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House of Assembly - Fifty-Fourth Parliament, First Session (54-1)
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Criminal Procedure (Miscellaneous) Amendment Bill

Second Reading

Adjourned debate on second reading.

(Continued from 30 May 2018.)

Mr PICTON (Kaurna) (16:10): I indicate that I am the lead speaker on this bill, and rise to indicate the opposition's support for the bill.

An honourable member: Hear, hear!

Mr PICTON: Hear, hear, indeed. However, at the outset I would like to express my disappointment in how this bill and a number of other bills have been dealt with in terms of the process of government. This happened during some personal leave—which was very appropriate—for the Leader of Government Business, so perhaps things are going to significantly improve now that he is back in the chamber. We did see some significant lows in the management of government business during his absence.

Mr Odenwalder: A shambles.

Mr PICTON: A shambles the member for Elizabeth says, and I think that is quite right. Unfortunately, this was one of those bills where that shambles did occur. We saw the government try to get this bill dealt with by the parliament without even giving the opposition the opportunity to be briefed on the bill or for the opposition to consult with its shadow cabinet or its caucus about the bill. That is quite unprecedented for a bill that is pretty routine and pretty standard, and we saw this in respect of two or three other bills over the past sitting fortnight.

This is something where the opposition absolutely needs to take time to consult with people and needs to take time to consider the legislation in detail before arriving at a position. At the very least it should be receiving briefs from the government. That is something we will be insisting on to make sure that proper scrutiny is applied to legislation in this place. Certainly that is the standard the now government expected when it was in opposition, so it is a pretty dramatic turnaround to see that falling out so soon after this government has taken office. I will be speaking a little more about that in terms of one of the other bills where the government moved a lot further to try to seek debate, and in fact to close debate, which they sought to do before an opposition briefing had occurred.

This bill addresses some of the unintended bugbears in the current legislation. It makes amendments to resolve unintended consequences resulting from timing issues when the parliament passed the Summary Procedure (Indictable Offences) Amendment Bill 2017. The changes from that act commenced on 15 March 2018 and, in her second reading speech, the Attorney-General advised that concerns had materialised that required further amendments that would not have been known to the government at that time. We certainly agree with her on that point. The reforms in this bill include:

reinstating the unintended repeal of a provision allowing the defendant to withdraw a written guilty plea that was inadvertently removed as a result of the Summary Procedure (Service) Amendment Act 2017 commencing prior to the Summary Procedure (Indictable Offences) Amendment Act 2017;

correcting the unintentional exposure to costs in what has been a no-costs jurisdiction;

clarifying a matter regarding the new case statement provisions, where prosecution case statement needs to include whether the prosecution intends to lead discreditable conduct evidence only in instances where it has been used to show a particular propensity or disposition of the defendant as circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue; and

removing the requirement to have a defendant sign a case statement in the presence of their legal representative.

A real page turner, this bill. The amendment to section 123(5) which deletes, quote, 'in the presence of the defendant' seems to empower a lawyer to sign a case statement while not in the presence of their client. I am interested in the impact that this might have on remote and regional South Australians and those clients already in gaol. I presume case statements could be signed while client and lawyer are on the phone, but the Attorney-General or the representative might like to expand on how this might work in practice.

We also do not know whether amendments in the bill are precisely what the judiciary and other stakeholders have requested. The Attorney-General has not provided us with the submissions that she has received, which is something that she always insisted upon when she was the shadow attorney-general, so that is another very surprising departure from precedence there. We genuinely want to be a supportive and helpful opposition. We do not want to oppose things for the sake of opposing them, but in good conscience we also owe it to our constituents to ensure we fully inform ourselves of matters before the parliament. We should not simply provide blind support for everything that comes before us.

With those words, I indicate that Labor will support the bill and once again voice our disappointment at how the fledgling government and Attorney-General were conducting the business in relation to this bill. I also indicate that we have a number of questions that I will raise within the committee process, and also that our shadow attorney-general, who is in the other place, I am sure will continue to scrutinise this bill further as it progresses through the parliament.

