hansard what I believe the standards ought to be and the test that would be met by a court.

Clearly, there is a compliance cascade that starts with education, particularly in newer areas, and then moves through giving feedback to start to invoke some of the legal provisions that sit here, ultimately needing to reach the test of whether a court would agree that the person had not provided an animal with appropriate or adequate food, for example, or had not taken reasonable and practical measures.

So the inspectorate is very well aware that the courts are going to test them on reasonableness and whether they are within an appropriate definition of 'adequate food' and 'adequate shelter'. We are not planning at this point to start exhaustively setting standards or even guidelines. If ever there was a case where that was needed, naturally that would be worked through extensively with those who are in that category of looking after those animals.

I will give you the specific example that we have, in fact, in the not too distant past, worked up guidelines that are turning into standards for breeding kennels because of serious concerns people had about what breeding kennels were doing, turning into puppy factories. We have set up a guideline of how animals in those conditions need to be treated: how many times you can have a female breeding in its lifetime, for example.

In specific cases where it becomes evident that a class of ways in which certain animals are treated is problematic, we may work with that industry—or group in some cases and industry in others—to determine what reasonableness would look like in order to head off things going wrong. However, it is not something we propose to do in a wholesale manner.

We would expect that the definition of appropriate and adequate food would be sufficiently well understood and, if it is not, it would be able to be guided through education rather than needing to be exhaustive and definitive for every circumstance and animal there is.

Mr COWDREY: Regarding subclause (3), while you have mentioned in your answer that the government is not looking to exhaustively call out classes of animal, there is obviously be the inclusion of subclause (3) where, by regulation, you have provided the opportunity to prescribe specific care requirements for specific cohorts or subsets of classes of animal or animals. Are you able to give any indication of what classes of animals you assume regulations would be drafted for in the first instance and in operation—what we are assuming to be, hopefully, by July next year? Do you imagine those specific care requirements in all circumstances to be more restrictive or above a higher threshold, a higher duty, than what is contained in the bill to this point?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: This clause, and then subclause (4), are the ways in which what will be the new version of the act captures all those regulations we were talking about earlier, which are the existing codes of practice for various animal husbandry industries. This is necessary because we have changed this into being a duty of care rather than responding to harm that has already occurred.

Because we have flipped it, this is a rewriting of what was already there, which is that by virtue of having regulations those regulations will be defined. They are currently already defined through the various codes of practice we talked about before for dairy and so on. There is no proposal to change those; this is just the legal mechanism by which they are recognised, and for animal husbandry industries to be able to continue to manage as they are managing now without having fear that the general duty will change what they are doing.

It does, of course, enable us, as I said, to create new ones should we wish to. We have no plans to do that but this is, as existed previously, the mechanism by which that is able to be added into our legislation, to mean that the general duty of care is addressed through a code of practice that has been agreed by the agricultural ministers' ministerial council nationally, and recognised that this is the way that Australia treats pork, treats dairy, treats beef and so on.

Mr COWDREY: Perhaps I did not frame the question well enough in terms of being in addition to the existing codes of practice. Were there any other classes of animal you were seeking to draft regulations for using that subclause? So to this point the expectation is no.

In regard to natural events such as drought, obviously there is going to be a change of expectation and potentially circumstance in terms of the ability to provide adequacy of food in those circumstances. While we have discussed the code of practice, which in some way covers this, I am thinking of the example of a farm more generally where perhaps not all animals on that farm are necessarily captured by the code—how that interplays in a drought scenario for a farmer or otherwise in terms of the changing of the duty of care in regard to animals in that circumstance.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: Subclause (2) really does the work in those circumstances:

(2) The owner of an animal must take all reasonable and practicable measures to prevent or minimise harm to the animal.

We all appreciate that there are circumstances—flood, drought and fire being the most obvious examples—where suddenly it is very difficult to look after the animals in the way in which you had been accustomed to. As the shadow minister points out, there are codes of practice that cover many circumstances but not necessarily all, and there may be animals also on that farm that are not covered by the codes of practice that are regulated, in which case the test will be reasonableness and practicableness.

At a standing start as a community, we would expect that in the event there is not sufficient food for animals the animals would be managed in a way other than just allowing them to starve. That may be that there would be a test of reasonableness or practicability that meant that a court did not find someone who allowed the working dogs on the farm to starve to have committed cruelty. That would be a matter for a court to decide, but I think most of us would expect that the owner would do what they could to avoid that being the outcome.

