Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) (No. 2) Bill

Second Reading

Adjourned debate on second reading.

(Continued from 6 June 2019.)

Mr PICTON (Kaurna) (12:04): It is my pleasure to be the lead speaker for the opposition on the Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) (No 2) Bill 2019. I assure the house that I will not need the full unlimited time available to me to talk about this. However, something that is common practice is for attorneys-general on both sides to have portfolio miscellaneous bills to bring to the house, bundling up a whole range of minor matters, but it is important to scrutinise them very thoroughly. I am sure that is something the government, when they were in opposition, were careful to do, and we certainly are doing that because you would not want an attorney-general to slip something in here and for parliament not to notice. I certainly would never accuse the current Attorney-General of doing such a thing.

I indicate that it is, sadly, very disappointing that the opposition is in a position where the Attorney-General has brought on this bill to debate in the house today—

The Hon. L.W.K. Bignell: She's on the phone.

The ACTING SPEAKER (Mr Pederick): Order!

Mr PICTON: She is not listening; she is on the phone. It is very—

The Hon. L.W.K. Bignell: Not even listening; she's on the phone—disrespectful.

The ACTING SPEAKER (Mr Pederick): Order!

The Hon. L.W.K. Bignell: Highly disrespectful.

The ACTING SPEAKER (Mr Pederick): You are showing a high level of disrespect, member for Mawson. Carry on, member for Kaurna.

The Hon. L.W.K. Bignell: I'm not on my mobile phone. I'm not on my mobile phone like the Attorney-General.

The ACTING SPEAKER (Mr Pederick): Order!

Mr PICTON: Thank you, Acting Deputy Speaker. As the member for Mawson points out, the Attorney-General is on the phone, but I am sure she is getting a late-minute briefing on this very bill. It is very disappointing that she has brought on this bill to discuss here in the house today without actually providing all the answers to the questions that the opposition has raised about this bill. Labor is yet to receive answers to the questions that were put on notice during the briefing we had with the Attorney-General's Department and her office staff.

Those questions included the provision of examples of why a judge would need to have immunity in both civil and criminal trials. As it was explained in the briefing (and the Attorney-General might be interested in listening to this if she wasn't on the phone), the immunity provisions are to prevent a judge from being prosecuted for something contempt of court or corruption. We requested examples of where this immunity might have been used in the past or how it might be used in the future, and that question was taken on notice.

In fact, it would be very useful to have an example for each jurisdiction in which a judge is granted additional immunities. The jurisdictions include those found in:

the Coroners Act 2003;

the District Court Act 1991;

the Environment, Resources and Development Court Act 1993;

the Liquor Licensing Act 1997;

the Magistrates Court Act 1991;

the Supreme Court Act 1935; and

the Youth Court Act.

Another question that we did not yet have an answer to was how the proposed change of definition of 'premises of a participating body' in the Sheriff's Act 1978 will function. In particular, what is the 'precinct or immediate environs,' how is a laneway 'between' or 'abutting' a premises different and how far do those geographic definitions extend? I hope that the Attorney-General can answer these questions. I am very certain that she did not hear any of them because she has been on the phone the entire time, but we will try to address these when we get to the committee stage of the debate.

Once again, I indicate that Labor reserves its position on this bill, and it is on behalf of the shadow attorney-general in the other place that I indicate that. We will try to get some of these answers here, but certainly between the houses we will continue to try to get answers, and then we will reserve our position to see what it is in the other place, where the numbers are a little less definite than they are in this place.

Mr TEAGUE (Heysen) (12:08): I rise to commend the bill to the house. As the member for Kaurna has indicated, there is nothing terribly extraordinary about the structure of the bill that is brought in this way, by way of an omnibus bill, within the Attorney-General's portfolio. I am grateful to note that the member for Kaurna observes what is true—that the Attorney would not be bringing along in this format, in compendium legislation, anything that is going to take the parliament unduly by surprise. Indeed, that is not the case here. We have a bill that will, in 18 parts, create amendments to a number of acts in ways that are largely uncontroversial.

The only extent to which I express any surprise in relation to the contribution of the member for Kaurna is that it should be necessary, at the second reading stage, to be reserving a position. I did not hear any indication, other than in relation to the extent of immunity that ought appropriately be enjoyed by judges, that is particularised in the member for Kaurna's contribution. However, I will be interested to hear, as he has obviously decided that he will take the opportunity to interrogate that at the committee stage, where else there may be specific issues the opposition might take with this otherwise uncontroversial legislation.

