Independent Commission Against Corruption

The Hon. F. PANGALLO (19:47): I move:

That this council—

1. Notes that the Inspector for ICAC, Mr Philip Strickland SC, delivered reports to parliament of reviews into investigations into complaints on the following matters investigated by ICAC:

(a) review of PIR 18/E17253 and complaint of Mr Michael Fuller, April 2024;

(b) review of the investigation and prosecution of Mr Trent Rusby, April 2024;

(c) review of the investigation of Chief Superintendent Douglas Barr, April 2024; and

(d) the investigation and prosecution of John Hanlon, June 2023.

2. Notes that the parties named in the reports have registered with the Hon. F. Pangallo detailed submissions in writing, complaining that the reviews were attended by:

(a) abuse of power;

(b) failure to exercise power;

(c) failure to provide procedural fairness and natural justice;

(d) exceeding jurisdiction;

(e) mistakes of fact undermining probity of the reports; and

(f) failing to make findings of 'misconduct' and/or 'maladministration' in public administration in the face of clear and undisputed evidence.

3. Calls on the Attorney-General to act on the recommendations contained in the 2021 Report of the Select Committee on Damage, Harm or Adverse Outcomes resulting from ICAC Investigations.

4. Calls on the Attorney-General to order an independent judicial review, with an officer appointed from interstate with the powers of a royal commissioner, into the inspector's reports/reviews/findings in the matters of Mr Hanlon; PIR 18/E17253 and complaint of Mr Michael Fuller; the investigation and prosecution of Mr Trent Rusby; and the investigation of Chief Superintendent Douglas Barr.

This motion is intended to respond to and provide some balance from the perspective of the complainants to the inspector of ICAC's reviews of significant cases. This will include those of Mr Trent Rusby, Chief Inspector Doug Barr, Ian Lawton and Michael Fuller. I have already spoken at length previously on the John Hanlon fiasco, in which I described the inspector's conclusions to him as a snow job, a whitewash, intended to shield ICAC from further damage to its already tarnished reputation.

The inspector's reports into Mr Rusby, Mr Barr, Mr Lawton and Mr Fuller also, in my view, demonstrate an apprehended bias by Mr Strickland and a lack in probity, procedural fairness and, more surprising, a comprehensive investigation of the complaints themselves. Sworn statements were not taken from some of those directly involved in the complaint or individuals who were party to them. They were refused the opportunity to speak directly with the inspector and his deputy, Mr Plummer. Others were barred from acting as support persons for complainants, including me—I will go into that astonishing aspect later. But you get the feeling that the outcomes were predetermined and that he was just going through the motions to satisfy the obligation. Certainly the complainants have told me it felt like it was all a wasted exercise, a whitewash.

I am quite familiar with the details of each one of those complaints. I am doubtful that a few members in this place would take the time to research them and be able to make some informed comment. I think the inspector and the ICAC have felt safe in that, knowing that no-one else in here, nor in the media, would bother probing the validity of their reports—but I will. I will be the voice for those who remain aggrieved and feel let down by the so-called independent umpire. As we all know, umpires make mistakes. Umpires can get it wrong and umpires can choose to be blind. Their decisions might stand, but at least they can be challenged.

I have found integrity issues with ICAC, the justice system, SAPOL and, more recently, the Police Association and others. To be wilfully blind to these problems condones poor conduct. I note that some members in this chamber acted like proverbial tornado chasers for a headline opportunity when the current commissioner announced her resignation in a huff over the changes to the act, which I moved three years ago and which were unanimously endorsed at the time in both chambers and moved in the house—

The Hon. C. BONAROS: Point of order, Mr Acting President: I do not appreciate the member referring to any other honourable member in this place as, and I quote, 'tornado chasers', whoever it may be that he is referring to. There are protocols and standards in this place, and I expect the speaker and the mover to adhere to them.

The ACTING PRESIDENT (The Hon. R.B. Martin): I appreciate that some colourful language was used, the Hon. Mr Pangallo. Are you willing to withdraw that particular phrase?

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: I will withdraw that, Mr Acting President.

The ACTING PRESIDENT (The Hon. R.B. Martin): Thank you, the Hon. Mr Pangallo.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: I have heard worse, particularly from the member who just rose.

The Hon. C. BONAROS: Point of order, Mr Acting President: I do not think this is the forum for these sorts of comments to be made by the mover. He can stick to his speech without being disrespectful to other members in this place.

The ACTING PRESIDENT (The Hon. R.B. Martin): Understood. We have a long night ahead of us; let us keep the debate fair.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: As I said, Mr Acting President, I moved that act three years ago. It was unanimously endorsed at the time in both chambers and moved in the House of Assembly by the then Attorney-General, Vickie Chapman. So I ask: why were these members so oblivious, for the past three years, to Commissioner Vanstone's repetitive calls to make modest changes?

One of these members, the Hon. Ms Game, was not in parliament at the time and appears to have made her mind up because of the media attention the commissioner's resignation attracted. Has she read the act? Does she not see that there is a mandated three-year review set to begin at the end of the year?

I am confident in saying that not one of the members has familiarised themselves with the full detail of the many cases resulting from failed ICAC investigations since its inception in 2013, other than what they may have read in the paper. Nor have they ever met or spoken with any of those who were charged and who endured a horrendous ordeal, only for them to be acquitted or found not guilty, or simply the matter did not stack up and was thrown out of court. These are the sloppy and costly investigations that went nowhere, knowingly breaking international protocols and breaching the sovereignty of another country; withholding or losing exculpatory evidence; charging innocent people with offences; and giving flawed legal briefs and inadmissible evidence to the DPP. There is a lot more.

Much of ICAC's conduct would not have become known had it not been for the select committee, which I chaired, into damage, harms or adverse outcomes resulting from their failed investigations. Until that committee was formed, these damaged victims had nowhere to turn to air their grievances because the old act forbade that, and they had no confidence in the limited and grossly under-resourced Office of the Reviewer.

I shine a light in dark places where others in this place may be too timid to go. One member warned me in 2020 not to step on powerful toes because they would come after me. And they did, without much success, I may add.

The old 2020 act needed reform. To refresh members' memories, an example was the draconian clause that any offence constituted corruption. Let me repeat that for members in here: any offence. As the first commissioner, Commissioner Lander, once remarked, 'any offence' could mean he could launch an investigation into a minor traffic violation by a public officer like speeding or not wearing a seatbelt. That had to be changed, of course. Would Ms Game or Ms Bonaros like to have been investigated for corruption just because they were caught using their phone in a car or not indicating at an intersection?

I advocate for injustices, and a lot was going unchecked at ICAC. Prominent silks and barristers have recounted their experience in representing clients as being in a star chamber. Can I point out that the catalysts to making the amendments to the act were the botched joint ICAC-SAPOL investigation and prosecution of police officers from Sturt Mantle codenamed Operation Bandicoot; the failed prosecutions of BioSA Chief Executive Jurgen Michaelis, which Mr Michaelis says resulted in more than $300 million lost in investment and economic development to the state; Mr Trent Rusby, who was part of a group from the Department of Transport charged with supposedly stealing an Aladdin's cave of goods if you believe the reporting details that were leaked to The Advertiser by ICAC itself; the still unexplained circumstances surrounding the dropping of a fraud investigation into a multimillion dollar cattle station swindle and the handling of the subsequent complaints made against police by an ailing pensioner, Mr Ian Lawton, and his associate, Mr Michael Fuller, a retired and highly skilled barrister; and the tragic suicide of Chief Superintendent Doug Barr during an ICAC nepotism investigation into SAPOL called Recruit 313. Renewal SA executives John Hanlon and Georgina Vasilevski followed those matters.

Before even word of evidence had been taken by the harms committee and two years before the Hanlon matter disintegrated and while the ICAC office was in a shambles, as was found by Strickland, the then new ICAC Ann Vanstone denounced it when she fronted the Crime and Public Integrity Committee for the very first time on 20 December 2020, saying she was not afraid of scrutiny. Let me quote her:

I confess that I am perplexed at this initiative, absolutely perplexed. I ask myself: what is the point of this? Anyone reading the transcript of Hansard—

clearly a reference to my speech to set up the committee—

might infer that ICAC operates outside a regulatory framework and acts like cowboys and neither of those things is true in the least. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Those words came back to haunt her in her short tenure in the top job. Around that same time ICAC would have still been briefing and providing evidence to the DPP on the Hanlon case. It was doing so right up until it was dropped in 2022.