Mr CREGAN (Kavel) (16:16): I address the second reading of the Criminal Procedure (Miscellaneous) Amendment Bill and have much pleasure in assisting the Attorney to bring forth the legislation. The bill is necessary so as to effect amendments that will remedy certain unintended consequences of reforms earlier introduced by the Summary Procedure (Indictable Offences) Amendment Act 2017.

The matters the bill addresses are specifically: the unintended repeal of a provision relating to the procedure for pleading guilty in writing introduced by the Summary Procedure (Service) Amendment Act 2017; the unintended exposure of parties to litigation to an unacceptable costs risk, that is, the exposure of parties to costs orders in what has historically been a no-costs jurisdiction; and the unintended re-instatement of the effect of certain repeal provisions relating to the discreditable conduct notices in consequence of the new case statement provisions.

Another amendment is directed at a practical difficulty, which is the requirement to have a defendant sign a case statement in the presence of their legal representative. Before coming to this place, and having practised as a solicitor for nearly a decade, these practical matters, though apparently to some arcane and certainly unromantic, are very necessarily addressed by the machinery of this bill. I turn to the machinery of the bill and the way in which it cures the defects that I have outlined to the house. It will do so in ways which I now briefly reflect on.

Section 62B of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for certain powers of the Magistrates Court on a written plea of guilty. The Summary Procedure (Indictable Offences) Amendment Act commenced after the Summary Procedure (Service) Amendment Act. Consequently, section 62B(5) contained in the Summary Procedure (Service) Amendment Act was, in error, further amended the very day after it commenced by the commencement of the Summary Procedure (Indictable Offences) Amendment Act.

Such are the pitfalls of the machinery of certain legislative amendments, and I have great sympathy for parliamentary counsel, whose thankless task it is to assist us all in correcting these matters, but correct them we must. In view of these circumstances, the bill reinstates the version of subsection 62B(5) that was intended to be the final version in force in South Australia by way of statute.

I turn to section 189B of the Criminal Procedure Act and amendments relating to costs, which amendments I foreshadowed in my earlier remarks to the house. An unintended legislative consequence following the introduction and passage of the Summary Procedure (Indictable Offences) Amendment Act has been an unacceptable costs risk that parties are now exposed to in what is intended to be a no-costs jurisdiction.

As has already been or will shortly be made clear by other speakers, prior to the amendments parties were not entitled to costs in relation to the prosecution of major indictable matters except in—there is always an exception—certain very limited circumstances. In the lower court this was made clear by the application of section 189B of the Summary Procedure Act. Section 189B of the Summary Procedure Act provided, and I will read it for the benefit of members:

Despite any other provision of this Part, costs will not be awarded against a party to a preliminary examination of an indictable offence unless the Court is satisfied that the party has unreasonably obstructed the proceedings.

A revision to section 189B removed the reference to 'preliminary examination' and replaced it with a reference to 'committal proceedings', which was a consequential amendment following a change in terminology in this area of criminal procedure and practice. On its face, that amendment was desirable and necessary. However, there is also a pre-committal phase for certain offences. In any case, there was no intention to change the scope of the operation of section 189B of the act. The intention of the drafter was apparently to ensure that references to define terms or the usage of common terms was consistent between acts, as we might expect, of course. This bill is directed at ensuring that the long-held position, that major indictable matters are not subject to costs, remains in force by operation of law in South Australia.

I turn briefly to discreditable conduct provisions in case statements. Members would know that the Summary Procedure (Indictable Offences) Amendment Act introduced case statements into the Criminal Procedure Act. I read for the benefit of the house section 123(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides:

(f) whether the prosecution intends to lead discreditable conduct evidence (within the meaning of section 34P of the Evidence Act 1929) and, if so, details of that evidence;

As others will no doubt observe in this place, on one reading of section 123(2)(f) the section may do some unintended mischief. That is, it may have the effect of unintentionally placing again on the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions an impractical burden to give notice of conduct evidence. Our bill is intended to cure this possible defect. I welcome the support from the opposition benches for the amendments that we are proposing in this legislation.

Finally, I will address the signing of defence case statements and reflect on section 123(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act. That section raises certain practical considerations for defence counsel. Is the defence case statement to be signed either by the defendant personally or by a legal representative representing them in the presence of the defendant? These are no small matters of practice. The practical mechanics of the remand and prison system means it is not always possible to be present with a client of a solicitor.

