Constitution (Deadlocks) Amendment Bill

Second Reading

Adjourned debate on second reading.

(Continued from 9 March 2016.)

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS (17:15): I rise on behalf of Liberal members to oppose the second reading of this bill. Given the comprehensive nature of the vote on the companion bill which we have just had, the Constitution (Appropriation and Supply) Amendment Bill, members will be delighted to hear that I do not propose to speak at length on this bill. A number of members including myself have addressed broad comments on that previous debate relating not only to that bill (the appropriation and supply bill) but also this, the Constitution (Deadlocks) Bill, as well.

I have to say that when one is talking in the South Australian community at the moment about issues that in any way relate to South Australian politics, issues like the cost of living, jobs and unemployment, child protection, health and Transforming Health issues—there are many issues that get raised by constituents, friends and acquaintances with each of us as members of parliament—I have never had anybody, not only in recent times but in my long history in this parliament, raise with me as a barbeque conversation starter, or otherwise, the question, 'Why don't we do something about the deadlock provisions in the Legislative Council and the House of Assembly?'

I think for reasons that we have outlined earlier, this is essentially an attempt at distraction which has obviously not been successful because there has been very little media, community or public debate about the issues. I think that is because they are seen for what they are and that is that it is a distraction, a side issue and certainly not addressing the major issues that are of concern to South Australians at the moment.

As outlined in my previous contribution, our system of government is one where the houses of parliament essentially have equal powers except on the issue of money bills. What this particular bill is seeking to do is to again chip away at the powers of the Legislative Council and, in particular, it is setting up a new prospect of a deadlock provision between the two houses of parliament. Put briefly, the second reading outlines a series of steps which would need to occur.

That is, the House of Assembly would pass a bill, the Legislative Council would either fail to pass the bill within 15 sitting days, so if the Legislative Council was still debating the bill after 15 sitting days, such as a planning bill or a workers compensation bill or something complicated like that, that would trigger the first provision for a double dissolution and a deadlock arrangement; or if the Legislative Council rejected the bill or it passed the bill with amendments that the government or the House of Assembly does not agree, that is the first trigger point.

The second trigger point is then the House of Assembly introduces a similar bill (it could be the same bill or a similar bill; I will not go through the caveats but essentially the same or similar bill) but on this occasion the Legislative Council does not have 15 sitting days to consider the bill, it only has nine sitting days and if it does not consider the bill within nine sitting days, or it rejects the bill or passes the bill with amendments, amendments that the House of Assembly does not agree to, then the second trigger point for the double dissolution or the deadlock provisions is triggered.

Then essentially what is to occur is that there is to be a double dissolution election which means all members of the House of Assembly and the Legislative Council would have to face election. After the double dissolution, the third trigger point—or the fourth trigger point if you take the double dissolution as the third trigger point—was that if the government was re-elected and introduced the same or a similar bill again, it could do so, and if the Legislative Council failed to pass the bill within nine sitting days, or rejected the bill for the third time, or passed the bill with amendments to which the House of Assembly did not agree, then you had the fourth and final trigger for a joint sitting of the members of the Legislative Council and the House of Assembly.

At that joint sitting, the intention would be of the government of the day that the government might have the numbers at the joint sitting to pass the bill contrary to the wishes of the majority of members of the Legislative Council. Again, without going through the detail, this bill outlines a process whereby that bill is to be passed into law without ever having passed the second house of parliament, that is the Legislative Council.

That is the structure that is set up in the bill for resolution of deadlocks. Without entering the current debate about the success or otherwise of double dissolutions and resolutions of deadlocks in the commonwealth arena (because this is modelled, so we are told, on the commonwealth arrangements) the reality is, as I outlined in my previous contribution, that the argument for this has not been made by the government.

The overwhelming majority, or approximately 99 per cent of bills, over the last 20 years, or let me put it another way, just on 1 per cent of bills that the government might have introduced and had considered by the Legislative Council have either been defeated or laid aside over the last 20 years. There is certainly no argument that can be made which has said that over a period of 20 years the Legislative Council has been obstructionist to the program of either Labor or Liberal governments, for that matter, over that 20-year period.