In her valedictory interview with David Bevan on the ABC back in July, Commissioner Vanstone said this:

When I started in my position—

in 2020—

we could brief the Director of Public Prosecutions directly, so we would put a brief together—our legal officers, supervised by me. We would have a conference with the Director of Public Prosecutions person, the prosecutor or the director and we could talk about the matter with them, fully apprise them of the matter, talk about how we saw it going forward, what we thought its strengths and weaknesses were, what we foresaw the defence might be.

She went on to say:

No-one knows more about the matter than the investigators who have lived and breathed it for six, nine months.

From that I can only assume that Ms Vanstone had been made aware by ICAC's legal officers—those two incompetent Hanlon investigators who lived and breathed the case, Andrew Baker and Amanda Bridge—that there were great problems about the gathering and admissibility of evidence over that bungled trip to Germany to get what were unlawful and inadmissible statements from reluctant German witnesses, in the face of warnings from one of our diplomatic offices in Europe.

After all, this was the biggest case on ICAC's books. Maybe they did not raise it with her at all. So much for fully appraising the matter. We are yet to learn the full story because nobody, not ICAC and not the courts, has even seen Mr Hanlon's defence. We have not seen Mr Hanlon's seven submissions to the inspector. I have asked for them but only Commissioner Vanstone can authorise their release. I ask again here: let's have a look.

We have not seen documents I requested from the Attorney-General from footnotes in Mr Strickland's reports. Commissioner Vanstone will not release the contents of her own inquiry for scrutiny. Why not, if she is not afraid of scrutiny? Whatever was the case, it was inexcusable how the Hanlon matter turned out.

Strickland found impropriety, incompetence and negligence. The ICAC had been mismanaged under Mr Lander in his puzzling and disturbing findings, that no one individual was responsible for appalling, inexplicable and inexcusable conduct and maladministration which put at risk the reputation of the Australian and South Australian governments, that the maladministration was institutionalised.

Strickland found excuses for Lander where he proffered, at another committee meeting, someone else may have found differently. There was no reason under the existing Ombudsman's Act to find an individual culpable. I wonder if Mr Strickland saw a statement on ICAC's website, authored by none other than Mr Lander, titled 'Integrity in Public Administration', in which he excoriates maladministration in public administration. ICAC is part, not an exception, to public administration. Let me quote a few choice words from that article authored by Mr Lander:

Regrettably, there are public officers who misuse their positions and abuse their powers, and it is important that their conduct is detected and they are prosecuted or disciplined. I have said publicly before that the biggest risk to integrity in South Australian public administration is maladministration. I remain of that view. Maladministration is a scourge, and the harm it causes to the South Australian public administration and, consequently, the South Australian public, should not be underestimated. It is incumbent upon every public authority to work diligently to minimise waste, combat mismanagement, and reduce opportunities for more serious conduct, such as corruption, to go undetected.

Here is the kicker:

I think the office, ICAC, has made a positive contribution to assisting public authorities to improve integrity in their institutions, and I hope the office continues to do so in the future, but while the office has an important role to play, in the end, the leaders within public administration bear the greatest responsibility. Good leadership is critical to good public administration, and good decision making is critical to good leadership.

So the buck stops at the top with the leader, according to Mr Lander, yet somehow Mr Strickland could not find himself to apply those principles espoused by Mr Lander to Mr Lander himself. This matter alone is extremely egregious, and there are others that I will go into in response to Mr Strickland's superficial reports.

The South Australian ICAC is the only integrity agency in Australia to have such an adverse finding made against it. If it were another government department, heads would have rolled and it would have been restructured. But to some in this place, it does not seem to matter, nor was it the parliament's right to intervene when ICAC was bungling its way through case after case at great cost to taxpayers and destroying the lives and careers of innocent people.

They are still scarred today, even though they were not guilty of any wrongdoing. One is still waiting for his property and documents to be returned years after the matter was thrown out. Even though this person was cleared, they now have problems getting a visa to travel to the United States on business because they must declare if they were ever charged with a criminal offence. Even when you are innocent, the stain of an ICAC investigation is never removed.

Who gives a toss that this integrity agency lacked integrity, failing dismally of ICAC's own key core issues, like conduct and decisions made according to law, and be evidence based, and being responsible for their conduct and decisions. But responsible to whom? As I have said previously, who guards the guards? Parliament sets the rules and boundaries, not any unelected statutory officer.

None of this was put to Ms Vanstone in that farewell swipe at the parliament and her boss, the Attorney-General, and the Premier. It was not even mentioned that there is a legislated review of the act coming up at the end of this year by the joint party Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee, where there will be an opportunity to make amendments if they are needed.

In my 53 years in the media covering politics, including my six years as an elected member, I have never seen a statutory officer behave in such a disrespectful manner to the parliament, and to members, bringing all in this place into disrepute and scorn with consistent attacks using her friends in the media or in forums. Can you imagine if other statutory officers behaved in a similar fashion towards parliament about legislation covering their departments that they did not like?

I agree with Commissioner Vanstone when she says ICAC is an important cog in the fight against corruption. I am not opposed to this agency—let's get that clear—and I will commend the agency on several reports they have compiled to better educate and inform public officers about types of corruption. But it needs to be beyond reproach itself, and I chose to be the whistleblower to call it out, for them to clean up their own act, knowing full well that it was not going to win me friends or political points. When there are principles of justice at stake, I will not be silenced because it might get noses out of joint, or politicians too afraid to rock a sensitive boat, and right some wrongs. No fear or favour is how I prefer to work.

I will now move on to address each review in some detail, to put them into some context for the benefit of members who are unfamiliar or have not made themselves familiar with, and to hear their response, which would not otherwise get any traction or consideration. I will start with review of PIR18/E17253 and complaint of Michael Fuller.

There is one important omission from this title: Mr Ian Lawton, who was an integral part of the referral and terms of reference which I had drafted and which the Attorney-General gave to the inspector in March 2023. Why? Because Mr Lawton refused to participate after coming to the realisation that it was looking to become more of a hatchet job predominantly on his associate, Mr Fuller, and his daughter, District Court Judge Joana Fuller, than the merits of their complaint.

Mr Strickland barred me from being a support person for Mr Lawton, as was Mr Fuller, who was not only familiar with the matter and was a complainant but also had extensive legal experience from years of practice as a barrister. Mr Strickland refused to meet with Mr Fuller or to take a sworn statement from him. The kangaroos were being herded into court. Judge Fuller had given compelling evidence to the harms committee that she believed lies had been told to her by police investigating Mr Lawton's claim of fraud when, as a barrister, she had provided them with an opinion that there was a prima facie case for fraud involving the sale of a cattle station, Mount Lyndhurst.

A former DPP investigator also gave evidence to support this. After a police incident report had been raised, the criminal matter was inexplicably dropped. Mr Lawton, with the assistance of Mr Fuller, then filed complaints about how the matter had been managed. These complaints to the Commissioner of Police and the OPI and ICAC were dismissed, much to the dissatisfaction of the complainants.

The alleged swindle of Mr Lawton in that property transaction runs into the millions of dollars. Mr Lawton is today an ailing, penniless pensioner spending his final days in a nursing home with the forlorn hope that one day police will reopen his case. Well, fat chance of that now. Mr Strickland had no authority to examine Mr Lawton's original complaint to SAPOL, the handling of police complaints generally or compliance to the PCD Act. He only had jurisdiction over OPI and the ICAC's review of SAPOL's decision to cease the investigation into the complaint. He did so anyway with amended terms of reference he supplied to the Attorney-General. He also decided to look at the initial police investigation, which was not his task, and he did so sketchily.

In her own report into Mr Strickland's reviews, Commissioner Vanstone says they are fairly described as exhaustive. From my reading and understanding of all those matters, I would describe them as much ado about nothing because many interested parties were not interviewed or had sworn statements taken from them. I have concluded that what has operated here is the preferment of comity of former judicial office over the execution of statutory office without fear or favour.

