Auditor-General's Report

Auditor-General's Report

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN (Lee—Minister for Transport and Infrastructure, Minister Assisting the Minister for Planning, Minister Assisting the Minister for Housing and Urban Development) (15:59): I move:

That standing orders be and remain so far suspended as to enable the report of the Auditor-General 2014-15 to be referred to a committee of the whole house and for ministers to be examined on matters contained in the papers in accordance with the timetable as distributed.

Motion carried.

In committee.

The CHAIR: I remind members that the committee is in normal session so any questions have to be asked by members on their feet, and all questions must be directed in reference to the Auditor-General's Report. The member for Bright is going to ask some questions, and I understand you have half an hour for your questions to the Premier.

Mr SPEIRS: I reference the first question to the Auditor-General's Report 2014-15 Part A, page 46, remuneration of employees disclosures. Can the Premier explain the reduction in the number of employees employed within the Department of the Premier and Cabinet whose normal remuneration is greater than the base executive remuneration level?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: For 2014-15, the top nine employees with the highest remuneration are executives who were terminated and had their contracts paid out, so that changes the figures a little bit. Remuneration increased by $800,000 compared with 2013-14, despite a reduction in the number of employees reported from 91 to 80, due to the executive contract payouts.

Mr SPEIRS: Were these 11 executives, who were dismissed in January of this year, included here?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: I think it is probably more accurate to say 11 employees no longer had continuing employment. For some of them, their contracts terminated through the effluxion of time, so it was the end of the contract and they were not renewed. For others, the provisions under the contract to bring the contract to an end were accessed.

Mr SPEIRS: How many of the executives the Premier just referred to have subsequently been reemployed in the public sector?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: As far as we can tell, none of the employees were reappointed as executives, although one employee was employed as a non-executive public sector employee in another part of government.

Mr SPEIRS: What was the total value of costs, including TVSPs and other payments, related to the terminations of these executives?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: I think that was asked and answered in the Budget and Finance Committee, so I will try to get that answer for you. The total number of executive positions that were abolished across the department since 1 July 2014 was 18, 14 of which occurred after 1 January of this year. Fifteen of the abolished positions were subject to termination payments and the net reduction of seven executive positions for an annual saving of $1 million per annum. So, fifteen executives received early termination payments. The total cost was $2.74 million in relation to the early termination provisions, plus normal leave accrued payments on termination.

Mr SPEIRS: Moving on to Part B of the Auditor-General's Report, page 340, which covers payroll. With regard to the issues identified in relation to the CHRIS payroll system, can the Premier clarify whether the failure of controls has resulted in overpayments or underpayments, and, if so, the total value of these incorrect payments?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: The Auditor-General does note, in Part A of his report, that payroll and human resource system controls reflect the materiality of the outlay, so they receive substantial attention. The Auditor-General has raised some operational concerns, particularly as it relates to the payroll function, but this is a matter that should be referred to the Minister for the Public Sector as the operational management of this function sits within her area of responsibility.

Mr SPEIRS: Notwithstanding your reference to the Minister for the Public Sector, are you able to provide any information of whether or not there have been instances where the lack of controls have allowed employees to lodge incorrect information?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: I do not have any briefing about that. I think that is a matter you should refer to the relevant minister. I will pass this question on to her and she will be prepared when the question is asked on that occasion.

Mr SPEIRS: Thank you, and I appreciate the Minister for the Public Sector listening intently to that question. Moving a few pages further on to page 342 of Part B, which covers purchase cards. As referred to in bullet point 2 on this page, have there been any instances where purchase cards have been used to make incorrect purchases in contravention of departmental policy?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: I think there were about 190 purchase cards on issue. Three instances were identified where cardholder reconciliations were returned one week late and one instance where the reconciliation was two weeks late. In one instance it was identified that the cardholder reconciliation was not independently reviewed and approved and in three instances the cardholder did not provide any supporting documentation for purchases. One instance was identified where inadequate supporting documentation was provided. In relation to travel, two instances were identified where purchase cards were used to purchase items that were not permitted by departmental policy and two instances were identified where an account code allocated by the cardholder did not align with the description of the purchase.

Mr SPEIRS: What did these purchases include, and what was the value of those purchases?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: We do not have that detail, but we are more than happy to bring that back.

Mr SPEIRS: This is probably related to that. In the second-last dot point it states that purchase cards were used to purchase items that were not permitted by the department's policy. Can the Premier tell the committee what items were purchased that were not permitted by the departmental policy, as referred to in that dot point?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: One of them was a single, wooden wine box for presentation of wine to then governor Scarce at his farewell dinner for an amount of $95. The suggestion there is that it was not permitted to give a gift to employees. Frankly, I do not think he was an employee; nevertheless, it was regarded as being inconsistent with policy so we will have to tidy that up. The other one was that a flight was booked for a DPC employee to travel to an overseas conference directly through the airline instead of through the mandated government supplier. Strictly speaking they are meant to go through the mandated supplier. That was for the sum of $658.78.

Mr SPEIRS: Thank you, Premier. Throughout the Auditor-General's Report there is a canvassing of policies around purchase cards and mistakes being made here and there, as we have just discussed. Are there any plans by your department, or has your department undertaken any action, to tighten up the use of purchase cards or to ensure that policies are being appropriately dealt with?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: In response to these matters the department has revised its purchase card policy and procedure and reiterated the importance of adhering to this policy to all cardholders and senior management. The department has also commenced scoping the implementation of an online reconciliation system through its purchase card provider ANZ, which will further strengthen controls in relation to these matters.

Mr SPEIRS: Moving on to page 345, Increment progression. Did the data entry resulting in the incorrect change to an employee's increment date result in an overpayment or underpayment? Has the overpayment or underpayment been corrected?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: I will refer that matter to the Minister for the Public Sector, and if you ask it again I am sure you will get an answer.

Mr SPEIRS: Moving to page 346 of Part B, Business continuity and disaster recovery plans. What was the total cost for engaging Ernst & Young to undertake the awareness session and testing consultation referred to in the final paragraph?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: I will have to refer that matter also to the Minister for the Public Sector. We will have that data by the time of that examination.

