SIGNAL PASSED AT DANGER INCIDENTS

64 Dr McFETRIDGE (Morphett) (20 March 2012).

1. How many Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD) incidents were there in each year since 2006?

2. How many incidents were investigated and how many investigations have been completed?

3. What corrective action has been taken to educate train drivers?

4. How many train drivers involved in SPADs had less than 12 months driving experience?

The Hon. C.C. FOX (Bright—Minister for Transport Services): I am advised:

1. There were:

11 Train SPAD incidents in 2006;

15 Train SPAD incidents in 2007;

15 Train SPAD incidents in 2008;

10 Train SPAD incidents in 2009;

8 Train SPAD incidents in 2010;

14 Train SPAD incidents in 2011; and

1 Train SPAD incidents to May 22, 2012.

2. All train SPAD incidents have been investigated and completed for the period 2006 to May 22, 2012.

3. The following actions have been taken in relation to the education of train drivers:

In 2008 HALCROW conducted an independent review of SPAD incidents and assisted in the development of a SPAD management program that was adopted by the organisation.

A SPAD committee comprising of drivers and management representatives meet each month to review SPAD incidents, the SPAD management program and develop SPAD mitigation strategies.

A SPAD policy has been developed to provide guidance and support to drivers and the SPAD management program.

Ongoing discussion regarding SPAD issues occur at daily driver briefings provided by Senior Drivers.

A SPAD awareness board has been erected in the Adelaide Railway Station to inform staff of SPAD performance including number for current and previous period, incident signal numbers, trend data and graphs.

SPAD Alert posters are displayed to train drivers within 24 hours of any SPAD incident.

The recruitment process for drivers now includes psychometric testing designed to identify a candidate's propensity for response to rail signals.

In recent years the number of supervisory staff has doubled to allow for greater mentoring of new drivers.

The level of supervision, retraining and reassessment of drivers involved in SPAD incidents, is assessed on an individual basis.

Signal Sighting Assessments are conducted on an ongoing basis throughout the network which has contributed to a progressive LED upgrade of signals to improve sighting capability.

Furthermore, acquisition of an Automatic Train Protection system, announced in the recent State Budget, is progressing with several systems presently being assessed. The departure procedure for trains leaving Adelaide Railway Station was reviewed throughout the year with a new procedure that reflects Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommendations being adopted in October 2011. The driver training program has been revised and extended to include twice as much one on one tuition on the mainline and now includes a period working in Adelaide Railway Station to consolidate safeworking knowledge.

4. 31 drivers involved in the 74 SPADs between 2006 and May 22, 2012, had less than 12 months driving experience.' It is widely recognised across the rail industry that inexperienced drivers have a higher likelihood of SPAD incidents.