However, to the chagrin of the departing Commissioner Vanstone, who told me four years ago that she was not interested in looking at this matter that had already been investigated, I will waste a final few drops of ink on the Lawton saga and I will remind them that it could have been resolved simply and quickly by interrogating SAPOL's complaints management system entries, but nobody did or ever wanted to.

I want to take members through the considered reply response addressed to the President of the Legislative Council and members by Mr Fuller. It reads:

Mr President and honourable members,

The Report was tabled in this House on about 30 April 2024 and contains adverse comment about me and rewording in the Report of material that is responsive to critique by me and which I assert in the result has denied to me proper opportunity to contest.

Through the good offices of the Honourable Frank Pangallo, I make this submission as an appeal to the conscience of each of you to consider what is required in the public interest to remediate the scandalous conduct in law enforcement in this State which I believe will be exposed to the public gaze upon the tabling of this my submission.

It is the case that Review by Strickland has taken since March 2023 to complete and present to me by email dated 10 April 2024 a draft Report comprising (disregarding Appendices) 162 pages and 405 individual paragraphs, and I was only allowed until 22 April 2022 to serve a responsive submission.

To assist me to make a submission informed by documents referred to and relied upon, (but not exhibited to the Draft Report) for the conclusions reached in the Draft Report I requested that I be provided with copies of a number of these documents. Each request was refused—see paragraph 7 of my submission, attached as appendix A.

Hampered by these extremely difficult circumstances imposed upon me by Strickland I nevertheless managed to compile and serve the submission Appendix A.

For the reasons particularised below, I appeal to the conscience of all members, whatever your political persuasion, to give your earnest consideration to the particulars presented in the text below and the accompanying documents Appendices A to F.

I am entirely comfortable in the knowledge that my reasoning will stand critical examination by any competent lawyer and is more than sufficient basis for inquiry by an appropriately constituted Royal Commission.

Particulars:

Background:

1. I was provided with a draft of The Report on 10 April 2024 as it was then proposed and invited to make a submission, which I managed to do under the very tight timelines allowed to me.

2. That submission is attached to this request as Appendix A. It is one and the same submission as appears as appendix F to the report ('My submission').

3. My submission is attached in full for context as I quote passages from it and the paragraphs of the then draft of The Report which I was addressing.

4. My submission was critical of a number of aspects of the Report then in the draft.

5. My justification for the occasional trenchant language and acerbic tone of my submission is the same as for my various complaints over time, to Fraser W. Stroud, then director of OPI, Michael Riches, then deputy IC, Bruce Lander, then IC, Kevin Duggan, then ICAC reviewer, Ann Vanstone, present ICAC, John Sulan, then ICAC reviewer, and now Phillip Strickland, recently resigned ICAC Inspector; and Stephen Plummer, deputy ICAC Inspector.

6. At every turn my complaints have been frustrated by the power of Statutory Officers to ignore my reasoned and detailed submissions to each of them in turn (supported by attached anecdotal communications and references), and their respective individual refusals to engage openly and honestly with me.

7. I prefer to describe my language as the expression of 'righteous anger'.

8. I was and am but one individual with a right of things contesting the might of statutory office to ignore and deride, my only weapon the pen and the wit to use it to effect…

9. But for the support and encouragement of the Hon. Frank Pangallo my contest would not have entered the public arena at all.

10. As I demonstrate hereafter my language was not only appropriate to the circumstances at the time, but appropriate in the result as the material not available to me at the time is now enshrined in The Report, (albeit only by reference and/or extract) and is eminent justification.

11. This material is now part and parcel of The Report and a matter of public record in Hansard for all to see.

12. Strickland responded to my critique by material alteration to passages in the Draft Report which are now enshrined in the report.

13. The result is that the door was closed to me for any reply.

14. The processes of dealing with Lawton's complaint on 3 December 2018 to Commissioner Grant Stevens as disclosed in The Report can now be seen to have been employed under the [Commissioner of Police's] direct supervision and was not only a covert management resolution of that complaint, but implemented knowingly in breach of the Section 16 determination, the statutory prescription of the criteria which are only satisfied if the complaint according to its terminology alleges conduct which if proven would not result at its very minimum in disciplinary process.

I want to refer to appendix E and read it into the transcript. The heading is 'Determination pursuant to section 16 of the Police Complaints and Discipline Act 2016'. It reads:

Pursuant to section 16 of the Police Complaints and Discipline Act 2016 I, GRANT STEVENS, Commissioner of Police determine that a complaint, report or allegation relating to the conduct of a designated officer may be dealt with by management resolution in accordance with Part 3 of the Police Complaints and Discipline Act 2016 unless the conduct alleged, if proven, would result in—

(i) termination of the officer's appointment; or

(ii) suspension of the officer's appointment for any period; or

(iii) reduction of the officer's rank, seniority or remuneration; or

(iv) the imposition of a fine.

If a complaint or report consists of more than one allegation that complaint or report may be dealt with by management resolution unless one or more of the allegations would, if proven, result in:

(i) termination of the officer's appointment; or

(ii) suspension of the officer's appointment for any period; or

(iii) reduction of the officer's rank, seniority or remuneration; or

(iv) the imposition of a fine.

This determination is made on the 14^th day of August 2017 at Adelaide.

[Signed the] Commissioner of Police.

On the 1^st day of September 2017 at Adelaide this determination is approved by the Office for Public Integrity.

It is signed by a CEO of the Office for Public Integrity. I continue:

15. Strickland recites at paras 69, 70, 262, 303, 305, 330 and 333 (amongst others) criticisms of my manner and tone when addressing statutory officers including himself and Plummer.

16. Strickland says variously that my conduct is 'unacceptable', 'threatening in tone and content', 'In some circumstances such conduct could amount to the offence of threatening to cause harm within section 19(2) CLCA (noting harm includes mental harm)…'

17. Strickland recites multiple times extracts of my various exchanges with the ICAC/OPI personae referred to in paragraph 5 above to make his point.

18. Serendipitously I can now call in aid of all these extracts in support of my allegations over time without having to repeat them here in this request to be heard in reply in the same forum in which The Report has been tabled and published.

Under the heading, 'Abuse of Power':

19. Mentioned in The Report at paragraphs 71 to 75 is the initiation of contact by Lawton with Plummer on 15 November 2023 and subsequent vacillation of Lawton on 20 November 2023.

20. Of note and significance to this my submission is an invitation by email dated 24 November 2023 issued by Strickland to Lawton to provide a voluntary statement to Plummer.

21. At this date I remained a director of Lawton's company Gills Bluff Pty Ltd (an acknowledged co-complainant to OPI) and I was his main support person.

22. What I find is disturbing in this invitation. and which should be disturbing to members of this Council also is the rider that, if he brings a support person (his absolute right) he is not permitted to bring either the Hon. Frank Pangallo, a member of this Council, and his Parliamentary supporter or me.

Which is Mr Fuller. Just to repeat that again to make it quite clear: Mr Strickland invited Mr Lawton to bring with him a support person who could either have been somebody of his choice who he trusted or somebody with legal experience, a lawyer. However, he told him that he was not permitted to bring either myself, a member of this council, or Mr Fuller. I still cannot understand why. Mr Fuller goes on:

23. I attach as Appendix B this invitation for all its content.

Let me read appendix B. This is a letter from the Office of the Inspector dated 24 November 2023. It is marked 'strictly confidential', addressed to Mr Ian Lawton, to his email. It says:

Dear Mr Lawton,

RE: Invitation to meet with Deputy Inspector to provide a witness statement

I refer to previous communications in relation to the review I am conducting as a result of the Attorney-General's request and a separate complaint made by Mr Michael Fuller. Both matters relate to a complaint of criminal conduct made to SA Police in May 2018 relating to your purchase of an interest in the Mt Lyndhurst Station in 2013 and subsequent complaints made to the Office for Public Integrity (OPI) and the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (ICAC) about the termination of the investigation into your complaint.

I would like to invite you to an interview with the Deputy Inspector Stephen Plummer on Wednesday 29 November 2023 at 11am for the purpose of obtaining a voluntary witness statement from you about the following topics:

1. The circumstances in which your complaint was brought to the attention of SA Police, and the OPI.

2. The circumstances in which your complaint has progressed since your complaint to the OPI and how you wish for this office to communicate with you.

Should you wish to accept this invitation please respond to this letter as soon as possible so that appropriate arrangements can be made.

