Legislative Council - Fifty-First Parliament, Second Session (51-2)
2008-04-08 Daily Xml

Contents

STATUTES AMENDMENT (PUBLIC ORDER OFFENCES) BILL

Second Reading

Adjourned debate on second reading.

(Continued from 3 April 2008. Page 2285.)

The Hon. R.D. LAWSON (15:30): I rise to make a brief contribution to this bill, which is part of this government's public relations campaign regarding outlaw bikie gangs. This legislation is designed to assure the public that the government is doing something about outlaw bikie gangs and their activities, and it does this by defining three common law offences, namely, those of riot, affray and a new offence in the Summary Offences Act of violent disorder. I say that these offences are window-dressing; they are designed to suggest to fearful members of the community that their safety is protected by measures of this kind.

The offence of riot will occur when 12 or more persons are present together and use, or threaten, unlawful violence for a common purpose such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her personal safety. When looking at this offence and, more particularly, at the offence of violent disorder, it is interesting to learn that it was this government that refused to accept a private member's bill which would have given police power to move on loiterers whose presence would (in the language of these sections) cause persons of reasonable firmness to have fears for his or her personal safety.

I believe that these offences, and especially the offence of violent disorder, can, if not appropriately handled by police, be misused to put down civil protest. We have had hundreds—indeed, thousands—of people on the streets of this city in recent days complaining about this government's savage attack on workers' rights under the workers compensation scheme, and it does not take much for a large group of people who are angry and who are demonstrating to be incited to engage in activity which might be deemed by police to amount to unlawful violence for a common purpose.

There is no adequate protection against incursions into civil liberties in this legislation and, for that reason, it is objectionable. However, I personally do not believe there is any point endeavouring to ameliorate window-dressing of this kind. It is purely window-dressing, and it is designed purely for political purposes, and that is to improve the standing of the government. It is not designed as a legitimate law and order measure, and it is not designed to improve the safety of citizens: it is designed to improve the Premier's popularity.

The Hon. SANDRA KANCK (15:34): Like other members, I agree that violent behaviour, particularly organised violence in a public setting, has no place in our civilised society and, when it occurs, warrants severe penalties. However, I echo the concerns of others regarding the potential for the sorts of powers that are in this legislation to be used to stifle peaceful, democratic protests and rallies. The example that the Hon. Mr Lawson just gave about the protest last week against the government's WorkCover legislation is an interesting one. What if an element of that crowd had turned very aggressive? It would not require the whole of the crowd to react, just a small number. Under this legislation, everyone there, it appears, could be offenders.

I think we need to see this bill in the context of the dramatic expansion of police power which is resulting, and which has resulted, from bills with which we are currently dealing and bills that have already been passed. As a society, there is a great deal of complacency about the potential abuse of these powers. Everyone wants to be tough on crime and, if someone dares to speak out against it, they are put into the soft on crime category.

In living memory (and I am sure this would apply to almost everyone in this chamber), we had the Bjelke-Petersen regime in Queensland, where street marches were banned and any, I think, three or four people getting together on a street corner and talking together could effectively be arrested. We have also had the secret files of the police special branch in South Australia. There have been a whole series of abuses at the federal level—and I am sure that no-one can forget the saga around Dr Haneef last year, but there have been others as well.

Members may not recall, but I certainly do, that in 2005 an American peace activist, Scott Parkin, was deported on the basis of what in this bill will be called criminal intelligence. That decision was subsequently overturned in the courts. Anyone who has an eye for history would be aware of the very celebrated Dreyfus case in 19th century France, where a Jewish army officer was framed on the basis of secret—and, as it turned out later, fabricated—evidence. There are many examples to show that, when we go down this path, we put everyone's freedoms in jeopardy.

I note the new concept of criminal intelligence, which is also contained in the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Bill before us. It is, in effect, secret evidence, and it is a concept that seems to be mushrooming now in this state. As I said, it is in the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Bill, and it is now in the Firearms (Firearms Prohibition Orders) Amendment Bill and the Liquor Licensing (Power to Bar) Amendment Bill.