For my part, I propose to make some specific remarks in relation to that part of the bill that amends the Spent Convictions Act. Part 13 of the bill amends the Spent Convictions Act 2009 in clauses 16 and 17, and I propose to take this opportunity to spend a few moments to consider what is occurring there.

The amendments that are the subject of clause 16 of the bill, which would repeal amendments to the act moved in 2017 by a former member of the other place, have some history that would be familiar to those who were members of this house in the Fifty-Third Parliament. In 2017, the parliament, by a similar compendium act—in that case the Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio No 3) Act 2017—passed amendments to the Spent Convictions Act that had the effect of clarifying rules relating to the disclosure and use of a conviction that is taken to be immediately spent under the Spent Convictions Act. Those amendments have not yet commenced.

The amendments would have the effect of remedying what is an anomaly in the Spent Convictions Act that had, I understand, in some cases prevented employers from taking appropriate disciplinary action against employees following criminal offending, including where the offence was committed in the course of employment or where an employee posed a serious risk to other staff and/or to the public. The way that the spent convictions legislation works, it might be noted at this point, is that conviction, once spent, does not, as one might describe in the vernacular, have the effect of wiping the slate clean; it does not cease to exist once spent.

The spent convictions legislation works in such a way that, for example, in court proceedings, if someone is charged with an offence, it is not brought to the attention of the court for purposes of prosecution from an evidential point of view and, in other ways, is not available for consideration in a number of circumstances in which convictions are relevantly considered. It has the effect of preventing the disclosure of the relevant conviction and, relevantly, in relation to these amendments, operates so as to prevent there being any proper basis for refusing or revoking an appointment in circumstances where the conviction is spent.

In relation to a case where a conviction is determined immediately to be spent, the perhaps unintended consequence is that an employer would find themselves relevantly, practically, effectively barred from taking action in relation to the conviction because its status would be such as to not provide a basis for disciplinary action or for the refusal or revocation of the relevant appointment. In that sense, the employer is prevented from using relevant knowledge of offending in order to, for example, commence an investigation or other relevant conduct in the workplace.

By contrast, if circumstances were sufficiently different that no criminal charge was laid or if, following the laying of charges and the prosecution, there was an ultimate not guilty determination then the employer would be able to go ahead and carry out the kinds of investigations or other procedures in the workplace that might be deemed necessary or appropriate in relation to disciplinary action. One can see the unintended consequence that follows. If a conviction resulted, one might conclude that the relevant conduct—therefore the subject of some ultimate disciplinary action having been proved—if deemed immediately spent, might have that unintended consequence.

To remedy that anomaly, the 2017 portfolio act I referred to earlier facilitated the creation of a new exclusion that would find its way into the spent convictions regulations. It would only apply to immediately spent convictions and would allow employers to take into account those immediately spent convictions for employment-related purposes for a limited and defined period of time and purpose. To date, those regulations have not been enacted either. The amendments in 2017 effected a necessary restructure of the Spent Convictions Act in order to facilitate that.

There were then a number of amendments moved by the Hon. Kelly Vincent in the other place in the course of that debate. Those amendments were to have the effect of allowing younger persons—people under the age of 25, the subject of the amendment—who were covered by this immediately spent conviction to make application to a qualified magistrate for an order that that particular prescribed exclusion would not apply in relation to that conviction. The idea was to recognise certain exceptional circumstances that might apply in which that immediately spent conviction ought not be disclosed, even in that particular employment circumstance for which the regime was designed to operate.

Those particular amendments were supported by both government and opposition at the time. It was also foreshadowed that a review would need to occur in relation to that before the new legislation came into operation to ensure that that might be appropriate in all the circumstances. It is for that reason in particular that I set out to focus on part 13 of the compendium bill, because the government has had the opportunity in bringing this legislation before the house to do the work that was foreshadowed in 2017 in the previous parliament.

I am glad the member for Kaurna has rejoined us to participate in the debate. I am glad there is a level of interest on the opposition side, having made the remarks that I did at the outset, because there is apparently a limited appreciation of the contents of the bill. It has been foreshadowed that there might be some investigation in the course of the committee process. I am doing what I can to enlighten those on the other side about just this particular aspect of the bill and I am endeavouring to walk through it in as clear and straightforward a way as I am able.

