Bills

Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) (No 2) Bill

Second Reading

Adjourned debate on second reading.

(Continued from 28 September 2017.)

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN (15:44): I rise to speak to the Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) (No. 2) Bill. I am speaking on behalf of my Liberal colleagues and indicate that the opposition is supporting the second reading of the bill. This is an omnibus bill but it also has somewhat controversial amendments which have made the front page of The Advertiser. For the benefit of members, I might go through the less debatable amendments, if I could put it that way, and then address some of the amendments that relate to changing the nature of criminal sexual offences.

The bill itself, without amendment, corrects minor errors and deficiencies that have been identified in various pieces of legislation within the ambit of the Attorney-General's portfolio. The amendments are relatively minor in nature, and I am excluding, of course, the substantive amendments that have been tabled and subsequently filed in this chamber.

Firstly, the bill amends the Cross-border Justice Act 2009, which governs the approach to criminal justice on the NPY lands. The NPY lands is an area that spans the central desert region of South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory. The extant legislation enables correctional facilities and youth training centres to be regulated according to the state in which that particular centre is located. The relevance of this is that each centre can apply the same set of rules to all inmates, regardless of where the particular inmate might have committed an offence, been arrested or usually lives.

This bill contains amendments that are consequential to the passing of the Youth Justice Administration Act, to specify that it will only apply to youths detained in South Australia but not the other participating jurisdictions in the cross-border scheme. The amendment is straightforward and the Liberal opposition supports the same.

The bill also amends the Justices of the Peace (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2016, which has been assented to but has not yet commenced. The government has advised that when the act was passed in 2016, it failed to take into account the changes made to section 11 by the Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act, which at the time had not yet commenced operation. Section 11 confers the power to take disciplinary action against a justice of the peace from the Governor to the Attorney-General. The bill corrects any inconsistencies in section 11 to ensure that it operates as was intended.

The bill also amends the Real Property Act to remove any potential unintended consequences following the passing of the Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 2013. Finally, an amendment to this bill was moved by the government in the other place and passed with Liberal Party support. This amendment resolved a technical issue identified within the Surveillance Devices Act. The act prescribed the Police Ombudsman as the relevant review agency for South Australia Police. However, in September of this year, the Ombudsman was dissolved following the passing of the Police Complaints and Discipline Bill. The amendment replaces it with the reviewer under schedule 4 of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012, and we are advised that the Hon. Kevin Duggan AM QC has been appointed as a reviewer until 4 March 2020.

The bill in its raw form is one that requires, I would suggest, little debate. Subsequently, the government has, under the cloak or justification of urgency, filed further amendments, which relate to persistent sexual exploitation of a child. These amendments involve complex law, and it is the Liberal Party's view that these amendments require proper debate. This has been debated in the public forum ahead of today's debate, but it was the Liberal Party's view that proper debate would better test this bill to ensure that we do not have the situation we are now facing, where there needs be further amendment with retrospect provisions providing for retrospective application.

The justification for the amendments were the result of a High Court case, in shortened title of Chiro. The effect of that case was to say that because there was no special verdict—which means that there was a course of behaviour that the individual was found guilty of, but no special verdict on the particular aspects of the offending was taken from the jury—in the sentencing the most minor of the range of offending had to be taken into account and not the other, perhaps more serious, aspects of the case.

In essence, the bill seeks to rectify that and adopt a model clause that was articulated in the criminal justice report of the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. That report was released prior to the High Court delivering its judgement in Chiro. There was another associated case called Hamra, but the main focus seems to be on the case of Chiro in briefings, I understand. These provisions before us, I understand, relate to implementing that model, and I would like to explore the aspects of that model when we enter into the committee stage immediately after the second reading.

I understand there has been limited community consultation, but I am appreciative of the South Australian Bar Association managing to provide a letter by email. Because we are dealing with this bill with some urgency, I intend to read it out. Members will be relieved that it is only two pages. It begins with the usual salutations. The letter is addressed to myself by email and dated 19 October 2017. I sought their views. The signature block is from Ian Robertson SC, the President of the South Australian Bar Association:

I refer to the letter from the Attorney General to you dated 17 October 2017 and to the Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) (No 2) Bill 2017...

I observe that the Bill was not provided to this Association for comment by the Government. In the plethora of Bills provided to the Association in the last month, this Bill and the Statutes Amendment (Recidivist and Repeat Offenders) Bill 2017 were notable omissions.

This Bill was forwarded to the Criminal Law Committee of the Association for comment. In the little time available to consider this Bill, the Criminal Law Committee have formed the view that the proposed amendments it sets out to make appear to be largely a knee jerk response to defects in legislation which is arguably flawed to begin with.

With respect, the Attorney General's position misses the point highlighted in Chiro. Chiro was a case about an unfair and lazy use of s 50 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 by the prosecution. The type of charge which is permitted by s 50 was never intended to become a run of the mill offence to be commonly utilised in prosecutions relating to sexual misconduct against children. It was intended to be a charge of last resort only, and then, primarily in regard to young children who could not particularise the offending conduct in the usual way. It seems that the section is routinely used in most child sex cases, including cases where the complainant is not a young child and is capable of properly particularising the instances of offending conduct in the usual way.

Encouraging charges relying on s 50 tends to encourage lazy and, we would argue, unfair prosecutorial tactics. Indeed, this was highlighted as a problem in Chiro.

The offence created by s 50 is a significant compromise on the usual common law principle requiring the prosecution to properly particularise the case that the accused has to meet at trial. There is perhaps a justification in appropriate cases for resort to be had to s 50, for example, where a child cannot distinguish one occasion of offending from another. The need to modify the common law was based on resolving the practical difficulty (in some cases, the impossibility) of the victim being able to remember material particulars, or to provide the dates or the exact detail or circumstances of an alleged offence. Justice Kirby has observed in KRM (2001) 206 CLR 221 (at [80]) that the offence is a modification of the requirements of the common law which insisted upon a high degree of specificity in the proof of criminal offences, generally.

So, in Chiro, where persistent sexual abuse in breach of s 50 was charged, the acts alleged by the prosecution hugely varied. They ranged from kissing to unlawful sexual intercourse. If a single verdict of guilty was returned, as it was in that case, for what misconduct was the accused convicted? The High Court held the sentencing judge could not guess. Hence, the need to sentence the accused on the basis most favourable to him.