Mr SPEIRS: Thank you. Moving on to page 349 of Part B of the report, Across-government stationery procurement review. Can the Premier explain the matters of noncompliance with requirements stated in procurement policy guidelines, as referred to in the third last paragraph of this section?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: Once again this is for the Minister for the Public Sector as this is in her general area of responsibility; so, I will refer that matter to her.

Mr SPEIRS: Going to Volume 4 of the report now, page 143, which is the Statement of Comprehensive Income, are there any other changes outside of machinery of government changes and the movement of agencies outside of the department which have substantially impacted the finances of the department in the 2014-15 financial year?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: I am sorry, I missed the first bit. What was the reference point?

Mr SPEIRS: It was in the appendix to the annual report, Volume 4, page 143, under Statement of Comprehensive Income.

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: All of the changes relate to machinery of government changes except the revenue that was received through the sale of the Auditor-General's residence. I am sorry, the Agent-General's residence. The Auditor-General does not have a residence—not in London, anyway.

Mr SPEIRS: Just a supplementary to that and with reference to machinery of government changes, in previous hearings with the Auditor-General through the Economic and Finance Committee, the Auditor-General has raised some concerns about the frequency of machinery of government changes and the disruption that that can create and the continuity of financial and policy management within departments. Does the Premier have an opinion about how the government is dealing with the view of the previous Auditor-General with regard to machinery of government?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: I think it is a reasonable point. What we are seeking to do, obviously, with the Department of the Premier and Cabinet now is to have a rather slimmed down Department of the Premier and Cabinet, which is largely responsible for the imperatives of managing my office and the functions associated with Premier.

We still share some functions with agencies. The machinery of government changes that have been occurring in every agency have been, to some degree, driven by the need to keep economising because of the challenges of shrinking revenues and the growing demands, in particular, of the healthcare budget; and, so, we have been forced to restructure on a number of occasions.

A number of agencies obviously have significantly decreased over the years and that has led to amalgamations and the consequential machinery of government changes. But, by and large, we are trying to reduce the frequency of those matters, but we are conscious of the disruption that it causes.

Mr SPEIRS: Thank you, Chair, and supplementary to that: when a machinery of government change is undertaken is a cost-benefit analysis or similar analysis undertaken to assess the benefits or costs of such changes, and are evaluations taken down the track within a specified period of time to gain an understanding of the success or otherwise of machinery of government changes?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: Probably the most substantial machinery of government change was really the Shared Services change where we brought together many of the back office functions and consolidated them. The total saving to 30 June this year is $352 million, so a very substantial efficiency. In fact, the whole purpose of that rather dramatic machinery of government change was, in fact, savings. It was driven by a cost-benefit analysis; that was the whole purpose of the exercise.

Generally speaking, some of the smaller machinery of government changes are largely consequent upon reshuffles where, as far as possible, we try to line up ministerial responsibilities with a single chief executive, if we can, so some of them are driven by those matters.

Mr SPEIRS: Moving on to page 145 of Volume 4 (so the same section of the report) it is Statement of Changes in Equity. Can the Premier explain the correction of a $305,000 error as referred to in this table?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: Yes, the explanation is that the correction of error relates to accounting adjustments made as a result of prior year machinery of government changes—not that that is particularly helpful.

Mr SPEIRS: Moving to page 173 of Volume 4, Payments to consultants, will the Premier provide a list of all consultancies commissioned by the department with a value equal to or greater than $10,000, including the name of the consultant, the value of the engagement and the general purpose of the consultancy?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: I will take that on notice and get that answer.

Ms CHAPMAN: I am referring to Part B, Agency audit reports at page 569 and it is under the agency of Urban Renewal Authority. I am going to refer to some sections which suggest that cabinet approval is to be obtained. When the representative from the department has the opportunity to identify that, I am looking at Governance at the bottom of the page.

I appreciate this is a portfolio area that I will be asking the Deputy Premier about because obviously it is strictly under his role but, as you can see there, the Auditor-General reports that the URA (which is abbreviated here) was established from March 2012—you will be familiar with that. It was to establish an ownership framework and he notes that it is yet to be finalised and formally approved. He goes on to say:

It is of particular concern that the URA has operated without an approved ownership framework for a period of more than three years. In the absence of a formal approved ownership framework, Cabinet's expectations regarding the URA's role, functions and funding arrangements may be unclear. This may result in the URA not conducting its operations in accordance with government expectations.

The response is detailed on page 570 where the agency is saying it is still developing this, together with some other policies and developing a long-term financial plan which, as I paraphrase, he then suggests will ultimately be presented and subject to cabinet approval. It concludes on that section by stating:

Once Cabinet approval has been obtained, the ownership framework will be drafted and approved, formalising the targets associated with the revised financial plan.

As I said, I will be asking the Deputy Premier some questions about this, but in respect of that identified process, were you aware until this report had been published that this agency had been operating without an ownership framework for more than three years?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: I am not familiar whether I was aware that it was operating with or without an ownership framework. What I do know though is that we are going to have to look at the governance arrangements for the URA. The truth is that the government has important parcels of land that it needs to use for strategic purposes. I think there has been in the past some confusion about the role of the URA. It historically had been just a land disposal body, which was all about trying to maximise the value of land.

More recently, we have been asking the URA to deal with elements of its land for purposes which were not strictly about simply land disposal to create dividends for government. We have been seeking to use it as a showcase for renewable energy projects and sustainable living, such as Lochiel Park. We have been asking it to use its land for economic development purposes. We have asked it to develop key strategic sites like Bowden.

I think we are going to have to review the whole governance and the way in which the URA operates, because we have obviously very significant ambitions for government landholdings which may be a little inconsistent with a government business enterprise just simply trying to maximise the rate of return of its government landholdings through a process of disposal. So, that is the process that we are now going to embark upon. It is something that I think was touched on in the Ombudsman's report which Commissioner Lander has handed down. It now becomes something that we will come back and consider in due course.