The point that I am making is that this authoritarian impulse is not far beneath the surface in our society and, unlike the United States and European nations, we in South Australia and Australia do not have the protection of a bill of rights. And, of course, there is always the possibility of mistakes. In the past 24 hours, our news media has been dominated by the Coroner's report, which has identified 49 mistakes made by South Australian police in the lead-up to the murder of Christopher Stuart Wilson, and yet we continue to give more power, with less restraint, with these assorted bills that we are passing.

The Statutes Amendment (Public Order Offences) Bill is most likely to have implications for rallies and protests, and it is because of unintended consequences that we could get those implications in action. Rallies and protests are always very open events; they are open to all-comers. That means that those who do attend could range from vegans, who would not even swot a fly, let alone a human being, to very mainstream South Australians to militant unions. There are always, as I have discovered, feral individuals who are very anarchic.

This openness by the protest movement can extend to decision making protests. I have twice been involved in protests against the US base at Nurrungar where there was a kaleidoscope of protesters. There were church attendees and unionists; in fact, I recall that the Hon. Ian Hunter attended, and I think that that was a very appropriate thing for him to do. There were anarchists, Maoists, Marxists, Democrats and Labor Party people; it was a huge range of public people.

The Hon. R.I. Lucas: Any Liberals?

The Hon. SANDRA KANCK: Not that I was aware of, which is unfortunate; however, maybe that is because the Liberal Party has misappropriated the term 'liberal'. About three or four hundred people attended, and we sat around the campfire and talked about what action we would take, but I have to say that there was very little agreement. At the end, we all agreed to disagree. Some groups were going to take action such as pulling down fences or disrobing, but the majority of us were not going to be involved in that. Under this legislation, it is quite likely that the actions of those people choosing to pull down fences could have resulted in everyone involved in the protest being arrested—including even the Hon. Ian Hunter.

The Hon. I.K. Hunter: I didn't disrobe.

The Hon. SANDRA KANCK: I didn't either. The point is that rallies and protests can be very organic. I have seen rallies where people started off in Victoria Square and, quite spontaneously, said, 'Quick; let's wander down King William Street and take our protest outside the commonwealth parliamentary offices,' where the then minister for foreign affairs (Alexander Downer) was located. When hundreds of people do that, it can be manageable but, if thousands are involved, of course it can become a public order issue.

My experience in South Australia is that the police handle rallies very well. I remember that in the early nineties (I have forgotten the exact year) we had a Palm Sunday rally attended by 12,000 people. I was the person liaising with the police, and I found them very good people to liaise with. I introduced myself to them at the beginning of the rally. We were expecting a protest from National Action, as we had been warned that that would occur. I stayed fairly close to the front of the march so that I could see what was happening. When I spotted the group of National Action protesters, I simply went to the head of the police group and said, 'That's the group over there we are expecting problems from.' He ordered—

The Hon. R.I. Lucas: They were the bad protesters.

The Hon. SANDRA KANCK: These were the protesters who could turn all 12,000 marchers—

The Hon. R.I. Lucas interjecting:

The Hon. SANDRA KANCK: There are protesters who take things into their own hands, and this group was intending to do that. What happened as a consequence of my pointing out to the police that this was the group we anticipated would cause problems was that the head of the police group assigned about six police officers simply to stand in front of the National Action group so that it could not move in and cause any problems.

I give this as a personal example of my seeing that sort of cooperation with the police in very large rallies and, until the present time, it has worked very well. However, I fear that, with this bill, there will be a change in culture and a message to the police that that sort cooperation we experienced in the Palm Sunday rally may not occur in the future.

Having said that, let me reflect on some of the provisions in the bill that cause concern to me. New section 83A defines violence to include violent conduct toward property. I interpret that as applying to the threat to pull down the razor wire fences at Woomera.

For the record, the fence at Nurrungar was really only symbolic. There was a fence on either side of the gate that went for about 200 metres, and then it was open paddock; so it was quite easy to walk through onto the Nurrungar land. The pulling down of the fence, while it may have cost a little amount to put back up after it had been taken down, really was not a major offence of any public order proportion; it was, in fact, extremely symbolic. I believe that the police, the Australian Defence Force, and so on, knew that it was symbolic. That was the purpose of the gate and those few hundred metres of fence.