What has become clear is that, in light of the opportunity to conduct the work that was foreshadowed back in 2017, the government has determined that it would be and is inappropriate to enact those amendments. That is for a number of reasons but boils down to the fact that they do not contemplate or appreciate the relevant question, and that is whether or not that special category of spent conventions, the immediately spent convictions, ought be disclosed for an employment-related purpose as opposed to the context in which the offence has occurred which relates to the workplace in which that person may be currently employed or seeks to be employed.

While the endeavour may be meritorious—that is, to provide a process for younger persons to be provided with a broader exemption—the effect, perhaps unintended, would be undesirable in that the immediately spent conviction might find its way to be hidden from disclosure simply by virtue of the relatively young age of the offender, and that ought not, as a matter of principle, be a circumstance that persists within the regime and within the nature of that special exclusion.

It is convenient in that the time has now transpired so that that work foreshadowed in 2017 could have been done and is done, the result being that the undesirability of pressing on with that machinery means that those amendments will be repealed, and they are the subject of part 13. With those remarks, particularly in relation to those clauses of the bill that deal with the Spent Convictions Act 2009, I commend the bill to the house and wish its speedy passage.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN (Bragg—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General) (12:29): I rise to firstly thank the shadow minister and the member for Heysen for their contributions. I thank the member for Heysen for his interest in this law reform in relation to a number of areas but particularly spent convictions. I note the indication by the opposition that they will support the bill but have some questions.

I am not just the Attorney-General; I am also a woman and I can do two things at once. It came to my attention that the Leader of the Opposition was interested in a number of matters. A number of issues have been raised on the bill by the opposition in the briefings provided to them. I am going to outline to the parliament a number of aspects on which the opposition have already been briefed, so they may not be interested anymore in these matters, but I expect they will cover the matters that the leader wants to repeat again in the parliament, as is consistent with his modus operandi on these matters.

For the benefit of the parliament, I am going to outline some aspects of some of the reforms in the bill, in particular the judicial immunities, unexplained wealth, court premises and spent convictions aspects. I think the other matters speak for themselves. As I have indicated, we are happy to answer any further questions.

One of the issues that was raised on the judicial immunities, which of course provide protection to our judiciary, was whether examples could be given of the types of acts that are exercised in the performance of a judicial function, which would fall within the scope of the common law civil and criminal immunity for judicial officers. The position at common law is that the judicial officer enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability for acts performed in the course of judicial functions.

The immunity of a judicial officer from civil and criminal liability, under the common law, exists despite any express statutory reference in legislation to the contrary and there is no distinction between judicial officers of a superior and inferior court, so this applies to Supreme Court judges and to the Magistrates Court alike. The purpose of the immunity is to preserve the integrity, independence and resolve of the judiciary to ensure that justice may be administered by judicial officers independently on the basis of their unbiased opinion.

An example of an act that may fall within the sphere of judicial immunity from civil liability is the tort of negligence, whereby a defendant may allege that a judicial officer failed to apply or indeed misapplied the law in the course of a hearing or deciding a relevant matter. At common law, judicial officers also enjoy immunity from criminal liability for acts performed in the course of judicial functions. However, the immunity does not attach to acts that are outside the performance of judicial functions, i.e. theft, assault, murder, fraud, etc. Most criminal acts committed by a judicial officer are likely to fall outside the scope of a judicial officer's official functions and that, therefore, would not attract immunity from criminal liability.

An example, however, of an act performed in the exercise of a judicial function, where the immunity from criminal liability may theoretically arise, is criminal defamation, whereby a defendant may seek to argue that they have been criminally defamed by a judicial officer as the result of a wrongful conviction or finding of guilt. In this example, the judicial immunity would extend to protect the judicial officer from any criminal liability arising out of the exercise of the judicial authority to determine the defendant's guilt and the publication of any material to that effect, i.e. their reasons for judgement.

Further clarification was also sought about which judicial officers currently enjoy statutory immunity from (a) both civil and criminal liability and (b) only civil liability. In respect of the former, legislation that currently confers statutory immunity from civil and criminal liability on judicial officers for acts performed in the course of judicial functions includes:

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, section 79(1);

South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014, section 76(1);

Police Complaints and Discipline Act 2016, section 37(1);

Protective Security Act 2007, Part 5A—Protective Security Officers Disciplinary Tribunal, section 31E(1); and

Legal Practitioners Act 1981, section 81(2).