For prisoners held in regional prisons, the practical limitations are of course acute. Defence counsel may be prevented from filing a case statement within the time frames otherwise contemplated by practice and practice rules. Our legislation removes the requirement that the case statement be signed in the presence of the defendant if a legal practitioner is signing the statement for the defendant.

I refer to the explanation of clauses that have been or will shortly be tabled and I commend the bill to the house, observing that its passage is necessary to facilitate the administration of justice in South Australia. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr Deputy Speaker.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: The member for Heysen.

Mr TEAGUE (Heysen) (16:23): Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker.

Members interjecting:

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: The member for Heysen has the call.

Mr TEAGUE: I will confine my remarks in support of the Criminal Procedure (Miscellaneous) Amendment Bill 2018 to addressing very briefly the amendment of section 123 as it relates to case statements. In so doing, I simply wish to address the relatively recent advent of case statements as a means of preparing for trial. As a procedural step, they remain somewhat novel. It is an evolving area insofar as the preparation for trial is concerned.

I just wish to be clear about the nature of the unintended consequence of introducing the case statement regime into the Criminal Procedure Act and how it interacts with the relatively more longstanding amendments to the Evidence Act 1929. As has been observed, the Summary Procedure (Indictable Offences) Amendment Act, which was act No. 18 of 2017, introduced case statements into the Criminal Procedure Act. Section 123(2) requires the prosecution case statement to include the following:

(f) whether the prosecution intends to lead discreditable conduct evidence (within the meaning of section 34P of the Evidence Act 1929) and, if so, the details of that evidence;

Prior to the commencement of the Criminal Procedure Act, it was section 34P of the Evidence Act 1929 that governed the requirement to give notice when discreditable conduct evidence was proposed to be led. It was a particular regime under the Evidence Act requiring notice to be given. The Evidence Act was specifically amended in 2013 to ensure that the notice required for those purposes was only required to be given when discreditable conduct was being sought to be led for a propensity or similar fact purpose. As I understand, it was act No. 50 of 2013 that clarified that narrow scope.

The original requirement to give notice without reference to purpose had the effect of imposing an impractical, expansive and somewhat unintended burden on the office of the director because the concept of discreditable conduct captures a vast amount of evidence commonly used in court for purposes other than propensity or similar fact purposes. The 2013 amendment brought the notice requirement back into that more narrow purpose. It also brought it into line with the Uniform Evidence Act. So far so good, until the recent amendment came along.

It is only arguable, but arguable nonetheless, that the way the case statement regime, and in particular section 123(2)(f), has been drafted has had the effect of unintentionally reinstating that broader requirement and reinstating the conditions that applied under section 34P prior to the 2013 amendments, which would then reinstate that onerous and impractical burden on the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. That was not intended, and the bill, as far as it goes in that respect, addresses that and removes what might arguably have introduced that more onerous burden and really addresses that unintended consequence.

There are a number of other aspects of important, yet technical and necessary, amendments consequential to other changes. I will not address them further. I have listened carefully to those who have contributed and I commend the bill to the house.

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER (Morialta—Minister for Education) (16:30): I have pleasure in rising on behalf of the Attorney-General to close the debate on this bill. I encourage all members to support it, and to support it expeditiously, because this is indeed an important bill to fix a number of issues in our current legislation that came about due to defects in legislation previously offered by the former government that now need to be addressed. I thank the member for Kaurna for his contribution and, in particular, those aspects of the contribution in which he indicated that the Labor Party will be supporting the bill. I thought that was the good bit.

I thank the members for Kavel and Heysen for their considered and diligent approach to considering legislation. I encourage members of this house to reflect on other members' contributions to the bill that deal directly with the salient points, such as those of the members for Kavel and Heysen, especially when they bring to this chamber the technical expertise and skilled experience of their prior working careers. It is to be encouraged when members make contributions that are relevant to the bills, and I encourage all those members who do not feel that way to have a good hard look at themselves.

