Planning, Development and Infrastructure Bill

Committee Stage

In committee (resumed on motion).

Clause 28.

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I have some answers to questions asked in relation to clause 28, if you would like me to put them on the record. Before we adjourned, the Hon. Mark Parnell and the Hon. Stephen Wade asked two questions relating to this clause. Firstly, the Hon. Mark Parnell asked for confirmation that this clause applies to both permanent appointed members of the commission and sessional members who may be co-opted from time to time. On advice from parliamentary counsel I confirm that this is the case. The government also indicates that although the requirement to disclose only crystallises upon formal appointment, as a matter of administrative convenience we would require disclosure to be made during the recruitment process for the list of sessional members.

Secondly, the Hon. Stephen Wade sought clarity regarding the interaction of the disclosure regime under this bill and the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act. Our advice is that these two acts operate concurrently but effectively apply the same requirements. It is important to recognise that the disclosures regime in this bill mirrors that already applying under the Development Act. The main reason it applies in this bill is so that these disclosures apply to members of joint planning boards and assessment panels who would not be covered by the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: In relation to disclosure of financial interests, in any other clause of the bill or in this particular one, what are the integrity and accountability requirements for senior staff of the planning commission?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: The staff, including senior staff, of the commission will be staff of the department, so they are basically public servants and are bound by the Public Sector Act, the Codes of Conduct, and also the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Just to clarify that, in terms of financial interests or pecuniary interests of senior staff in particular, or all staff, would it require a declaration of financial interests in relation to that? If they are treated as public servants, I am not sure that other public servants—with the possible exception of chief executive officers of departments and agencies, who might have a strict requirement in terms of financial interests or pecuniary interests—are required to declare, on a register in any way, their financial interests. Clearly they would have to declare a conflict if they were involved in something. So I seek confirmation or clarification of that.

Would the equivalent of the chief executive officer of the planning commission (if there is such a title or designation) have similar disclosure requirements as a chief executive officer of the justice department or Treasury and Finance, for example?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I have been advised that generally, in terms of public servants, you are right: it is mainly the chief executive who has disclosure obligations, and I believe they are annual. I do not believe any other staff are required to make disclosures, but we are happy to look at that. We could extend that further to other senior members of staff. We are certainly happy to consider it.

The Hon. R.I. Lucas: And the chief executive of the planning commission has that same requirement?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: Yes, I am advised.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: I seek a little clarification. Earlier in questioning you indicated that the planning commission would be like an advisory body and that it would not be a full-time position. The Hon. Rob Lucas is talking about the chief executive of the planning commission but my understanding, from earlier in the debate, is that it would not be someone who was seen as the chief executive of the planning commission. You would obviously have a chief executive of DPTI or of planning, but the planning commission is an advisory body. I think that is what I recall you saying.

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: The Hon. David Ridgway is right; the commission will not have a separate position of chief executive. I am advised that the chief executive of DPTI will also be acting as the chief executive of the planning commission.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: In relation to staff, I know earlier in the debate you indicated that it would be funded out of existing resources, but I am sure that the government has some idea of the sort of staffing resources that would be required to properly support the planning commission. Are you able to give us maybe not a full FTE figure but the likely support that the planning commission will need?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I am advised that currently we have two statutory committees: one is called the Development Policy Advisory Committee and the other is DAC. Each currently have their own separate executive support. These will be merged into one, and we believe that it will be able to use that surplus executive support to assist the planning commission.

Clause passed.

Clause 29.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: Clause 29 is entitled 'Committees'. It provides that:

(1) The Commission—

(a) must establish 1 or more committees in connection with its functions and powers as a relevant authority under this Act (to be known as Commission assessment panels)…

Why does it say 'must establish 1 or more'? Clearly, there is a number of committees that you need; so is it 'must establish one' or 'we must establish more'? It seems a little strange to me worded that way.

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: The reason it is one or more is that of the two powers given to the planning commission: one is advisory and the other is the assessment. In relation to its assessment powers, it is required to delegate its powers to a subcommittee. So it is actually required by legislation to do that, and that is why it must be at least one, and it can be more if it decides it needs other committees to assist.

The Hon. M.C. PARNELL: Reading through the Hansard of the other place and the amendments that they made, I see that the minister has done exactly what our minister just explained, and that is sought to separate the two functions of the commission to make sure that when they are assessing development applications it must be assessed by a committee rather than by the full planning commission; and I think that makes sense. Clause 29 says the commission must establish at least one of these commission assessment panels, and clause 30, as I understand it, says that having established that panel, they must then delegate to that panel their development assessment role. I think that is a useful reform that was made, and I think that is good.