Certainly, there were many people in Australia at that time who saw the symbolism of pulling down that fence as important and worthwhile. I have great difficulty in seeing the pulling down of that fence, or something similar, as being equivalent to a crime gang blowing up someone's house to intimidate them. New section 83B, which deals with riots, provides:

(1) Where 12 or more persons who are present together use or threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose and the conduct of them (taken together) is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his...personal safety, each of the persons using unlawful violence for the common purpose is guilty of riot.

Putting together sections 83A and 83B suggests that a lot of people who tore down the fence at Woomera could have gone to gaol for seven years, because that is the penalty for a basic offence. This seems to lump a mob baying for blood and a crowd chanting, 'Tear down the fence!' in the same category. To my mind, tearing down a fence is simply not of the same magnitude.

Section 83C 'affray' also causes me some concern. The offence of 'affray' is defined as follows:

(1) A person who uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another and whose conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her personal safety is guilty of affray.

(2) If two or more persons use or threaten the unlawful violence, it is the conduct of them taken together that must be considered for the purposes of subsection (1).

Subsection (6) provides:

A person is guilty of affray only if the person intends to use or threaten violence or is aware that his or her conduct may be violent or threaten violence.

In his speech, the Hon. Mark Parnell gave the example of how one person in a rally, who threw a rock, could cause others, who witnessed the rock throwing and were, therefore, aware of the resulting fear, to be guilty of an offence under this section. As part of a group that is indirectly creating the rock throwing incident, they could be seen as offenders under this bill.

To me, the possible weakness in this section is the notion of conduct. It is essential that there is some clarity about whether the conduct is the rock throwing or the participation in the rally that led to the rock throwing. I hope that the minister will address that when he responds to the second reading. I have a similar concern about the notion of common purpose in riot. Is the common purpose the violence or the participation in the event that precipitated the violence?

In supporting the second reading, I stress that I have no problem with stern penalties for people who use or threaten violence; however, I do seek an assurance that this legislation will not have unintended consequences for our open and democratic culture of protest.

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY (Minister for Police, Minister for Mineral Resources Development, Minister for Urban Development and Planning) (15:49): I thank honourable members for their comments and indications of support for the bill. The Hon. Stephen Wade noted that, with respect to the new offence of riot, a requirement is set down in section 83B(1) that, for the offence to be made out, the conduct of the people engaging in the riotous behaviour (using or threatening unlawful violence) must be such that, taken together, a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene would have feared for his or her personal safety.

The Hon. Mr Wade asked for clarification as to whether that person need actually be present at the scene of the riot. The answer is found in subsection (4) of the offence provision which states that no person of reasonable firmness need actually be or be likely to be present at the scene.

The Hon. Mr Wade also asked with respect to the new offence of affray whether the participants in an affray need to share a common purpose for the offence to be made out. The answer to that question is no. Common purpose is not an element of the offence of affray. For a good explanation of the statutory offence of affray, I refer honourable members to the New South Wales Supreme Court decision in Colosimo and Ors v the Director of Public Prosecutions (155 A Crim R 573).

The Hon. Mr Parnell asked for assurance that the new offences will not be used inappropriately to stand in the way of peaceful democratic protest. The Hon. Sandra Kanck has just made the same point. In particular, they sought assurance that laws will not be used to stifle the democratic process and the right of people to conduct protest rallies. I am happy to give that assurance. These laws have no application to people engaged in peaceful protest of any sort.

In addition to all the other requirements that have to be made out before a person is guilty of one of the new statutory offences, a person is guilty of the new offence of riot only if he or she actually uses unlawful violence. A person is guilty of affray or minor disorder only if he or she uses or threatens unlawful violence. In the scenario given by the Hon. Mr Parnell, the innocent protester he refers to would not be guilty of affray because he or she has not used or threatened unlawful violence.

Again, I thank honourable members for their comments on the bill. I look forward to its passage through the council.

Bill read a second time.

Committee Stage

In committee.

Clauses 1 to 4 passed.

Clause 5.

The Hon. S.G. WADE: In thanking the minister for his comments in the summing up, I ask him to look at my second reading speech where I posed a question, because it clearly distinguishes the notional person from an actual person. I stated:

There is a requirement that, if a person of reasonable firmness were present at the scene, the behaviour is such that it would cause that person to fear for his or her personal safety. However, the bill makes it clear that that notional person does not actually need to be present. In terms of the implementation of this offence, I would appreciate clarification from the minister whether a person needs to be present or just the lack of a notional person.