Ms CHAPMAN: I appreciate, Premier, that Mr Lander has touched on this question of governance and the line of command between the board, the minister and the CEO and all those matters; that is not what I asked you about. What I have asked you about is the governance aspect that has been highlighted here by the Auditor-General, which is that for three years now, since you announced the establishment of the new model with a new charter converting it from the Land Management Corporation to the Urban Renewal Authority, it has been acting without even an ownership framework for three years.

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: You have my answer.

Ms CHAPMAN: I am sorry, I did not hear that.

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: You have my answer.

Ms CHAPMAN: That you were not aware?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: Have a look at my answer.

Ms CHAPMAN: Alright. It goes on here to talk about the unsolicited proposals, and in particular refers to the Gillman report, which as you know was the subject of the Auditor-General's Report last year, as a separate, distinct report held until, I think, December 2014. To paraphrase what is here on page 570: the government has acted—in fact, I think as early as November 2014—to introduce a new general unsolicited bid policy guideline that has been published. What is noted here, at about point 7 of that page, is that:

[The Auditor-General's] follow-up in 2014-15 indicated that a formal policy and procedure framework, specific to the URA, governing the consideration and assessment of unsolicited proposals and significant transactions [has not yet been] finalised and approved.

The details of what have been recommended are preceded on that page but I am assuming that you are familiar with that. So, whilst there is a general proposal, and whilst they have been working on some policies, were you aware that the URA were continuing to operate without having concluded its new policy recommendations and guidelines, as set out by the Auditor-General's Report from 2014?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: I do not think that is necessarily an accurate summation of what is contained in the report, but that is a matter for the relevant minister, and no doubt you will ask him that question during that examination.

Ms CHAPMAN: On the update of the Board of Management policy, which is detailed at the bottom of page 570 and on 571, the Auditor-General says:

Our follow-up in 2014-15—

after detailing all its recommendations from last year's report—

indicated that the Board of Management policy had not yet been updated to provide guidance on these areas.

Again, were you aware that, a year later, that still has not been concluded?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: The member knows that I am not responsible to the house for that particular agency, and you can ask those questions of the relevant minister.

Ms CHAPMAN: Finally, on the gifts and benefits policy which again is reported here as having been breached to the extent of persons who have certain areas of responsibility in the URA, namely procurement, payment or property delegation, persons responsible for contracting who are prohibited under the guidelines from receiving gifts, have apparently done so. I just heard the member for Bright ask you some questions about a similar issue in your department. Were you aware that there had been gifts and benefits provided to the URA staff which had not been recorded or were in breach of that policy?

The Hon. J.W. WEATHERILL: As the member knows, it is not within my area of responsibility to the house and there are no briefings about those matters.

Ms CHAPMAN: Has the Deputy Premier advised the Premier—

The CHAIR: The time has expired. The beep did go so I thank the minister and his advisers and we look to the next section. The Deputy Premier is coming into position with his advisers.

Ms CHAPMAN: I refer to Part B: Agency audit reports. I am referring firstly to the Urban Renewal Authority, page 568, and following pages, and I also indicate that on this topic there is a provision for—

The CHAIR: Which page are we on?

Ms CHAPMAN: It commences at page 568 in the large volume, and on the same issue in Part A: Executive summary of the Auditor-General's Report at page 7 under 2.6 Urban Renewal Authority. I will start with the latter. On this matter, Attorney—the reference here is page 7—the URA's board recommendation budgeted dividend of $14 million has not been paid in 2014-15. The minister approved the URA's recommendation.

In short, during estimates, there was a provision for an $11.6 million estimated dividend that was identified to be paid. At estimates you indicated that there had been a process where a request had been sent to the Treasurer to enable that dividend not to be paid, and obviously the Auditor-General says it has not. But there is a difference: $11.6 million at estimates, 22 July, was the estimated dividend to be paid, and he reports a $14 million budgeted dividend. Can you explain the difference?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I will have to take that one on notice. I am not going to make a guess at where the numbers come from. I have a vague recollection that when we were in estimates and questions were asked around this, there was some explanation given to me by those who were sitting next to me about another smaller amount of money, but that is only a recollection and I do not have in front of me the Hansard from the estimates. I will take it on notice so that I am not guessing.

Ms CHAPMAN: The difficulty with it is that, when I asked the questions at estimates on 22 July, and you indicated that you were going to get back to the house with something in writing on it, we are now near the end of October and we still do not have any answers.

I will perhaps direct your attention to page 83 of Estimates Committee A, where you indicated you were going to get back to answers on that, including the time at which a request had been put to the Treasurer. Are you able to confirm, as per the Auditor-General's Report, that basically the recommendation not to pay the dividend has occurred and that there has been no money paid to the government from the URA in the 2014-15 financial year?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I will take those one at a time. First of all, there was a resolution by the URA board to the effect that, in light of their view of their current financial circumstances, there should be no dividend payable to the government. The opinion of the board so expressed was conveyed to me and conveyed to me in circumstances where I then referred that on to the Treasurer.

I think the member for Bragg asked me a question about this in the parliament not that long after the estimates, and I confirmed to her that the formal note to the Treasurer had occurred post estimates. There has been an ongoing discussion with Treasury and the URA about not just this particular amount of money but in general the financial circumstances of the URA, and those conversations are actually ongoing.

I caught the tail end of some remarks made by the Premier when he was answering a question about governance, wherein he explained that there are a number of different considerations a government might legitimately have in respect of the way in which they dispose of assets and the price at which they dispose of assets. Those policies have implications for the URA, and there is work presently being done around a sustainable, ongoing model for the URA, not simply in respect of governance, in the sense the Premier's remarks were focusing upon, but also from a financial point of view.

The exact status of that amount of money is something that continues to be the subject of conversation between the URA and Treasury. I am hopeful that there will be a satisfactory resolution of that in the not too distant future, but I see that as being part and parcel of a bigger question about the funding arrangements for the URA because, by any measure, the old model of the LMC, where you had large amounts of land acquired for very little, and you were able to put it to market and get a good price for it and the government actually earned a significant return year in year out from the LMC, has morphed into what is now Renewal, in circumstances where the days of the government having massive landholdings on the periphery of the city ready and available for major development is increasingly a thing of the past.