The proposed amendment will, we contend, relieve the prosecution of thinking about what is the appropriate charge. It will encourage inexactness and promote laziness. If passed, that amendment would enable the prosecution simply to allege a range of unlawful sexual acts (ranging from the minor to the egregious) and the accused will have no way of knowing what conduct the jury has relied upon to convict. A long, unwarranted and unjust sentence may result, even though the jury may have convicted on the basis of the least serious offending conduct.

Further, the amendments appear to permit that the jury is no longer required to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of both unlawful sexual acts in the event of more than two acts being alleged.

The association contends that any amendment to these provisions should commence from the standpoint that the intention for the charging of offences of this type is a circumstance of last resort, namely where the complainant cannot give appropriate particulars. These amendments are self-styled by the Attorney's letter to you as proceeding on quite a different, and we, argue, misconceived basis.

This Bill will be conducive of laziness in prosecutorial practices and inevitably will lead to serious unfairness and miscarriages of justice.

The Association recommends that consideration of this Bill is deferred so that its ramifications can be determined, including its effect, if any, on the ratio of Chiro. That case is scheduled for further consideration by the Court of Criminal Appeal on Friday 20 October 2017, the contemporariness of which cannot help but be remarked upon.

I thank the Bar Association for providing me with that submission under difficult circumstances. I was going to ask the minister for a couple of topics to be addressed in his second reading summing-up, but it would probably be more appropriate at clause 1 since he will have the opportunity for an adviser to sit alongside him.

I would like the minister, who has tabled his second reading speech, at clause 1 to set out formally for the benefit of the Hansard the reason for the urgency; the extent of consultation, particularly after the royal commission report, because the royal commission report is providing the model for which these legislative changes are based; and whatever cases are being impacted, which I know has been the subject of the some of the briefs to the Liberal Party.

I would like to put to honourable members that the Attorney-General on many occasions has expressed his particular dislike of the Legislative Council chamber. I would like to point out to the Attorney-General in the other place that on many occasions this chamber corrects errors that have appeared in bills and more often than not improves them, and that is why this chamber exists, not only to have its own legislative initiatives but also to review the work of the House of Assembly.

The shadow attorney-general has asked the Attorney-General on a number of occasions to debate this bill in the House of Assembly first. This has been rebuffed. The Attorney-General's new tack is to try to reduce this chamber to a rubber stamp, using urgency to justify limited examination and consultation. What concerns me is that we may end up in the same set of circumstances as we find ourselves now with ill-considered law and having to then legislate for retrospective provisions, which anyone should feel distinctly uncomfortable about, and we will get to those in the committee stage.

What I find a little galling is that the Attorney-General in the other place expects us to fall on our knees in awe of his demands for urgency when he got it wrong in the first place. How can we trust that this version is any better? I reiterate, poor law comes from a limited opportunity to debate.

I was going to attempt to move an adjournment but I know that I do not have the numbers so I am not going to proceed down that path. My final comment is to reiterate that the Liberal Party is genuinely concerned that the urgency of the passage of this bill through the two chambers will impact on the quality of the legislation and undermine the aspects of the bill which provide for community safety. The Liberal Party does not have an issue with the policy objective but it does have concerns that the urgency may well result in unintended consequences.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER (Minister for Employment, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation, Minister for Manufacturing and Innovation, Minister for Automotive Transformation, Minister for Science and Information Economy) (16:00): I thank all those who have contributed to the second reading of this bill. As honourable members know, the government is going to move amendments relating to the offence of persistent exploitation of a child and to address the impact of a recent High Court ruling in Chiro v The Queen. I will provide some background on these amendments and might be able to answer some of the questions that the Hon. Andrew McLachlan has raised.

In South Australia the offence of persistent sexual exploitation of a child is prescribed by section 50 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935. The High Court recently delivered judgements in two appeals, Hamra v The Queen (the Hamra case) and Chiro v The Queen (the Chiro case), dealing with the existing South Australian offence of persistent exploitation of a child. The Criminal Justice Report of the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse recently recommended changes to the offence of persistent exploitation of a child—recommendations 21 and 22 of the report.

It was recommended that each state and territory should introduce legislation to amend its persistent sexual abuse of a child offence in accordance with the recommended draft provision, the model provision, which was itself based on a similar provision in the Queensland Criminal Code. These amendments substantially implement recommendations 21 and 22 of the Criminal Justice Report of the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse and also address some of the problems created, bearing in mind the majority High Court decision in the Chiro case.

The offence of persistent exploitation of a child creates an offence where an adult commits more than one act of sexual exploitation of a child over a period of not less than three days. An act of sexual exploitation of a child is an act of a kind that could be the subject of a charge of a sexual offence if it were able to be properly particularised. The offence is designed to overcome the problem whereby children or adults recounting historical allegations from when they were children are unable to particularise the alleged offending sufficiently to enable the alleged acts to be separately charged. This may be because they are unable to provide specific dates, times or places that the alleged offences took place. It may also be due to the repeated nature of the offending resulting in an inability to delineate two specific offences to provide the degree of specificity required to differentiate repeated individual acts from each other.

The offence of persistent sexual exploitation of a child is, therefore, designed so that an offender can be found guilty as long as the jury or other trier of fact is satisfied that more than one sexual act was committed against the child over a period of not less than three days. Until the recent decision in Chiro, upon the finding of guilt by the jury or the trier of fact, the sentencing judge sentenced taking into account all the sexual acts that the judge found were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Chiro a majority of the High Court has said that upon a finding of guilt by the jury, the jury should be asked by the judge which of the sexual acts they find proven beyond a reasonable doubt and then the judge has to sentence, taking into account only these acts. If the jury is not asked the question, the judge must sentence on the version of facts most favourable to the offender; that is, only taking into account the two least serious acts, regardless of whether the judge has formed the view that other more serious acts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

In relation to trials in the future, the requirement to ask questions of the jury may create difficulties as to how the questions are framed, as well as creating difficulties for prosecutors when framing the charge at the outset. In particular, the jury's answers to questions may differ, depending on whether more than four hours have elapsed, when they can return a verdict by statutory majority. They may be unanimous as to some acts, and only have a statutory majority as to others.

