Parliamentary Committees

Select Committee on 2022-23 River Murray Flood Event

The Hon. N.J. CENTOFANTI (Leader of the Opposition) (15:50): I move:

That the report of the select committee be noted.

I rise today to speak to the final report of the Select Committee on 2022-23 River Murray Flood Event. This inquiry was one of the most significant of recent times, not just because of the physical damage caused by the floodwaters but because it laid bare the strengths, weaknesses and blind spots in our state's emergency preparedness and response frameworks.

Let me begin by acknowledging the extraordinary resilience of River Murray communities. They lived through an event of historic proportions: the largest flood the River Murray has seen in South Australia since 1956. Three successive flood peaks moved through the system, driven by months of heavy rainfall in the Eastern States. The scale and duration of the emergency were unprecedented for many in our state's emergency services, but alongside the devastation we witnessed incredible acts of leadership, generosity and determination from local council, volunteers, service providers and community members. That spirit deserves to be recognised in this chamber.

The select committee was established to review what happened during this flood and, more importantly, to chart a better way forward. We received 37 written submissions, held regional hearings in Murray Bridge, the Riverland and Adelaide, and heard from over 75 witnesses, including local councils, government departments, farmers, businesses and non-government organisations. I would like to acknowledge our committee secretary, Mr Anthony Beasley, and our committee research officer, Dr Merry Brown. I would also like to acknowledge the other members of the Legislative Council who formed part of the select committee: the Hon. Reggie Martin, the Hon. Russell Wortley, the Hon. Frank Pangallo and the Hon. Jing Lee. Hopefully, I have not forgotten anyone.

The committee has made 23 recommendations and I wish to use my time today to walk through the most critical issues raised. One of the clearest findings was that our current emergency management framework is not suited to a slow-moving, long-duration event like this. It became abundantly clear that the system, which is built largely for bushfires, storms and other short, sharp incidents, lacked the capability to manage the protracted, complex and often evolving nature of this flood.

Roles and responsibilities were blurred. Agencies often operated in isolation and communities were confused about who was responsible for what, particularly when it came to flood modelling, levee maintenance, river restrictions and grant processes. This lack of clarity led to delays, duplication of effort and, in some cases, decisions that put communities at greater risk. One of our key recommendations is for the state government to seriously consider an alternative governance model for such long-duration hazard events, one that enables better cross-agency coordination and puts community needs at the centre of decision-making from the outset.

Another significant concern was communication or, in many cases, the lack thereof. While there were some positive examples of collaboration, too often communication was top down, one directional and difficult for locals to interpret. For instance, flood forecasts were delivered in gigalitres per day, when what communities really needed was a clear understanding of potential inundation levels in metres. This caused real confusion. People could not plan, protect their properties or even decide whether to evacuate.

The committee also heard of missed opportunities to engage with local knowledge holders. In one case, a caravan park operator found out about a closure order affecting his business through the media, rather than from the authorities. In another, irrigators were told by one agency to dismantle infrastructure unnecessarily, only to find out later that the advice was incorrect, costing them time and money that they simply could not afford.

We need a system that listens as well as talks. That is why we have recommended the early appointment of a dedicated flood coordinator role during such an emergency, someone tasked specifically with cross-agency communication and community engagement. We have also recommended the development of a live, cross-agency information sharing platform to provide consistent and up-to-date communication across departments and with the public.

I now would like to turn to infrastructure and, specifically, the levee network. The committee heard grave concerns about the condition of state-owned levees and the lack of clarity over who is responsible for their maintenance. Many levees, particularly in the Lower Murray Reclaimed Irrigation Area, were not engineered to withstand the kinds of flows that we saw, which were over 200 gigalitres per day at the peak. Worse still, many had not been inspected or maintained for years. The result was in effect an ad hoc, crisis-driven response to levee reinforcement during the floods, with inconsistent outcomes.

We cannot continue to rely on good luck. The government must invest in regular engineering assessments, maintenance schedules and clear ownership arrangements for levees. We recommend dedicated annual funding for levee repair and maintenance and greater use of portable levee technology where appropriate.

