Motions

Independent Commission Against Corruption Investigations

Adjourned debate on motion of Hon. F. Pangallo:

1. That a select committee of the Legislative Council be established to inquire into and report on—

(a) any damage, harm or adverse outcomes to any party/s resulting from investigations undertaken pursuant to the ICAC Act (other than adverse findings resulting from the conduct of persons investigated);

(b) any damage, harm or adverse outcomes to any party/s resulting from prosecutions which follow investigations undertaken pursuant to the ICAC Act (other than adverse findings resulting from the conduct of persons prosecuted);

(c) options that may prevent or reduce the likelihood of, or any harm or damage resulting from, such outcomes and whether exoneration protocols need to be developed; and

(d) any other related matter; however, the committee shall not receive submissions or evidence in relation to any current investigation or current prosecution arising from such an investigation or any matter that is currently the subject of referral by the ICAC for further investigation and potential prosecution.

2. That standing order 389 be so far suspended as to enable the chairperson of the committee to have a deliberative vote only.

3. That, during the period of any declaration of a major emergency made under section 23 of the Emergency Services Act 2004 or any declaration of a public health emergency made under section 87 of the South Australian Public Health Act 2011, members of the committee may participate in the proceedings by way of telephone or videoconference or other electronic means and shall be deemed to be present and counted for purposes of a quorum, subject to such means of participation remaining effective and not disadvantaging any member.

4. That this council permits the select committee to authorise the disclosure or publication, as it sees fit, of any evidence or documents presented to the committee prior to such evidence being presented to the council.

5. That standing order 396 be suspended to enable strangers to be admitted when the select committee is examining witnesses unless the committee otherwise resolves, but they shall be excluded when the committee is deliberating.

(Continued from 14 October 2020.)

The Hon. F. PANGALLO (17:31): I rise to speak on the motion in my name to establish a select committee of inquiry into investigations by the integrity agency, the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (ICAC), that have caused harm, damage or adverse outcomes to individuals and whether there needs to be exoneration protocols in place to help restore the reputational damage caused by such investigations.

The select committee, if my motion is successful, will examine damage, harm or adverse outcomes to individuals and whether there need to be remedies to restore damaged reputations. The committee will not accept submissions or evidence from any current investigation, pending prosecution or matters the subject of referral by the ICAC for further investigation and potential prosecution.

I have a saying: corruption is the mortar that binds the walls of society. It is around us every day, it lurks in every dark corner of the community and it takes many forms, from low-level misdemeanours and wilful blindness to blatant subversive criminal behaviour. A former legal wag put it this way, 'corruption is the oil that greases the wheel'. Corruption of any sort cannot be tolerated. In order to defeat this activity, it is essential that governments do have powerful weapons like anticorruption agencies at the ready as deterrents and enforcers. But we also need our anticorruption agencies to be authorities we can trust, have confidence in its ability to carry out its job responsibly, work within the law and be accountable.

In South Australia, ICAC has been operating for the past seven years. It has enormous clout and resources at its disposal. However, the jury is out on its performance. Over the past year, several very serious matters concerning the conduct and standard of investigations by ICAC, OPI and joint SAPOL-ICAC investigations have come to my attention. I have been appalled and troubled by this and so should the public of South Australia, if they knew the facts. So should the media, had it taken the time to fully scrutinise the agency's conduct in some of its more high profile cases and failures. However, to my disappointment they chose not to, perhaps out of fear of raising the ire of the agency by questioning and evaluating the model that follows.

Some cases I will refer to in this address have fallen well short of the organisation's six core values. This is a brief summary of those values:

Independence

Our conduct and decisions will be made according to law and will be free of influence…

Impartiality

We will be fair and unbiased in all our dealings. Our decisions will be evidence based and made without fear or favour.

Accountability

We will be responsible for our conduct and decisions.

Integrity

We will conduct ourselves with complete integrity.

Respect

…everyone will be treated respectfully, fairly and courteously.

Excellence

We will embrace excellence, team work and professionalism…

In some of the cases I will outline, I found it difficult to tick any of those boxes. The agency's highly secretive cloak allows it to avoid the same kind of independent scrutiny applying in other states like Victoria and Western Australia. That needs urgent attention. The push for my inquiry comes at a time when corruption-busting bodies around the nation are under intense examination at the same time the federal government considers a commonwealth integrity commission.

There is a perception that these bodies are infallible untouchables and not answerable for their actions, particularly when they have crossed the line and there is ample evidence where corrupt conduct has occurred. Following the public humiliation in an ICAC public hearing of New South Wales Premier Gladys Berejiklian, Queen’s Counsel Peter R. Graham, a former justice of the Federal Court, wrote a letter to The Australian newspaper on 19 October under the heading 'ICAC a star chamber without safeguards of the common law'. It read:

Adversarial litigation endeavours to guarantee fairness. Inquiries, commissions against corruption and royal commissions are but poor relations of court proceedings.

Affected persons are not free to issue subpoenas, call witnesses or lead evidence. Under the New South Wales ICAC Act the commission is not bound by the rules or practice of evidence and investigations are to be conducted with as little emphasis on the adversarial approach as is possible. In other words, these non-judicial investigations are star chambers, where safeguards that common law procedures provide for the protection of the liberty of subjects are lacking.

Mr Graham questions the need for a federal corruption commission and wonders whether it exists for the benefit of their staff rather than the protection of the public interest, which should be its sole raison d'être.

Our previous ICAC, the Hon. Bruce Lander, scoffed at similar criticism by eminent QC Michael Abbott at a Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee hearing in 2018, where he accused the agency of operating like a Star Chamber. It is a common belief based on its performance over the past seven years.

There have long been concerns that ICACs can also threaten the independence of the judiciary. Those concerns are held to this day, including in South Australia. Former judge Tony Fitzgerald QC in his 1989 report into corruption within the Queensland government said:

There is the risk that any autonomous body, particularly one infused by its own inevitable sense of importance and crusading zeal, may become increasingly insensitive to the delicate balance between conflicting public and private interests, which is traditionally and best struck by judges.

Anti-corruption bodies seem to assume that it is their role to determine guilt or innocence. A High Court judgement on the role of the New South Wales ICAC determined that it was:

…an investigative body; that it wasn't a law-enforcement agency and it exercises no judicial or quasi-judicial function.

Yet that distinction seems to be somewhat blurred here in this state as we have seen it played out currently in our courts. South Australia's ICAC does see itself as a law-enforcement agency. We have seen instances where matters have not been referred on to South Australia Police to carry on the process of investigation and laying charges, but directly to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, where it has used its coercive powers to question defence witnesses even before they have even given evidence in trials.

There has been a lacuna of oversight in our own agency by the South Australian parliament for the seven years of its existence—and that needs to change. We need to look beyond the veil of secrecy and protection that this limited oversight provides. In the ICAC Act of 2012 there was no provision for the agency's own conduct to be independently scrutinised. Its annual reports are bland, perfunctory documents, while the ICAC's reviewer has limited powers and resources to do the job that is actually needed.

So has there been corrupt conduct in the very agency established to confront and investigate it? The answer to that is perhaps, yes. However, we will never really know because of the ICAC's secretive nature, and that no outside authority like parliament has gone looking. As New South Wales senior prosecutor Margaret Cunneen warned, after the New South Wales watchdog crashed and burned when it went after her with baseless allegations in 2015, and again, I quote:

We must be very careful about these bodies that bind everyone to secrecy. What have they got to hide?