There are also, increasingly, the standards that are imposed by consumers and by markets—that the ways in which we run our primary production are ways which are very conscious of the cruelty to animals. That is why the standards exist, so that we can demonstrate overseas that these are the standards by which our primary producers are held to account and those standards are accepted by agriculture ministers as being reasonable and appropriate.

Having a natural emergency such as a drought or a flood does not automatically exempt you from these provisions, but it does constrain what 'reasonable' and 'practicable' will be in those individual circumstances. Should it reach a point where that became something that went to a court, a court would test whether that person had indeed acted reasonably and appropriately, given that they were in a flood. Those circumstances would be taken into account but that person would not necessarily be automatically exempt from what I think we would probably regard as the human responsibility to try to minimise harm to an animal in difficult circumstances.

Clause passed.

Clause 7.

Mr COWDREY: Perhaps it is best in this instance to ask a question in regard to penalties. The minister obviously provided some level of explanation earlier in regard to some level of reasoning around the severity of the fines and the fact that these are in advance of what is in place in other jurisdictions around Australia.

This is not necessarily a question of why the particular numbers were settled on in terms of them being ahead of the field, but in terms of the penalties involved was there a process of finding analogous contraventions that drove you to landing on these levels of fines, both in the previous clause and in this clause? Was there an underlying process, rationale or logic that connected the level of the particular expiation or penalty that you have landed on?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: The process that was adopted was first of all to tier the various offences, so from administrative through to aggravated and serious cruelty. Then we looked interstate at what kinds of equivalents were present and also any analogous legislation in South Australia. We took into account the fact that there has been no movement for 17 years in the penalty levels and recognised that we had fallen significantly behind and that it was important that we caught up and, in catching up, that we reflected the community views which we gained through the extensive consultation processes that we undertook.

We wanted to make sure—and we got this through the feedback as well—that the seriousness of animal cruelty was recognised and, to the extent possible, with serious penalties, that there be a deterrent against it.

The links between animal cruelty and other criminal activity, including domestic and family violence and including becoming a violent person, is recognised. We want to make sure that the penalties reflect the seriousness with which the community regards those very significant elements of animal cruelty. In terms of how we sit interstate, as I stated earlier, that is where we are towards the front of the pack, and occasionally ahead, when asked earlier about the general comparison of the bill here and the legislation that exists elsewhere.

If I look across—and it is hard to be definitive, of course, about the comparison—where there is a fine for aggravated cruelty and a corporate fine here that we are saying could be up to $1 million in Victoria, when you add up the various elements that can contribute to a corporate fine, it can be well over that figure that would be charged, even though in their legislation the base corporate fine would be around $250,000.

So we tried to understand it, not only clause by clause but how those crimes are treated in other legislation and we put ourselves near the top or, not often but occasionally, at the front but in that top band, bearing in mind that the other states all have this approach of incremental increases because they use units and we are not going to be changing this legislation for some time in all likelihood because that is what happens with these kinds of acts: they sit in place for a decade or more—17 years in this case. So we would expect that, having set this, that will not change for a significant period of time, whereas the other states will continue to rise up because they use that unit approach.

Mr COWDREY: In regard to the penalty provisions, again, you have referenced the process to this point, which I think is fair, the comparative jurisdictions, noting that there has been 17 years transpire between this act last being updated. In regard to the point that you have just made, there may be concerns in some circles that we would very quickly again fall behind appropriate penalties in comparison to other jurisdictions should there not be any updating of this act for essentially the same period of time.

Has the government considered or through the consultation process was there any feedback provided to the government that a more regular review of this bill in terms of penalty provisions was potentially warranted? Has the government got any plans to potentially set something in place to deal with a more regular updating of penalty provisions to ensure that they are in line with what will be, we expect, a progressed environment in other jurisdictions in the coming years?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: I personally wish that we had the unit approach to fines, by the way. I do not know exactly who is supposed to make that change to affect that. In the absence of that, for those following along at home, if they are still with us when we get to clause 79, there is a review after five years and so I would expect that that, at the very least, would be an opportunity.

Of course, nothing prevents a government from diving back in and altering any time they want, it is just the experience is that we tend to do the big changes not too frequently and therefore this was our opportunity to properly update. Had we gone way ahead of everybody else on everything, then there might have been some disquiet that we were overachieving, trying to futureproof. We have not done that; what we have done is gone near the top in order to give us some time. In five years, we will have a look and see what others—obviously, it is about all of the provisions of the act, but we will have a look and see, or you will if you are in.