You may bring a legal practitioner who holds a current practising certificate with you to the meeting should you wish to do so. In that event, please advise of the name and contact details of the legal practitioner you have engaged.

If you would like to bring a support person with you to the meeting (whether in addition to, or instead of, a legal practitioner), please advise of the name, contact details and relationship you have with this person to enable this request to be considered.

Neither Mr Michael Fuller nor Mr Frank Pangallo will be permitted to attend the meeting with you.

The information contained within this letter is strictly confidential, pursuant to section 54(3) of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 2012 (SA) (the ICAC Act) as is connected to the subject of a review I am currently conducting pursuant to Schedule 4 of the ICAC Act.

Accordingly, it is a criminal offence for you to disclose the information contained in this letter to any person pursuant to section 54(3) of the ICAC Act unless one or more of the following exceptions apply:

(a) the person is authorised in writing by the Commissioner or the Director of OPI, or by a person approved by the Commissioner or the Director of OPI under this section to give an authorisation; or

(b) the disclosure of that information is for the purpose of—

(i) dealing with a matter referred under this Act by the Commission or the Office; or

(ii) a criminal proceeding, a proceeding for the imposition of a penalty or disciplinary action; or

(iii) a person obtaining legal advice or legal representation or for the purposes of determining whether a person is entitled to an indemnity for legal costs; or

(iv) a person obtaining medical or psychological assistance from a medical practitioner or psychologist; or

(v) a person advising their employer; or

(vi) a person advising their business partners or others for whom a relevant fiduciary relationship exists; or

(vii) the management of a workers compensation claim; or

(c) the information relates to the person and is disclosed by the person to a close family member of the person.

I note that for the purposes of subsection (c), a person is a 'close family member or another person' if: one is a spouse of the other or is in a close personal relationship with the other; or one is a parent or grandparent of the other (whether by blood or marriage); or one is a brother or a sister or other (whether by blood or by marriage); or one is a guardian or carer of the other.

I look forward to receiving your response.

Yours faithfully

Philip Strickland SELECT COMMITTEE

Inspector.

24. I can't leave this invitation without noting the threat to Lawton of possible breach of confidentiality provision of the ICAC Act, section 54(3) if he divulges the contents to anyone.

Anyone. This undermines the democratic, fundamental right of even members in this place to engage with constituents. It continues:

25. This threat I say is clearly directed to preventing disclosure to me—

Mr Fuller—

or to Pangallo of the rider to the invitation.

26. Lawton fortunately consulted Karen Stanley solicitor who sought on his behalf a list of topics which might be canvassed in the proposed voluntary statement.

27. By email of 11 December 2023 Strickland provided that list.

28. I attach as Appendix C the email to Stanley dated 11 December 2023.

Allow me to read appendix C. It is dated 11 December 2023, is addressed to Ms Karen Stanley of Stanley Law and was sent by email:

Dear Ms Stanley,

RE: Your client: Ian Lawton

I refer to previous communications.

You have requested that I provide you with a scope of questions and information to be sought from your client when he attends to meet with Deputy Inspector Stephen Plummer on Wednesday 13 December 2023 at 11am. The topics that will be addressed in this statement are:

1. The circumstances in which your client sought assistance from Mr Michael Fuller prior to making his complaint to SA Police in May 2018 alleging criminal conduct;

2. The circumstances in which (then barrister) Ms Joana Fuller was briefed to provide legal advice to your client prior to making his complaint to SA Police in May 2018, alleging criminal conduct;

3. The circumstances in which your client made his complaint to the Commissioner of Police and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) on 3 December 2018 and the role played by Mr Michael Fuller in relation to that complaint;

4. The circumstances in which Mr Michael Fuller was appointed a co-director of your client's company, Gills Bluff Pty Ltd on 9 January 2019, whether he remains a co-director; and what business activities this company carries on;

5. The circumstances in which your client and Mr Michael Fuller made their joint complaint to the OPI in January 2019 and in particular what occurred at the in person meeting with OPI staff members on 29 January 2019;

6. The communications your client had with Detective Chief Superintendent Tom Osborn of SAPOL prior to receiving this letter dated 29 January 2019;

7. Your client's understanding of the content of Detective Chief Superintendent Tom Osborn's letter dated 29 January 2019 and, in particular, his statement that there had been an informal discussion between Detective Della Sala and DPP in the context of the decision to terminate the investigation of his complaint;

8. Your client's understanding of the contents of Chief Inspector Tim Curtis' letter dated 19 February 2019;

9. Your client's understanding of the content of Deputy Commissioner Riches letter dated 3 July 2019 and, in particular, his statement that he was satisfied that SAPOL met with the DPP on three separate occasions and discussed this matter, that the view of two different DPP solicitors was sought and that the views of the DPP form part of the decision to discontinue the investigation into your client's criminal complaint; and

10. Your client's relationship with Mr Michael Fuller subsequent to their joint complaint to the OPI in January 2019 including up until the present date.

Yours faithfully

Philip Strickland SC

Inspector

I go back to Mr Fuller's statement:

29. Mr President and members of the Council you will see from the content of this list how insidious the purpose of this invitation to provide a voluntary statement in reality was.

30. It was directed at obtaining from Lawton any information which might be used in the report by Strickland predominantly to undermine my credibility (but also that of Judge Fuller).

31. The insidious nature of this invitation is incontestable.

32. All this while I am requesting the opportunity to give sworn evidence in support of my complaint.

33. Any questions Strickland might have had concerning my role vis a vis Lawton should have been put to me and my answers given on oath.

34. The reason for this invitation was clearly not to obtain credible evidence from Lawton concerning his complaint but predominantly to obtain evidence, if any was available, tending to show that Lawton had not in relation to any material event or communication exercised any independent judgement.

35. This invitation and its insidious purpose was, and is, an abuse of power and for an improper purpose, as I next in paragraph 36 demonstrate.

Mistake of fact undermining probity of report

36. I was as of 24 November 2023:

(a) a codirector with Lawton of Gills Bluff Pty Ltd (Gills Bluff), the trustee of the Lawton family trust,

(b) both Lawton and I had fiduciary obligations to Gills Bluff and to each other both at common law and under the Corporations Act thereby falling within the exceptions under ICAC Act section 54(3)(b)(vi),

(c) I was an acknowledged complainant to OPI, as was Gills Bluff and Lawton,

(d) I was recognised by Strickland as a person having lodged a relevant complaint in respect of the same subject matter as the referral by the Attorney-General,

(e) I was not a person whose conduct was the subject of inquiry under the referral.

37. I now return to my complaint of denial of opportunity to reply to alterations to the draft report now comprised in The Report and in doing so quote from a particular paragraph 224 as it appeared in the draft report, my critique of that paragraph appears in paragraphs 74, 75 and 76 of Appendix F to The Report (and now Appendix A to this request).

38. I do so for the revelation of a, but not the only, major and inexcusable mistake of fact undermining (I say fatally even considered alone) the probity of all the conclusions in the Report.

39. Draft report paragraph 224 [says, and I quote]: 'There is also no evidence to indicate that the [Commissioner of Police] was personally aware of Mr Lawton's complaint or Mr Osborn's MRP [management resolution].

I will just repeat that again, in the draft report at paragraph 224, Mr Strickland says:

There is no evidence to indicate that the [Commissioner of Police] was personally aware of Mr Lawton's complaint or of Mr Osborn's MRP.

40. My response (paragraphs 75 to 79 inclusive, in Appendix A hereto/Appendix F to The Report) the underlining hereafter is mine for emphasis in this request.'

41. '[Paragraph] 75. It is a conclusion so demonstrably wrong to the point of absurdity in the context of PCDA requirements and the obvious incontrovertible fact known to you that Lawton's complaint was made to the [Commissioner of Police] personally, that he was thereby constituted the 'designated officer'. But there is more that I can and below bring to bear.

42. [Paragraph] 76. This absurd statement cannot be withdrawn. It renders this review a farcical, incompetent exercise proof positive of my allegation that you and Plummer have been since your respective commencement of function by your writings and now by this draft report unfit for office.

43. [Paragraph] 77. After receipt of Lawton's complaint and its acknowledgement of receipt the [Commissioner of Police] then knew everything there was to know about the circumstances of the termination of PIR 18/E 1725 and the gravamen of Lawton's complaint to him.