ICAC's modest successes have been overshadowed by some spectacular failures, none more so than the scandalous and flawed six-year investigation and prosecution of innocent police officers from Sturt Mantle, who were acquitted of criminal charges. This wasted operation alone, codenamed Bandicoot, is estimated to have cost South Australian taxpayers tens of millions of dollars. I am trying to get the full cost of this operation but to no avail. I will further address this and other troublesome cases shortly.

The public stain of corruption is one of the most severe penalties you can inflict on an innocent person. Reputations, careers, marriages and lives can and have been destroyed. Tragically, there have been suicides and attempted suicides. There is no comeback. Even after someone walks free from court or an investigation falls over for lack of evidence or, for that matter, the absence of any evidence at all, the fallout is enormous, yet it rarely gets the same attention as being publicly named and shamed. There is no exoneration and no apologies. Innocent until proven guilty? If it only turned out that way.

Everybody is expected to just move on with their lives but we know that is not possible. Mud sticks. Reprisals continue even though the investigations must cease after a matter is dealt with by the courts. Former ICAC, the Hon. Bruce Lander, expressed his dismay that proposed legislation for him to conduct public hearings fell over. Parliament decided there were good and valid legal reasons for that.

If you take the New South Wales ICAC as an example, think of them more as a 21^st century kangaroo court with public hangings. Take the public humiliation of Premier Gladys Berejiklian, where her most personal and intimate details were made public over her relationship with former MP and boyfriend Daryl Maguire and his dodgy business affairs. While the investigation and a secret compulsory examination of Ms Berejiklian was appropriate in trying to determine whether she may have turned a blind eye to Maguire's conduct, which she vehemently denies, was it really necessary to have details of their affair provided at a public hearing as well, after this was canvassed in a private hearing?

In New South Wales there is a provision to force their ICAC to consider privacy and reputational damage before deciding to hold a public hearing. In the proposed South Australian legislation, there was a similar measure for those facing corruption charges to seek a judicial review. However, this was opposed on the grounds that it could be used as a deliberate ploy to delay and subvert proceedings.

I will refer to an article published on 16 October in The Australian, written by the Vice President of the Rule of Law Institute of Australia, Chris Merritt, who condemns the New South Wales ICAC's zeal for publicity, something that has not been lost in our own agency of late. Mr Merritt writes:

One of the curious aspects of this affair is that ICAC decided to subject Berejiklian to this while the NSW parliament's ICAC oversight committee is considering a reform strongly opposed by the commission.

That committee recently conducted an inquiry into whether to introduce an 'exoneration protocol' that would provide a remedy for those who have been accused by ICAC of wrongdoing but have been acquitted in court or had the case against them thrown out by the DPP.

The Rule of Law Institute made a submission to that inquiry supporting such an initiative and arguing that it should be followed next year by the abolition of public hearings.

If the factors in s31 (of the NSW ICAC Act) were not sufficient to save Berejiklian from the immense harm to her privacy and reputation, it seems clear that ICAC is determined to pursue publicity regardless of what the law says.

Self-righteous zeal blinded it in the past when it engaged in activities that had no basis in law, inflicting damage on innocent people who remain without a remedy until parliament enacts an exoneration protocol.

The decision to subject Berejiklian to a public hearing shows it has still not learned its lesson. Parliament tried and failed to reform public hearings. They now need to be abolished, leaving ICAC to investigate, produce reports and provide briefs of evidence to the DPP.

Berejiklian might be finished. But parliament should never again allow this agency to indulge in its thirst for publicity.

This brings me back to Operation Bandicoot, the South Australian ICAC's first big collar operation, announced in a blaze of publicity in October 2014 by the former ICAC, the Hon. Bruce Lander, and the previous police commissioner, Gary Burns. This was on the eve of ICAC's first report to the parliament, which really did not have that much to report. Ironically, in his first annual report, Mr Lander expressed misgivings about the quality of some investigations. He stated:

As I said last year, where I refer a matter to a public authority for investigation, the investigation should be undertaken to determine the facts; to identify wrongdoing (if any); and to detect shortcomings in practice, policy and procedure. An investigation should have the overarching purpose of determining the truth and minimising opportunities for future misconduct or maladministration.

This is going to be the first time the public of South Australia will know what really took place and what a farce this turned out to be.

Operation Bandicoot is the lowest point for ICAC in its seven years. Operation Bandicoot was a joint ICAC investigation with SAPOL's Anti-Corruption Branch, led by Detectives Selina Dinning and Christine Baulderstone, and headed by Commissioner Lander, as was required by statute, and overseen by former policeman Mr Grant Moyle as director of operations.

It began in January 2014 on the hearsay and assumptions of a disgruntled police officer who had reported that several officers based at Operation Mantle at Sturt, which deals with property confiscated from crime scenes, may have been involved in a cabal of theft and abuse of office. There was no evidence to substantiate any of the allegations of serious criminal conduct. More of that shortly.

First, let's begin with the very public hangings of those policemen and women I call the 'unlucky eight' in the media storm that erupted on 13 October 2014, when six officers were arrested. Looking at transcripts from several media interviews given on the day of the arrests and subsequent days after that by both the then police commissioner, Mr Burns, and Commissioner Lander, nowhere could I find them making reference that those charged should be accorded the privilege of a presumption of innocence until proven guilty.

The only ones who did, to their credit, were the then police minister, the Hon. Tony Piccolo, the then Premier, the Hon. Jay Weatherill, Police Association President Mark Carroll, and just two media identities: Matthew Abraham on ABC and Mike Smithson on Mix 102. In everyone else's eyes, the police officers were denounced as guilty or, as one put it, having 'sticky fingers'. There were prejudicial and egregious comments like this one on 14 October by Commissioner Burns:

We'll be looking at what opportunities they had that helped form this little subculture that saw them operate in this manner.

That is a direct accusation, not an allegation. Another comment was:

It was a ten out of ten on a scale of seriousness—

And:

My emotions range from anger to extreme disappointment to bewilderment, officers—some very respected officers—to be involved in something like this.

On FIVEaa on 14 October, host David Penberthy said to Commissioner Burns:

It sort of presumes what will happen when it gets to court but, in any case, like this where police are charged, that's it, that's the end of their career isn't it?

Commissioner Burns replied:

Yeah, pretty much so far charges that relate to integrity and honesty and ethical behaviour of this nature.

On 14 October, Commissioner Lander said:

I am satisfied with the integrity of the Anti Corruption Branch.

And this:

They had let the force down. The truth is there are still people that engage in opportunistic episodes of corruption and we are seeing that revealed. I am confident that it is an isolated case.

Their comments could only imply to any reader, listener or viewer that these officers were all guilty of criminal offences of stealing from crime scenes.

I now seek to table a letter from Mark Carroll, President of the South Australian Police Association.

Leave granted.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: The letter to the Assistant Crown Solicitor states:

This was egregious and quite unprecedented conduct from two senior public officers charged with investigating crime and upholding the law. It was especially appalling in respect to the then Police Commissioner (Burns) who was also our members' employer.

It is disturbing that these two individuals completely disregarded the presumption of innocence and placed SA Police and the ICAC in a position from the outset where the matter needed to be prosecution to its conclusion whatever the evidence was. It is a reasonable possibility that these media appearances played a role in the decision to continue to prosecute the matter notwithstanding the strength of the prosecution case.

In other words, there needed to be a massive arse-covering exercise if it did not stack up. The truth is it did not. There was no hard evidence against them that could reasonably result in a prosecution and that it was time to grab headlines to coincide with the tabling of ICAC's first report to parliament which lauded Bandicoot as a successful investigation.