Mr COWDREY: My last question on this clause is around expected prosecutions, effectively. With all of these bills, we certainly understand that the government generally has—I will not use the word 'target' as that certainly is not the right context—an expectation in terms of the number of people who are potentially going to be prosecuted under the different sections of the act based on past experience.

Obviously, with what is in place at the moment not necessarily 100 per cent aligning with what we are moving to, are you able to outline for the committee the expected prosecutions? Obviously, the desire is for them to be as minimal as possible, but based on past experience perhaps you can give some level of information to the committee as well in terms of how many prosecutions there have been over the past years, whether that trend is down or up, but what your expectation is in terms of prosecutions both under—I think it is helpful—the duty of care provisions as well as clause 7 in regard to ill-treatment.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: As the member would be aware, about 99 per cent of prosecutions are undertaken by the RSPCA and their annual report suggests around roughly 30 a year. Very few are aggravated cruelty, so this is not an area of law where there are a lot of prosecutions resulting from the enforcement of the law.

Mr Cowdrey: Which is a good thing.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: Which is a very good thing. Clearly it is difficult for us to give an estimate of any that would arise if any numbers would be different as a result of the changing provisions, particularly relating to duty of care, but the expectation in this legislation is not that we are facilitating more prosecutions; the expectation is that we are providing more options for the way in which the act is enforced, so notices to comply that are not the precursor to ending in prosecution but may be the precursor to going to a magistrate and asking for people not to be allowed to hold animals anymore.

The way in which we have written the principles and objects of the act is really putting the emphasis on having people treat animals well in the first place, and therefore education is overwhelmingly the preferred approach as long as that is effective. It is certainly the preferred approach of the RSPCA. Although they operate in a way that is designed to get the best outcome for animals, there is also no financial incentive for anyone to undertake a lengthy prosecution if a word in time can head that off.

So it is not like we are setting up an opportunity for that to be more likely; we are actually trying to create a piece of legislation that encourages better treatment of animals from the beginning, intervention to guide that where necessary, and we hope not any significant prosecutions. If the increase in some of the penalties results in a deterrent effect that bodies corporate in particular choose to behave differently, that would be a good thing too.

Clause passed.

Clause 8.

Mr COWDREY: I will ask the same question in the context of this clause before getting to the specifics around working animals. My previous question in terms of asking expectation was more framed around: is the government's expectation that there will be a reduction in prosecutions? We are yet to get to, obviously, the particulars of the bill where it sets out the alternate compliance tools that are going to be available for compliance officers now that were not available previously. So there is a significant change in terms of how situations, hopefully, are highlighted and addressed in an earlier circumstance than they may have been otherwise under the existing framework.

My question was more framed in hopefully a positive light and whether the government had any expectation or target in terms of a reduction of prosecutions based on the tools available to those officers now to hopefully deal with finding these circumstances, having the ability to alter these circumstances at an earlier point in time than they would have otherwise.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: To give a background, when we were drafting this policy in opposition, the RSPCA made several representations to me that they felt that the way the legislation exists at present was antithetical to having a reduction in cruelty because it drove them so hard to either prosecute or not prosecute. What they wanted, as mentioned we will come to, was different ways of enforcing the act in order to not have to end up in prosecution but in order to actually deal with the cruelty.

There are circumstances where they have not addressed the cruelty but nor have they been able to prosecute. That can happen when you think of people who maybe have mental health issues and are highly disadvantaged, live in poverty and have far too many animals. If all they are able to do is prosecute, then the chance of prosecution being successful, or even the right thing to do when you are dealing with people in those conditions, is something that they had to balance and judge. They felt that they were having to allow cruelty to not be stopped because they only had prosecution as an option.

Although I would not in any sense turn this into a number, the expectation is that by providing those alternatives as asked for by the inspectorate, we will see, at the very least, no more prosecutions—if not, one would hope, fewer—but we would see better ways of dealing with the cruelty that fall far short of prosecution.

Mr COWDREY: In regard to clause 8, which is specific obviously to working animals, and there are very specific provisions in this section of the bill, I am keen to get an understanding of who specifically was consulted in regard to this section. Was SAPOL consulted? Were a cohort of people that are using vision dogs, etc.? How much consultation was actually undertaken in regard to the very specific circumstances that are outlined in clause 8?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: This is what was known at the time as Koda's law that we have taken out of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act and moved into here because this is where it belongs, so all of the consultation had occurred obviously in creating that piece of legislation.