44. [Paragraph] 78. [The Commissioner of Police] was then required to keep the complainant informed—see section 9 of the PCDA but did not so. [The Commissioner of Police] did not inform Lawton that IIS had recommended that his complaint be dealt with by [management resolution], that OPI had approved that recommendation and that he,[ the Commissioner of Police], had implemented that recommendation by the appointment of Osborn.

45. [Paragraph ]79. The Commissioner of Police was the person to appoint the 'resolution officer' and must have done so. See section 18(1). He appointed Osborn.

46. I attach as Appendix D the email dated 6 December 2023 from[ the Commissioner of Police] to Lawton, personally acknowledging receipt of Lawton's complaint to him.

I will read appendix D. This is an email from Mr Lawton, and it is in relation to correspondence for the commissioner. It is from Ian Lawton, his email address, sent Thursday 6 December 2018 at 9.57pm. It has the subject: 'Correspondence for the commissioner'. Underneath this is the email from the Commissioner of Police himself, from the Office of the Police Commissioner, which, as Mr Fuller has pointed out, Mr Strickland did not believe there was any evidence that the Commissioner of Police had known about this complaint. But here is the evidence; it is this email. It is dated 6 December 2018. It was sent at 4.47pm to Ian Lawton, and the subject: 'Correspondence for the commissioner'.

Dear Mr Lawton,

Following your phone call today, I can confirm your correspondence has been received, and a response will be provided at the earliest opportunity.

Regards,

Commissioner of Police

South Australia Police

Mr Lawton had no other reason but to believe that his complaint had reached the highest level, the Commissioner of Police. It continues:

47. This email was included in the brief of documents accompanying my Complaint to Strickland.

As Mr Fuller points out, it is something that underlines the incompetence in attending the compilation of the report. Continuing:

48. The response, as it appears in The Report to my critique above is contained at paragraph 227 of the report.

I will read from paragraph 227 of that report:

49. There is also no evidence to indicate that the Commissioner of Police was personally aware of Mr Lawton's complaint or of Osborn's MRP.

At paragraph 329 Mr Strickland says:

Mr Fuller's submission to me, containing numerous assertions against the Commissioner of Police personally—

at paragraph 330—

fails to recognise that SAPOL is a very large organisation, and that whilst the Commissioner of Police has ultimate responsibility for many matters under various pieces of legislation, he has the ability to delegate to others…

Then at paragraph 331 Strickland says:

…and cannot be expected to be aware of all correspondence addressed to him, which is received by SAPOL, nor of all complaints being handled by the IIS under the PCD Act.

And then there is a footnote to that paragraph:

50. The added text is highlighted by me in red, firstly for identification as new and, secondly, that the original text of the paragraph is retained as part of a now expanded paragraph. The numbers 329, 330 and 331 are footnote numbers.

51. What competent lawyer, I ask rhetorically, would maintain the demonstrably absurd and then add to the absurd by postulating a possibility for which no evidence exists, and which is excluded in any event by the anecdotal record of the Commissioner of Police's personal response.

52. No competent lawyer of course, I answer.

53. Strickland is exposed as a personality unwilling to admit error and in extremis prepared to postulate the impossible in defence of the indefensible.

54. This is but one example of what can be described at its lowest as incompetence but arguably intellectual dishonesty about which I have more to say.

55. What Strickland does next is not excusable as incompetence but is sophistry writ large. 'Sophistry'—the use of clever but false arguments, especially with the intention of deceiving.

56. The deception practised by Strickland is upon members of this Council, members in 'the other place', and ultimately the public of South Australia…

Under the heading of 'Failure to Make Finding of Misconduct of Clear Evidence':

57. The noting by Strickland at paragraph 154 of The Report of the uploading on 5 February 2019 of the PCDA complaints management system to the OPI case management system of entries relating to a clandestine management resolution process, including a resolution report by Osborn, which in turn included a note of a conciliation meeting which had failed to resolve the complaint. This is highlighted in paragraph 154 of Mr Strickland's report.

58. For confirmation that the resolution report included a note to this effect, see paragraph 159(b) of The Report quoting an extract from email dated 14 February 2019 by an OPI assessor to Curtis of IIS, which includes the following:

'While the OPI considers the complainant's second complaint requires no further action (noting that it concerns the same conduct as that complaint made directly to IIS; and that steps were already taken previously to conciliate the matter), we anticipate the complainant will be awaiting a decision/correspondence in relation to the complaint he made directly to the OPI. Can you advise whether you intend to write to the complainant to inform him that no further action will be taken in relation to his complaint made to OPI?'

59. In the preceding paragraphs 157 and 158 of the Report Strickland notes variously that paragraph 157 available to an OPI assessor conducting a review on 6 February 2019 ([sic of Lawton and my complaint to OPI 29 January) was the IIS assessment (sic of the complaint to the Commissioner of Police 3 December 2018) and an email by Osborn on 5 February 2019 remitting his resolution report to Chief Inspector Curtis.

60. This fixes in place knowledge in OPI of the treatment of Lawton's complaint to the Commissioner of Police dated 3 December 2018 by way of management resolution, including the referral by Osborn to Curtis of a resolution report for recording in the SAPOL complaints management system. This resolution report contains reference to a failed 'conciliation'.

61. A 'conciliation' to which Lawton was not only a party, but completely unaware of the process itself, all the while known by the Commissioner of Police, Curtis of the IIS, the senior assessors at OPI as is exposed in the email to Curtis of 6 February 2019, to be a false entry in the SAPOL complaints management system, uplifted to the OPI case management on 5 February 2019.

62. On 6 February 2019 the OPI senior assessor had before him in the OPI Case Management System all of the details recorded in the SAPOL Complaints Management System, including Osborn's Resolution Report. The OPI's senior assessor is literally telling Curtis 'to bin' the complaint to OPI and explain it to Lawton.

63. At this moment in time all at ICAC and OPI are fixed with the knowledge of a covert and improper response to Lawton's complaint to the Commissioner of Police of 3 December 2018, and, importantly an OPI assessor's facilitation of it.

64. Improper because it is contrary to the mandate in the Section 16 determination.

65. I attach as Appendix E the Section 16 Determination, the text of Lawton's complaint to the Commissioner of Police of 3 December 2018 and my 'heads up to OPI' 25 January 2019.

66. I ask members of the Council to note the allegation by Lawton in his complaint to the Commissioner of Police that, 'I now formally complain (my 2^nd complaint) that there is on the facts as presently ascertained a reasonable suspicion that Yeomans, Bolingbroke and (potentially) Della Sala have engaged in corrupt conduct in terminating the investigation of my complaint.

67. I ask members to note the allegation by me in my 'heads up' to OPI on 25 January 2019 '9…upon which the allegations against Superintendent Yeomans and Detective Sergeant Bolingbroke and the Commissioner, Grant Stevens of improper conduct are principally based.

68. There is no room for mistake or misunderstanding by the principals involved in the covert faux management resolution of Lawton's complaint to the Commissioner of Police on 3 December 2018 and my and Lawton's complaint to the OPI of 29 January 2019 and the subsequent cover up of wrongdoing by all at OPI and ICAC.

69. The Section 16 Determination was executed by the Commissioner of Police for SAPOL and Riches for OPI in August/September 2017 pursuant to section 16(1) and (3) PCDA, but was withheld from public knowledge until July 2019 when it was belatedly tabled as required by section 16 (5) PCDA in the House of Assembly by the then Attorney-General.

70. For the benefit of members of council, I attach as Appendix F a copy of section 16 of the PCDA.

I will read appendix F, and this is from the Police Complaints and Discipline Act 2016, 'Making complaints and reports', part 2, 'Assessment of complaints and reports', division 2, under 'Part 3–Certain matters to be resolved by management resolution':

16—Application of Part

(1) This Part applies to matters of the following kinds:

(a) a complaint or report determined by the Commissioner to be a complaint or report that may be dealt with under this Part;

(b) an allegation relating to conduct of a designated officer of a kind determined by the Commissioner to be conduct that may be dealt with under this Part.

(2) The Commissioner may vary or revoke a determination under this section.

(3) On making or varying a determination under this section, the Commissioner must submit the determination or variation (as the case requires) to the OPI for approval.