One needs to question how the Anti-Corruption Branch had the time to prepare a case for Mr Lander and Commissioner Burns for them to make those public statements when a second totally flawed and illegal integrity test, a bogus crime scene that had been set up by SAPOL, was completed only days before their arrests. There was some extremely shoddy, sloppy and, as it turns out, unlawful detective work in Operation Bandicoot. This was like slapstick Keystone Kops material.

After reviewing court transcripts, associated documentation and statements made in the media, when it comes to the conduct and quality of the investigation in Operation Bandicoot, I would put heavy crosses through ICAC's six organisational values. I shall give some glaring examples that emerged in this torturous five-year process that virtually destroyed the lives and career prospects of eight innocent good men and women serving in SAPOL.

The Anti-Corruption Branch, with the blessing of ICAC, had conducted two integrity tests that were found to be unlawful or invalid because the applications, prepared by the Anti-Corruption Branch officer heading the investigation for the covert operation, failed to get the necessary approvals from the then director of operations, Mr Moyle, as required under the Criminal Investigation (Covert Operations) Act. The officer had also breached SAPOL's own policy in regard to these.

Further, a relevant section 34 notice, issued by ICAC, had expired on 31 August 2014 yet was not renewed. Bear in mind those integrity tests were conducted soon after in September and October and could have placed those tests in legal jeopardy. New police officers, not under any suspicion of corruption, were assigned to Sturt Mantle during the investigation. How was this allowed to happen when contrary to section 4(2) of the Criminal Investigation (Covert Operations) Act 2009, they were put at undue risk to criminal conduct? Who approved this and were Mr Moyle or Commissioner Lander made aware of it?

The integrity tests carried out at two bogus crime scenes turned up nothing to implicate these officers in any wrongdoing. In other words, there was no theft of any items or any evidence of abuse of public office. I will refer to a SAPOL audit of the Sturt local service area finalised in December 2014 where supposedly stolen items from those operations were still in the Mantle office that the ACB missed in its own search.

In an example of the sloppy detective work, Chief Inspector Selina Dinning, who had relocated from ACB to Officer in Charge of Sturt CIB, misidentified a TV in the Mantle office as being from a crime scene. She had questioned the senior officer in charge of Mantle, Sergeant Iain Mott, about it. He told her it was purchased. Dinning later secretly inspected the TV but failed to check the serial number or make inquiries as to whether Sergeant Mott had told her the truth that it had been legitimately purchased. It turned out to be a legitimate purchase, and a receipt was later discovered in a search of the Mantle office.

As Police Association president Mark Carroll describes it, 'This incompetence was a hallmark of the joint ACB/ICAC investigation.' I gather we have struck six, Mr President, so I will continue my remarks after the dinner break.

Sitting suspended from18:00 to 19:45.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: Before the dinner break I was describing the inept investigation of a joint ICAC and ACB investigation, known as Operation Bandicoot, and I will continue with that. The timing and existence of that SAPOL audit branch report and its contents is quite significant. It found numerous and serious breaches of protocols and policy, and poor bookkeeping and record-keeping in the property section of Sturt Local Service Area, far worse than was found at Sturt Mantle or what its members were accused of doing. In fact, the report noted that items destined and recorded for destruction were kept for personal use by other members at Sturt but not by Mantle officers. However, no officers were charged. That alone should have set off an early alarm about the direction the investigation was taking.

The audit branch report, for still unexplained reasons, was conducted separately under general orders and not part of Operation Bandicoot. It was finalised months after the arrests, yet it was not voluntarily disclosed to the prosecution and the defence by the ACB or ICAC under the Director of Public Prosecutions Act. It would have been integral to the outcome of proceedings but was kept a secret from defence lawyers for five years. There has been no explanation for that glaring failure of procedure in breach of the DPP Act. Had it been disclosed from the outset, it would have blown the investigation to smithereens because, as one officer stated, and I quote:

…there was no evidence of offending but only what 99 per cent of other officers were doing that were accepted practices.

In conducting those covert operations, which I remind the chamber were found to be illegal because of the invalidity of approvals, Mr Moyle could not recall signing any document authorising the integrity tests. So police, being party to this, were breaking the law in that they had rented premises under assumed names, had hydroponic equipment contrary to the Controlled Substances Act and made false reports to Crime Stoppers. My understanding and reading of the comments by Judge Lovell—and I stand to be corrected if I am wrong—is that those ACB officers who mounted that operation were not indemnified from breaking the law and could have themselves been charged with criminal conduct.

In an extraordinary if not bewildering move, and even though in 2017 the court ruled the approvals were unlawful, the matter still proceeded and the evidence, insufficient as it was, was not excluded. There were serious issues of a lack of proper disclosures, including vital video footage of the faked crime scenes, which also allege to show anticorruption branch detectives handling items during the searching in a less scrupulous manner than the accused and a failure to record items for almost eight months.

The prosecution and the defence were unaware of the video footage, which was only disclosed inadvertently by an ICAC employee to defence lawyers. In haste to avert a mistrial, the footage was shown to a jury in the middle of the prosecutor's closing address. This should not be happening.

It surely must have been concerning that the case was so flawed from the beginning to the very end, particularly after Mr Moyle recommended the file be closed in August 2015, seemingly satisfied all was in order for SAPOL to complete the task. From my reading of various documents, the only thing these officers were guilty of was a very minor breach of internal procedures, in that they failed to book in property in a timely manner. Not one item was found to be missing or stolen from crime scenes, even the bogus ones.

To be clear, this operation was a massively expensive undertaking. Dozens of police were assigned to it for months, conducting thousands of hours of phone taps that had to be heard and transcribed, of which not one second was tendered as evidence. If the public only knew the entire circumstances of this case, they would be justifiably enraged. Senior lawyers I have spoken with say it is one of the most shameful chapters in our criminal justice history, worthy of a royal commission.

As a former investigative journalist, this ranks right up there as one of the worst miscarriages of justice I have seen. I do not say this lightly—on the contrary, in fact—but what happened to the unlucky eight could be likened to a South Australian version of Victoria's Lawyer X, such is the breadth of this largely unreported scandal.

It is my understanding that recriminations against some of these officers continued well after the case was thrown out of court. There has been no exoneration, no apology, no admission of mistakes and no follow-ups from the media who participated in their 2014 crucifixion. These officers have suffered enormous mental anguish, reputational harm and severe economic loss for something they did not do. How do you reconcile that?

Fighting for your reputation does not come cheap. While ICAC has the resources to go into court or carry out its investigations using the very best counsel assisting, defendants have to sell or get another mortgage on their homes just to afford some quality representation. The Police Association is still seeking reimbursement of its costs, in excess of $2 million, along with costs of its prosecuted members, one of whom self-funded to the tune of almost $1 million.

The police commissioner still refuses to pay the allowances, up to $120,000 for each officer. They would have received that amount had they not been suspended, and it turns out there were no grounds for suspension. Had there not been this forum in parliament, the public would be none the wiser of how badly bungled and mismanaged Operation Bandicoot was.

With your indulgence, Mr President, I wish to detail another matter. You can get gaol time if you hold up a servo with a knife, yet if you use a pen to steal there is a perception you can get away with it. It is still a criminal offence, yet it is often treated differently and dismissed as a civil action because it requires specialised expert detective work, usually involving forensic financial skills. The next matter I raise is an intriguing essay of alleged fraud, lies, deceit and cover-up, starting with SAPOL and winding up in the Office for Public Integrity.