The answers to the questions will differ only on account of the time elapsed, but a proper and less consequential verdict could still be returned within four hours. The jury might simply not attempt to reach a verdict on the more serious acts once they reach a unanimous view on the two less serious acts. Answers to serious questions will likely, in many cases, provoke more questions, leading to a complex and unworkable sentencing process, and there would be a stark inconsistency between the approach of sentencing following a trial on the one hand and a plea of guilty on the other, where the necessary fact finding is the province of the sentencing judge.

Under the current offence provision, any charge must cover all alleged acts in respect of the relevant period. It is common for acts of different degrees of seriousness to be alleged during the charged period, as is often the case when offenders groom their victims by beginning with less serious acts of abuse and progressing to what can be regarded as much more serious acts.

The effect of the decision in Chiro is that it will now be difficult to avoid the risk that the accused will only be held accountable for the less serious acts, and will ultimately not be held accountable for the more serious acts. This result can be avoided by substantially adopting the model provisions recommended by the royal commission.

The model provisions provide that the actus reus of the offence is the maintaining of an unlawful sexual relationship—the unlawful sexual relationship established by more than one unlawful sexual act. The trier of fact must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the unlawful sexual relationship existed. If the trier of fact is a jury, the members of the jury are not required to agree on which unlawful sexual act constitutes the unlawful sexual relationship.

The provision is retrospective, but only in relation to sexual acts which were already unlawful at the time they were committed. This is not creating an offence that was not an offence at the time it was committed. In that respect it is not doing something that you fit retrospectively to people's behaviour in the past. It is only retrospective in relation to sexual acts that were unlawful at the time that they were committed.

On sentencing, regard is to be had to the relevant lower statutory maximum penalties if the offence is charged within that retrospective application. Accordingly, the amendment deletes the existing offence of sexual exploitation of a child (prescribed by section 50 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act), and adopts all but the last of these aspects of the model provision. In respect of that last aspect, the royal commission recommends making the persistent sexual abuse offence retrospective, but acknowledges that doing so may have the effect of exposing the offender to a much higher maximum penalty than applied to the individual acts of abuse at the time they were committed.

To address this concern, the model provisions firstly suggest that, where a predecessor offence was in force at the time of the unlawful sexual relationship, the maximum penalty that applied to the predecessor offence should be taken into account. This concept is in South Australia as the predecessor offence is contained in section 50 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act, and attracts a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.

The model provisions go on to provide that, for offending that took place before the predecessor offence was in place, the court should take into account the maximum penalty then applicable for the unlawful sexual acts upon which the unlawful sexual relationship is alleged to have involved.

At this point it should also be noted that the recommendations were made before the High Court delivered the judgement in the Chiro case. The very mischief the relationship offence seeks to address is to remove the requirement to prove particular offences to found the offence. This is achieved by making the maintaining of an unlawful relationship, rather than the particular unlawful sexual acts underlying it, the actus reus of the offence. It also clearly removes the requirement for extended jury unanimity as to the underlying sexual acts.

Given this, it is counterproductive then to bring the penalty back to the individual acts in historical cases. It carries the risk that, notwithstanding no longer requiring that extended unanimous verdict, the court may be required for sentencing purposes to inquire of the jury which acts the finding of guilt was based upon. In the context of an offence where the jury is not required to be unanimous in those acts, this becomes an unworkable task.

Further, tying the sentence to the unlawful acts proven may be impossible under the model provisions given that they remove the requirement for the extended jury unanimity. That is, in a case where multiple acts on multiple occasions are alleged, it is difficult to see how it could ever be possible to apply the maximum penalty for the unlawful sexual acts that are alleged to have been involved in the situation where the jury is not required to be satisfied of the same acts to make out the offence. For example, some jurors may have been satisfied of underlying acts attracting life imprisonment, while others may only have been satisfied of underlying acts attracting a seven-year maximum, and some jurors may have been satisfied of both. It is not clear how a court should sentence in that scenario, under the model provisions.

Accordingly, instead of following the model provisions in this respect, proposed subsection 50(11) provides that, in sentencing, the court must sentence consistently with the verdict of the trier of fact, but having regard to the general nature or character of the unlawful sexual acts determined by the sentencing court to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. There is no need to ask any questions of the jury for that purpose.

In relation to clause 2G, sentencing for offences under previous law, the decision in Chiro potentially impacts on sentences passed prior to that decision. That is, where an offender has been found guilty of the existing offence of unlawful sexual exploitation of a child before the decision was handed down, no questions were asked of the jury as to the factual basis for their verdict and the court proceeded to sentence on the then accepted basis, taking into account all the sexual acts that the judge found were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than on the basis most favourable to the offender.

Subclause 2G(1) declares that such sentence imposed before the commencement of the section is taken to be and to always have been not affected by error, or otherwise manifestly excessive, merely because the jury was not asked the questions by the trial judge and sentenced on that then accepted basis. In addition, subclause 2G(2) makes provision for the situation where a person is to be sentenced for an offence against the existing section 50 offence after the commencement of the provision. For example, where a jury verdict of guilty has been returned prior to the commencement of the provision, but where the offender has not yet been sentenced.

It will also apply to any matters where existing charges under the existing provision proceed after the commencement of the amendment. It makes clear the guilty verdict is a verdict of guilt for acts of sexual exploitation comprising the course of the conduct alleged. It also makes clear that on sentencing it is for the sentencing court to determine which alleged acts are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the sentencing court is not required to ask questions of the jury nor is it required to sentence on the basis most favourable to the offender unless it has determined that due to the acts it is satisfied to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that it is appropriate to do it in that case.

The Hon. Andrew McLachlan asked a number of questions, and I think they can be summarised as follows: why the urgency, and what consultation was undertaken? This is urgent because there are matters before the court at the moment. The situations I referred to are particularly in relation to where a jury has returned a verdict of guilt but the offender has not yet been sentenced. It means that someone who would have otherwise come under what had been the accepted practice by all involved in the legal process, may well now only be sentenced on the basis of the facts most favourable to them. It means that everyone involved in the process, and expecting to get a very strict sentence, may get a very, very light one now; and I certainly cannot, and I think many in here cannot, in good conscience allow that to happen.