The member for Kaurna raised some questions in his contribution and, to the extent that I am capable at this stage, I will address a couple of them. It may well be that if there are further questions to be sought, in addition to those that I can respond to and in addition to those that were provided in briefings and emails offered from the Attorney-General's office to the shadow attorney-general prior, then they can be sought between the houses.

In relation to consultation and case statements and, in particular, potential impacts on rural and regional South Australians, I can quote from the Legal Services Commission, which advised that they support these amendments. They state:

The removal of the requirement for the defendant to be present while the case statement is signed by a legal representative will reduce delay and cost, as well as improve efficiency in the court process. The clarification of the discreditable conduct provisions will avoid confusion and help to ensure a fair trial for the defendant.

There are further submissions that the Attorney received from other stakeholders broadly supporting the need for this bill. In particular, there was a question in relation to the issue of costs. I do not want to single out the member for Kaurna. I know that he is doing good work for his party on behalf of the shadow minister whose attention is in the upper house, but I direct him to potentially look at the debate on the Summary Procedure (Service) Amendment Act 2017, which was a bill introduced by the former attorney-general, the member for Enfield, I would imagine. I remember that there was a great deal of back and forth.

In the second reading explanation provided on 30 May, some three weeks ago, a number of these matters were dealt with. But the point is that we have an expectation that we are indeed a no-costs jurisdiction in relation to these matters. There is ambiguity that this bill clearly seeks to clear up to ensure that that policy outcome, that decision, is not undermined as a result of the passage of that bill last year.

If there are improvements that are to be made to acts such as this, then I think it is entirely understandable that the Attorney-General would seek to act expeditiously and with enthusiasm to ensure that South Australia's community does not suffer those unintended consequences of prior legislation. The acts took effect as of 5 March; therefore, for several months, for those issues that were highlighted by the judiciary, the Director of Public Prosecutions, it was clearly important that the government listened to those concerns that were raised and address them.

In relation to the time line, and I do not want to dwell on this, the member for Kaurna did spend at least half his speech talking about the time lines provided. As leader of the house, I also had the opportunity to work for several years as manager of opposition business. I am advised that briefings were offered to the opposition on 4 June. The briefing occurred on 6 June, and at that meeting it was clear that there was no intention and no indication that the government was seeking to ensure that the bill needed to be completed in that week, understanding that that briefing had been offered.

A secondary briefing took place on 14 June. This has been considered as routine business. Members opposite who would like to complain about the treatment they received should reflect on their behaviour in government, as it is noticeable that a complaint such as that which was heard from the member for Kaurna would not necessarily have fallen on sympathetic years from the Labor Party in government. Indeed, the fact that we are debating the bill today, on 20 June, three weeks after it was introduced, some weeks after the briefings took place, is the outcome that was sought.

There were many occasions when the former government decided to push legislation through, whether or not briefings had been held. The opposition was advised that there would be no attempt by the Attorney-General's office to push the legislation through in those briefings, and the opposition were advised that they would have the opportunity, if they wished and if there was time, to hear from members of the government who were ready to speak on the bill, it having been introduced on 30 May, but that they would not be expected to have their response required to be finalised. The Attorney-General was indeed enthusiastic to get this dealt with as quickly as possible because it is important for the people of South Australia.

However, I do reflect that there were many occasions when, as manager of opposition business, I would receive the information about what was to be debated the following week on a Friday, potentially an hour or two before it was circulated, sometimes at the same time, from a lovely young man—well, he was probably my age—in the leader of government business's office.

An honourable member: He is older than you.

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER: He may well be older than me; I was being kind. He would provide an indication of what was to happen the next week. Sometimes that would bear resemblance to what would take place on the Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday; sometimes, it would not. I make absolutely no reflection on him. I think he is, as I said, a lovely man. He would suggest on the Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday morning what might take place that day, and sometimes that would also bear resemblance to what happened on that day. I commend him for those days when he achieved that because I know that it was his personal intention to give the opposition, as we were then, due notice of whatever bills were to be debated.

However, that was not always the outcome because it turns out that the former government, on many occasions, would shuffle procedure in a given week, and that happens. Sometimes governments need to do that to meet their priorities. Oppositions can complain, as the member for Kaurna did, and they are entitled to do that. We give them their space to do that, but it is not actually that unusual when it happens.