The dogged persistence of the two people at the centre of this matter is proving to be an unwanted nuisance because they are far from satisfied with the level of investigations carried out and they have the courage and integrity to call this behaviour out. They have located and compiled all the documents to prove their case and their allegations of inappropriate conduct that followed. I seek leave to table those documents, contained in two folders.

Leave granted.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: These two men could have given up a long time ago, but they refused to go away. In doing so, they have pinned these integrity bodies into a very difficult and potentially scandalous corner.

When a serious fraud complaint to police was suddenly and inexplicably dropped, pastoralist Ian Lawton and his business partner, Michael Fuller, a retired lawyer, rightfully sought answers via the police complaint process under the Police Complaints and Discipline Act. They followed the prescribed process, but what they got in response was a tangled web of distorted facts, untruths and misleading information, which made them even more suspicious about the motives behind the original decision to drop their complaint.

Here is what happened. In 2012, Ian Lawton purchased a 48 per cent interest—in an existing partnership with his accountant, Andrew Cleland, a senior partner at Cleland McFarlane Selth—in a livestock property, Mount Lyndhurst, in the state's Far North for $4.5 million. Cleland facilitated the legal and financial obligations and transactions. Lawton, a farmer, took responsibility for the property and its stockholding. He set about getting the station into running order.

The deal included the purchase of almost 16,000 sheep. As is the usual practice in pastoral acquisitions, this was an approximate number. If there were more sheep after an official count, the purchasers would need to reimburse the sellers of the partnership interest, the Marston family, around $79 per head. If there were found to be fewer sheep than the tally given at the point of sale, the purchasers would be reimbursed at that same figure—fair enough so far.

For taxation scheme purposes, the sellers (the Marstons) had maintained a 20 per cent stake in livestock on the books until the end of that relevant financial year. Following a formal headcount during shearing time and after settlement, it was revealed that the actual headcount of sheep had been dramatically overstated. The purchasers were entitled to a significant reimbursement going by the agreed price per head of $79. Under the purchase agreement, Lawton would need to be notified and was required to give any consents and authority to amend this figure.

Lawton later discovered the purchase agreement had been amended by another agreement entered into on his behalf by Cleland, which he alleged was done without his knowledge or consent, where the price per head of sheep had been reduced from $79 to $50 per head, a 60 per cent discount. This reduced the financial liability on the lower headcount by the sellers to the purchasers by a significant sum, estimated to be in the region of $120,000. Lawton claimed to be $120,000 out of pocket on the amended deal done, as he claims, without his knowledge or consent, as required.

Lawton refused to accept the new arrangement. Suspecting he had been defrauded, Lawton filed a complaint with SAPOL. His complaint was accompanied by a full brief of documents—his comprehensive sworn declaration and a written advice from his counsel, Ms Joana Fuller (now Judge Fuller of the District Court), in which she states:

I summarised below the important features that have led me to the view that there is a prima facie case of deception and dishonestly dealing with documents.

I seek leave to table that document dated 10 May 2018, along with an attached statement from Mr Lawton.

The PRESIDENT: Is the nature of that a single document? I think the previous one you tabled was a significant number of documents.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: I believe this one is a significant one, Mr President. I will challenge that.

The PRESIDENT: Sorry?

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: I believe the document I wish to table here is a significant document. Rather than me going through it, I would prefer to table it.

The PRESIDENT: The volume I think is what we are talking about. The previous one seemed to be of significant volume. Is this one more concise?

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: It is a smaller one, yes.

Leave granted.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: Ms Fuller's carefully crafted brief contains 12 features which must have given Detective Senior Sergeant Andrew Bolingbroke, who is now deceased, a clear indication that something was legally amiss and afoot. Lawton's complaint was subsequently given police incident report number PIR 18/E 17253 by Detective Bolingbroke for dishonestly dealing with documents and unlawful bias in a commercial relationship.

SAPOL dropped the case 2½ months later, expressly citing advice allegedly received from the DPP that there were no reasonable prospects of conviction, that it was a civil matter and the reason for that was that Lawton had given Cleland an informal verbal authority to carry out various transactions he would not have been able to do because Cleland had the expertise in that area.

However, it makes no sense. Why would Mr Lawton give Mr Cleland authority if he knew, or he was to know, Mr Cleland would later do a dodgy deal without telling him of any implications that would have short-changed him? Mr Lawton was unhappy, and eminent barrister Joana Fuller—who, as I said earlier, is now a respected District Court judge—complied and sent to SAPOL a critique of the alleged advice from the Office of the DPP. SAPOL rejected it and continued to claim to have received advice on three occasions with a full brief to that effect from the DPP.

Ms Fuller contacted the DPP and made inquiries herself. She ultimately was directed to a solicitor at the DPP, Gary Phillips. Mr Phillips confirmed for Ms Fuller that he was the only officer of the DPP to speak to SAPOL's Commercial and Electronic Crime Branch, that the contact from another detective, Della Sala, was informal with no brief and that he, Phillips, was only provided with Joana Fuller's written advice.

According to Ms Fuller, Gary Phillips additionally confirmed to her—he advised that having regard to Ms Fuller's covering advice with the delivery of the brief—that the complaint should be investigated. In December 2018 a DPP prosecutor confirmed to Ms Fuller the DPP did not receive a formal brief from SAPOL, nor did it provide formal advice to SAPOL that he, Mr Phillips, had tried to do the right thing but had got himself into trouble and could provide no further information. The first alarm bells started to ring.

In the meantime, an unhappy Mr Lawton had gone back to SAPOL. In a letter to the police commissioner, Grant Stevens, dated 3 December 2018, he alleged his complaint had been corruptly terminated and requested that the circumstances of the termination be referred to the Anti-Corruption Branch of SAPOL for investigation. Commissioner Stevens acknowledged receipt of Lawton's letter of 3 December, and a follow-up letter of 6 December by email to Lawton on 10 December, and said he would provide a response when he had considered the matter.

Lawton heard nothing further from the commissioner. Lawton then filed a complaint in person with the OPI on 29 January 2019 against the commissioner, acting assistant commissioner Tom Osborn and three officers of the crime and electronic branch for involvement in the alleged corrupt termination of his original complaint to SAPOL. Even though the complaint to OPI alleged corruption, OPI referred the complaint made to it not to ICAC but back to SAPOL's internal investigation service.

What was not known by Lawton or Mr Fuller (co-director of Lawton Trustee Company and assisting Mr Lawton) at the time and not conveyed to them by OPI was that Commissioner Stevens had apparently referred Mr Lawton's letter of 3 December 2018 to the IIS and had subsequently, with the active cooperation of the IIS, determined that Lawton's letter of complaint date, 3 December 2018, be resolved by 'management resolution' under part 3 of the Police Complaints and Discipline Act (PCDA).

IIS did not contact either Lawton or Fuller, and in the face of email requests from Fuller for contact and input, Lawton next received a report from the IIS chief superintendent, Tim Curtis, dated 19 February 2019 that there was a previous management resolution of Lawton's complaint to Commissioner Stevens by chief superintendent acting assistant commissioner, Tom Osborn, under part 3 of the PCDA, and that there were no conduct issues regarding any members of SAPOL, and noted that OPI had oversight of the PCDA.

The problem with this report is that neither the commissioner, nor anybody on his behalf, had advised Lawton of the commissioner's determination or that Osborn had been appointed the resolution officer for that purpose. OPI has, and had at the time, oversight of management resolution processes and direct real-time access to the complaints management system maintained by IIS under the PCDA.