Ms Chapman: You sold them, that's why.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: That is what happens when you sell it: it is not yours anymore. Renewal is increasingly doing quite a diverse range of jobs for the government. At one end of the spectrum, you have things like Clipsal, where the government has invested a great deal of money in that site. There are costs associated with remediation, costs associated with proper planning and development for that site.

The site represents something which is of great value to the city above and beyond what the government gets out of that in terms of sheer dollars and cents. It is an urban renewal project of great significance. It is a demonstration project in terms of new technologies and new architecture and new design. I think the Premier probably covered all that stuff off, but it is a different beast from the LMC.

Ms CHAPMAN: We have had three years of the new beast. I now change to page 569 of Part B, which is the first reference I gave you. There are three things that I brought to the attention of the Premier, which he thought you were better able to answer; hence, he did not—lucky you. Of particular concern, at the bottom of page 569, is the Auditor-General's observation that the new URA has been operating without an approved ownership framework for more than three years.

At page 570, he then says, in respect of the unsolicited proposal, guidelines and recommendations he made in respect of what URA does, aside from the November 2014 new guidelines for unsolicited bids, should be advanced. He notes that has not been finished; some work has been done and sent off to the Crown Solicitor's Office at about point 9 on page 570, and then the third aspect, which he refers to at about point 4 on page 571, is that there should be a board of management policy which again, notwithstanding his report from last year that it should be attended to, has been started and again is sitting with the Crown Solicitor's Office.

I appreciate that this is a report to June 2015, so a few months have passed, but have these policies and their recommendations come out from the Crown Solicitor's Office? Are they in place? Are they still there? Are you still considering them? Are they operational? What is the status of them?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I thank the member for her question. The situation is that, yes, we have referred all these matters to the Crown Solicitor's Office because I consider governance of all government agencies, and in particular obviously Renewal, to be important especially in the light of the comments made by the Auditor-General and other comments that have been made by other reviewing agencies.

One of the complexities in this matter has been that there has been, running in tandem with this process that we are looking at here, or that the Auditor-General is looking at here, court proceedings in the Supreme Court between various protagonists in the Gillman business. This has drawn the URA into litigation in a tangential way, I guess, and we have had Justice Blue making certain comments and findings about the nature of governance within the URA. His decision was then, we discovered, immediately about to be the subject of an appeal.

That appeal, in due course, was heard. There was a bench of three, as is usually the case for these matters; two of the judges took more or less one view. A dissenting judge, Acting Justice Debelle, took a different view. Can I say that the view of the majority in that case slightly at least changed the interpretation open on the basis of Justice Blue's original decision and, in some respects, departed from his original decision. The parties then decided that they would seek special leave to go to the High Court, or at least one of them did.

Now, as I understand it, there is going to be a hearing, some time in the next month, where the parties will be arguing before the High Court that they should be granted special leave to take the matter of the Full Court decision to the High Court. If they are granted that, it is my advice that the final determination of the matter by the High Court could be as much as a further year away.

The reason I am explaining that in some detail is that the crown, in order to finish this advice, needs to be reasonably clear what the law is in this space. What I am told, and from the explanation I have just given I hope it makes sense, is that when you have got a single Supreme Court judge, then a full bench of the Supreme Court and then, potentially, the High Court, yet to settle on what some of these fundamental principles are, the crown is still in a position where, to some degree, they are doing their best to assume where things are going to land but there are still things that are, to some extent, up in the air because of the state of this litigation.

I am quite disappointed it has taken this long, because I would have liked to have had all this sorted out a long time ago, but I am not in charge of those legal proceedings and those legal proceedings continue to leave question marks around some of the issues that are talked about here.

Ms CHAPMAN: I thank the Attorney for that, but that might well be the explanation as to why the unsolicited proposals formal policy and procedure framework has been delayed, and the Auditor-General makes that comment on page 570. But when it comes to the board of management, he says, after it has been referred for legal review, 'Once the Crown Solicitor's Office completes its legal review', and there is no reference to legal proceedings holding that up, 'URA intends to present the updated policy to the board of management in either September or October 2015.' Has that happened?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Not to my knowledge, but I will check. I can say that, in light of this report and also in light of the remarks made by Commissioner Lander, sitting as the Ombudsman, in his recent report, there is a need for governance arrangements with the URA to be given special attention, although I do note the commissioner on, I think, page 243 of his report did say that most of the things that he could have recommended be done by the board of management of Renewal have, in fact, already been done. However, he did point out there are still some untidy reporting and accountability lines there which need to be fixed. I agree with him and I do have the Crown Solicitor looking at the recommendations of Mr Lander, as well as this.

Ms CHAPMAN: I look forward to receiving that. At about 0.5 on that page it refers to the gifts and benefits policy having been breached, to the extent that staff who were involved in contract and procurement, payment or property delegations had accepted gifts, and that is obviously prohibited, as he indicates, under the rules. My question is: what gifts were given, or benefits received; to whom, and to what value? If you do not have that detail on you, will you take it on notice and provide it to the committee?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I will take that on notice, yes.

Ms CHAPMAN: At page 572, the Tonsley Park redevelopment project. This is another project which has come to attention sufficiently to be commented on significantly and adversely by the Auditor-General. First, he says at page 572 that the procurement and contract management sector adopted a sloppy practice—and that is my word. However, I think it is fair to say that if you look at that comprehensive list of what he considers to be failings, you would have to be concerned. He also makes comment on simple things, such as the contract not being disclosed on the South Australian government's tenders and contracts website, as required by the Department of the Premier and Cabinet circular.