In respect of the latter—that is, in respect of only civil liability—legislation that currently confers statutory immunity in respect of that area on judicial officers for acts performed in the course of judicial functions includes:

Coroners Act 2003, section 33;

District Court Act 1991, section 36;

Environment, Resources and Development Court Act 1993, section 36;

Magistrates Court Act 1991, section 44;

Supreme Court Act 1935, section 110C; and

Youth Court Act 1993, section 26.

In respect of unexplained wealth as it relates to serious and organised crime in this bill, a query was made as to whether any other jurisdiction has an expiration clause built into its respective unexplained wealth legislation. I advise the parliament that South Australia is the only jurisdiction to have a sunset clause prescribed in its unexplained wealth legislation. The bill was introduced into parliament by the former Labor government with the expiry clause included.

In respect of the definition of 'premises of a participating body', which relates to court premises and the precinct being extended, clarification was sought on the meaning of 'precincts and immediate environs' in reference to the definition of a 'premises of a participating body', i.e. court premises, in relation to clause 15 of the bill. It is interesting that this was asked. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and I recently had a discussion, and I indicated that this matter was in the parliament for its current consideration. He was pleased that this was advancing, as it was a matter that had come at the express request of the Chief Justice.

The terminology that has been used was at his express request so, as advised during the briefing, the inclusion of the words 'precincts and immediate environs' has been adopted from the definition of 'court premises' as provided in section 2 of the Court Security Act 1980 (Victoria). The phrase 'precincts and immediate environs' is not expressly defined in our Sheriff's Act 1978. The phrase is therefore likely to be given its ordinary meaning by a court. The Macquarie Dictionary defines 'precinct' as including 'an enclosing boundary or limit' or 'a walled or otherwise bounded or limited space within which a building or place is situated' and 'environs' as the 'immediate neighbourhood; surrounding parts or districts'.

Members probably will not get much further assistance with the definition and interpretation of this clause from our liquor licensing laws, but members who have been here for a while will recall that we have quite a number of laws that relate to a precinct around a liquor licensed premises, which persons cannot enter if they are carrying weapons and the like. There are opportunities, for example, for SAPOL to search persons in those precincts.

However, this is a definition that has been provided by the Chief Justice, who requests that the terminology be expanded in this legislation. It has been mirrored from legislation that operates interstate, and we are confident not only that it is appropriate that the Chief Justice seek this for the protection of the staff and judiciary themselves working within the precinct but that he is eminently competent to be able to properly define that for the purposes of this legislation.

As to the Spent Convictions Act and the repeal of the Hon. Kelly Vincent's amendments, firstly I thank the member for Heysen for making a contribution in this regard because it is important that we understand exactly what is happening here and put this in the context that this is an issue that not only needs to be remedied but could have been remedied by the previous government, and they did not do so.

In respect of the information provided already on the amendments in clause 16 of the bill, which seek to repeal the amendments to the Spent Convictions Act 2009, that is, the SC Act moved by former member the Hon. Kelly Vincent MP, in 2017 parliament passed the Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio No 3) Act 2017, that is the 2017 portfolio act, which included amendments to the SC Act to clarify the rules relating to the disclosure and use of a conviction that is taken to be immediately spent under the SC Act.

The amendments to the SC Act have not yet commenced. The amendments remedy an anomaly within the SC Act, which had, in some cases, prevented employers from taking appropriate disciplinary action against employees following criminal offending, including where the offence was committed in the course of employment or where the employee poses a serious risk to other staff or the public.

Generally speaking, a spent conviction cannot be disclosed and is not a proper basis for refusing or revoking an appointment. In the case of a conviction that is immediately spent, the employer is effectively barred from taking disciplinary action and prevented from using their own knowledge of the offending to commence an investigation. By contrast, if no criminal charge is laid, or if the person prosecuted is ultimately found not guilty, the employer is able to carry out their own investigations and consider the need for disciplinary action.

To remedy the anomaly, the 2017 portfolio act facilitates the creation of a new exclusion that will be found in the Spent Convictions Regulations 2011, hereafter referred to as the regulations, that would only apply to immediately spent convictions and allow employers to take immediately spent convictions into account for employment-related purposes for a limited period of time. To date, these regulations have not yet been enacted.

The amendments in the 2017 portfolio act also affected a necessary restructure of the SC Act to facilitate this. During debate on the 2017 portfolio bill, the Hon. Kelly Vincent MP moved a number of amendments to the SC Act. The Vincent amendments sought to allow for a young person, (i.e. a 25 year old or under) with an immediately spent conviction to apply to a qualified magistrate for an order that a prescribed exclusion found in the draft regulations does not apply in relation to that conviction.