OPI did not advise Lawton or Fuller at the time of what Curtis reported to Lawton in his letter of 19 February 2019, and only confirmed that knowledge in a roundabout way when deputy ICAC, Mr Michael Riches, responded to the allegations by Fuller against OPI assessors and the director of OPI, Mr Stroud, in Mr Riches' email to Mr Fuller on 3 July 2019. I seek leave to table that letter.

Leave granted.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: Fuller then emailed the then ICAC commissioner, the Hon. Bruce Lander, and made the allegation that Mr Lander was complicit in a cover-up of OPI involvement. Mr Lander denied that OPI had been complicit in any wrongdoing, and asserted the investigation conducted under the supervision of OPI was dealt with appropriately.

Under the Police Complaints and Discipline Act, the police commissioner must inform the police minister, the Hon. Corey Wingard at the time, within 15 sitting days of making such resolutions, and these resolutions need to be tabled in parliament by the minister. There is no record of this being tabled. Here is where questions need answers to resolve the impasse of this dispute and subsequent complaints.

There are serious penalties for breaches of the Police Complaints and Discipline Act. Did the police commissioner breach this by the inadequate management resolution investigation? Release of the complaints management system entries would reveal the trail of complaints and the veracity of a management resolution if it exists and which is disputed by Lawton and Fuller. Access to these documents and others would probably settle the dispute once and for all.

Lawton and Fuller are alleging a cover-up has been put in place to suppress any disclosure of OPI involvement in the initial reasons for the failure by SAPOL to act on the criminal allegations by Lawton in his original complaint to SAPOL. All the comprehensive material referred to above and tabled is contained in a submission requesting a further review of the original decisions and was delivered to the new ICAC, the Hon. Ann Vanstone. As Mr Lawton and Mr Fuller fully expected, it was flatly rejected, although it is not known if the material provided was scrutinised.

In a postscript to this ongoing saga, in 2016 Mount Lyndhurst was sold for $8 million, realising a profit of $3.5 million from the original investment. Mr Lawton is claiming that, on top of the initial loss—$120,000, incurred after the questionable fraudulent document was drawn up, reducing the value of each head of sheep and thereby significantly reducing the financial liability by the sellers under the original contract of sale—he is now around $1.4 million out of pocket.

Mr Cleland denies the claims made against him and others. Mr Lawton and Mr Fuller, meanwhile, are sticking to their guns. Mr Lawton is refusing to accept some of the moneys still owed to him and will not sign taxation documents that could implicate him in a dodgy transaction.

Imagine waking up one Saturday morning and seeing your picture prominently plastered on the front page of the paper, accused with four others of credit card misuse after a 16-month ICAC investigation. This was part of the nightmare experience at the hands of ICAC that enveloped senior Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure Director of Transport Safety Regulation, Trent Rusby, four years ago. The exclusive story was clearly what the media referred to as a 'drop', a selective tip-off.

Considering the nature of the investigation, which was described as intensive auditing by the department and ICAC officers, it could only have originated from one source and it came after Commissioner Lander granted a release under section 56 of the ICAC Act, which allows publication, and a month or so after Mr Rusby and the others were charged with over 30 offences and summonsed to appear in court. Allow me to read excerpts from that story.

Five Transport Department officers, including two senior managers, are accused of using government credit cards to buy and misappropriate an Aladdin's Cave of electrical and consumer goods. Goods worth tens of thousands of dollars—electrical items, four-wheel drive accessories, computer and camera equipment and outdoor clothing to building materials, tools and equipment and even a pool carpet—

I point out that, unlike Aladdin's, this was not a magic one—

were allegedly bought using government credit cards and then misappropriated.

Synonyms for the word 'misappropriated' include stolen, pocketed and embezzled. They were thieves and, of course, using the Aladdin's cave analogy, this was a veritable treasure trove. It would not surprise me if the staff at ICAC had a decent chuckle over their Saturday morning latte. Mr Rusby, because of his seniority at the time, received the most prominence in the article that appeared to paint him in a bad light. He was charged with four counts of failing to act honestly, and dishonestly taking property on a work-related trip to Kangaroo Island, although that is not how the ICAC investigator saw it.

Up until then, Mr Rusby had an impeccable work record—he was held in high regard—but in October 2014, he was advised to go on gardening leave as an audit was underway at his worksite. He knew little else. Unsure, and feeling insecure, it weighed heavily on Mr Rusby and his family. It affected his mental state and he was placed on anti-depressants. Rumours started flying that it was initiated by a jealous and ambitious work colleague with an axe to grind.

An ICAC investigator named Miroslav Petkovich contacted Rusby in April 2015 to inform him he would be interviewed for abuse of public office. That was the first and last time Mr Rusby heard from ICAC. Concerned about his health and that he could no longer bear being on gardening leave, Mr Rusby decided to resign from his contracted position a few weeks later to await his fate.

Mr Rusby rejected all those charges levelled against him and said he could easily have proven they were false, including a trip to Kangaroo Island where he was required to inspect berthing facilities for cruise ships. But those charges were never pursued, he was never interviewed and he was never provided any evidence. On 22 July, the charges were dismissed: four years and four months of hell was over. The pain and economic loss remain in defending nothing. He wants and deserves an apology from the government for putting him through that ordeal and placing a stain on his reputation. So what became of that Aladdin's cave witch-hunt?

Just one of the five, Michael King, was put through the wringer in a court case dogged in controversy over the validity of ICAC search warrants, which at the time rankled the former commissioner. Fearing he was going to be deep-pocketed by ICAC's legal muscle if he fought on, and wanting to bring it to an end to save his sanity, marriage and family home, Mr King opted to plead guilty to two charges. The sum total of the misappropriated Aladdin's cave goods was a little over $2,000. What was the sum total of ICAC's investigation? Well, to hazard a guess, it would have run into a few million. Was it all worth it? As the Treasurer once said of ICAC: it would scare the bejesus out of public servants.

Another ICAC victim who came to see me expressing his disgust at the treatment he received is Dr Jurgen Michaelis. Dr Michaelis has a very impressive CV. He has worked in the international life sciences industry, served on many company boards, has extensive experience in venture capital funding, and he has listed companies—so impressive that he was appointed CEO of BioSA, the South Australian government's industry development organisation, where he secured funding for more than 90 bioscience companies.

However, a couple of his underperforming employees earmarked for the axe went to ICAC as whistleblowers, accusing Dr Michaelis of having conflicts of interest where he stood to gain a benefit from his job. It was not based on any credible evidence, just what they believed was going on, which is what happened in Operation Bandicoot. ICAC investigators seized thousands of documents—almost all of them irrelevant to the investigation—and trawled through his enormous files and forensically analysed bank accounts, credit card statements, tax returns, travel claims, grants paid to companies by BioSA and entertainment expenses going back 10 years.

ICAC investigators were unable to identify a single cent that was not properly accounted for. He maintains ICAC based all its investigations on hearsay. There was no case to answer and it should have been dropped. Dr Michaelis says even the DPP's senior prosecutor wanted the matter dropped as there was no reasonable prospect of finding him guilty of anything. They pressed on. Dr Michaelis wonders whether any influence was put on the reluctant prosecutor. The trial by judge alone lasted five hours, three witnesses were called and not guilty of all charges.