These are pretty basic requirements and I would have thought their not being done would be of concern to you as minister, particularly as this agency which you are responsible for (the URA) is supposed to be working in tandem with the Department of State Development. It is noted at page 573 that its joint committee has not met for a whole year. It is called project control group meetings, and it did not happen at all during the subject year 2014-15. So, there are clearly some problems there. What he does note, at page 572, is that, as a consequence of some of this general failing in relation to the procurement and contract management framework:

Given these instances of non-compliance with applicable policy requirements, there is an increased risk the URA may not have obtained maximum value for money from the procurement contract.

Just as a reminder here, what he is referring to there is with respect to the access to the Flinders University, as I recall. It might have been the University of South Australia—it is Flinders University, I think. Obviously, he has identified this as a problem. The agency's response is that it is going to do some staff training. Has that happened? Are you satisfied the situation has been remedied?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: As to staff training and whether this has been fully rectified, I would need, obviously, to seek advice from the agency on that, and I will. It is an interesting point though the deputy leader raises with respect to Tonsley. Tonsley is a reasonably complicated proposition and it is complicated because DSD is basically running it but the URA is the landowner. That is not without its complexity.

Ms Chapman interjecting:

The Hon. J.R. RAU: That is a good question.

Ms Chapman: You're the minister.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I am only a minister—

The CHAIR: One at a time.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Can I just explain? Inasmuch as it is Renewal, I am basically the minister for the agency or the entity which has the title to that land. Inasmuch as we are talking about the day-to-day running of what goes on down there, that is pretty much exclusively being managed by DSD, not by Renewal.

Ms Chapman: Is that you?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: No. I am spared some things.

The CHAIR: One at a time, in an orderly fashion.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: No, that is alright.

The CHAIR: You are okay?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Yes, I am fine. I think minister Maher is the responsible minister in that regard. I intend to have a very close look at the Tonsley situation, partly as a response to the passages that you have pointed out to me but also because I think that governance structure is potentially problematic in going forward. The idea that you are separating the beneficial and the legal ownership of the asset is not necessarily a good idea, in my view.

Ms CHAPMAN: When you do get that information, because it is all reported under your agency—at page 573 at about point 3 it says, with respect to the project risk register, that that was to be completed in September 2015—can we have an update on that when you get that information? It also says, at about point 5 on that page, with respect to the Project Delivery Structure manual, that that is supposed to be finalised by 30 September 2015. So, I would appreciate an update and, hopefully, have the information to confirm that both are completed and in operation and are successful.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Yes, of course, I will seek that information. Just to make it clear again: the governance here is complicated. I am not meaning to argue, or I am not arguing at all, with the Auditor inasmuch as the Auditor identifies the URA as the agency to whom this remark is directed. I am just making the point that behind this it might be that URA, for the reasons of governance that apply out there, is not capable of doing all of that, standing alone in isolation, without having to be engaged with DSD, and that is the complicated bit, but I will seek to get an answer about that.

Ms CHAPMAN: Page 96, same volume, Courts precinct urban renewal project procurement. It covers up to page 98, to which I will be referring. My first question is: can the minister advise the total amount spent on the courts precinct development project procurement to date?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I think the answer to that question lies somewhere inside DPTI, and not the bit of DPTI that responds to me. I think you will find that minister Mullighan is the appropriate person. I can say this though—and I am advised this by AGD—and I am quoting from page 27 of the report of the Auditor-General, 30 June, Part A—

Ms CHAPMAN: Sorry?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Page 27—

Ms CHAPMAN: Of this report?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Yes; Part A. At the middle of the page, or thereabouts, it says:

The Courts Administration Authority advised it incurred expenses of $356,000 for the project and the Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure received $2.8 million for the procurement process and additional funding to acquire intellectual property. The final amount spent was not confirmed at the time of this report.

Ms CHAPMAN: That is why I am asking.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Okay; that is as far as I can take you presently. I will have to take that on notice.

Ms CHAPMAN: On page 98 it says, again, the—

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Minister Mullighan might have the latest information about that. I do not know.

Ms CHAPMAN: It is just that in your section, under Courts Administration Authority, it says, again at page 98, that it has incurred the $356,000. It then goes on to say that was made up of salary of $341,000 of existing staff resources on the project and $70,000 it got from the Department of Planning. I will come back to the Department of Planning, because it got $2.8 million allocated to it, and I will deal with that down there.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: DPTI—

Ms CHAPMAN: Sorry, DPTI; the Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure I meant to say, which is referred to further on in the report. I will be asking Mr Mullighan about that. It says here though, again at page 98 and you have just referred to it being summarised in the page 27 reference, that you have purchased the intellectual property. What did you pay for it?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Again, I think that is a question for minister Mullighan. He is the one who can answer that question. If I can just explain, although DPTI is in part responsible to me or reports to me, it is only the planning bit of DPTI, not the infrastructure, transport or other elements of it. They report to minister Mullighan. The question you are asking relates to his bit, not my bit.

Ms CHAPMAN: I will ask him as well, but if it is not the case, because it does talk about cabinet approval of this discontinuance of the process and the approval to purchase that, if he does not have it available, will you make it available, as to the amount that has been paid? If we are ultimately going to proceed with the courts precinct proposal was it necessary for the government to buy it in the first place?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: As far as the money paid for the intellectual property goes, I will leave that with minister Mullighan. The second part of your question was why was anything paid at all—

Ms CHAPMAN: Why did you buy it?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Buy the IP? I think the answer is that the government still, in my opinion—and I have made no secret of this—at some point in time has to confront the fact that the courts' physical infrastructure is no longer likely to be sustainable, and something has to be done. That project, and the intellectual property associated with that project, represented one potential solution to that problem into which quite a bit of work has been done. If it turned out that the government ultimately decided that a single build of that nature was the appropriate solution, in my view it was not an imprudent thing for the government to acquire the intellectual property and all that work so that we did not have to reinvent the wheel if we went down that track.

I think, in fact, that is quite a prudent option, in particular given the fact that the proponents, in having worked the thing up to that point, had clearly invested a lot of time and effort in doing that. I think it is part of the government paying attention to the sovereign risk issues associated with dealing with government; if you have a process like this which misfires, it is reasonable that a proponent that has taken it that far and has worked that hard is not, basically, out of pocket on the exercise.