Another area that generated considerable frustration was the grants and financial assistance process. While the committee acknowledges the efforts of state and federal governments in providing support, it became clear that many grant schemes were not fit for purpose. The eligibility criteria were often too narrow, the application processes too complex, and the timeframes misaligned with the needs of the community still in crisis.

One submission pointed out that certain councils were ineligible for key funding streams, even though they had played a critical role in the response. Many small businesses and flood-affected residents found themselves navigating red tape while also dealing with physical loss and trauma. We have recommended a full independent review of the grant system to ensure it is fair, timely and accessible during future emergencies. Importantly, we have also recommended that recovery funding be more flexible and locally targeted, because a one-size-fits-all model simply does not work in a flood zone that spans hundreds of kilometres.

One of the most disturbing findings of this inquiry was the mishandling of the procurement processes during the recovery phase, particularly by Green Industries SA, which was tasked with delivering the waste clean-up and demolition services in the aftermath of the flood. What we found was a process riddled with confusion, a lack of transparency and poor governance. Local contractors, many of whom were willing, ready and qualified to assist in the recovery, were sidelined. In some cases, businesses spent time and money responding to tender invitations that were later withdrawn or quietly abandoned. Others told the committee that they were led to believe that they had a role to play, only to be excluded without explanation when the contracts were awarded to a large interstate tier 1 firm.

Instead of a process that valued fairness, local content and value for money, we saw a government agency rely heavily on a cost-plus model, a procurement arrangement that lacks the most basic safeguards for taxpayers. Under cost-plus, contractors are paid for their actual expenses plus a guaranteed profit margin, regardless of performance or efficiency. It creates a perverse incentive to inflate costs and drag out timelines. It is the exact opposite of what we should be doing in an emergency, when public money must go further, not disappear faster.

The committee heard evidence that there was little to no documentation explaining why certain contractors were chosen over others and that key meetings and decisions were not properly recorded—a blatant breach of government procurement principles. These are not minor technicalities. This is public money. These are disaster recovery funds meant to help communities rebuild, not boost the profits of big companies through vague, uncompetitive processes. A review by an independent external contractor appointed by the Procurement Review Committee found that the tender process did not meet the usual standards of the South Australian Government Procurement Framework.

This is more than administrative sloppiness; it is a failure of integrity and a failure of stewardship. The very least that South Australians expect from their government, especially in times of crisis, is that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely, transparently and with local communities in mind. Instead, what we saw was a top-down, poorly managed recovery effort that actively excluded local businesses that could have delivered the work faster, cheaper and with stronger community benefit. In doing so, this government, I think, really squandered an opportunity not only to rebuild flood-impacted communities but to support their local economies at the same time.

The committee has rightly recommended that the Auditor-General investigate the procurement and tendering processes surrounding the flood recovery, but let me be clear: South Australians should not have to wait for another inquiry to demand basic transparency from their government. This should be the norm. The fact that we are even having to recommend something so fundamental speaks volumes about how broken that process was.

There is ample evidence. The committee heard from a man who was still homeless on his block of land two years after what has been described as essentially a bungled demolition and remediation job by the government's preferred provider. We heard from businesses that are still unable to fully reopen at pre-flood capacity due to lengthy delays in repairs and insurance processes. A two-year broken recovery is not the sign of a well-executed disaster mitigation and recovery effort.

Let us not forget that effective recovery requires continuity, not just during the emergency but well beyond it. Our local governments bore the brunt of the flood response and recovery. Councils reported enormous pressure on staff, with many teams stretched thin and working long hours with little external support. Once the waters receded, the burden of long-term recovery was largely left to local government. This cannot be allowed to happen again. We have called for more robust, longer term support for councils in recovery planning because they are the ones on the frontline, including funding for staff, access to engineering and community wellbeing services, and recognition of the unique role councils play in maintaining community cohesion and resilience during prolonged disasters.

Lastly, but certainly not least, this report is not just about looking back, it is about preparing for what lies ahead. This means the lessons of this flood must inform future planning. What we need is a River Murray action plan: a coordinated, forward-looking strategy for managing flood risk across the basin in South Australia with input from local communities, businesses, irrigators and emergency services. We also need to do more to reduce risk before disaster strikes. This means funding for flood mitigation infrastructure, public education campaigns, updated digital elevation maps and better data sharing between agencies. The aim must not be to just survive the next flood but to weather it with less disruption, less damage and more confidence.