(4) A determination, or variation of a determination, has effect from the day on which it is approved by the OPI.

(5) The Minister must cause notice of each determination, and each variation of a determination, to be tabled before both Houses of Parliament within 15 sitting days after the day on which it is approved.

So that determination had to be tabled in both houses of parliament within 15 sitting days after the day it was approved, but now we know it was tabled two years later. I will continue:

17—Further matters relating to operation of Part

(1) The Governor may, by regulation—

(a) specify the kinds of complaints, reports and conduct that should, or should not, be the subject of a determination under section 16; and

(b) set out procedures for dealing with matters under this Part (including, to avoid doubt, making provision for the conciliation of complaints); and

(c) make further provisions relating to the operation of this Part.

(2) The Commissioner must, in respect of the operation of this Part, have regard to, and seek to give effect to, the following principles:

(a) the purpose of a management resolution under this Part is to avoid formal disciplinary proceedings by dealing with the matter as a question of educating, and improving the future conduct of, the designated officer concerned;

(b) management resolution of matters under this Part is to be conducted as expeditiously as possible and without undue formality.

18—Dealing with matters by way of management resolution

(1) A matter to which this Part applies is to be dealt with by the Commissioner causing the matter to be referred to…a suitable member of SA Police…(the resolution officer) for resolution in accordance with this Part.

Mr Fuller goes on to say:

71. The conduct by all involved is beyond improper because it is subsequently attended by deceit of Lawton and of me on and after 29 January 2019 by all at OPI and ICAC.

72. In paragraph 158 Strickland quotes from an OPI record by a member of OPI of 22 February 2019, pages 11 to 12, which I now repeat in part, '…I think the course of sending the entire matter for management resolution to review was reasonable.'

73. That this view could be held at OPI from 6 February 2019 and moreover confirmed on 22 February 2019 is beyond belief!

74. We now have an assessor at OPI having on 11 December 2018 approved a recommendation by IIS to refer Lawton's complaint of 3 December 2018 to management resolution, which was knowingly in breach of the statutory instrument Section 16 Determination, an OPI senior assessor on 6 February 2019 directing IIS not to investigate Lawton and my complaint to OPI on 29 January 2019 (alleging improper conduct by the Commissioner of Police—a CLCA offence), and on 22 February 2019 another OPI employee recording in the OPI Case Management System that the resolution by MR of Lawton's original complaint to the Commissioner of Police of 3 December 2018 'was reasonable'.

75. OPI has once again dealt with a complaint (this time to it) not according to its terms, firstly as a new complaint this time against the Commissioner of Police, and secondly alleging the Commissioner of Police is complicit in improper conduct for not having dealt with Lawton's complaint to him at all.

76. Moreover, the OPI assessor implicitly directs Curtis to inform (not OPI to inform) Lawton that 'no further action will be taken in relation to his complaint made directly to the OPI.'

77. I now refer to paragraph 159 of The Report for Strickland's recitation of my contemporaneous response to what I could observe was happening on the surface and my extreme disquiet.

78. I was right to be concerned, as is now revealed in paragraphs 158, 159 of The Report.

79. Strickland quotes my reference to 'Pandora's Box'. The reference was apt then and is now.

80. Strickland in his myopic focus on recharacterizing Osborn's faux management resolution as an 'investigation' has lifted the lid on Pandora's Box and let into the open the miasma of the covert, fraudulent faux management resolution entered into the PCDA Complaints Management System and uplifted to the OPI Case Management System on 5 February 2019.

81. And yet Strickland sees no misconduct in this?

82. I say to members of this Council, beyond comprehension for a senior counsel not to see, properly motivated by, and acting conscientiously in accordance with his ICAC Act Schedule 4.

Under the heading 'Exceeding jurisdiction':

83. Sophistry as defined is writ large. Not incompetence, but intellectual dishonesty intended to deceive members of this Council, members in 'the other place' and, ultimately members of the public of South Australia.

84. There are now 'two strike's against Strickland, independently and in combination, rendering the Report utterly lacking in probity.

85. I next illuminate a 'third strike'.

86. At paragraph 41', Strickland says '41 I have no jurisdiction to examine either Mr Lawton's original complaint to SAPOL or the handling of police complaints generally, or SAPOL's compliance with the PCD Act. I have no jurisdiction to examine the operations of the Reviewer…'

87. Now compare this statement with paragraphs 396 and 397 under the heading 'Conclusion':

88. Paragraph 396. I have found no evidence of dishonesty on the part of SAPOL officers in relation to the termination of Mr Lawton's complaint of criminal conduct.

89. Paragraph 397. I find there was no dishonesty or improper conduct by any relevant SAPOL officer in the decision to terminate the criminal investigation. I, therefore, find that there was no cover up of the conduct of the relevant SAPOL officers by more senior SAPOL officers, the IIS, the OPI or the ICAC.'

90. Absurdity upon absurdity. Within the Report inherently contradictory statements. Firstly the statement (correct) that the Inspector's jurisdiction did not extend to making findings with respect to conduct of SAPOL officers, and then secondly to make the finding quoted in paragraphs 396 and 397.

That is where he said he found no evidence of dishonesty, and there was no dishonesty or improper conduct by relevant officers. It continues:

91. The 'third strike' is now demonstrated. A 'third strike' and you are usually 'out'. He and Plummer are yet to be declared 'out'.

92. Mr President I consider that with the lifting of the lid by Strickland of Pandora's Box there is now exposed a legal conundrum, which I first identified in my complaint to Strickland.

93. There is no investigative body in South Australia that is competent to declare Strickland and Plummer 'out' or to investigate the conduct of all the dramatis personae identified by me herein and in my complaint to Strickland.

94. I will now quote a paragraph from my complaint to Strickland—'63 In respect of the exercise of your compulsory powers I request/require access to the documents produced and to make further submission to you at the end of that point of the process of your enquiry as to your then lack of remit to a body free from conflict and what then is your appropriate action.'

95. Mr President and Members this is precisely what confronts this Parliament now.

96. It cannot be erased from the public record. The miasma is there now for all to see. I have merely highlighted the telltales of the corruption which lies beneath the surface.

97. At paragraph 398 on the back of the extra jurisdictional findings recited above is the commencement of the pillory of me, continued in paragraphs 404, 407, 408 and 409., and finally in Paragraph 410 the spectre of potential prosecution of me is raised!

98. The sophistry employed by Strickland in paragraphs 396 and 397 of The Report enables Strickland to airbrush out of the total picture the knowing manipulation of Lawton's complaint to the Commissioner of Police by IIS, assisted by OPI, put in train by the Commissioner of Police, and implemented by Osborn.

99. This knowing manipulation of Lawton's complaint to the Commissioner of Police we now know was uplifted to the OPI Case Management System on 5 February 2019 and fixed everybody at OPI/ICAC with that knowledge, including[ Commissioner] Vanstone on and after her appointment.

100. Vanstone cannot escape responsibility for her part in the suppression of publication to me of the entries in the SAPOL Complaints Management System uplifted to the OPI Case Management System on 5 February 2019.

101. In an appearance before the Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee on 10 December 2020 at page 687 of the transcript Vanstone was asked by the Chair (Pangallo): 'Have you reviewed that file?' (Sic the Case Management file at OPI relating to Lawton's complaint to the Commissioner of Police and my and Lawton's complaint to OPI.) The answer 'No, and I am not going to.'

102. At this time, 10 December 2020 Vanstone knew what had been uplifted to the OPI Case Management System on 5 February 2019, she was privy to all that conduct exposed in the entries. She had by her answer become a knowing accomplice to the continuing cover up.

103. I made a submission to her on 7 October 202, soon after her appointment as ICAC 'for her eyes only' following which, in the course of a series of exchanges I said to her in an email of 3 November 2020, 'This method was chosen by me to afford you the opportunity to discreetly interrogate the 'Complaints Management System' maintained by IIS and verify for yourself 'proof beyond reasonable doubt' of improper and corrupt conduct by all of the dramatis personae named by me and attendant upon the complaint by Lawton to Stevens of 3 December 2018 and the complaint by Lawton and me', OPI reference No. 2019-002957.'

104. At this time, she knew all that had been uplifted to the OPI Case Management System on 5 February 2019! There is nowhere for her to hide. No escape from complicity in corrupt conduct.