That paragraph clearly indicates that I am aware of section 43B(4) which provides that no person of reasonable firmness need actually be (or be likely to be) present at the scene.

The point I was making in my request for clarification was that, because 'riot' can relate to violence against property, does that mean that a riot can occur without any person being present? I appreciate that a notional person is not present, but can no person be present for a riot to occur?

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY: Section 83B(1) provides that, where 12 or more persons present together use or threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose, the conduct of them taken together is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her personal safety. Each of the persons using or threatening unlawful violence for the common purpose is guilty of riot. So, obviously you would have to have at least 12 persons present and all of them together would either have to use or threaten unlawful violence.

I am not quite sure whether that answers the honourable member's questions, but there would obviously have to be 12 or more persons. Clearly, these sorts of offences are looked at. The motivating force, if you like, behind these amendments is obviously outlaw motorcycle gangs, where you may have the scenario where there are two gangs involved. There was an incident at Adelaide Airport, for example, where there was one gang waiting for another. Presumably, there may have been members of the public present there, but if you just had two outlaw gangs and no other persons present other than, presumably, the police to make an arrest, then you would still have a riot.

The Hon. S.G. WADE: I take it from the minister's comment—and I do not wish to put words in his mouth—that the government does not see a need for a person to be present other than the perpetrators. I accept that you might have a case where you have two sets of perpetrators, if you like—criminal gangs which are going head to head (for want of a better phrase)—but I take it from the minister's comment, considering that he focused on 12 or more persons, that the government does not see the need for another person to be there.

I think that does change the nature of the offence because, if I understand section 83A and the definition of 'violence', it could be merely throwing objects. You could have a group of 12 people throwing stones at a building or a sign, or graffiti even, in the middle of the night and the government would regard that as a riot. I indicate that on the basis of the minister's response I assume that no person need be present, that you could have a single group of 12 people, not engaging another group of 12 people, and that that would constitute a riot under this legislation.

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY: There obviously has to be at least 12 persons present. In addition to that, there also has to be the condition that a person of reasonable firmness would have to be fearful for their personal safety. The person may not actually be there, but the circumstances of the behaviour would have to be such that if a person was there they would be likely to fear for their safety. So, the behaviour would have to be of an extent to make a person of reasonable firmness fear for their personal safety. That is the additional condition, other than having the 12 persons threatening or using unlawful violence.

The Hon. M. PARNELL: I would like to pursue that further, from what the Hon. Stephen Wade was saying. For example, maybe there is a group of 12 young people, late at night, with sticks smashing the windows of a school, behaviour that we would all abhor and where the criminal law would have a definite role to play, but is it riot? I would imagine that if the school is empty there would be no person present who actually felt fear, but if there was a person there then I imagine they might be fearful.

I would be fearful if there was a group of 12 kids with sticks and they were breaking windows. If a security guard happened to be around, they would have been fearful. I am trying to work out whether an offence of perhaps criminal damage, which would attract a certain penalty in criminal law, is being morphed into something of most serious consequence, that is, riot with very serious general terms attached. So, I would ask the minister to further explain the answer he gave to the Hon. Stephen Wade, because it seems to me that might be an unintended consequence.

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY: In those situations, one would expect that, if you had people throwing things at a public building with no-one else around, or something like that, they would normally be charged with criminal damage. We have a range of offences here, in addition to the riot, which has the 12 or more persons making somebody present fearful for their personal safety.

There is also the new lesser offence—if I can call it that—of violent disorder, which covers three or more persons present together using or threatening unlawful violence, and that conduct making a person fear for their personal safety. So, we have the additional offence. However, obviously it is not just a matter of the police present determining what they will be charged with: ultimately, the courts will determine whether that conduct was such as to warrant the charge.

In relation to violent disorder offences, they have a maximum penalty of $10,000 or imprisonment for two years. The definition under subsection 7 is: 'violence' means any violent conduct. So, that includes:

...violent conduct towards property as well as violent conduct towards persons; and

(b) it is not restricted to conduct causing or intended to cause injury or damage but includes any other violent conduct.