The purpose of the amendments was to recognise that there may be exceptional circumstances in which the immediately spent conviction of a young person should not be disclosed to an employer or potential employer. The amendments were supported by the former government and the opposition at the time, but it was foreshadowed that the amendments may need to be reviewed before coming into operation to ensure that they were appropriate in the circumstances.

From reading Hansard, it seems that, notably, neither party had considered this proposal yet supported it to enable the bill to pass before the parliament was prorogued. The current government has now had the opportunity to review the Vincent amendments and determined that it would be inappropriate to enact the Vincent amendments. The Vincent amendments fail to recognise that the question of whether it is appropriate for an immediately spent conviction to be disclosed for employment-related purposes is not specific to the particular offence committed by the relevant person but rather the context in which the offence relates to the workplace in which they are currently employed or seek to be employed.

In addition, it is noted that the Vincent amendments allow for any person aged 25 years or under to apply to a qualified magistrate for an exemption for any exclusion that is, or may be in future, prescribed by the regulations, not only the employment-related exclusion detailed above. In other words, this would allow for any person aged 25 years or under to apply to have their immediately spent convictions hidden from disclosure as a matter of course simply by virtue of their age and merely because of the fact that the exclusion is prescribed in the regulations.

This is clearly inconsistent with the original policy issues that the parliament agreed to with the passage of the 2017 portfolio act. Accordingly, we are seeking that the Vincent amendments be repealed as part of this bill. I will now provide two examples that compare the effect of the former government's amendments with the Vincent amendments.

Example 1: person A is a 23-year-old healthcare worker employed in a hospital. The person is charged with numerous offences in connection with the theft of fentanyl, a drug of dependence, from the hospital where they work. The person is found to have taken fentanyl on 31 occasions for their own use. The offences are found proved, but the person was ultimately found not guilty by reason of mental incompetence. As a result, the person receives an immediately spent conviction.

Under the current act, the employer is unable to act, despite the obvious risk that the person posed to patients at the hospital. Furthermore, the employer is prevented from notifying the Australian Health Practitioners Regulation Agency about the person's substance abuse or incapacity. Under the amendments made by the former government, including the regulations proposed at the time, person A's immediately spent conviction is liable to be disclosed to an employer or prospective employer for a prescribed period.

Under the Vincent amendments, because person A is under the age of 25, they would be eligible to make an application to a qualified magistrate for an order that a prescribed exclusion under clause 14 of schedule 1 of the SC Act does not apply in relation to their immediately spent conviction. In the event that the magistrate has determined to make the order, this would mean that the anomaly would continue to exist and person A's employer would be barred from taking any disciplinary action in relation to person A's offending.

Let's consider a second example. Person B is a 42-year-old worker in a children's residential care facility. The worker is charged with stealing surplus medication that was prescribed to one of the children at the facility and falsifying documents to cover the theft. The worker subsequently pleads guilty and the court declines to record a conviction. Consequently, under the current act, the worker's employer is unable to take any action against the worker.

Under the amendments made by the former government, including the regulations proposed at the time, person B's immediately spent conviction is liable to be disclosed to an employer or prospective employer for a prescribed period. But, under the Vincent amendments, person B is over the age of 25 and will therefore not be able to make an application to a qualified magistrate for an order that a prescribed exclusion under clause 14 of schedule 1 does not apply in relation to their offending.

I bring those matters to the attention of the parliament because they are important matters raised during the course of briefings and I hope illustrate the significance of why these particular aspects are being pursued in the government's Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) (No 2) Bill. They are worthy of the support of the parliament to advance. I would hope, upon reflection by the shadow minister on matters he has previously raised, that he, too, will see the merit of supporting the bill and be satisfied that it is important that we give these matters favourable consideration. I otherwise thank members for their contributions.

Bill read a second time.

Committee Stage

In committee.

Clause 1.

Mr PICTON: I thank the Attorney-General for her very lengthy answer in the summing-up stage of the second reading. I would like to ask the Attorney-General, as I do not think it was mentioned in her summing-up, who she has consulted with in terms of the consultation she has done in regard to this bill and if she can provide a list of that and a summary of what their representation and position on this legislation were.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I will identify the consultation list of those who were consulted. As has been previously reported to the parliament, it is the policy of the government to alert the parliament where there have been published submissions put by various stakeholders. It is not the policy of the government to provide details from parties that are parts of the government or, indeed, the judiciary in this case.