Mr COWDREY: To confirm, no additional changes were considered. This was simply lifted, plonked in. There was no additional consultation. SAPOL were not consulted in terms of whether there was any need to update change or subtract in terms of the make-up of what has come into clause 8.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: No. We did this under the request of the Attorney-General and the Attorney-General's Department. I believe he will be taking care of this piece of legislation in the other place so there can be more specific questions also to him.

Clause passed.

Clause 9.

Mr COWDREY: Clause 9, in a similar vein I understand there is a subclause here. Give me a second to locate it in terms of activities that can be added to this list by regulation. In terms of prohibited activities, are there any that the government is currently considering adding to the list through regulation?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: We do not have plans at present to add a prohibited activity. The regulation-making power—also this is true for clause 10, by the way—is important because things can change, other activities can occur that had not occurred previously, but there is not an intention to add anything at this stage. We did receive feedback from a number of people who wanted us to use this for things such as duck hunting. There is no intention to use this for that, and I do not believe it would be appropriate given that that is captured in another piece of legislation anyway, but just as an example of the kind of feedback that we received. That is not the plan of this government.

Clause passed.

Clause 10.

Mr COWDREY: Again, this may have some overlap between clauses 9 and 10, anyway, in regard to the powers provided by regulation. Can you outline, from a practical perspective, what consultation is required by the minister prior to making regulation under both of those clauses?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: There is no embedded requirement for any particular consultative process to come up with a regulation for either 9 or 10, as there generally is not for regulation-making powers in legislation. I am just thinking about how it would operate in practice. In any regulation that a government chose to bring in that stopped people from doing something, it would be a very unwise approach to do that without any consultation at all. Of course, regulations are subject to disallowance motions and there has not been a government majority in the other place for a very long time.

The CHAIR: Since 1975.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: Since 1975. So it would be sensible for a government to undertake sufficient consultation to be able to at least defend a decision that had been made and, of course, there is a parliamentary element to allowing a regulation to continue to exist.

Mr COWDREY: In regard to clause 10, you outlined in regard to clause 9 other activities that were potentially proposed through the consultation process.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: I am sorry, but because I was being corrected or provided with a little bit more clarity about what I was saying previously, we missed some of the question, so I will just clarify what I was saying and then ask you to repeat the question. When I spoke about the consultation, it is the case for both clause 9 and clause 10 that the—

Mr Cowdrey interjecting:

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: That is right, section 78(4). That consultation does need to occur in a way that is defined by the minister. So it does not say what that should be, but it does say that it should happen. I did not give that full response previously, so it is very good work from the people listening to make sure that that is clearly articulated in Hansard. Could you repeat the question that you were asking about that?

Mr COWDREY: The form of that consultation, again, is up to the minister of the day—we understand that—but there will be something undertaken. The question was to get to the practical purpose of how you saw that consultation being undertaken, so if perhaps you wanted to touch on that as I add to the second question, which is in regard to your answer at clause 9. You mentioned that there were other activities that were raised as potentially being proposals for wanting to have them added to the list of prohibited activities. In terms of possession of items, were there any proposals and are you able to outline those to the committee?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: Duck hunting was a significant one because it is such a hot issue in the community. There was a request to consider opera house nets being banned but, of course, that has already occurred under fisheries. Shock collars were mentioned, but shock collars are already banned. Duck hunting was the one that stood out to me as one that I could understand why people wanted me to consider that, but that is not under consideration by this government at all.

In terms of the way in which consultation might occur, it would be fit for purpose, in my view, but whichever minister is responsible for the legislation at different times—and it may well be the shadow minister—will determine what is best practice. Usually, one consults with the community at large but also with any specific interest groups. The YourSAy website is a very useful way to do this, so that would be an orthodox way of undertaking a consultation.

Clause passed.

Clause 11.

Mr COWDREY: In regard to clause 11, I understand that through the consultation process the minister received a number of submissions from a range of different parties. Were there any views expressed to the government or through the consultation process that were at odds with the position that the government landed on in clause 11 of the bill?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: This clause is only because we recognised that a loophole existed in the current version, which required 'place on the animal and use' rather than 'or use'. Some of these can be used without actually placing them on the animal as they can be applied to the animal, so we just want to update that. We did not receive any feedback otherwise that would want us to change the section.

Mr COWDREY: Has there been any science or representations provided to the government by Livestock SA in regard to the concept of virtual fencing and how does that interact with the provisions outlined in clause 11?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: Yes, the member is correct that virtual fencing is something that Livestock SA and people in the pastoral lands have been asking whether they could be able to use. That is under active consideration at present and would be done through regulation. This section allows for regulation to say how these items could be used, so a shock collar that is associated with virtual fencing could be permitted under regulation and we are currently looking at the merits of that.