105. From all of this Lawton's complaint to the Commissioner of Police of 3 December 2018 is now revealed as having been dealt with unlawfully under the personal supervision of the Commissioner of Police.

106. That unlawfulness is aggravated by the covert nature of its implementation by Osborn and the deceptive and misleading communications by Osborn with Lawton all with the knowledge and endorsement of the Commissioner of Police.

107. All of this unlawful and covert dealing with Lawton's complaint is known to OPI/ICAC and from the 5 February 2019.

108. None of this obvious unlawfulness has disturbed the conscience of anybody at OPI/ICAC/ICAC Reviewers ever since in response to my complaints over time to each of them.

109. This unlawfulness and the aggravating circumstances attending it is in Strickland's face, but by intellectual trickery is pasted over in his Report.

110. This sophistry, this intellectual trickery I have called out above as now 'three strikes'.

111. There are three strikes identified by me as rendering The Report lacking in probity.

Findings vitiated and unable to stand

112. Against this background is now in stark focus the finding by Strickland (would you believe?) in paragraph 8 of the Report under the heading 'Introduction.'—8. As a result of my review of this matter I found no evidence of corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration by ICAC, the OPI, or any employee of ICAC or the OPI.

You might say, Mr Acting President, 'Well, how on earth?' He continues:

Implications for the Government.

113. Strickland and the whole of the Inspectorate should metaphorically be sent back to the bunker.

114. This means in practice that the Inspectorate as currently comprised by Plummer and senior solicitors should be dismantled.

115. How that might be achieved in practice is a matter for Government.

116. I rest my case that Strickland and Plummer have at all material times been unfit for the office to which each was appointed.

117. The implications for the Government to consider are the demonstrable failure of this inspectorate to conduct any competent, dispassionate Review of this referral and my complaint and the jurisdictional limitations on Strickland now exposed for there to be any legitimate finding by Strickland with respect to the conduct of SAPOL officers involved in the termination of the investigation entitled PIR 18/E 1725.

118. Only a Royal Commission can now satisfy the public interest to enquire into and make findings in the matter that was originally referred to Strickland and now his review and Report as Inspector, namely the matter of the termination of PIR 18/E 1725 recommended by the Select Committee to be the subject of a judicial inquiry.

The Hanlon, Rusby and Barr reviews

119. Strickland derides me for my impertinence in critiquing his review of 'the Hanlon reference'.

120. My critique of Strickland's review of the Hanlon reference was made to him and is now incorporated in Hansard as part of a speech by Pangallo in the Council on the 21^st of February 2024.

121. I refer to that speech in the tabling of my critique of Strickland's review of the Hanlon reference as if incorporated in the submission as an Appendix hereto.

122. In closing there are matters of sophistry by Strickland I have observed in reading the reports in the Barr matter and the Trent Rusby matter which reinforce a conclusion I have reached, namely that this Inspectorate has been an imposition upon the taxpayers of this state of several $$millions since its inception January 2023.

123. This Inspectorate under the stewardship of Strickland, aided and abetted by Plummer has been a shameful episode in the recent legal history in this state.

124. In the Barr Report Strickland by sophistry has massaged conduct by Lander demonstrably 'cruel and unusual' as that term has been used to describe the death penalty in criminal law into the excusable.

125. Lander had advised Doug Barr that he would inform Barr within 3 weeks as to an outcome to an investigation into Barr's conduct then completed.

126. This was in all of the circumstances attendant upon the investigation notification to a person, metaphorically on death row (potentially career-ending findings of, and potential prosecution for, corrupt conduct) that consideration of commutation would be provided in that time.

127. That commutation was decided (likely within the 3-week period), but advice was delayed by 3months, in which time Doug Barr took his own life.

128. The Review necessarily for Mrs Barr and family, reopened the emotional wounds barely healed, but with the expectation from the Select Committee hearings, and the fact of the reference itself, that Doug Barr's reputation would be publicly restored.

129. She reasonably expected that there would be forthcoming some expression of, and acknowledgement of, Lander's contribution to Doug Barr's death in his clearly unconscionable delay.

130. Any expectation that Mrs Barr might have had was dashed by Strickland excusing Lander's conduct which inflicted upon her then further cruel and unusual punishment.

131. Shame! Is all I can say.

May I add here, that it has been much reported in media circles and elsewhere, that the investigation into Doug Barr in the Recruit 313 report by ICAC, was justified. Nobody in this place, and nor would I, would ever question the right of ICAC to have investigated the allegations of nepotism that were investigated in the Recruit 313 report. They were quite entitled to do that. They had complaints that the commissioner had to investigate.

The crux of the point here, and the crux of the point that was made at the committee was not so much the justification for that report, it was the fact that Chief Inspector Barr had taken his life, waiting almost three months for something he had expected in three weeks. All the time, Mr Barr was under enormous strain mentally and physically, not knowing what his future held. Was he going to be charged criminally? Was it the end of his career?

For the committee, it was the actual delay in telling Mr Barr what was going to happen that we took an interest in, not the veracity or the justification for that report; that was fine. The central point of all this was the delay that could have been avoided, and that could have saved Doug Barr's life. That was what was shocking about that, not that it was used, that the report itself being justified was a reason for the changes to the ICAC Act. No, it was not that at all.

The reason we looked into the Doug Barr matter was that inordinate delay in telling him that he was not going to be criminally charged. It may have led to some disciplinary procedures, and that may have come as a relief to him. But not knowing for three months after you have been investigated for a long period of time, not knowing what the outcome was going to be, of course is going to play on somebody's mind. Of course their mental health was going to deteriorate to the point where they start to think, 'Is life worth it? Is it worth it all?'

Tragedy struck the Barr family when Mr Barr decided to take his own life. Could parliament ignore that? Could we not question why there was that delay? We would never have known about that delay or any of the contents of report 313 had that committee not been called. I think the people, the taxpayers, had a right to know. I will continue:

132. Then there is Trent Rusby. Sophistry again.

133. Strickland finds that Lander was wrong to send a brief of evidence to the DPP which he ought to have known 'offered no reasonable prospects of conviction'.

134. By sophistry Strickland excuses that conduct by focusing on the appropriateness of the investigation as not a waste of public resources, and then deliberately ignores the personal consequence of accountability to Lander for incompetence and/or negligence.

135. The conduct by Lander in referring the brief to the DPP was then aggravated by what can only be described as a claim to victory in providing Nigel Hunt—

He was a journalist with The Advertiser. He is now media adviser to the Commissioner of Police—

with an exclusive report for publication.

136. Nothing to see according to Strickland. Shame again I say!

I just want to add here in relation to Mr Rusby, but I will take it up when I come to his matter, that I know that in the current debate over changes to the ICAC Act, the commissioner and other supporters of the changes keep bringing up the issue about allowing the commission to refer matters directly to the DPP, to refer their cases directly to the DPP. Well, I have just highlighted two cases where they totally bungled that: the Rusby matter, and also the Hanlon matter. Mr Rusby was totally innocent of charges. He should never have been referred, yet his reputation has been totally destroyed, although the inspector did not think that was necessarily so.

That was part of the reason that parliament decided that perhaps the briefs should first go to the police to try to ensure that all the t's were crossed and the i's were dotted, that all the possible available evidence had been gathered, that there were no anomalies, that there were no oversights before they could then lay criminal charges. That was the reason for that and I have just highlighted two cases why it was a mistake sending them to the DPP because ICAC could not get their act together and as a consequence of that caused embarrassment to the Office of the DPP when they took those matters into court. Mr Fuller continues:

137. Institutional/systemic organisational failure in private or not-for-profit sectors is universally attributed to failure of leadership and without exception results in either in forced resignation or dismissal of the leadership team.

I can say here that this place often acknowledges recognition of the ministerial responsibility for serious error in public administration portfolios regardless of actual knowledge. As I said earlier, where there is a case of wrongdoing, whether it is the minister or by a statutory officer in that minister's department, heads usually roll and that there is a restructure. There is accountability for leadership failure in the private sector as well. Mr Fuller continues:

139. But not here in the public administration sector in the form of the entity of ICAC/OPI, is there any accountability for institutional or individual failure as found by Strickland.