Example—

Throwing at, or towards, a person a missile of a kind capable of causing injury which does not hit, or falls short of, the person.

In the case relating to the school, which the honourable member talked about earlier, if no-one was present, obviously, one would expect that, if those persons could be identified, criminal damage would be the appropriate charge that police would make in those circumstances.

The Hon. S.G. WADE: I would like to explore the issue about violence towards property. As I understand it, under 83A(a) riot and violent disorder can be found to have occurred if the violence is not violence towards a person but violence towards property. I am just trying to understand the circumstances in which violence towards property could be affected and yet the reasonableness test—for want of a better word—or the test of the fear of a person of reasonable firmness would be held out. Going back to the school stoning situation, if violence is perpetrated against property but not against a person, how can a person of reasonable firmness fear for their own personal safety? So, my point is: how could we have a situation where violence towards property was being affected—and an offence being established under this section—unless there was also violence towards a person? In other words, is the violence towards property superfluous?

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY: The test is: if a person of reasonable firmness had been there, would they fear for their safety? If their behaviour was such, obviously an offence would be committed under this act.

I guess you could have a situation where, if a person was inside a motor vehicle that was being attacked, anybody might feel for a person in that situation. But even if a person was not there, if other elements of behaviour were such that if a reasonable person feared for their safety by the nature of the behaviour (and that would have to be established), then, yes, it is possible for an offence to be committed under this section.

The Hon. SANDRA KANCK: In clause 5, we are dealing with three different definitions (riot, affray and violent disorder), but they are all about either using or threatening unlawful violence. I am curious to know how the numbers were worked out. For riot, it is 12 or more persons; for affray, it is two or more persons; and, for violent disorder, it is three or more persons. What is the rationale for choosing those numbers? What is the cut-off point?

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY: I am advised that this legislation is drawn from New South Wales, which in turn follows the United Kingdom's use of this. So, we are using well-trod legal precedent in relation to these sorts of figures.

But I come back to the fact that the principal purpose of this is to deal with some gaps, I guess, in the legislation, particularly in relation to the behaviour of outlaw criminal motorcycle gangs, which do use intimidation. Intimidation is one of those offences that is particularly difficult to deal with. We have had numerous cases where people of reasonable firmness and otherwise have been terrorised by intimidatory behaviour. Obviously, the more people you have, the more serious the offence will be if all those people are acting with a common purpose and threatening. There is a certain logic to it, but it is based on—

The Hon. Sandra Kanck interjecting:

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY: The honourable member laughs, but is she saying that, if you have one person threatening, that is different from having 30 or 40? I think it is different.

The Hon. R.D. LAWSON: Can the minister point to any example of a situation in South Australia where the provisions of section 83B, in relation to riot, would have applied but prosecution did not occur by reason of some defect in the existing law? The only examples given to the parliament have been those arising out of the Jacobite revolt of the early 18th century in England.

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY: I do not have the exact date, but I am advised that there were some riots down at Glenelg where that behaviour had to be dealt with under current legislation, and it was more difficult for that to happen than if this legislation had been enacted.

The Hon. R.D. LAWSON: Can the minister indicate what the particular difficulty was in prosecuting the offenders on that occasion?

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY: We do not have that information; we would need to go back and check that particular case. But, more generally, we can say that the difficulty we are seeking to address is getting witnesses in order to get a conviction. It is the intimidation of witnesses that is a particular feature of the behaviour of outlaw gangs. They do intimidate witnesses. Their very presence and, if you like, reputation are such that it is very difficult to get witnesses and get convictions. However, if these new laws are enacted we will, hopefully, be in a situation where it will be possible to get convictions against this sort of unacceptable behaviour, creating riots and affray. Under current legislation it is difficult to get witnesses.

The Hon. SANDRA KANCK: In both cases, when defining riot and violent disorder, the bill provides that it really does not matter whether or not the threat to use violence occurs simultaneously. I would like to know over what period of time these threats should occur for it to apply under this legislation.

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY: I am advised that there is no time limit in relation to these events; however, under the terms of the legislation either 12 people or three people (depending on whether it is riot or violent disorder) would have to be present together at that particular time, or the offences would not apply. That really is the condition.