There are currently at least three matters before the courts where an offender has been found guilty of persistent sexual exploitation of a child, but has not yet been sentenced. In each of these cases, in accordance with what has been the accepted practice, the jury was not asked which acts of sexual exploitation of a child it had found proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Allowing this situation to continue while there are these live legal proceedings is completely unacceptable. Any delay in passing this legislation and the amendments could lead to very serious offenders receiving a far weaker punishment than they deserve and that was expected by all at the time of the trial. It is the government's very strong view that we must address the impact of this High Court ruling today. Failure to do so would, I think, be a failure to meet all realistic community expectations of what an offender should receive for these types of offences.

In relation to consultation, it was necessarily limited as these matters have been impacted upon only by a very recent High Court judgement. As I said, I understand that there are matters due before the court next week and again early next month that, if we delay this any further, will be sentenced on the basis of those facts most favourable to the offender, not on the basis of what all participants in proceedings at trial had reasonably expected they would be sentenced upon.

Bill read a second time.

Committee Stage

In committee.

Clause 1.

The Hon. M.C. PARNELL: I did not make a contribution on the second reading because I thought I would put some remarks in relation to this bill on the record at clause 1. At the outset I am going to say that I am unhappy with how this bill and a number of others have been dealt with. They are complicated bills but we get amendments late in the piece, and it seems now that invariably key stakeholders have not been consulted. It is a really poor way to legislate.

The Hon. Andrew McLachlan read onto the record some observations of the Bar Association, and they were talking about lazy prosecutors using this section 50 when, according to the Bar Association, they should have more rigorously used individual, specified offences rather than, if you like, a pattern-of-behaviour type of offence. However, I do not want to let the government off the hook with this approach, and I think this is probably the third criminal justice bill we have had where, for whatever reason—and I will explore these reasons later—the government comes in like Chicken Little saying, 'The sky is falling, the sky is falling,' and blackmails the Legislative Council, saying, 'If you don't support these amendments today this bad thing will happen in the future.' It is a poor way to legislate, and it treats the Legislative Council very poorly.

However, then we have to reflect and ask, 'Did the government have no choice? Was there nothing they could have done about it?' That is when we start doing the old, 'What did they know, when did they know it, and what did they do about it?' As we saw the day before yesterday, when we were debating the fate of a 17-year-old boy, we discovered that no-one was consulted, that the submissions came in late. Then, part of my questioning of the government in relation to that is to put them to the test: do we really need to do this now? Is there a plan B? Is there an alternative way of approaching it that allows the parliament to do its job properly and to properly consider the legislation? Is there a plan B?

I was very grateful this morning to spend half an hour with the Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr Adam Kimber. I talked this issue through with him, and my first question was about a plan B. He pointed out, as the minister has, that there are three pending cases, all of which could be resolved in a potentially unsatisfactory manner if the government's second set of amendments are not passed. So, my question to the DPP was, 'If the first of these is next week on 24 October, can't you just put that off?

Probably within a few seconds of asking the question I think I knew the answer: that it is not really appropriate for the Director of Public Prosecutions to be going to a judge and saying, 'Judge, just hold this, will you, because we think the Legislative Council is about to change the law that's going to ensure a harsher penalty on this defendant.' It would probably be challenged successfully by the defence if they were to try to do that. The next question was, 'Okay, that's one. What about the other two?' We discovered that they are listed for mid-October, so there would be a possibility for us to have a bit more time to scrutinise this bill properly here, from stakeholders.

However, then, as the DPP points out, if you were a defence counsel for one of these mid-November cases, you would be seeking to bring them forward to make sure that they were dealt with before the parliament messed with—to use the vernacular—the sentencing rules. So, that puts us in a difficult position, and we have to weigh up the criticisms that I and the Hon. Andrew McLachlan have delivered about the process. I will point out that this Chiro case was apparently some six weeks ago. Six weeks is a reasonable amount of time. I understand that it can take time for a Solicitor-General or whoever else to give advice. We know the wheels move slowly, but at the tail end of this process is the poor old Legislative Council that gets one or two days to think about the implications, when other organs of government have a month and a half to deal with it.

I come back to the question of whether we allow our disappointment—our outrage, if you like, at the poor process—to prevail over what the minister has put to us, which is whether we can, in good conscience, risk the outcome of potentially outrageously low sentences for serious offending. So, those are the two things we have to weigh up. The material that the minister read onto the record is incredibly complicated; it is detailed. As a lawyer, I pretty well understand most of it: that in the criminal law system you normally say, 'This person did this on this event in this way,' and you have these very specific offences.

However, you do not have to think too hard: we are talking about children and people who are traumatised beyond what many of us can imagine, and often the detail just is not there. It would not just be young children: I think the Bar Association suggested that mainly young children is why you have this offence of persistent sexual abuse of a child. I would not think that it is limited to young children; I think all children suffering the sort of abuse we are talking about would struggle to identify days and times and which bad thing happened on which day.

I understand that the previous or current version of section 50 makes sense. Whether the Bar Association is correct in that it is now the offence of choice, and that, as the Bar suggests, it is laziness on the part of the prosecutors, I do not know. I still think that, if you can, the best way to proceed is with highly identifiable offences.

As the minister has pointed out, if the offence that the person has been convicted of is one of persistent sexual abuse of a child and if the jury has not been asked—and I get why they would not be asked, because they have not needed to be asked until the Chiro case; now it appears they have to be asked—'Jury, which bits of this have you relied on to convict? Was it kissing, was it touching or was it something far more awful?' Not that they are not bad—they are bad, they are illegal. As we have all accepted, there is a gradation of seriousness of these offences.

For me, the idea that, if the judge has not asked the jury that question, and the High Court has now suggested they should have, it is too late to bring the jury back; you cannot do that. Ultimately, I think this idea of sentencing the defendant in the best possible light might mean that some pretty, whilst still illegal, minor conduct results in a very light sentence when in fact there is some awful conduct, which in fact the jury may have relied on, which deserves a far more significant sentence.