The Hon. R.I. Lucas: But the committee could be the whole commission.

The Hon. M.C. PARNELL: That's right. That gets me to the next point, which is: who is going to be on these committees? Clause 29(2) has this curious sentence. It says:

A committee may, but need not, consist of or include members of the Commission.

I think what that means is that it need not include any members of the commission, and that raises the interesting question about who is going to populate these committees if not members of the commission. The only answers I can think of are you have some of these, as the minister called them, sessional members, so they will certainly be on a committee, or perhaps the answer is staff, because there is going to be staff in clause 31.

What I am nervous about is whether, having given the state planning commission development assessment roles, you might end up with people actually doing that work who have only a peripheral connection to the state planning commission. None of the actual members of the commission are going to sit on the committee. It could be just all staff, or it could be anyone—the car park attendant—who knows who gets dragged in off the street? Can the minister respond to the meaning of subclause (2) as to who is going to be on these committees?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I am advised that this provision is really a standard clause in relation to the composition of committees. For instance, it is currently reflected in the DAC at the moment. They can set up and delegate to a subcommittee that does not require any of its members to be on it, so that is the first thing. The second thing is, if you asked the question who is likely to be on a committee, you have clearly identified some obvious people: sessional professionals with specific knowledge, experience or skill set. One of the things we have done in the past is where, for instance, we needed some specific knowledge to do with a particular urban area, we actually asked the council to nominate one of its council assessment panel people who sat on the committee. So, we would imagine it would work pretty much the same way as it has been working in the past.

The Hon. M.C. PARNELL: I thank the minister for her answer and accept what she says if it is a fairly standard sort of condition. Other arrangements I have seen in the past have tried to keep a more formal connection back to the head body, as it were, by saying at least one member of a committee must be someone on the commission. I accept what the minister says if it is a provision that is currently being used; that is fine.

I am not proposing to take it any further, but I do find it a little bit curious that you could end up with a situation where the most important committee of the planning commission does not actually have any planning commission members on it. I think that would be an odd outcome. I do not know whether that is intended, but it might be something we revisit between the houses as to a minimum requirement for at least one commission member to be on that committee. I am less worried about the advisory committees than I am about the actual decision-making committees for development assessment.

In terms of accountability, something like 90 to 95 per cent of development assessment decisions are made by people under delegation, usually just employed town planning staff, so I think it is possibly not that big a problem, but I will have a look at it over summer and see whether we think it needs improving.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: In relation to the committees—maybe I have missed it somewhere—what size will they be? Two, three, five or 10? The minister made some reference to maybe council planning staff, and obviously the Hon. Mark Parnell talked about a lot of decisions and development approvals being given a delegation as such that it is a council staff member, but if they actually have to sit on a committee and they are not on the commission, will there be any level of remuneration, such as a small sitting fee or something, so that these people are compensated for their time?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I am advised that in terms of the numbers or the size of these subcommittees, it would be a matter for the commission to determine. In terms of remuneration, I am informed that it would be some sort of sitting fee or sessional fee, and we have talked previously about what those sorts of rates might look like.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: Is it possible that the commission could be somewhere between four and six people—let's say five—but you could have a subcommittee of six or seven that are delegated to do some work on behalf of the commission?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: Yes, that is right.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Can I just clarify what I thought I heard the minister say earlier and that is that one of the options available to the government under this, and one of the reasons for the drafting of this particular clause in the bill, is to allow in certain circumstances a local council member with expertise to be able to serve on one of these committees or commission assessment panels?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: The example that I gave was where we have asked the council to nominate one of their council assessment panel members, so they are not a member of the council; it would be a professional.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Just to clarify: the minister is referring to the fact that the minister would ask the council to nominate someone, but the restriction would be that it could not be a council member with expertise, it would be a council staff member with expertise.

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I am advised yes, if it was related to an assessment matter.

The Hon. M.C. PARNELL: Just to tie up the loose ends: is the minister saying that the arrangement will be similar to, I think it is called the Inner Metropolitan Development Assessment Panel, which is a subcommittee of DAC, and that if the block of flats is in Unley council's area, then Unley would provide one of their panel members—not being an elected member, so one of the appointed panel members—to sit on this committee? Is that what the minister has in mind?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: Yes, that is exactly the type of arrangement that could occur and that we have done in the past, not with Unley, of course, but another council.

Clause passed.

Clause 30.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: I want a bit of clarification in relation to delegations. It says:

(1) The Commission may delegate any of its functions and powers.