What also happened under the former government that the opposition got more upset about was when we were given notice of motions or, indeed, bills from time to time on the morning that they were to be introduced by the government. The government, obviously, had had a cabinet process with time to consider them and go through them. On the morning that they sought to introduce the bill or the motion, they would let the opposition know at about the same time they were letting the world know, and the opposition would be expected some hours later to respond to that, potentially a couple of days later. That happened on a pretty regular basis under the member for Cheltenham's premiership. I am not aware of it happening so often under his predecessor, but I was not here for much of it.

My experience is that when oppositions spend their time complaining about such things, there are not that many people who lend a sympathetic ear because, at the end of the day, life can be challenging sometimes. We as a government will endeavour to work with the opposition in a complementary way as much as we can, in a constructive way, as much as we can.

The complaint made by the member for Kaurna would carry a lot more weight if we were not here some weeks after the introduction of the bill, after he had been provided with many briefings or indeed his shadow minister had been provided with many briefings. Indeed, if we had forced it through last week, then I might have listened a little bit more sympathetically to his complaint, but the fact is we did not.

Mr Bignell interjecting:

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER: The member for Mawson complains that we are still going. The member for Mawson complained when members were speaking directly to clauses in the bill. I do not think the member for Mawson is showing much respect for the parliament, and that is disappointing. I think his constituents expect better. At any rate, I commend the bill.

Mr PICTON: Point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker: it is a reflection upon a member to say that they are not showing respect to the parliament. I ask the minister to withdraw that.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: If the member mentioned feels offended then—

Mr Bignell: I just think this guy thinks it is all about him.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Stand up.

Mr Bignell interjecting:

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: No, member for Mawson, you are out of order. The minister.

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER: I commend the bill to the house.

Bill read a second time.

Committee Stage

In committee.

Clause 1.

Mr PICTON: I will note firstly some of the lengthy debate and sermon we just had from the minister and respond to it in another form in this parliament soon. In relation to clause 1, what consultation did the government conduct in relation to this bill?

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER: The Legal Services Commission, the Law Society, the SA Bar Association, the Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement, the Director of Public Prosecutions and South Australia Police and there was further consultation with agencies as part of the usual cabinet process.

Mr PICTON: Will the minister table the responses received from all of those organisations?

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER: I do not propose to do so today. However, if the Attorney and Deputy Premier feel that it is appropriate to do so, noting that indeed I am not familiar with whether some of the responses in those consultation were expected to be public, I will allow her to make a decision obviously as to what she deems appropriate to provide between the houses. Obviously, any non-government agency or representative group is entitled to provide their responses to the opposition and the public if they so wish.

Mr PICTON: What was the response from the Bar Association to the consultation?

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER: Again, I refer the member to my previous response in relation to whether or not any particular correspondence will be released, but I am advised that the response advice from the Bar Association was welcoming of the amendments.

Clause passed.

Clause 2 passed.

Clause 3.

Mr PICTON: Can the minister outline the process in terms of how this came about and whether it was the result of the commencement dates being in the wrong order, or what the process was that led to this particular issue?

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER: On 4 March, the Summary Procedure (Service) Amendment Act repealed and substituted section 62B. On 5 March 2018, the Summary Procedure (Indictable Offences) Amendment Act came into effect and amended section 62B(5). This amendment was not intended in light of the amendments that came into effect on 4 March.

The effect of the unintended amendment on 5 March was that subsections 62B(5) and 62B(6) now deal with the same matter, namely, the powers and procedures of the court if the defendant states matters in a written plea that indicates he or she has a valid defence or that differs substantially from the relevant particulars in information. Section 62B(5) should deal with a different issue, namely, the ability of defendants to withdraw their written guilty pleas. Clause 3 of the Criminal Procedure (Miscellaneous) Amendment Bill 2018 amends section 62B(5), so it deals with the correct issue of defendants withdrawing written guilty pleas. It was identified by parliamentary counsel as being necessary.

Mr PICTON: Can the minister outline how regularly defendants withdraw their written guilty pleas? Are there particular statistics on the numbers of cases in which that happens, and what kind of cases?