The next line of inquiry—and I explored this with the DPP—is, in the criminal justice system, we tend to differentiate the finder of fact and then there is the finder of law and the sentencing body. But it would be wrong to suggest that judges do not do both jobs—they do. Not every case has a jury. Judges find facts as well as apply the law. I do not think the judges are incapable of determining which elements of behaviour should be taken into account in terms of the sentence.

They have been in the same court as the jurors. They have heard all the same evidence. Whilst they do not necessarily need to second-guess the jury and the judge saying, 'I reckon the jury decided that it wasn't the kissing, it wasn't this, it was something else,' they do not necessarily need to do that, but I am happy that the judge has heard all the evidence, the judge knows what the serious allegations were and what weight might be appropriate to attach to those.

When we put all that into the mix, whilst I am still very unhappy with the way the government has gone about this and the fact that it has happened to us three times now in two weeks with different bills, whilst I am unhappy with what they have done, the conscience that the minister urged us to rely on does prevail in this case for me.

It is a very longwinded way of saying that the Greens, whilst we are reluctant to curtail proper democratic processes and proper consultation with stakeholders, these are very serious matters. I would struggle if we stood on principle, insisted on proper process and a bad outcome resulted in these three cases. That is my way of informing the chamber that we will be supporting the government amendments, but we are not happy about the circumstances in which we are being asked to do it.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I thank the honourable member for his contribution. I take on board the process comments that are made. I can assure the honourable member it does not give me a lot of joy to come into this chamber and know I am bringing in something that will elicit such comments about, 'We didn't have time' and 'Process hasn't been followed.' It is not something I love to do either, but on this case, I could not in good conscience not have asked the chamber to pass this as soon as possible.

In terms of the time frames, I think it was 13 September—so almost five weeks ago to the day—that the High Court handed down the judgement in the Chiro case. I am advised that in the five weeks it was acting on the advice of the Solicitor-General to get this as correct as possible, which is why it has taken that time frame. In my legal experience, if it is five weeks to do something that is reasonably complicated, I do not think anyone has been dragging the chain on doing this.

I am advised it was about 4 October that it was realised that there was one of these cases in November that a verdict has been returned but sentencing had not taken place. I am advised it was only on Monday of this week that it was understood that there was a case coming up next week. So this is not a fake call for urgency. When the government became aware of the facts, we acted as quickly as possible, I am advised, to bring this to the chamber, as we knew the facts and became aware.

Again, I thank the honourable member for his contribution. This is not some esoteric debate, where we can stand up and talk about process and how the wrong thing has been done. This has a real-life impact. I agree with the honourable member. With a clear conscience, I do not think we could sit here and allow someone to face a relatively minor sentence when, at the time of trial, all involved in that trial understood how they thought this would play out, to allow them to receive a much lesser sentence than everyone understood at the trial for the mere fact that in the intervening period there has been a High Court decision that has meant a judge, on the view of the High Court, ought to have asked questions of the jury that they did not ask—but they did not know that they ought to have asked that—to allow what would be probably considered by all at the time a reasonable sentence to be imposed.

The Hon. K.L. VINCENT: I just wanted to place on the record that the Dignity Party also agrees that this is not an ideal situation to be in. Usually, we adhere to process in this place, and ultimately that is because adhering to process helps us to get the best outcome for everybody in the state. Usually, we take time to pass bills, because it takes time to consider them and to consult with people, and to reach the right verdict considering everyone's perspectives, but in this case we do not have that luxury. Ultimately, although the reason that we are here might not be perfect and it might not be preferable, I think the best outcome we can achieve would be to pass this legislation quickly to ensure that we do get the appropriate action for these very serious offenders and we do not have more children at risk.

Having said that, though, I would like to place on the record that I do take umbrage at comments that were made by the Attorney-General in the other place on ABC radio this morning. I am paraphrasing him, so I hope I am not doing him any great injustice. They were along the lines of, 'You know, we'd like to pass this bill as soon as possible, but gosh only knows what will happen in the Legislative Council. I can't control what happens there,' more or less implying that it is the Legislative Council, and only the Legislative Council, that ever holds up legislation. I think those comments are particularly offensive, given that in recent times we have passed three bills and in fact, this will be the second one this week, by my count, that we have agreed to pass expeditiously to ensure the best outcome for the state.

As I have said, given that the procedures are there and the usual processes are there to allow us to reach the best outcome, in this case, in this situation, as imperfect as it may be, the right thing to do and the best outcome to reach is for this legislation to pass, to make sure that offenders do not get away or do not have a lesser offence for their very serious crimes, and that the children and young people are sent a very serious message, and a very genuine message, that we are willing to do all we can in this place to keep them safe. We support the speedy passage of this bill.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: I might just make a couple of comments on the delay, and then we will move on to the bill, probably to the relief of the minister. The delay issue will probably be circulated more in the other chamber, between the Attorney and the shadow attorney. I am not questioning the minister's assertions, but five weeks for the Solicitor-General I think personally is a tad long, given that it has been a model that we are adopting from the criminal justice report of the royal commission. I will leave it there, and those issues have been articulated in the media, anyway, at length.

I thank the minister for his second reading summing-up. There is a lot of information there. For the benefit of Hansard, I want to break down a little of that. Obviously, we are not seeking to amend this bill, so it is not for the purposes of justifying any form of amendment. Let's put the retrospective provisions aside for a moment. Can we just go through again a case where there is a series of allegations to which a jury has made a finding of guilt. This is how it would operate, as enacted, with the new law applying.

The Hon. K.J. Maher interjecting:

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: This is the law applying as if we passed the amendments in this bill.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: Pre Chiro?