Dr Michaelis says if Commissioner Lander had taken the time to meet him in his office with the chair of BioSA in 2015 to seek an explanation, it would have been put to bed in minutes. Who knows what this bungle cost taxpayers? Dr Michaelis applied to have his legal costs of $215,000 refunded. It took a year and he only received $170,000. He still has not had all the items taken from his office at BioSA returned.

Shortly before his arrest in 2015, he was on the verge of a $100 million investment deal that would have generated a further $300 million for the state. His skills and experience have now been lost. The stain remains.

There is a Wikipedia entry about South Australia's ICAC. I am unsure who moderates this site; however, it has been updated as recently as the middle of this year to show the Hon. Ann Vanstone is now the new commissioner. It also makes mention of Dr Michaelis' case, and it reads:

In August 2015 an unnamed Chief Executive from a South Australian government agency was charged with two counts of abuse of public office. Attorney-General John Rau told the media that 'the commissioner has made it clear on many occasions that he has not encountered in his investigations any evidence of systemic or institutional corruption in South Australia.' In October 2015, it was revealed to be BioSA chief executive, Dr Jurgen Michaelis. In April 2016 it was announced that he would face corruption charges. It was alleged that he 'improperly exercised a power or influence' on two occasions in 2012 while working on the development of the biotechnology sector within South Australia. No proof or charges had been made public at that time. In December 2016, Dr Michaelis pleaded 'not guilty' to the charges.

That is the end of the Wikipedia reference. No attempt has been made to correct or update the entry that he was actually found not guilty on all counts. I quote Margaret Cunneen about her 'frightful ordeal':

But for people to have all these powers exercised against them for something that's at best extremely trivial—and as we know there was no evidence at all, nothing of any cogency which would even warrant any kind of charge at all, what on earth was it all about?

In Mr Michaelis' case, what on earth was it all about? In Operation Bandicoot, what on earth was it all about? In Mr Rusby's case, what on earth was it all about?

Last month, I read an excellent opinion piece in InDaily by lawyer Morry Bailes, who says he has lost his enthusiasm for our ICAC—the model of course, which he believes may have problems. He is not at all comfortable with public hearings in the wake of the Berejiklian episode, pointing out the situation where a number of New South Wales police officers suicided—suicided, Mr President—when they were publicly named and shamed by the Police Integrity Commission. He wrote:

Is the public interest, rather than the public curiosity, really served by exposing someone who may be innocent of any wrongdoing to a process that seems to have more in common with the old Star Chamber than a contemporary justice system?

He continues:

As to our state parliaments, the time may have come to reconsider what model and type of anti-corruption commission is required. It must have teeth but should it be destroying lives on a high road of moral certitude?

There have been suicides, attempted suicides and mental breakdowns in South Australia. A former New South Wales ICAC commissioner, Megan Latham, once said, 'Examining witnesses at public hearings was like pulling the wings off butterflies'. I will read that again just to make that emphasis: 'Examining witnesses at public hearings was like pulling the wings off butterflies and it is a lot of fun.'

She must have a warped sense of humour. The Rule of Law Institute made a submission to the New South Wales parliamentary inquiry into whether to introduce an exoneration protocol that would provide a remedy for those who have been accused by ICAC of wrongdoing but have been acquitted in court or have had the case against them thrown out by the DPP, people like those unlucky eight Mantle police officers, Trent Rusby, Jurgen Michaelis.

The institute's vice-president Chris Merritt now intends filing another submission to the New South Wales inquiry. I shall invite him to make a submission to my inquiry, should it proceed. In his perspective on the first 12 months of the New South Wales ICAC in 1990, jurist Peter McClellan wrote:

The ICAC will ultimately be effective only if its performance justified its extraordinary powers. If the commission is to justify those powers, it must be scrupulously fair, value the rights of individuals and accept that persons should only be convicted after due process in the relevant court. The experience of the first 12 months is that as a result of ICAC's actions, some of which are the direct result of legislation, great harm has been done to many innocent people.

I ask you: has anything changed in 30 years? I will begin to wind up with these sage words by one of our pre-eminent QCs, Michael Abbott, when he appeared before the Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee in 2018 and addressed the extraordinary powers given to ICAC:

With that great power goes great responsibilities. My concern is that some of the responsibilities need to be legislatively enshrined.

Regarding the separation of powers, Mr Bailes puts it very succinctly in his opinion piece:

What we do not need are unelected, sometimes overzealous corruption fighters, making a mockery of centuries of common law principles, causing elected people to fall from public favour when they may have done nothing wrong except to have the misfortune to be obliged to appear before or be investigated by an anti-corruption commission.

On the subject of reputational damage, what about the humble Woodville pizza guy and how the Premier and police commissioner demonised him by blaming him for the statewide lockdown and being part of the Parafield cluster, not to mention the deployment of what I refer to as the 'lying squad', as opposed to flying squad, of 20 detectives in 'Operation Supreme', I guess I can call it, in which SAPOL threw the lot at it.

They probably had better things to do. It turns out today that no charges will be laid against the pizza worker. In what appears to be a face-saving exercise, SA Health has claimed it is exercising its obligation to claim privilege in not providing information to the investigators. Whether he lied out of fear is one thing. It is the reputational and mental health damage from the publication and the pile-on done in conflating that embellishment with the lockdown that cost the state hundreds of millions of dollars. I can only call on the on the police commissioner and the Premier to do the right thing and follow the class act of Professor Nicola Spurrier and offer this poor fellow a personal apology for his premature public execution.

I will not make any apologies for speaking this long to my motion because I firmly believe that the subject of this inquiry is an extremely important issue that goes to the heart of our modern system of democracy and justice, built on the values of today and not those of a mediaeval era. I thank those on the opposition and Greens' crossbench who have indicated their support for my inquiry.

The Hon. T.A. FRANKS (20:30): I rise on behalf of the Greens to support this motion for a select committee and note also that I am willing to serve on it. The Greens wish to see transparency for a genuine ICAC, a strong ICAC and a fair ICAC, which I think everyone in this council would agree with, and also to ensure that a secret ICAC—that was designed to protect people's reputations, their careers, their relationships and their lives—does not, by that very secrecy, actually ruin their careers, their reputations and their lives. I commend the motion.

The Hon. C. BONAROS (20:31): There is a technical amendment that needs to be made to the motion. The motion should refer to the Emergency Management Act, but I understand that it refers to the Emergency Services Act. As such, I move:

Leave out 'Services' in paragraph 3 and insert 'Management'.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER (Leader of the Opposition) (20:32): I rise, on behalf of the opposition, to indicate that we will be supporting the Hon. Frank Pangallo's motion to establish a select committee. He has raised some issues that, at the very least, deserve a proper and thorough investigation. We think that a select committee is the best and proper way to do this.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS (Treasurer) (20:32): I rise on behalf of government members to oppose the motion, but acknowledge that, from the members who have spoken so far, the majority of members are intending to support the motion. The government's very strong view, and certainly my view as well, is that this parliament has constructed an appropriate body which is in essence meant to tackle the issues that the Hon. Mr Pangallo has ventilated at quite some length during his extensive contribution to this particular select committee motion.

This parliament—I think unanimously, but I cannot recall the exact numbers—established the Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee, whose responsibility is to provide oversight over the operations of the ICAC. Frankly, it is also there to look at the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Commissioner of Police and the Ombudsman in relation to their annual reports and various other functions that are outlined in section 15O of the Parliamentary Committees Act. That body—and we have had a recent debate: the Hon. Mr Pangallo is newly installed as the Chair of that particular Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee—is quite clear that it is there to, in essence, provide the oversight of the operations of the ICAC.