There was a trial done under the aegis of PIRSA a couple of years ago, I think, although it might have only just finished but started a while ago, so we are looking into that. Passing this does not prevent that, but nor does it require that. The capacity for that to occur under regulation already exists and we are continuing to look at that at present.

Mr COWDREY: Perhaps, I will be more direct with my question then: was there a representation to the minister or to the consultation process to have a specific exemption in regard to that issue contained in this bill?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: I believe that primary industries and other interests are well aware that, should virtual fencing be permitted, it will be done through regulation and that this section does not change that, so we do not believe that there was a representation specifically to change this clause. We can double-check that that is accurate, but the question of allowing virtual fencing via regulation has been, if you will forgive the almost pun, a live question for some time and remains one.

There are different views from different parties, but I have heard not only directly from Primary Industries SA and Livestock SA but also from people from the pastoral lands—which of course is part of the environment department's responsibilities—about the virtues of it, and we are taking seriously the contemplation of a regulation. We also have views expressed by the RSPCA about that. We are working through it, but this legislation does not trouble that in any way.

Mr PEDERICK: In regard in questioning along the same line, and noting that you have already commented on the Livestock SA submission, I just want to quote from that submission, as follows:

Livestock SA has repeatedly requested that the restrictions on the use of virtual fencing collars in livestock be permitted beyond the research sector and allowed for use on commercial livestock properties. We note that the definition of an electrical device remains unchanged in the bill. As such, we again request government expedite amendments to the Animal Welfare Regulations 2012, specifically amending section 8(1)(a), to enable virtual fencing to be used for livestock management purposes.

Further:

As we have already outlined in submissions, letters and meetings, virtual fencing has been shown, through peer reviewed research, to be effective at managing livestock movements in a low stress, reduced handling way. The benefits of this technology have been shown in trials in South Australia in the rangelands and the benefits to the environmental management of these areas and reduction in labour requirements have been demonstrated. There is also ongoing research to further evaluate the impacts on the welfare of livestock using these collars and we look forward to seeing the results; however, we consider sufficient evidence that there are no adverse effects to sheep and cattle using these collars already exists.

I note that in trials the CSIRO have done they have described these collars as 'animal friendly', and I also note that PIRSA has been doing work with virtual fencing as well.

I guess I ask, as a combined question, about the use of stock prods, which are obviously regulated under this clause as well, which are essential at times for moving stubborn stock, especially loading trucks sometimes. I also note that the very last clause in the schedule repeals all the regulations and the old act when this bill becomes an act. I am just seeking surety.

I appreciate the minister's view earlier that it is under consideration, but with the submission from Livestock SA—and I am sure there are others—that talk about the practicalities of virtual fencing and obviously the use of stock prods under regulation still being authorised into the future, from my perspective I just hope the minister and the department take a valued look at how realistic both these things need to be into the future.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: It is entirely accurate, as has been read out, what the Livestock SA's submission was. As is clear, they recognise that what they are asking for is a change to the regulations. The clause that removes the old regulations is necessary because they do not work with the wording of the current act, but will be remade in a way that does.

As I said, we are actively considering ways in which virtual fencing might be regulated. There are views that have been expressed by people who manage livestock that have been heard by the department and by myself as minister, and there are some other views that have been expressed as well, of course, and there are a variety of ways in which virtual fencing and the collars associated with them can be used for herding as opposed to being used for managing an area.

As I said, we are working through that and taking it very seriously. There are advantages in not having fencing associated with native wildlife moving through as well, so we are cognisant of some of the benefits as well as some of the challenges that come from some of the animal welfare views. We will work through that conscientiously, but recognising the validity of much of what the Livestock SA and primary producers representations have been. At present the regulations will be remade in order to work with this legislation.

Mr TEAGUE: I just add my voice to that concern. I am glad to hear the minister in the last sentence talk about the immediate reinstatement of the regulations. I note the amended structure—there is a clue there in terms of the addition of the 'placing on the animal', which is inherent in the collar associated with virtual fencing.

The existing regulations at regulation 8 that talk to section 15 provide for the whole process to be occurring presently for research purposes. We commend those at PIRSA and SARDI who are working with the state government in connection with the University of Adelaide in advancing that. I commend to people the piece that is presented by Megan Willis, who is a senior research officer at PIRSA/SARDI on precisely that.