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: No, not pre: on the passage of this bill. I am just trying to tease out how it operates in practice. We have a series of events. The charge has been proved. Some events are less serious; some are in the higher range. As I understand, it is a conviction for the one offence. What then happens during the sentencing process? This is not under the retrospective amendments. The jury does not have to agree on which ones they accept brings them to the finding of guilt. How does the judge then decide which ones have been proven, or does the judge not have to and just sentences on the collective?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I am sure, as I am speaking, if I am getting this at all wrong, I will get a tug on my jacket to tell me. As I am advised, it is the one offence the trial of fact finds the accused guilty on, but I think the question is in terms of what part or what particular acts you are to be sentenced on. As I am advised, that part remains the same as, effectively, the pre Chiro situation. What this bill seeks to do is keep that situation; that is, it is up to the sentencing judge, who has heard all the facts and all the evidence, to make a decision as to which of the particular acts, in the sentencing judge's view, has been proved beyond reasonable doubt to then form the basis for sentencing.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: I have a couple of questions. Rather than trawl through the bill, we may as well deal with them as general issues. That is what I thought my understanding was. I hope the minister appreciates that I have had an equally limited amount of time to consume the technicalities of this bill. So, once the verdict of guilty has come in, the judge then, according to what the minister has said, contemplates, post the verdict of guilt, the allegations of the particular incidences—I am just asking for a correction on this—then makes a personal finding as to which ones have been proved beyond reasonable doubt and sentences accordingly.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: That is correct. That is how it is intended to operate under what we are being asked to pass today. That is how it operated and how everyone has understood it to operate pre the Chiro High Court decision, yes.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: So, the government's justification for the bill, which I am not challenging, is that, in effect, it is clarifying and crystallising best practice, which would have occurred by asking for specialist verdicts. In effect, it is providing a framework for a process that the government previously thought was being carried out; is that fair?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I will give the answer, and that might reflect whether I understood the question properly. I think it is the case that this regularises what everyone—I think all participants in proceedings—had understood the way the legislation had previously worked before. In that respect, in terms of what the judge sentences upon, it reverts back to the understanding all participants in proceedings would have had before the Chiro High Court case.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: It clarifies and provides a framework, in my reading, of how it was expected to be done and, therefore, that is the justification the government gives for the retrospective provisions because, as I understand from the summing up of your second reading, that is the justification. I am not challenging it. I am just trying to draw it out onto Hansard.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: Often the quite reasonable objection to retrospectivity in relation to criminal law is that humans base their behaviour on how they understand the law operates and what the punishment for behaviours will be, whereas this in that sense is applying how everybody thought the law operated before the High Court case. So, in that respect, it is not retrospectively fitting what people would have had no way of knowing were penalties for behaviour, which is most commonly the basis for objection to this type of retrospectivity, particularly when it comes to what the potential punishments for offences are.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: Can I move on to a slightly different topic? The minister mentioned in his second reading summing-up—and there was a lot of information there, so I just want to go back to it. If I understood correctly, and I am now on the retrospective provisions, if they apply to you, there was some protection on penalty or there was some trade-off on penalty on the maximums or minimums. Did I completely misunderstand that, or does it just operate as normal? There was some commentary.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I think this is the question. The royal commission recommended 25 years as a maximum penalty. The maximum penalty under the existing legislation was life imprisonment, so we have not downgraded that one in effect to what the royal commission's recommendations were. We have left the maximum penalty at life imprisonment.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: As to the person who is awaiting sentence and to whom the retrospective provision applies, will they face the same sentence as they would have otherwise?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: Yes, my advice is that if we take it pre Chiro—so, what operated for this offence prior to that—if this bill passes, the maximum penalty going forward will not change. My advice is that there is not a greater penalty for this bill now than there was to what everyone thought was the case before this. Again, I think that goes to what I talked about: the biggest objection usually to anything that is seen as retrospective is that it is not a different punishment for what was the same set of behaviours in the past.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: I thank the minister. There was a lot of information in his second reading and it was not entirely clear to me. I would like to go through for the sake of completeness just to tease out why not all aspects of the royal commission's recommendations were adopted. There is a paragraph at the end of the Attorney's letter to me, dated 17 October, at the end of page 2:

Finally, not all aspects of the Royal Commission recommendations have been adopted. There are minor deviations from the recommended model provisions, aimed at preserving the existing South Australian provisions where it makes sense to do so.

I would like to understand the concept of 'makes sense to do so'. And:

These deviations include retaining the existing South Australian maximum penalty for the offence—

which the minister has already addressed—

retaining 'under 17' in the definition of 'child'…, and retaining several definitions used to establish a 'position of authority offence'.

That does not sound significant but I just want to be assured that that is really the use of a drafting technique and fitting it into the existing legislation rather than a new policy endeavour.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I thank the honourable member for his questions. As he said, not all aspects of the royal commission recommendations have been adopted exactly. It will not take long to briefly explain the four areas where there are slight deviations. The first one we have covered in terms of the maximum penalty. The maximum penalty recommended by the royal commission recommendations was 25 years. Ours, as it previously applied, was life imprisonment and that will continue, so we have not adopted that particular measure that would have, in effect, downgraded our charge.

The model provisions define a child as a person under the age of 16; the current SA position is under the age of 17. We are retaining that higher age of 17, so in effect, again, we are not downgrading it from what is already there in line with what would be effectively downgrading it by adopting the model provisions. The model provisions suggest that jurisdictions should define sexual offences by reference to their own existing offences. The existing definition in section 50 is appropriate and has been retained.

Finally, the model provisions refer to 'special care' whereas the existing South Australian terminology refers to 'positions of authority'. That existing South Australian terminology of positions of authority is retained. There are also differences in the context of the definitions of the roles or relationships that comprise a person who holds a position of authority. In essence, where the model provisions are broader they have been adopted but where the model provisions are narrower or weaken or downgrade what the existing provisions are, we have preferred those and have retained them.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: I do not have any further questions, and I am not seeking to amend any other part of the bill during the committee stage.

Clause passed.

Clause 2 passed.