It is modelled on similar oversight committees. I am not saying it is exactly the same, but I recall the debates and it was modelled on similar oversight committees in some other jurisdictions in terms of ensuring that there was some accountability through the parliament for the operations of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption.

In 15O(1)(a) the committee is allowed to examine 'each annual and other report laid before both Houses', each separate report on a review under section 46 of the ICAC Act and, under subparagraph (iii), various other reports as well. Under paragraph (b) it can inquire into and consider the operations of various other acts, which are outlined in the subparagraphs. Paragraph (c), which is the one I want to refer to, provides that the functions of the committee are to:

(c) inquire into and consider the operation of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 and, in particular—

(i) the performance of functions and exercise of powers by the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption and the Office for Public Integrity; and

(ii) whether the operation of the Act has made an appreciable difference to the prevention or minimisation of corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration; and

(iii) whether the operation of the Act has adversely affected persons not involved in corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration to an unreasonable extent…

It continues:

(d) to inquire into and consider the performance of functions and exercise of powers by the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act…

(e) to report to both Houses on any matter public policy arising out of an examination of a report or an inquiry (including any recommendation for change) as the Committee considers appropriate; and

(f) to perform other functions assigned to the Committee under this or any other Act or by resolution of both Houses.

So it is possible that this currently constructed committee can—under paragraph (f), for example, if there were a resolution of both houses—assign additional functions to the committee, if there were an argument to be made about the very wide-ranging functions. It was explained to me by some people in terms of what the Hon. Mr Pangallo was seeking to do, which is that there were people who I think would be covered by paragraph (c)(iii), which provides 'whether the operation of the Act has adversely affected persons not involved in corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration to an unreasonable extent'.

I am assuming that the Hon. Mr Pangallo, as he has sought to outline in his contribution this evening, is outlining persons who in his view are in that particular category; that is, they have broadly been unfairly treated by an ICAC investigation or operations of the ICAC. As I said, if that is not broad enough, it is possible by resolution of both houses to perform such other functions assigned to the committee if there is a resolution of both houses.

The ICAC and I have made comments that have expressed some concerns in the past in relation to some of the operations of the ICAC. When we do, I think we need to bear in mind that, whatever we think of the current operations of the ICAC—and a number of us may well have concerns about particular aspects of particular investigations, and they are the subject of ongoing discussions between interested parties in terms of how we might resolve some of these issues in the future—they are issues in relation to the role and functions of the ICAC and various other integrity bodies.

As I have personally expressed in the past, my view was that the ICAC, as originally constructed, ought to have been about allegations of corruption, and my personal views are on the public record in relation to that particular issue. Broader issues of maladministration and the like may well be considered by other integrity bodies.

All those issues I think are sensible and reasonable issues, which can be debated and discussed without having to publicly tear down the confidence in what should be an important integrity institution in this state. I think that is the danger; that is the dilemma and the challenge from those who are going to support this particular committee and this particular inquiry.

If I can offer a personal reflection, as someone who has been in this chamber for much longer than anybody else, the statements put on the public record by the Hon. Mr Pangallo today are essentially statements of people he would appear to support who are concerned about the operations of the ICAC. My experience, for what it is worth, is that there are always two sides to a story.

We have publicly ventilated one particular version of events. I guess I will be very surprised if an alternative version of some of the events does not find its way onto the public record at some stage, perhaps challenging some of the statements that have been made this evening. I do not know that because I do not know the details of the case to the degree that the complainants have put to the Hon. Mr Pangallo.

I accept, however, that all institutions, including integrity bodies—not just ours but in other states—have made, and I am sure in the future will make, mistakes or errors of judgement in terms of how they go about their task. They therefore need to be in some way held to account in our processes as a parliament or an oversight committee, or if there are to be reviewers of the operations. What some of the other jurisdictions are looking at are tougher or tighter procedures in terms of the oversight institutions or bodies that oversee the operations of these integrity bodies.

All those things are worthwhile grounds for exploration. That is a debate about how we can improve the oversight and the operations of the committee. I think the challenge is how you do that without trashing, or potentially trashing in the public mind, confidence in what should be an important integrity body in the state. As I said, my experience is that there are always two sides to a story. We have heard one side this evening.

The other cautionary note I want to place on the record—and this is, I think, for those who are going to be in this chamber for longer than I—is that the Hon. Mr Pangallo this evening tabled a significant volume of documents. In my experience in this chamber, there have been occasions when we were in opposition when the then Labor government put a position that what might be of concern to the then Labor government was what was actually being tabled and attracting privilege in this particular chamber.

Did it include, for example, a series of defamatory claims made against individuals? On one occasion, I think the then leader of the government and the then Labor attorney-general, sought to consider the documents before agreeing to have them tabled in the parliament, attracting privilege. I think in terms of standing order or debate, it is a useful discussion point to say: are we all going to have an unlimited power to table whatever document we want in the chamber and attract privilege in that particular way?

The alternative argument is that the Hon. Mr Pangallo, instead of speaking for an hour and a half, could have rivalled the Hon. Mr Parnell and spoken for eight hours on WorkCover legislation and read every element of the document onto the record. I do not know what is in the documents that have been tabled this evening. The only person who does is the Hon. Mr Pangallo.

But I think it is something that, outside of this particular debate, ought to have discussion in terms of what our processes ought to be regarding the capacity of members to table documents, without perhaps even giving to the chamber some sort of detailed explanation as to what is in the documents, if someone does want to disagree with the tabling or ask that they be deferred until someone has had a chance to have a look at them before agreeing to the tabling of documents. Anyway, I think it is a useful discussion point that perhaps the Standing Orders Committee or interested members in this chamber might want to have a debate about at some particular stage.

In relation to the functions of the current Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee, one reason for the select committee is that the current function of the Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee says that it cannot reconsider a decision of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption or any other person or body in relation to a particular matter. The Hon. Mr Pangallo was concerned about that and was wanting the select committee to be able to reconsider past decisions of the ICAC in relation to issues.

I guess the considerable material the Hon. Mr Pangallo placed on the public record would seem to indicate possibly that that is where the Hon. Mr Pangallo wants this particular committee to head, and that is that he saw a problem with the current committee because it specifically prevents going back and reconsidering individual decisions of the commissioner in particular cases.

As I said, the oversight committee was there to consider the overall body of work and, in the end, to provide recommendations, we hope, in relation to how processes can be improved, if legislation needs to be changed. I think the honourable member referred to proposals for exoneration procedures in other jurisdictions. I have raised the issue that other jurisdictions have talked about tighter and tougher oversight bodies and powers of the reviewer, for example.

These are all sensible suggestions for debate in terms of how we might improve oversight and accountability bodies, if we accept they either have made or will make mistakes in relation to their processes and procedures. But when one looks at the select committee drafting, it is clear that the Hon. Mr Pangallo is quite explicit in terms of wanting to investigate past investigations because he makes it clear in paragraph (d) that the select committee can inquire into and report on:

Any other related matter, however, the committee shall not receive submissions or evidence in relation to any current investigation, or current prosecution arising from such an investigation, or any matter that is currently the subject of referral by the ICAC for further investigation and potential prosecution.

They are obviously sensible exclusions because they are current processes, but by a clear inference the honourable member wants this committee, and wants him as the chair, to have the power to investigate, revisit and reconsider past decisions of the ICAC. In essence, we have the potential of a retrying in a public forum of past investigations.