(2) A delegation—

(a) may be made—

(i) to a particular person or body; or

(ii) to the person for the time being occupying a particular office or position…

It then goes on to say a delegation must be made, if required by the minister, and it gets more specific. I am interested to know what delegation would be made to a person for the time being occupied in a particular office or position. Can you explain the necessity for that clause please?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I have been advised that this involves the potential to delegate to a senior person or position. For instance, from the department, it might be to execute contractual documents, and you might want the arrangement to be with the position, not a person, so when the person moves on you do not have to keep changing the name. The example that has been referred to in this place is Stuart Moseley who has moved on but what this allows is for the delegation to be made to the general manager of information services rather than, say, Stuart Moseley.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: If the planning commission is really just almost like an advisory board that sits to one side from the chief executive, what functions is it delegating to individual people? I can understand how it would establish committees that would do the work, but I am struggling to understand why they need to that with individuals.

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I have been advised to remind honourable members that the commission would have a much broader role and function than just advisory, so it has a number of other functions, and it will have many administrative responsibilities. This provision allows for the technical expertise, if you like, of a departmental person, a specific function—for instance, a power to issue a practice direction. The decision might be made by the commission but the paperwork is obviously going to be done by a departmental service. The commission members are not going to sit around and fill out all the documents, and you need a level of specialised expertise to do that, so they could identify a particular staff member and delegate that to that position so that if that individual moves on they do not have to keep having to change the name of the person.

The Hon. M.C. PARNELL: Clause 30(2)(b) says a delegation:

…must, if required by the Minister, be made to a committee of the Commission designated by the Minister;

I note that when it comes to setting up committees, it says that the commission must establish any committees that are required by the minister. The minister can make sure that a committee gets established and then the minister can insist that certain matters be delegated to that committee. The Local Government Association in relation to this clause said:

The ability of the minister to dictate that delegations be put in place may undermine the independence of the commission. It is highly unusual for legislation to provide for the dictation of delegations.

They then go on to suggest the deletion of paragraph (b), the one that I read out. They also point out that the minister in the other place had agreed to look at it and see whether any changes were required. My question of the minister is: has the minister in the other place looked at it and determined whether any changes are required?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: Again, I am advised that this is not an unusual provision. It is a provision that has been migrated from the existing act and it exists in the current act under section 20(2)(a). It is not unusual and it seems to have worked quite well without the roof falling in—at least that we know of.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Can I just clarify that the minister can direct that a committee be established, but in that power to direct that a committee may be established, that is a certain committee, does the minister also have the power to direct the composition of the committee, that is, to say, 'I want these five people to be on the committee'?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I have been advised, yes, the minister can determine the composition of the subcommittee and that is already an existing similar provision within the current act, so we have simply migrated that provision into the new act.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: This is the sort of area where we had a similar debate earlier in relation to the need for transparency and accountability. It may well be that where the minister directs that committees be established, and in particular then directs that these five people should be on the committee, and then directs that a decision from the commission be delegated to that particular committee that he has constructed with the five people on it that he wishes, all of those issues potentially—and these are not matters that our party room has discussed—come within the broad ambit.

If we are talking as we were earlier in committee this morning, I think it was, about ministerial decisions and transparency and accountability, it would probably make sense to look at this sort of area as well, where, as I said, as the minister has just now indicated, the minister has the power to establish the committee and say, 'I want these five people to be on the committee,' and say, 'I want the commission to delegate all of its powers to these people I have just appointed to the committee.'

I would have thought in those sorts of circumstances there might be some interest in at least exploring whether that should be something which is transparent and accountable; that is, is immediately made public or, in particular, that sort of direction, as we would designate it, might need to be tabled in the house within a number of sitting days. We clearly do not have amendments, we have not discussed it as a party room, I have not even discussed it with the Hon. Mr Ridgway, but I think, as this debate has gone on, it does raise some interesting issues in terms of transparency and accountability.

The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD: I think the Hon. Mr Lucas has raised a very good point, and I do not think it is one that is lost on anyone, so I would ask the government: what checks and balances does the government see in place currently within the bill that would give members some confidence?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: These provisions have been in place since 1993, or similar provisions—they might be identical. They are not secret committees. If the minister has directed that a committee be formed then the committee is formed. It exists. It is not secret and it is there for those who have an interest in it to ask questions or take an interest. As far as I am aware, there have been no problems identified with these arrangements in the past and I cannot imagine that there would be in the future. As I said, they are not secretly conducted committees.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: Just from my perspective, if I could have some clarification. I think one of the reasons the opposition, and probably all of us, are quite—

The Hon. G.E. Gago: Cynical.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: No, not cynical at all—have been quite attracted to the planning commission model is that there was this level of independence from government.