Ms CHAPMAN: I will conclude on that, and I appreciate that you are going to get the amount that you paid them, and that, in the circumstances of the government's election not to proceed with the project at that time, they would be given some fair payment for the work that they had prepared. My question is: was it a condition of the proponents not proceeding with an application for a compensation payment that they receive a fair payment for their intellectual property?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Again, you might need to ask that of minister Mullighan, but to the best of my recollection there was no talk of anybody suing anybody or anything else. My recollection of what happened was that, when we got to this point, we recognised that there was a potential unfairness, if I can put it that way, that might be visited on the developers of that proposal, and I think that negotiations began with them with a view to resolving that. That is my recollection of it.

The CHAIR: I thank the Deputy Premier and his advisers, and I ask the advisers to the Minister for Health to assemble as quickly as possible. Deputy leader, are you doing the health questions or is the member for Davenport?

Ms CHAPMAN: No, the member for Davenport.

The CHAIR: Member for Davenport, would you like to start us off on your page while everyone is assembling and we can be ready. Tell us what page you are looking at and we will be ready.

Mr DULUK: We are starting on page 2.

The CHAIR: What book are we in?

Mr DULUK: We are in Part A of the Executive Summary, page 9.

The CHAIR: Why don't you ask the first question, then the clock is going back to 30 minutes and away we go.

Mr DULUK: Minister, on page 9 of the Executive Summary the Auditor-General comments on the Deed of Settlement, state development and SAHP, which was executed on 17 September 2015. The Auditor-General writes that the deed provided for the state to make payments to SAHP (SA Health Partnership) totalling $69 million for direct costs and delayed costs, including the state's share of financing costs payable over the period the commercial acceptance state was extended. What are the direct costs referred to and what is the monetary value of each; and, as part of that, which of these costs involved payment to SAHP and which of these costs are borne by the government?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: Do you really want that broken down?

Mr DULUK: Yes.

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: I will just say at the outset that the Auditor-General includes moneys that were being paid to SAHP, anyway, hence the $69 million figure, but in terms of the budget impact $34 million takes in the cost of settlement of remediation, which is $20 million, the cost for modifications to be made, which is $10 million, and as well we have other costs associated with prolongation of the project office and things like that. So, the total budget impact is $34 million. That is what the Mid-Year Budget Review will find.

In terms of the settlement payment: remediation, $20 million; modifications, $10 million. In terms of the second settlement payment which deals with the financial costs and which, I say, were already budgeted for because they are already being paid for: principal repayment, $6.068 million; interest $22.774 million; equity distribution, $6.348 million, which means total finance costs come to $35.189 million. Prolongation, (that is primarily Spotless and SAHP), $1.345 million; total secondary payment to project code, $36.534 million; modifications funded within the approved budget program, $1.528 million. Modifications included in the cabinet submission, in the deed, $1.150 million, which brings us to a total of $69.212 million.

Mr DULUK: Delay costs as well as deferred costs? Further to those delay costs on page 181 of Agency audit reports Part B, the Auditor-General comments on changes to the state government's public-private partnership arrangement with SAHP. What amount of financing delay costs have or will be incurred as a result of the 76-day delay in commercial acceptance of the new Royal Adelaide Hospital?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: It is included in the figures that I quoted, so the total delay cost is $35.189 million.

Mr DULUK: As part of the 76-day delay?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: Yes.

Mr DULUK: What amount of the financing delay cost will the government pay the consortium in relation to the 76-day delay in commercial acceptance to 3 July 2016?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: If I understand the member for Davenport correctly, that is it. They are the delay costs. The settlement, I guess, consists of a number of things. Obviously there is the direct cost, the cost we had to pay the consortium to remediate the land—and that is $20 million; cost of the modifications is $10 million. I guess they are the new costs, additional costs that we have to pay to SAHP.

The project was delayed and we, as part of the settlement, shared the responsibility for the delay—so that is equally shared between SAHP and the government. We are accepting that part of the delay is because of modifications and delays because of the remediation. Of the $69 million that the Auditor-General refers to, the total finance cost associated with that delay—so basically what we have to pay because SAHP have financing costs associated with the delay—our share of that is $35.189 million.

Mr DULUK: Have any financing delay costs for which SAHP considers the government is liable in relation to that 76-day delay in commercial acceptance been waived by the consortium? Have they waived any costs?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: Yes, they have; they have agreed to that and the cost is shared. It is the delay cost. We are not up for the full cost to 3 July, so it is a three-month delay (April to July) and we are paying roughly their finance cost for half that time and they are paying roughly the other half. It is pretty much a fifty-fifty split, if I remember correctly; roughly a fifty-fifty split between us and SAHP. Yes, they have waived it; they have waived about half of the cost. If the settlement was or if it was decided in court that the reasons for the delay were entirely to be borne by the state we would be up for the full cost but we are not; we are up for about half of it and SAHP are meeting the cost of the other half.

Mr DULUK: And that is it? There is no future costs in relation to the delay? There is nothing unexpected down the track or budgeted for or provisioned for?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: As much as there is anything unexpected in this but, no, this is certainly, as far as I am concerned, full and final settlement of all these issues. It is full and final settlement with regard to the remediation issues with SAHP and it is full and final settlement with regard to the delay costs.

Theoretically speaking, if SAHP came back to us and said, 'Well, we can't deliver it in July now,' then obviously that would be something that would have to be negotiated, but I certainly do not anticipate that happening. As far as anything which the government might be on the hook for, the only issues were associated with remediation and with the modifications.

Mr DULUK: Has SAHP agreed to forgo all financing delay costs in relation to the 76-day delay in commercial acceptance to 3 July 2016 and, as you said, should that move on, should that 3 July 2016 date not be met, what do you envisage the breakdown or cost-sharing split would be?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: If I understood you correctly, just to re-emphasise, the costs of the delay are being shared by both government and SAHP—roughly fifty-fifty are the costs associated with that. So, we are not paying for the entire costs of the delay, it is shared between the two. If there was any future delay, without wanting to crystal ball gaze, I cannot envisage the government being on the hook for that, because if there was anything I would have thought it would be apparent now.