That is, aggrieved parties would be able to come before the select committee and make their claims before the select committee in relation to all of these past cases, a number of which the Hon. Mr Pangallo has already placed on the public record. How the integrity bodies approach that, in terms of whether they will want to present evidence or not, I have no idea. I suspect probably not, but I do not know; I cannot place myself in the position of either the past commissioner or the current commission in relation to this.

However, I do express concern that this is a dangerous precedent. I said so in an earlier debate; I think it is a dangerous precedent for the chamber to be heading down. There has been, broadly, bipartisan support for the establishment of the ICAC, of the need for oversight. I can assure the Hon. Mr Pangallo that there have been ongoing discussions and broad agreement about the need to improve the current legislative arrangements in relation to the ICAC, all from a viewpoint of learning from the lessons we have seen and accepting that there have been some inadequacies. Some may describe them in stronger terms than that, but let me use an understated phrase.

We will accept, and I am included in that group, that there is a need for change and there is a need for improvement in terms of our current arrangements in relation to the ICAC, but I firmly believe this is not the appropriate way for us to go about it. Nevertheless, given that the Leader of the Opposition, the leader of the Labor Party, has indicated his support and that the Greens have also indicated their support, there is clearly a majority in this chamber that will support the establishment of a select committee.

I urge those members who are on the committee to exercise their functions with caution. I hope that at the end of this what we get are proposals for improved operation of the ICAC, and that it is not just used as a vehicle for aggrieved parties to ventilate their concerns on an ongoing basis without, as I said, some useful purpose coming from them in terms of sensible reform of the current arrangements of the ICAC in our state.

The PRESIDENT: I call the Hon. Mr Pangallo to conclude the debate.

An honourable member: Briefly.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO (20:52): Thank you very much—and yes, I will.

Members interjecting:

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: It will be brief, and I thank you, Mr President. I thank the honourable Leader of the Opposition and the Labor Party, and the Greens, the Hon. Tammy Franks and the Hon. Mark Parnell, for supporting this important committee. I pointed that out in my lengthy speech.

I want to address some points the Treasurer made. He refers to the fact that the Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee would be the appropriate avenue for this type of investigation. As it turns out I actually sought advice about that before coming to the motion for this inquiry. I am not sure whether the Treasurer was in the chamber today when I read my summary of the report of the Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee, where I pointed out that unfortunately the committee does not have investigative powers.

Unlike many other committees it cannot look at individual matters. It is a policy committee and, as the Treasurer points out, it looks at the operation of acts and public policy. That that is it. It cannot go any further. It is important that we do have a mechanism in South Australia, an independent mechanism, like they have in other states, that looks at the operations and conduct of their anticorruption bodies.

We made a recommendation for that to be considered in the Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee report that was tabled and noted today, that we do need what they have in other states. We do not have that in South Australia. His argument that the Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee can carry out the same functions of this committee is just totally wrong, and we have looked at that.

This committee is important because what it looks at is exoneration protocols and possible remedies for people who have been wronged by the integrity agencies. There is one in New South Wales currently underway. I point out that the New South Wales ICAC has been going for 30 years. I mentioned that in my speech. There have been a number of reviews of their ICAC, and there certainly have been a number of instances where their ICAC has made significant errors, mistakes.

When the Treasurer refers to mistakes being made, what should we do, just shrug our shoulders and say, 'Oh well, bad luck'? What shall we say to these people who have lost their homes, lost their jobs, probably lost their families, their marriages, lost virtually everything? What shall we say to them? 'Bad luck, get on with your life. They made a mistake, but we don't want to hear any more about it.' That is not how it should be. When I read the act, to me it was incredulous that it was able to get through in 2012 in the format that it is in. That is why there have been recommendations for changes to it.

When the Treasurer starts talking about mistakes being made, I will point out to the Treasurer that mistakes have cost lives as well. What we are doing here is accountability. We have an integrity body whose conduct has not been appropriately scrutinised for seven years. We are seeing instances regularly, not occasionally, but regularly in our courts where the manner of the investigations and prosecutions by the DPP are being questioned.

It is important that people who have been harmed and had their reputations sullied should not have to live with that stain without at least having a forum to make their views known. The cases I outlined tonight are quite clear. The Treasurer says there are two sides to every story. Yes, there are two sides to every story, Treasurer, and you do not need to tell me that; I know that. Except in this case we have only ever heard or seen one side of the story—one side, the ICAC side from their investigations. These people who have been put through the meat grinder, I think as the Attorney-General described it to me in a discussion I had with her, are at pains to try to get something to restore their reputations, and that is all this committee is going to do.

It is going to look at what had happened in these cases—we will probably get many others that will come forward—and see where the parliament can at least find an avenue to restore reputations that were destroyed on baseless evidence, flawed evidence, evidence that just did not stack up in court and should never have gone to court. That is what this committee will do. What I think the Treasurer is suggesting, perhaps, is that parliament should be wilfully blind to all the mistakes that have been made over the past seven years. The timing of my inquiry just seems ironic, in that some of these matters are only just starting to come to the surface.

In summing-up, I commend this motion to the chamber and I look forward to working with the members who will be on it and will welcome evidence and submissions to be made to the committee next year. We will look at it, and hopefully we will be able to report back to the parliament before the end of the year next year, in 2021. With that, I put the motion to the chamber.

The Hon. C. Bonaros's amendment carried; motion as amended carried.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: I move:

That the select committee consist of the Hon. Justin Hanson, the Hon. Tammy Franks, the Hon. Nicola Centofanti, the Hon. Russell Wortley and the mover.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: The long-established practice in this chamber is that the government is entitled to two members. I am advised by my whip that we were asked to have both Dr Centofanti and David Ridgway as members of the committee. I think it is grossly unfair that the motion that has been moved by the member has only one government member on the committee and four non-government members, which is a gross imbalance in terms of the representation in this chamber.

As I said, the long-established convention has generally been two government members, two opposition members and either one or two crossbenchers. I guess the only alternative I have is to propose that the Hon. Mr Ridgway be added to the committee. I am not sure who the other four members were. I think it was two crossbenchers and two Labor members. I do not know whether the Hon. Mr Pangallo is prepared to accept a sixth member on the committee or that the Hon. Mr Ridgway be substituted for one of the other members but, certainly from my viewpoint, I am moving that the Hon. Mr Ridgway be at the very least added to the committee so that the committee be a committee of six.

The PRESIDENT: Is the Hon. Mr Pangallo prepared to move in an amended form?

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: Yes, I will move in an amended form.

The PRESIDENT: Bear with us a moment. We have a five-member committee, and we now need to get the right way of extending it to be a six-member committee. The Clerk will assist you shortly.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: I move:

That standing orders be so far suspended as to enable me to move that it be an instruction to the select committee that its terms of reference be amended to input paragraph 2(a) as follows:

That the committee consist of six members and the quorum of members necessary to be present at all meetings of the committee be fixed at four members.

Motion carried.

The PRESIDENT: I note the absolute majority. If you would like to now move the new membership of the committee, the Hon. Mr Pangallo.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: I move my motion in an amended form:

That the select committee consist of the Hon. Justin Hanson, the Hon. Tammy Franks, the Hon. Nicola Centofanti, the Hon. Russell Wortley, the Hon. David Ridgway and the mover.

Motion carried.

The Hon. F. PANGALLO: I move:

That the select committee have power to send the persons, papers and records, to adjourn from place to place and that it report on 31 March 2021.

Motion carried.