The ACTING CHAIR (Hon. J.S.L. Dawkins): Order! There is too much noise to my right. I cannot hear the Hon. Mr Ridgway.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: Brokey, can you keep your voice down—the level of independence with the concept of having a planning commission. So, I am just intrigued by having a committee that the minister can appoint and also insist on who goes on that committee. It does not say it is some low level committee. Obviously, with some of these committees, the planning commission will have a significant role to play in decision-making in relation to the planning commission.

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I guess I can only reiterate or remind honourable members that the Development Assessment Commission is independent. It is its own authority and, as we have seen in the past with the current arrangements, a minister should—I mean, it is quite right and proper that a minister have the power to require an investigation if the minister deems that that is necessary, and this simply gives the minister the power to do that. As I said, this is not a new arrangement, a very similar provision has been in place since 1993, albeit by regulation, where this is ministerial direction, but it is minor.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Briefly, I accept the point the Hon. Mr Ridgway has made, but the only point I would make is that I do not know whether there has been an argument about the minister not having the right or the power to do it. The issue only is, I suspect, given this new regime, the new powers, whether or not perhaps there should be greater transparency and accountability when the minister does use that particular power, establish the committee, put his or her members on the committee and then insist on a delegation to it. That was the only point that was being made, certainly by me.

Given that the minister has indicated that this power has existed under the current legislation for a period of time, do the minister's advisers have any indication as to whether the power has been utilised at any time by a minister and whether there is a recent example they can give?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: To go back to the first point about transparency and accountability, the government indicates that it would be happy to look at, for instance, the possibility of publishing the formation of a committee. We could do that through our portal, through an annual report or something like that. We would be happy to look at that. The answer is, yes, they have occurred. The examples I have been given are the inner metropolitan committee of DAC, which involved a committee, the Port Adelaide redevelopment involved a committee, and I am advised that DPAC has several.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: To clarify, they are examples where the minister required a committee, but did the minister also nominate in those three cases the actual members the minister wanted to go on those committees?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I am advised that it does vary but, for instance, for the inner metro committee of DAC the composition was determined by the minister.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: I refer to clause 30(2)(d), which says:

(d) if the instrument of delegation so provides, may be further delegated by the delegate;

Does that include (2)(b), where the minister makes a request or directs for a delegation to a committee, and can also similarly request that that delegation to a committee provide for further subdelegation?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I am advised that potentially, yes, but it is a long bow. It would be hard to imagine, and I do not think any examples have ever occurred before of subdelegation—probably not is the advice I have been given. If you imagine the minister has a pressing issue and identifies that as needing attention, directs that a subcommittee be formed and directs who is on the subcommittee, you cannot imagine a circumstance where that in turn would need to be subdelegated, given that the minister has already determined what the matter is to be looked at and determined who is going to be on the subcommittee. It is very hard to imagine subdelegation, but I am advised that potentially, yes, that could happen.

Clause passed.

Clause 31.

The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD: I thank the Hon. Mr Ridgway for his generosity. Clause 31 deals with staff and facilities, and the very first subclause talks about the minister appointing such staff, and goes on to say that they will be public servants, etc. My questions are fairly simple, although I suspect that the detail of this has not been ironed out. To the extent that the minister can answer, how many staff are envisaged at this point will be required and are they likely to be existing or new staff? That is, will they come from DPTI at the moment, or is the government envisaging that they will need new staff with different skill sets, etc.?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: We have already gone to this a little bit previously. Clearly, the detailed staffing arrangements have not been worked out yet, except that they are coming from within existing resources and are likely to be departmental staff who are already there. Given the breadth and depth of skills that are already in the department, it is unlikely to warrant new people, but it could, potentially. I have already mentioned the executive support staff coming from the two committees that are folding into one. The executive support will be used from those resources. To remind honourable members, this is a fairly standard enabling-type clause.

The Hon. D.G.E. HOOD: Just to be absolutely clear, the government's plan at this stage is that this will not see the Public Service grow: it will be a reassignment of people within the Public Service?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I am advised yes.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: I note that subclause (2) provides:

The staff of the Commission will be public service employees.

It then goes on in subclause (3):

In addition, the Commission may—

(a) by arrangement with the appropriate authority, make use of the services, facilities or staff of any government department, agency or instrumentality…

I guess that means they are seconded or come in for a period of time to do a particular body of work. It also provides:

(b) with the approval of the Minister—

(i) make use of the services, facilities or staff of any other entity…

My first question is: what is envisaged by 'any other entity'? Subclause 3(b)(ii) provides:

engage any person to perform specific work on terms and conditions determined by the Commission.