New clauses 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 2E, 2F, 2G.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I move:

Amendment No 1 [Employment–2]—

Page 2, after line 8—After clause 2 insert:

Part 1A—Amendment of Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006

2A—Amendment of Schedule 1—Class 1 and 2 offences

Schedule 1, clause 2(ea)—delete paragraph (ea) and substitute:

(ea) an offence against section 50 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (persistent sexual abuse of a child);

(eab) an offence of persistent sexual exploitation of a child (see section 50 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 as in force before the commencement of Part 1C of the Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) (No 2) Act 2017);

Part 1B—Amendment of Correctional Services Act 1982

2B—Amendment of section 4—Interpretation

(1) Section 4(1), definition of child sexual offence, (ba)—delete paragraph (ba) and substitute:

(ba) persistent sexual abuse of a child;

(2) Section 4(1), definition of sexual offence, (ba)—delete paragraph (ba) and substitute:

(ba) persistent sexual abuse of a child;

Part 1C—Amendment of Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935

2C—Amendment of section 49—Unlawful sexual intercourse

(1) Section 49(5a)—delete subsection (5a)

(2) Section 49—after subsection (8) insert:

(9) For the purposes of this section, a person is in a position of authority in relation to a person under the age of 18 years (the child) if—

(a) the person is a teacher and the child is a pupil of the teacher or of a school at which the teacher works; or

(b) the person is a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child or the de facto partner or domestic partner of a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child; or

(c) the person provides religious, sporting, musical or other instruction to the child; or

(d) the person is a religious official or spiritual leader (however described and including lay members and whether paid or unpaid) in a religious or spiritual group attended by the child; or

(e) the person is a health professional or social worker providing professional services to the child; or

(f) the person is responsible for the care of the child and the child has a cognitive impairment; or

(g) the person is employed or providing services in a correctional institution (within the meaning of the Correctional Services Act 1982) or a training centre (within the meaning of the Young Offenders Act 1993), or is a person engaged in the administration of those Acts, acting in the course of the person's duties in relation to the child; or

(h) the person is an employer of the child or other person who has the authority to determine significant aspects of the child's terms and conditions of employment or to terminate the child's employment (whether the child is being paid in respect of that employment or is working in a voluntary capacity).

2D—Substitution of section 50

Section 50—delete the section and substitute:

50—Persistent sexual abuse of child

(1) An adult who maintains an unlawful sexual relationship with a child is guilty of an offence.

Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for life.

(2) An unlawful sexual relationship is a relationship in which an adult engages in 2 or more unlawful sexual acts with or towards a child over any period.

(3) For an adult to be convicted of an unlawful sexual relationship offence, the trier of fact must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the evidence establishes that an unlawful sexual relationship existed.

(4) However—

(a) the prosecution is not required to allege the particulars of any unlawful sexual act that would be necessary if the act were charged as a separate offence; and

(b) the trier of fact is not required to be satisfied of the particulars of any unlawful sexual act that it would have to be satisfied of if the act were charged as a separate offence, but must be satisfied as to the general nature or character of those acts; and

(c) if the trier of fact is a jury, the members of the jury are not required to agree on which unlawful sexual acts constitute the unlawful sexual relationship.

(5) The prosecution is required to allege the particulars of the period of time over which the unlawful sexual relationship existed.

(6) This section extends to a relationship that existed wholly or partly before the commencement of this section and to unlawful sexual acts that occurred before the commencement of this section.

(7) A person may be charged on a single indictment with, and convicted of and punished for, both—

(a) an offence of maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child; and

(b) 1 or more sexual offences committed by the person against the same child during the alleged period of the unlawful sexual relationship.

(8) Except as provided by subsection (7)—

(a) a person who has been convicted or acquitted of an unlawful sexual relationship offence in relation to a child cannot be convicted of a sexual offence in relation to the same child if the occasion on which the sexual offence is alleged to have occurred is during the period over which the person was alleged to have committed the unlawful sexual relationship offence; and

(b) a person who has been convicted or acquitted of a sexual offence in relation to a child cannot be convicted of an unlawful sexual relationship offence in relation to the same child if the sexual offence of which the person has been convicted or acquitted is one of the unlawful sexual acts that are alleged to constitute the unlawful sexual relationship.

(9) A person who has been convicted or acquitted of a predecessor offence in relation to a child cannot be convicted of an unlawful sexual relationship offence in relation to the same child if the period of the alleged unlawful sexual relationship includes any part of the period during which the person was alleged to have committed the predecessor offence.

(10) For the purposes of this section, a person ceases to be regarded as having been convicted for an offence if the conviction is quashed or set aside.

(11) A court sentencing a person for an offence against this section is to sentence the person consistently with the verdict of the trier of fact but having regard to the general nature or character of the unlawful sexual acts determined by the sentencing court to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt (and, for the avoidance of doubt, the sentencing court need not ask any question of the trier of fact directed to ascertaining the general nature or character of the unlawful sexual acts determined by the trier of fact found to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt).

(12) In this section—

adult means a person of or over the age of 18 years;

child means—

(a) a person who is under 17 years of age; or

(b) a person who is under 18 years of age if, during the period of the relationship that is the subject of the alleged unlawful sexual relationship offence, the adult in the relationship is in a position of authority in relation to the person who is under 18 years of age;

predecessor offence means an offence of persistent sexual exploitation of a child, or of persistent sexual abuse of a child, as in force under a previous enactment;

unlawful sexual act means any act that constitutes, or would constitute (if particulars of the time and place at which the act took place were sufficiently particularised), a sexual offence;

sexual offence means—

(a) an offence against Division 11 (other than sections 59 and 61) or sections 63B, 66, 69 or 72; or

(b) an attempt to commit, or assault with intent to commit, any of those offences; or

(c) a substantially similar offence against a previous enactment;

unlawful sexual relationship offence means an offence against subsection (1).

(13) For the purposes of this section, a person is in a position of authority in relation to a child if—

(a) the person is a teacher and the child is a pupil of the teacher or of a school at which the teacher works; or

(b) the person is a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child or the de facto partner or domestic partner of a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child; or

(c) the person provides religious, sporting, musical or other instruction to the child; or

(d) the person is a religious official or spiritual leader (however described and including lay members and whether paid or unpaid) in a religious or spiritual group attended by the child; or

(e) the person is a health professional or social worker providing professional services to the child; or

(f) the person is responsible for the care of the child and the child has a cognitive impairment; or

(g) the person is employed or providing services in a correctional institution (within the meaning of the Correctional Services Act 1982) or a training centre (within the meaning of the Young Offenders Act 1993), or is a person engaged in the administration of those Acts, acting in the course of the person's duties in relation to the child; or

(h) the person is an employer of the child or other person who has the authority to determine significant aspects of the child's terms and conditions of employment or to terminate the child's employment (whether the child is being paid in respect of that employment or is working in a voluntary capacity).