That is the reality. The reality is that no argument has been made for the requirement for this particular reform. The existing processes are by and large sufficient to resolve most of the differences between the houses. Clearly, if only 1 per cent of bills over 20 years—

The Hon. S.G. Wade: 1.1 per cent.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: 1.1 per cent—have been defeated or laid aside, then approximately 99 per cent of bills have been resolved in one way or another to the satisfaction—that might be too strong a word, but resolved in one way or another between the two houses, that is between the government and opposition and minor parties. In the end, the government of the day, Liberal or Labor, might not have been overly happy with the final nature of amendments that have been moved and passed by the Legislative Council, but have not been so offended as to say, 'We are not prepared to allow the bill to pass in any way or form with the amendments that the Legislative Council has moved.'

The second point I would make—and this was referred to, I think, by my colleague the Hon. Stephen Wade in his contribution on the appropriation and supply bills—is that we have an existing mechanism in terms of what is referred to as the conference of managers between the houses. In my experience in this chamber, Labor governments of an earlier generation and certainly the former Liberal government, were prepared to utilise the processes and procedures of this parliament in a way which this current Labor government for some strange reason has been unwilling to do. The former Labor government of the 1980s and the Liberal government of the 1990s used the conference of managers as a mechanism to seek to resolve differences of opinion between the houses.

The conventions in the early days of my career here were that when you went into a conference of managers, you did so and it was given a priority. Essentially, the conference of managers sought to resolve the issue almost immediately, that is within a day or so. Sometimes it went over a number of days. I have to say, in recent years that convention has been modified.

We have had one example where a conference of managers was deferred, I think, for many months over a parliamentary break and was revisited on a number of occasions before it actually ever reported back to parliament. That was never the intention. It is not prevented by the standing orders, but it was never the intention of the original drafters of our standing orders and our constitutional powers in terms of how we resolve differences. In and of itself, I do not think it is necessarily a deal-breaker. Governments can approach the management of the conference of managers in a number of different ways.

Certainly the original intentions were that only members of parliament were at the conference of managers. These days we see ministerial advisers, other experts, lawyers of all shapes and sizes, for example, sitting in or advising and seeking to, on occasion, broker a compromise through the conference of managers. Again, I do not necessarily see that as being a deal-breaker. Our conference of managers ought to be flexible enough to, within reason, adapt to those sorts of evolutionary changes.

As I said, with the brief exception of the last month or so where there has been this outbreak of, I think, two conferences of managers, which I must say is welcome, prior to this recent outbreak there was perhaps a recognition that these bills were not going to be going anywhere. I am not sure whether that is really the reason, but certainly over the 14 years of this particular government, and particularly the last six or seven years, there has been a noticeable reluctance of government ministers and the government to engage in conferences of managers.

It has essentially been: go out to the public arena, belt hell out of the opposition and the minor parties, try to browbeat a compromise, and on occasion sit down and negotiate with an individual minor party or Independent member or the opposition to broker a compromise over a longer period of time. There is a structure for that to occur, which is the conference of managers. Certainly it is the process envisaged to try to resolve differences between the houses.

I hope this is a change under the current Labor government, but my expectation should there be a Liberal government after 2018 is that the tried and true processes and conventions of resolving differences between the houses would be revisited. That is, that the tried and true processes of conferences of managers properly run and conducted, with perhaps evolutionary changes as might be required, is a mechanism which should be supported by the Legislative Council and the House of Assembly, by government and by opposition, and by minor parties and Independents as a mechanism to try to resolve differences of opinion between the houses. Certainly that is the preferred mechanism.

For those reasons, the Liberal members in this chamber strongly oppose this legislation and its companion bill the Referendum (Deadlocks) Bill as well. For those reasons, we will be voting against the second reading of this bill.

Debate adjourned on motion of Hon. D.G.E. Hood.