The Hon. R.D. LAWSON: In connection with the offence of affray, can the minister indicate any circumstances the government can identify in which a person who would be guilty of this particular offence could not be prosecuted under existing offences? The precondition for the offence of affray is 'a person who uses or threatens unlawful violence against another'. Is that not already an offence under section 19 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act?

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY: Take the Adelaide Airport incidents as an example. That has all been captured on CCTV (so there is evidence there), but there are no witnesses who will come forward. Clearly, that is unacceptable behaviour—it is, if you like, an affray—and, given that it has been captured on CCTV, charges could be laid; however, under current law you would need witnesses and, not surprisingly perhaps, witnesses are loath to come forward when we are dealing with outlaw motorcycle gangs.

The Hon. R.D. LAWSON: Is the minister indicating that witnesses will not be required for these offences?

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY: It is always preferable that witnesses be available but, if perpetrators can be identified, it is really up to the courts whether they would accept that as sufficient evidence. At least one could have some chance of successfully prosecuting. So, it is really not a matter of whether you can prosecute people: it is more a matter of whether there is any chance of convicting people.

The Hon. SANDRA KANCK: When the minister closed the debate he indicated that the legislation would not be used against peaceful protests, where someone in the group might become a little violent or wayward. Although the minister has said that it will not be used, how can it be ensured that it will not be used in this way? Will there be some directive to the police with respect to what we now accept as being the normal right to protest in our society?

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY: I suppose it is always possible for directions to be given. However, I do not really think it would be necessary in this situation, given that these sorts of offences have existed for some time, and it is quite clear—and it has been made quite clear by the government and SAPOL, which has been intimately involved in the construction of these new offences—that they are intended specifically to deal with the problems of outlaw motorcycle gangs and, in particular, the difficulties in getting convictions.

The vast majority of protests to which the honourable member has referred are peaceful, and the people involved in them are peaceful. These laws are not designed for dealing with people who are peaceful. That is not to say that there are not individuals who at various times cannot be violent. However, what one would expect to happen in the sorts of circumstances to which the honourable member is referring is that those persons, as individuals, could be charged with individual offences. However, I do not think that the police would ever attempt to use these laws with respect to the behaviour of people in what is largely a peaceful protest.

The laws are here for dealing with particular problems that we face in the criminal law, in terms of securing convictions against those groups who have no respect for the law and who intimidate witnesses and, therefore, there is a problem in obtaining proof. In any case, even if it was to happen, one could not imagine the courts ever agreeing, nor do I think governments would agree, to the use of these sorts of offences in the sorts of scenarios that have been talked about. These are laws that are required to fill a gap in our legislation when we do have violent and intimidatory behaviour by groups such as criminal outlaw motorcycle gangs that are involved in using or threatening violence.

The Hon. S.G. WADE: In light of the fact that the minister repeatedly reminds this committee that the minister does not interfere in operational matters, I find it hard to understand how he can give us an assurance that these measures will not be misused. Picking up on the line of questioning that the Hon. Sandra Kanck has been leading the committee in, considering the minister's response that the government is wanting to focus these provisions on the behaviour of outlaw motorcycle gangs and considering the fact that the minister is sharing with the Hon. Sandra Kanck the concern that law-abiding citizens engaged in public protests should not be affected, did the government consider having these provisions within the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Bill and only limiting it to members of declared organisations? Why is this bill separate and available to be used against the general public?

The Hon. P. HOLLOWAY: I referred earlier to the New South Wales Supreme Court case of Colosimo v. the DPP. As part of the judgment in that case, Justice Johnson noted: 'It has been recognised that conviction for assault may be more difficult than conviction for affray.' So, clearly, it has been recognised in those other jurisdictions that have these sorts of public order offences that the place where this legislation belongs is with other public order offences. That is why this bill amends the Criminal Law Consolidation Act. The serious outlaw crime bill stands on its own. So, I suppose it makes sense that new public order offences should appear in the legislation along with the other similar offences, and that is why they are put in the Criminal Law Consolidation Act.

Clause passed.

Clause 6 and title passed.

Bill reported without amendment.

Third Reading

Bill read a third time and passed.