2E—Amendment of section 57—Consent no defence in certain cases

Section 57(4)—delete subsection (4) and substitute:

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person is in a position of authority in relation to a person under the age of 18 years (the child) if—

(a) the person is a teacher and the child is a pupil of the teacher or of a school at which the teacher works; or

(b) the person is a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child or the de facto partner or domestic partner of a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child; or

(c) the person provides religious, sporting, musical or other instruction to the child; or

(d) the person is a religious official or spiritual leader (however described and including lay members and whether paid or unpaid) in a religious or spiritual group attended by the child; or

(e) the person is a health professional or social worker providing professional services to the child; or

(f) the person is responsible for the care of the child and the child has a cognitive impairment; or

(g) the person is employed or providing services in a correctional institution (within the meaning of the Correctional Services Act 1982) or a training centre (within the meaning of the Young Offenders Act 1993), or is a person engaged in the administration of those Acts, acting in the course of the person's duties in relation to the child; or

(h) the person is an employer of the child or other person who has the authority to determine significant aspects of the child's terms and conditions of employment or to terminate the child's employment (whether the child is being paid in respect of that employment or is working in a voluntary capacity).

2F—Amendment of section 63B—Procuring child to commit indecent act etc

Section 63B(6)—delete subsection (6) and substitute:

(6) For the purposes of this section, a person is in a position of authority in relation to a child if—

(a) the person is a teacher and the child is a pupil of the teacher or of a school at which the teacher works; or

(b) the person is a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child or the de facto partner or domestic partner of a parent, step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the child; or

(c) the person provides religious, sporting, musical or other instruction to the child; or

(d) the person is a religious official or spiritual leader (however described and including lay members and whether paid or unpaid) in a religious or spiritual group attended by the child; or

(e) the person is a health professional or social worker providing professional services to the child; or

(f) the person is responsible for the care of the child and the child has a cognitive impairment; or

(g) the person is employed or providing services in a correctional institution (within the meaning of the Correctional Services Act 1982) or a training centre (within the meaning of the Young Offenders Act 1993), or is a person engaged in the administration of those Acts, acting in the course of the person's duties in relation to the child; or

(h) the person is an employer of the child or other person who has the authority to determine significant aspects of the child's terms and conditions of employment or to terminate the child's employment (whether the child is being paid in respect of that employment or is working in a voluntary capacity).

2G—Sentencing for offences under previous law

(1) A sentence imposed on a person, before the commencement of this section, in respect of an offence against section 50 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (as in force before the commencement of section 2D of this Act) is taken to be, and always to have been, not affected by error or otherwise manifestly excessive merely because—

(a) the trial judge did not ask any question of the trier of fact directed to ascertaining which acts of sexual exploitation, or which particulars of the offence as alleged, the trier of fact found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and the person was not sentenced on the view of the facts most favourable to the person; and

(b) the sentencing court sentenced the person consistently with the verdict of the trier of fact but having regard to the acts of sexual exploitation determined by the sentencing court to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

(2) Where, after the commencement of this section, a person is to be sentenced for an offence against section 50 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (as in force before the commencement of section 2D of this Act) the following provisions apply:

(a) a verdict of guilt handed down by the trier of fact in relation to the offence is taken to be, and always to have been, a finding by the trier of fact that the person is guilty of the acts of sexual exploitation comprising the course of conduct alleged by the information;

(b) notwithstanding paragraph (a), in sentencing the person for the offence, the sentencing court may determine which alleged acts of sexual exploitation the sentencing court finds proved beyond a reasonable doubt and may disregard any acts of sexual exploitation that the sentencing court is not satisfied were proved beyond a reasonable doubt;

(c) for the avoidance of doubt, the sentencing court need not ask any question of the trier of fact directed to ascertaining which acts of sexual exploitation, or which particulars of the offence as alleged, the trier of fact found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and, unless it has so determined in accordance with paragraph (b), need not sentence the person on the view of the facts most favourable to the person.

(3) This section does not apply in relation to the particular matter that was the subject of the determination in Chiro v The Queen [2017] HCA 37 (13 September 2017).

Note—

Except as provided in subsection (3), this section negates the effect of the determination of the High Court in Chiro v The Queen [2017] HCA 37 (13 September 2017).

I will not speak at length to them. I think we have agitated quite thoroughly the issues in those amendments already in the committee stage.

New clauses inserted.

Clauses 3 to 6 passed.

Clause 7.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I move:

Amendment No 2 [Employment–2]—

Page 4, lines 1 to 6—Delete Part 5 and substitute:

Part 5—Amendment of Summary Procedure Act 1921

7—Amendment of section 4—Interpretation Section 4(1), definition of sexual offence, (ba)—after 'child' insert: 'or persistent sexual abuse of a child'

7A—Amendment of section 99AAC—Child protection restraining orders

Section 99AAC(8), definition of child sexual offence—after paragraph (d) insert:

(daa) an offence of persistent sexual abuse of a child under section 50 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935;

Part 6—Amendment of Surveillance Devices Act 2016

7B—Amendment of section 3—Interpretation

Section 3(1), definition of review agency, (a)—delete 'the Police Ombudsman' and substitute:

the reviewer under Schedule 4 of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012

Amendment carried; clause 7 as amended passed; new clauses 7A and 7B inserted.

Title.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I move:

Amendment No 3 [Employment–2]—

Page 1—Delete 'various Acts within the portfolio of the Attorney-General' and substitute:

the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006; the Correctional Services Act 1982; the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935; the Cross-border Justice Act 2009; the Justices of the Peace (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2016; the Real Property Act 1886; the South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014; the Summary Procedure Act 1921; and the Surveillance Devices Act 2016

Amendment carried; title as amended passed.

Bill reported with amendment.

Third Reading

The Hon. K.J. MAHER (Minister for Employment, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation, Minister for Manufacturing and Innovation, Minister for Automotive Transformation, Minister for Science and Information Economy) (16:51): I move:

That this bill be now read a third time.

Bill read a third time and passed.