140. What is then accorded to ICAC and its leadership team by sophistry is special treatment in the conclusions of Strickland across four discrete reviews that nobody is accountable!

Now, who can believe that: nobody is accountable? He continues:

141. The result is when all four reports are viewed in holistic context, no single person, including, but especially, the leadership team is held individually accountable when evidence of misconduct and/or maladministration abounds.

142. When misconduct and maladministration abound in ICAC/OPI and are found to be 'institutionalised' (Hanlon Report) the leadership team must necessarily be accountable individually and collectively.

143. This is what is exposed in all four Reports despite the sophistry employed by Strickland to deny the obvious.

144. The Inspectorate was supposed to be the oiled whetstone against which any corrosion in ICAC was to be removed and ICAC rendered continuing fit for purpose. Instead, this Inspectorate has turned out to be just a wet stone.

145. If I may be so bold Mr President, the cause for the very public failures of ICAC, the resultant major change to the ICAC Act in September 2021 removing jurisdiction from ICAC over misconduct and maladministration in public administration, the institution of the Select Committee to inquire into the harm caused by these failures and its several recommendations, can be traced back to the personal requirements in the ICAC Act for eligibility for appointment to the office of ICAC.

146. I refer to section 8(3)(a) ICAC Act. The mandated eligibility requirement is that a candidate must be a legal practitioner of at least 7 years standing or a former judge of a superior court.

147. These former judges obviously have first class intellects, but just as obviously have had no experience in governance of any corporation or private sector organisation, including people management.

148. Herein lies the problem and the explanation for all of ICAC failures under the stewardship of Lander and now of Vanstone.

149. What is required is an amendment to Sect 8(3)(a) ICAC Act to mandate as a minimum requirement that to be eligible the candidate must have had experience as an officer of an investigative body at a high level of governance and that a legal qualification is an advantage.

That is signed 'Michael John Fuller' on 19.6.2024. Before I finish off, a postscript was sent to me by Mr Fuller following the resignation of the current commissioner. It is a postscript dated 19.6.2024. He says:

Mr President…

Since the date of my Submission was composed ICAC Vanstone has given notice of resignation as ICAC effective from 6/09/2024.

I have also had an opportunity to read:

(a) a report by her to this Council and the House of Assembly entitled, 'Commissioner's response to the three reports of the Inspector tabled 30 April 2024', (which for reference I attach as Appendix G, and

(b) a transcript of an interview of her by David Bevan ABC Radio Adelaide following the announcement of her resignation, which for reference I attach as Appendix H.

On page 4 of Appendix G is the comment [attributed to Commissioner Vanstone]

'The scope of the Inspector's review can be fairly described as exhaustive.'

On page 8 of Appendix G is Vanstone's summary of the history of reviews of my complaints over time and the review and report on my complaint to Strickland, in which she says, 'None has found any evidence of corruption, misconduct or maladministration. Enough time has been spent and ink spilled on this matter.'

Vanstone does not include reference to my ultimate complaint to her in October 2020 which she has ever since resolutely declined and refused to consider. Her reason, as expressed in the quotation above she has consistently maintained in various fora over time since October 2020.

She misdirects herself when she includes amongst the list of persons to whom I have complained and who have not found 'any evidence of corruption, misconduct or maladministration…a Parliamentary Committee.'

The Select Committee constituted by this Council (the 'Harms' committee) to enquire into the then recent and very public failures of ICAC Lander is testament to her error.

After lodging my complaint with her in a subsequent email to her on 3 November 2020 I labelled her refusal to act on it as 'wilful blindness' and for her reference I quoted a passage to her from the joint judgement of the High Court in R v Crabbe [1985] HCA 22.

I also said to her in that email, 'If you had the honesty to do so, I challenge you to do this, (sic interrogate the SAPOL Complaints Management System entries) and report to me the result.

You either know already or are fearful of enquiring for the knowledge you will acquire as a result.'

That wilful blindness (at least) in her, if not complicity in unlawful conduct (and before her) in former ICAC Lander, Riches and Stroud is no longer a matter of allegation by me, but now a matter of record in the extracts from the OPI Case Management System cited by Strickland in the Report.

We know now courtesy of the Report and those extracts from the OPI Case Management System that she has damned herself by her public utterances and the continuing failure to self-report in the face of my complaint to her of systemic unlawful conduct in OPI and former ICAC Lander.

The unlawful conduct in which she has been, and is now complicit, is by SAPOL (in the person of Commissioner of Police Stevens, IIS and Osborn) in a fraudulent, unlawful and clandestine Management Resolution of Lawton's complaint to the Commissioner of Police 3 December 2018.

The persons against whom I say, based upon the entries in the OPI Case Management System alone, a strong prima facie case of complicity in unlawful conduct exists are (at this time yet to be identified) senior assessors (2) and Stroud at OPI, Lander, Riches, Duggan, Sulan and now Vanstone.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is likely to be exposed upon production of all the entries in the OPI Case Management System uplifted from the SAPOL Complaints Management System on 5 February 2019.

Importantly for the case now against Vanstone she has read Strickland's Report into my complaint and publicly commented on it. She therefore can be taken to have read the extracts quoted from the Case Management System if not the whole file OPI Ref—2019 002957.

Vanstone cannot now exculpate herself but can mitigate her own offending by belatedly performing her ethical and statutory obligation to self-report to you Mr Attorney-General and for you to now implement the recommendation of the Harms committee by the establishment of if not a Royal Commission, an Independent Judicial Enquiry.

That enquiry must now inevitably include an examination of the conduct of Strickland and his Inspectorate of the four views reported to and tabled in both houses of the SA parliament.

One example in the Report is sufficient to establish the need to examine the conduct of Strickland.

The example is the quotations from the OPI Case Management System in the Report above which inculpate (not exculpate) all at ICAC and OPI including now Vanstone.

For Strickland to author the Report and advance the quotations in it from the OPI Case Management System as exculpatory, on the strength of an opinion by the (unnamed) author of the email of 22 February 2019 is sophistry writ large.

By any criteria, for that opinion to be held, let alone expressed, as evidence exculpatory as Strickland asserts, of OPI complicity in the approbation of the fraudulent, unlawful and covert management resolution of Lawton's complaint to the Commissioner of Police, 3 December 2018, is case enough against him and the lack of probity of the Report.

You, Mr Attorney-General, allowed the review by Strickland by your reference to him of 'PIR 18/E 1725' to continue, notwithstanding advice by Strickland to you that he had no jurisdiction to enquire into and make findings in relation to the police conduct in and about the circumstances of the termination by SAPOL of 'PIR 1/8E 1725'.

In that you share responsibility for the fiasco which is the Report.

My submission and this postscript articulate a fully particularised indictment of participation in criminal conduct by all those, Commissioner of Police, ISS and Osborn at SAPOL, Stroud and assessors at OPI, ICAC Reviewers Duggan and Sulan, Lander, Riches, Vanstone at ICAC, and latterly Strickland.

Upon the tabling of my Submission and this Postscript by the Hon. Frank Pangallo they will then constitute a public record in Hansard to be interrogated by any person having an interest in the eradication of corruption in SAPOL and in ICAC/OPI, the latter paradoxically the very bodies constituted to combat corruption in public administration.

I am fully confident that my analyses will stand the test of interrogation by any open minded and competent lawyer.

There will also be a spotlight focused on you Mr Attorney-General and your government to do or not to do the right thing in the interest of the public of South Australia.

That is signed Michael Fuller, 20 August 2024. For the assistance of Hansard, to enable them to follow what I have read out in these statements this evening, I am asking that I table that complete report. It contains all that I have read out.

The ACTING PRESIDENT (The Hon. R.B. Martin): Mr Pangallo, I understand that you have actually already read it into Hansard.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: I am just asking that for the assistance of Hansard. If the Clerk considers that it is tabled, I am happy.

The ACTING PRESIDENT (The Hon. R.B. Martin): So you will provide it to Hansard. Is that what you are suggesting?

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: I can provide it to Hansard to assist them.

The ACTING PRESIDENT (The Hon. R.B. Martin): If you are comfortable with that, I think that would assist them.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: Okay. I am conscious of the time here tonight and that other members would like to speak on other business. I still have more to say about this motion and I seek leave to conclude my remarks until the next sitting week.

Leave granted; debate adjourned.