Certainly, I have no reason to believe that if there was any further delay there would be any reason—there is nothing to my knowledge to give me any cause for concern that the government would in any way have any liability.

Mr DULUK: Thank you, minister. Further from that, are there any other forms of payment being made to the consortium from the government as a result of commercial acceptance being delayed?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: No, other than what I have outlined.

Mr DULUK: Are there any provisions in the contract for the new Royal Adelaide Hospital which provide for penalties on SAHP for a delay in the construction or commissioning of the new RAH?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: Any additional delays?

Mr DULUK: Correct.

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: As I said, if there are any additional delays, if SAHP were to come to us and say they were not able to deliver on 3 July, then basically they would not get paid. That is a considerable penalty for SAHP, because they have had to borrow significant amounts of money to finance the contract. So, if they were not being paid, that would be a considerable penalty. So, that is the penalty, basically: they do not get paid until commercial acceptance.

Mr SPEIRS: Moving on to page 25 of the supplementary report, which refers to the fact that the annual service payments of $395.3 million for the new hospital are budgeted to commence in the 2016-17 financial year, during the period between commercial acceptance on 3 July and the opening of the new hospital in November 2016, how much is the government liable to pay the consortium per day?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: As was said before, it is approximately $1 million per day that we have to pay. Having said that, we will be speaking to the consortium because, given that the hospital will not be fully operational probably until November at the latest, there is potentially some benefit to SAHP because they are not going to have to employ orderlies, catering staff and those sort of staff who are part of the contract. So, we will be speaking to SAHP about us harvesting some benefit from that.

We do not have a figure yet. If we were paying the full cost, it would be roughly $1 million a day, but I would hope, if we are able to harvest some of that benefit that SAHP will get, because Spotless will not have to employ caterers and so on for a period of time, then that would be some benefit to the budget.

Mr SPEIRS: On page 25 of the supplementary report—so, the same page—the Auditor-General refers to $176.6 million allocated in the Mid-Year Budget Review for the transition of services to the new RAH. This allocation included funding to cover the cost of operating the old and new RAHs concurrently. Did the $176.6 million allocation provide resources to maintain the new RAH empty up until November 2016?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: The $34 million that I have previously said is the budget impact arising from this delay. It incorporates all the costs; so, the costs of having to continue to run the old Royal Adelaide Hospital and the costs associated with holding onto the new Royal Adelaide Hospital for a period of time. The $34 million is the total budget impact taking into account basically everything—the cost of the old, the cost of the new, project office elongation and having to run them longer—so that everything is being incorporated into that $34 million budget impact. Obviously, if we have to continue running the old Royal Adelaide Hospital for a period of time, yes, that is an additional cost, but that additional cost is factored into the $34 million.

Mr DULUK: Back to page 25 of the supplementary report, the Auditor-General writes that the new Royal Adelaide Hospital is 'expected to be open by November 2016'. On what day will the new Royal Adelaide Hospital receive its first patients?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: We are working through that at the moment. We would hope that we would have an answer to that fairly reasonably in the next couple of months or so, but the time frame over which we move patients into the new Royal Adelaide Hospital is something that we are planning for at the moment. Obviously we are keen not to have two hospitals running for too long, and we want to try to condense the move down into as short a period as possible. We are looking at a number of different scenarios at the moment but we do not have the answer as yet.

Mr DULUK: What date does the SAHP Master Works Program currently show as the technical completion date?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: The revised technical completion date is April 2016. I do not have a particular date but we shifted from January to April because of the delay.

Mr DULUK: I refer back to page 181 of Part B. The term 'prolongation costs' refers to the actual costs that a contractor, in this case SAHP, incurs as a result of the completion of works being delayed by an event that is the responsibility of the client. What prolongation costs in relation to the 76-day delay in commercial acceptance of 3 July 2016 has the government paid the consortium?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: That is what we have already been through, so I have already answered that question. That is the table of costs which I gave you. Sorry, that is the budget impact, but $35.189 million is that now—having said that, we have not paid that yet I do not think. We will not pay that yet, and the only thing we have paid so far is for the cost of the remediation. We have paid for the remediation, and may have paid them $10 million for the modifications, so that is all we have paid for so far.

With regard to the delay costs, they will be paid for, and they will not be due until next year. It has just been pointed out too, it is only the $20 million which is accounted for in the Auditor-General's report because he is dealing with the 2014-15 financial year. The remediation costs hit the 2014-15 financial year. The modification costs do not hit until the 2015-16 financial year, so they are not covered by the Auditor-General.

Mr SPEIRS: I now refer to Part B, page 181, where the Auditor-General refers to the components of the payments to SAHP under the deed of settlement. In the Budget and Finance Committee on 28 September, the CEO of SA Health listed a series of budget impact items in relation to the payment under the deed of settlement. Does the $14.198 million for the continuation of the project office mentioned by Mr Swan relate to the SA Health project office?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: Yes, it does.

Mr SPEIRS: What period of time is covered by this allocation for the project office?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: I need to check because I do not know whether we kept the project office going right through to November or whether it winds up its function some time before then.

Mr SPEIRS: Can you confirm that the cost of continuing the project office is a SA Health expenditure and does not involve any further payment to the SAHP?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: Yes, that is correct.

Mr SPEIRS: What does the additional dual running cost of $7.621 million relate to? Is this the dual operation cost of the old and new RAHs?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: Yes, it is.

Mr SPEIRS: How does the construction delay affect the period of dual operation?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: It is longer.

Mr SPEIRS: How is this a budget impact on the deed of settlement?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: That does not affect the deed of settlement. It is purely an increased cost which the government has to bear to continue the project office longer than we otherwise would. It does not relate at all to the deed of settlement; the deed of settlement is quite separate. It is not a payment.

The project office is run by SA Health, so it is the cost of the transition team, basically. We have a transition director and other people working on the transition from the old hospital to the new, and the effect of the delay means that we have to keep that office running longer than we had otherwise budgeted for. That is a cost entirely borne by government; it does not relate in any way to the settlement. It is not a payment. We are not paying SAHP for the project office: it is our project office that we run.