Among the serious work that is going on in South Australia towards the regularisation of virtual fencing, I think the minister acknowledges that is well advanced. The reinstatement of the regulations will be necessary to permit that research to continue. The 'placing on an animal' that is the subject of the provision in the new section 11 will serve the purpose of providing general thoroughgoing regulation to permit the use of virtual fencing.

It is something that I addressed in the course of the debate on the Disability Inclusion (Review Recommendations) Amendment Bill earlier in the year—for ease of my own reference, if nothing else, on 23 March, 9 April and 11 April—talking about virtual fencing being an example of a use of technology that is capable of being implemented in the interests of animal welfare but also in the interests of inclusion of those including my constituent Tom Carr at Ashbourne who, having suffered a catastrophic industry and being wheelchair-bound, is able to continue to conduct his cattle farming with the aid of technologies including virtual fencing. He is one very careful and well-informed advocate for the rolling out of those technologies in South Australia in terms of leading the way.

It is well known that CSIRO has been the leader since at least 2005 in this regard. We all note the RSPCA's caution in terms of its public pronouncement, but we all know as well that virtual fencing is permitted in a generalised way in several jurisdictions in Australia, so it seems to me that the structure of the replacement for section 15 might be regarded as paving the way for those more thoroughgoing regulations now to do that work.

I might perhaps put the question then in terms of: is there any particular deliberateness to the addition of that 'placing on the animal', and is there anything further that the minister can add in terms of likely timetable for the conclusion of the government's consideration, such that we might anticipate some new and enhanced regulation permitting those virtual fences to be used across the state?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: The remaking of the regulations is, as I said earlier, necessary because they do not work. To loop up to the earlier discussion about commencement, it is the reason it will take a while to commence the legislation because the new legislation does not work without the regulations and the regulations as they currently sit cannot work with the new, so we have to remake all of them. The intention is to remake them, essentially, as is but to work with this piece of legislation.

In the meantime, there is this work that is occurring to determine how we might facilitate the use of virtual fencing. There is a national working group to look at virtual fencing to see if we can have some kind of national consistency. I believe there are only two jurisdictions that allow it at present: Queensland and Tasmania, and WA have a single type that can be used. We do not currently have that all lined up, but we are actively looking, having had the representation that is reasonably persuasive but also recognising the concerns that are raised by the RSPCA. We will work through that while otherwise remaking the regulations in order to allow this legislation to commence.

Clause passed.

Clauses 12 and 13 passed.

Clause 14.

Mr COWDREY: As was foreshadowed earlier in the process, when we discussed the overlap of specific codes in specific legislation with regard to fishing, we obviously have the aquaculture act that is identified in the Fisheries Management Act, which we have identified. For the purposes of, I gather as the minister referenced earlier, rec fishing and other activities that do not necessarily have a prescribed code of conduct, there is a specific exemption that has been provided in the legislation. I did like the use of the 'etc' in the title. I do not know if I have seen that before. I just want to add my congratulations to whoever drafted that particular clause for the 'etc', mentioned a couple of times. I am not sure if I have an older version, but it is also after Part 3—Advisory committees. At any rate, I digress.

The question in the first instance, with regard to the specific exemption, is almost similar to what we discussed tonight in terms of positive versus the negative and how we interpret whether the duty is one that is a positive or a negative duty. In this regard, I think it is probably easier, from a practical example, to get at least on record a couple of instances where the minister would understand or see very clearly the particular exemption that has been provided would have been breached, effectively. Could the minister provide in the context of rec fishing, charter or traditional fishing and commercial fishing a practical example of a breach that would effectively limit the exemption for fishing activities that is contained in the bill?

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE: First of all, I will point out that there is a discussion about regulating to allow the use of bait fish that has been requested by RecFish SA. We would regulate that. Because live baiting is banned, we will create a regulation that makes it clear that you can use bait fish, just to be clear about that. Under the animal welfare regulations, we will create a regulation that facilitates the use of bait fish so that it is clear that the ban on live baiting, which otherwise exists, does not, because of the inclusion of fish, move through to that.

The example that is often used by people who wanted to see fishing practices that are cruel be treated as cruelty are the de-finning of sharks, which can occur. The de-finning of sharks is not legal under the fisheries act; it is explicitly banned. Because it is banned, it could then now also be treated as an act of cruelty under our piece of legislation. So something that is currently not allowed under the Fisheries Management Act could be regarded as cruel under the Animal Welfare Act; however, everything that is permitted under the fisheries act cannot be.

Sitting suspended from 17:59 to 19:30.