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER: I make the point that at the moment, because of the glitch we are seeking to redress, the act does not allow them to do so. However, if there are any statistics that are relevant then the Attorney will provide them to the opposition between the houses.

Clause passed.

Clause 4.

Mr PICTON: Can the minister outline how not signing a case statement in the presence of a lawyer will work in practice?

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER: The lawyer must be instructed by the client to sign the case statement but need not be in their physical presence. I am advised this is particularly potentially useful, for example, where a defendant might be in Mount Gambier and the lawyer in Adelaide, or indeed vice versa, or any other regional dislocation. There may be other circumstances. I advise that stakeholders have advised of their support for this on that basis.

Mr PICTON: Can the minister outline what would be the case in which a defendant was to later claim that they did not give permission for such a case statement to be signed by their lawyer?

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER: It will be up to the lawyer to satisfy their own professional obligations with regard to having written instructions, but I would imagine that a lawyer would most likely seek written instructions from their client in this case.

Mr PICTON: I appreciate that, but I guess I am suggesting an outcome where that does not go as planned and a statement is submitted but the client then turns around and says that it was not their intention of agreeing to from what the lawyer had signed.

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER: I am sure the Attorney will provide more advice between the houses if I am in any way providing less than a clear answer here. I would suggest that the lawyer has a range of professional obligations, and in terms of the relationship between the lawyer and their client, I am sure they will take note of the advice of the member for Kaurna in the way that they conduct their matters. I think that there would be a range of areas in which a lawyer and their client would have interactions, and it is suggested that by seeking instruction in writing the case suggested by the member for Kaurna need not necessarily take place.

The CHAIR: Member for Kaurna, this will be your fourth question on this clause. I will allow it.

Mr PICTON: I ask for your leniency, Chair.

The CHAIR: The minister is happy, so away you go.

Mr PICTON: There are not many other questions to go. Minister, in relation to regional and remote areas or people who are already incarcerated, are there any concerns that this would result in a lesser quality of legal representation to them due to the fact that the lawyer would not actually have to be physically present and, therefore, not physically present to provide advice to that client in those particular circumstances of a remote client or incarcerated client?

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER: I would suggest to the member for Kaurna that, far from diminishing the quality of legal representation—and I am sure my learned friend over there can advise if this has ever happened with him—by ensuring that a member of the community in a regional community is not restricted to having legal representation from only those lawyers who are physically spending time in those regional communities, they are in fact broadening their range of legal representation that they may indeed face.

Somebody who is seeking legal representation in the town of Coober Pedy or Mount Gambier, as I suggested before—although both of those towns are serviced by fine lawyers, members of those communities—if they were able to have this take place, need not only restrict themselves to those lawyers who present themselves physically in those towns if they are able to seek this service.

Clause passed.

Clause 5.

Mr PICTON: In relation to clause 5, can the minister outline what are the unintended costs, and in what instances would they come up.

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER: At the moment, as a result of the changes last year, section 189B of the Criminal Procedure Act provides:

Despite any other provision of this part, costs will not be awarded against a party to committal proceedings for an indictable offence unless the Magistrates Court is satisfied that the party has unreasonably obstructed the proceedings.

Obviously the member would be aware of that. The deletion is replaced with 'proceedings for an indictable offence' under part 5, divisions 2 and 3. The reason for that is that we now have precommittal proceedings in addition to committal proceedings as a result of the changes made under the former attorney-general under the Labor government.

Clause 189B, in not specifically referencing precommittal stages as well, suggests that now we have those precommittal stages it is unclear whether they will be excluded from costs. Instead, we are replacing the words identifying as 'proceedings for an indictable offence' to ensure that they are also captured.

Clause passed.

Schedule and title passed.

Bill reported without amendment.

Third Reading

The Hon. J.A.W. GARDNER (Morialta—Minister for Education) (16:56): I move:

That this bill be now read a third time.

In moving the third reading, I would like to thank the officers of the Attorney-General's Department and the adviser to the Attorney-General's office for assisting me during the time we spent together this afternoon.

Bill read a third time and passed.

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