The government undertook consultation with the heads of jurisdiction, including the State Courts Administrator, the State Coroner, the senior judge of the Environment, Resources and Development Court, the judge of the Youth Court, the judge of the Licensing Court, president of the Health Practitioners Tribunal, the Law Society of South Australia, the SA Bar Association, the Legal Services Commission, the Crown Solicitor's Office, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Commissioner of Police, the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption, the Public Trustee and the Department for Child Protection.

Clause passed.

Clause 2.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I move:

Amendment No 1 [DepPrem–1]—

Page 5, line 5 [clause 8, inserted section 36B(2)]—Delete ', subject to subsection (3),'

This is an amendment to the commencement clause. It will enable the amendment to the Summary Offences Act 1953 in the bill to commence immediately after section 4 of the Summary Offences (Liquor Offences) Amendment Act 2018 comes into operation or on the day on which the bill is assented to by the Governor, whichever is the later. This will ensure that the amendments to the Summary Offences Act 1953 and the bill will not come into operation until after section 4 of the Summary Offences (Liquor Offences) Amendment Act 2018 has commenced.

Amendment carried.

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I move:

Amendment No 2 [DepPrem–1]—

Page 5, lines 9 and 10 [clause 8, inserted section 36B(3)]—Delete subsection (3) and substitute:

(3) The Supreme Court may only consider 1 application in relation to each of the questions referred to in subsection (1)(b)(i) and (ii) (as those questions relate to a particular investigation) but the Court may, if an application has been made under this section, join such other parties to the application as the Court thinks fit.

I indicate that this amendment is also to the commencement clause. It will enable the amendment to the Surveillance Devices Act 2016 in the bill to commence on a day to be fixed by proclamation other than on assent. This is to provide greater certainty to relevant parties about when the amendment will commence.

Mr PICTON: I have a question for the Attorney-General in relation to this amendment: is this because the Attorney-General wants this to be sooner or wants this to be later? If it is later, which I presume it would be, how much later is the Attorney-General anticipating that part 16 would be proclaimed and would start operation?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Later. It is an offence provision, so it is important that we ensure that that occurs.

Mr PICTON: The second part of my question was: how much later does the Attorney-General believe that this section will be proclaimed as opposed to the rest of the act?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I am advised that there is no reason for it to be delayed for any length of time. It just has to be post that date. It may only be a week or so.

Mr PICTON: Lastly to the Attorney-General on this: what additional steps need to happen in terms of bringing this in? The Attorney-General mentioned that people need to be talked to. Is that consultation going to happen after the passage of this act? Is it discussions with the police? Who is the concern that discussions need to happen with that would delay the starting of this section?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I am advised that really the only stakeholders who would receive any advice on this prior to the process for proclamation would be the courts, because it relates to an offence and they would be the ones handling that matter, and possibly SAPOL.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 3 to 11 passed.

Clause 12.

Mr PICTON: In relation to clause 12, I understand that this has come about because of representations from the ICAC, OPI or the ICAC commissioner himself requesting these amendments. Can the Attorney-General outline whether her agency fully considered the nature and effect of the amendments, or were they introduced simply on the basis of the recommendation of the ICAC without further consideration from the department?

The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Firstly, yes, the amendments here came as a result of a recommendation from the commissioner, Mr Bruce Lander. I am further advised that in the original Public Interest Disclosure Act it was intended that councils be included, so this is fulfilling what was expected to be in the previous legislation.

For the benefit of the member and other members, you might recall that this legislation was presented by the previous government and then pursued by this government after it fell into deadlock, from recollection. As to the question of whether our agency considers any recommendation or just does it, I make this very clear: we welcome the representations and recommendations of any agency that has an interest in these matters.

Obviously, if it is at the level and status of the commissioner, that is worthy of respectful consideration, perhaps even more than others. I make this point: our agency carefully considers the recommendations and requests of all stakeholders because it is our responsibility, and I think our duty to this parliament, that we make sure that, even if the recommendations are with the best intentions in the world, they are not going to offend other important areas of our law or inadvertently have some negative impact on the application of other laws.

We take that responsibility very seriously. I know that the officers and advisers I have, some of whom are here today, do diligently consider these matters, and there is no exception in respect of this one.

Progress reported; committee to sit again.

Sitting suspended from 12:59 to 14:00.