This was a disaster that changed lives. People lost homes, they lost businesses and in some cases they lost hope, but they also showed us the best of what South Australia can be: united and fiercely determined to recover. This report gives the government a clear and detailed road map of how to do better, to govern with foresight, to prepare with integrity and to respond with compassion. The recommendations, in my opinion, are not optional. They are absolutely urgent, they are practical and they reflect the lived experience of communities that bore the brunt of government delays and systemic failures.

The next flood will not wait for this government to get its act together. The time to act is not in months and it is not in years, it is now. I urge the government to take the recommendations seriously and to act quickly. The next flood will not wait for us to catch up.

Let me be clear: this select committee did important work, but it is a committee that should never have needed to be formed. In the wake of a disaster of this scale, the largest River Murray flood since 1956, the government of the day should have immediately initiated its own independent review.

That is not unusual; it is not radical. It is absolutely standard practice, common sense and good governance. We have seen this routinely across Australia following other disasters such as major bushfires, floods and cyclones where independent reviews are launched promptly, conducted transparently and used to guide policy reform and investment. Yet in South Australia, our government chose to do nothing of the sort: no independent review, no public process, no transparent examination of what worked, what failed and what needed to change and needs to change into the future. The Minister for Emergency Services stated publicly in June 2023, and I quote:

I can advise that there is no imminent intention of the government to institute an independent inquiry. This flooding event has been to every extent, both possible and in a planned way, managed in a considered, appropriate way and in a way that has been responsive to community concerns, notwithstanding the fact that this has been one of the most significant natural disasters in our state's history.

That is not the sentiment of dozens of witnesses that we interviewed and it is not the sentiment of many of the submissions during the committee process. The government's failure to commit to an independent review left this parliament no choice but to step in. Again, I acknowledge the work of my honourable colleagues in helping to step in.

What is extremely interesting is that it has recently come to my attention, in the days post the tabling of this important report, that some stakeholders have now been contacted by the Premier's department seeking them to provide evidence for an evaluation of the 2022-23 River Murray flooding recovery. A consultant has apparently been engaged to undertake this review. I think the timing of this so-called independent review launched, mind you, only after the select committee's comprehensive report had been tabled, feels like no coincidence but rather a belated attempt by the government to cover ground that has already been thoroughly examined. While I welcome any effort to properly evaluate the recovery, the timing I think raises serious questions.

For the past three years, many others and I in affected communities have consistently called for an independent review, and to begin this process now, after so much time has passed, could not be more poorly timed. Communities are already under immense pressure at the moment, facing multiple challenges, not least the current drought. Asking communities to once again revisit their flood experiences after doing so extensively with our parliamentary committee, some may argue, could be seen as a bit of an insensitive burden.

We already have an excellent multipartisan report before the parliament. It includes clear recommendations and reflects input from members of all political persuasions. I would encourage the minister, as well as the government, to read through not just the report but all of the submissions as well as seriously consider the sensible recommendations we have put forward.

This committee was established because community voices were going unheard, because councils, businesses and residents were raising serious concerns, and because the government was not asking those difficult but necessary questions of itself. The fact that we had to form this committee at all is a failure of leadership and a failure of accountability. The fact that the government has only now recognised that they, too, need to independently look at themselves throughout this process, I would argue, is another failure of leadership.

Let me say, it should not be up to this chamber to do the job of executive after every disaster. This was not just any disaster. This was a slow onset, complex emergency that unfolded over months, requiring coordination across dozens of agencies, local government and service providers. It required detailed planning, timely communication and long-term recovery coordination. The stakes could not have been higher.

What governments do and how they react during a crisis matters, and how they honestly and openly evaluate their response matters. When governments do not look back with honesty, they cannot move forward with credibility. South Australians deserve better than a government that closes the books on a crisis and hopes no-one notices. They deserve transparency, they deserve learning and they deserve leadership that does not wait to be forced into scrutiny.

This report now stands as a record of what went right, what went wrong, and what must change. But let us never forget that it only exists because the government refused to act when the community was screaming for them to act, and that is not good enough. With that, I commend the report to the chamber.

Debate adjourned on motion of Hon. M. El Dannawi.