Mr SPEIRS: In Mr Swan's evidence to the Budget and Finance Committee, he refers to prolongation costs of $1.345 million. What are those costs?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: The only information I have primarily relates to Spotless, so I have to get the information if you are after any other detail.

Mr SPEIRS: In the same evidence, Mr Swan referred to procurement holding costs of $2 million. What are those?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: We have to procure equipment, and we have a schedule for the procurement of equipment to go into the new hospital. If the hospital is not ready, it means we have to hold that equipment, and there are costs associated with that.

Mr DULUK: In the supplementary report on state finances, page 22, are all the estimated interest payments on the finance lease for the NRAH part of the annual payments, as indicated in the report?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: Yes.

Mr DULUK: In the supplementary report on state finances, page 25, how much of the annual service payments of $395.3 million will be expensed as a cash payment as it applied to the reduction in the lease liability?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: I do not have that detail, but I will get it to you.

Mr DULUK: Assuming that, how much of the annual service payment of $395.3 million will be expensed as a finance charge?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: We can provide the complete breakdown for you. Obviously, it is composed of both the cost of providing non-clinical services, the cost of the capital and interest costs. We do not have the breakdown here, but we are happy to make that available.

Mr SPEIRS: Minister, moving on to EPAS, Part B: Agency audit reports, page 219, what steps is the government taking to review user access to EPAS given that the Auditor-General found that 'without a regular review of user access to EPAS, inappropriate access could result in inaccurate or unauthorised changes being made to data'?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: The department's response, which is quoted in the report, is that the EPAS program group:

had a process for establishing new EPAS user accounts that is reliant on the underlying network account unique to each computer user

will develop specifications for user audit reports and a process whereby EPAS sites can access the report to manage staff who are no longer employees or require access to EPAS for their facility.

will develop a procedure that will be incorporated into site policies around managing user access to their systems.

Mr SPEIRS: Have any cases of inaccurate or unauthorised changes been identified?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: I will check, but my advice is we are not aware of any.

Mr SPEIRS: 'The total of the EPAS transactional data extract differed from the Oracle general ledger by $589,955.' What led to this variance? That is on pages 219 and 220 of the report.

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: We are getting a report done inquiring into the reason for the discrepancy between the two. A review is being undertaken to quantify the volume of validation errors and I have actioned that an escalation process will be developed. My advice is that there are two reports generated by EPAS. There is a summary and there is a transaction detail. The summary reconciled with the general ledger but what did not reconcile was the transaction detail, and we are getting to the bottom of why there was a discrepancy between the two.

Mr SPEIRS: Moving on to the supplementary report Health Savings Targets, on page 71 of that report, given that it is almost a year since the findings of the SA Medical Imaging review were released, when will SA Health release a response to this review?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: My advice is that it is imminent.

Mr DULUK: Back to Volume 2 of the appendix, page 440. The Auditor-General says that an additional $417 million of the state works expenditure has been approved. Is that $417 million additional to the $244.7 million originally approved or is that $244.7 million included in the $417 million figure?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: It is included.

Mr DULUK: How much of that original state-funded works budget relates to core clinical equipment, precinct works, project management costs and transition works?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: We do not have a breakdown of that but we can get it.

Mr DULUK: Further to that, the total amount in that same breakdown as well?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: Yes, we can do that.

Mr DULUK: How much of the expenditure in each category will be capitalised? Can you provide that figure as well?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: You can take away the accounting firm but you cannot take the accounting firm out of the boy.

Mr DULUK: I refer to Volume 2 of that same appendix on page 440 which relates to the expenditure to date on the state-funded works. What has the $59.2 million of transitioning been spent on?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: I will have to get that.

Mr SPEIRS: I refer to volume 2 of the appendix, page 314, and the references to 'Unexpended funding commitments' and 'New Royal Adelaide Hospital—Site Works (Operational)' for both the 2014 and 2015 years. What do those references relate to, and who owes who?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: We will have to get that information for you. We have not got the breakdown of it, but it is money that has been carried over from 2014.

Mr SPEIRS: Moving back to page 181 of the agency audit Part B, around the financing delay costs that we discussed before. I am just trying to get it clear in my own head. Some of the financing costs are due to a construction delay and then we move into the winter period and that would obviously create some additional financing costs. Are you able to provide a breakdown of the delay costs because of the construction around financing and then the financing costs because we move into the winter period?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: I am not sure what you mean by construction delay?

Mr SPEIRS: The project has been delayed. The handover of the project from SAHP has been delayed from January 2016 to 3 April 2016.

The Hon. J.J. Snelling interjecting:

Mr SPEIRS: Yes, that is what I meant. Then we have the commercial acceptance date which is then pushed out to 3 July and then we move into the winter period. Can you differentiate between the financing and the costs that come through the technical completion date and the commercial acceptance date being pushed out and then when we move into that winter period when the hospital will sit empty for a period of time?

The Hon. J.J. SNELLING: The technical completion is basically when we have access to the hospital to do our own testing to make sure that the builders have fulfilled the contract. So, we have access, we go in, we can test everything and make sure that it meets the contract. We have three months to do that and then there is commercial acceptance, which was in April now in July. The technical completion has been pushed back from January to April. That has no additional cost because we do not start paying anything until commercial acceptance—we still do not pay anything until commercial acceptance.

Then there is a further delay. If commercial acceptance is July, the hospital is not going to be fully operational until November. We have to pay the consortium the normal service payment for that period from July to November. We are trying to negotiate whether we can get some benefit from the fact that Spotless is not going to be employing catering staff, cleaning staff and so on, or at least the full complement thereof, until the hospital is fully operational. That is something which we are negotiating at the moment, that we would get a benefit from that. Putting that aside, we have to pay the consortium for the hospital even though we are not using it. We do not get a benefit from that.

The CHAIR: The time for the examination of the health minister has expired.

Progress reported; committee to sit again.