Would you envisage that external consultants or contractors would be required to do some work there? So, they are not Public Service employees but extra staff again who would be brought in and may be subcontractors or consultants.

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: In relation to 'any other entity', an example I have been given is that it might be work with a particular council. There might be an agreement, for instance, to use their facilities: 'We use your facilities and we will give you this in-kind support,' something like that. It might be a professional body. In relation to the use of external consultants and contractors, if the commission needs specialist work to be done, it can call in expertise through the use of consultants for instance, and it will have the capacity to do that if need be.

Clause passed.

Clause 32.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: In relation to the annual report, obviously they must report before 30 September each year but subclause (2) says:

The report must contain any information required by the regulations.

There is a whole range of government instrumentalities, boards, commissions and committees that table reports in parliament, but is there a standard format or will there be extra information required by regulation? What is envisaged with this annual report?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I am advised that subclause (1) is a standard clause and this provision allows for or requires the commission to report on other matters that might be determined to be appropriate.

The Hon. D.W. Ridgway: That is subclause (2).

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: Yes, that is right. For instance, one of the things that we have talked about in one of the other clauses was publishing or advising on the fact that a ministerial direction has been given. This would be the provision that would allow us to use regulations to do that type of thing.

The Hon. M.C. PARNELL: Under the current regime, there is tabled in parliament each year a document reporting on the operation of the Development Act, and whilst I could not find my copy amongst all my papers, my recollection is that includes not just information from the government's state-level bodies like the Development Assessment Commission but it also includes statistics from all the local councils, how many applications they deal with under different categories, how long it takes them to deal with different applications, rezoning exercises like DPAs, who does them, how many of them there were, how long they took. Is it proposed that this annual report will become the compendium of all statistical information around the operation of the planning system in the state including aggregated information from local councils?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: The short answer is yes; plus schedule 4, clause 2(4) indicates that the annual report is basically the vehicle for performance monitoring of the system, so that is dealt with there.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: There is an existing either Commissioner for Public Sector Employment determination or Department of the Premier and Cabinet circular—I think it is a Department of the Premier and Cabinet circular—which requires existing government departments and agencies to report on certain things in their annual reports such as what detail needs to be reported on overseas travel, and what detail needs to be reported in terms of consultants and contractors. Will this annual report and the planning commission annual report be subject to that—as I said, I think it is a DPC circular—in relation to what is required in the annual report?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I am advised that the short answer is yes. The head power for that circular is in the Public Sector Act, section 12; it requires that reporting be given in relation to a range of specified matters.

Clause passed.

Clause 33.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Given the answers from the minister earlier, I am intrigued about section 33 of this act now. As I understood the minister's response to the question from the Hon. Mr Ridgway earlier, the chief executive of the Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure is also going to be the chief executive of the planning commission. An existing chief executive has clear lines of responsibility in terms of accountability, so the chief executive of DPTI has responsibilities to his or her minister for the department but also has clear responsibilities with the Premier in terms of his or her contractual arrangements.

The chief executive of the department would sign a contract with the Premier; there are key performance indicators within the contract; the Premier—depending on how premiers approach these things—may well meet on a regular basis and hold the chief executive to account within the terms of the contract. Pay and performance may well be determined by the Premier's judgement in relation to the chief executive's performance.

There are clear lines of accountability, putting aside the fact that the chief executive of DPTI might have a handful of ministers—it might not just be one minister, it may well be a handful of ministers but let's assume there is just one—and then you have the Premier involved in terms of accountability. Under this particular provision, the same person who has that line of accountability is responsible to the commission for managing the commission's business efficiently and effectively.

The chief executive can also, under subclause (2), have such other functions assigned to the chief executive by the commission. The commission can independently make a judgement—there is nothing there subject to a minister or a premier or whatever it is—and can, in essence, assign any other function (there does not appear to be any limit on it) to the chief executive. I think that is an interesting point in and of itself in terms of accountability, and one wonders what sort of functions might be assigned to the chief executive.

However, in terms of accountability, it does not take much imagination to contemplate circumstances where the work of the commission might be in conflict with the work of the department—that is, the department might be hell-bent on implementing a particular project or program or whatever it might happen to be as part of government policy, etc.; the planning commission is the independent body that is making decisions that may or may not impact on the project work of the Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure.

I am sure the Hon. Mr Parnell would be in a much stronger position to immediately come up with examples, but I am thinking of something like an O-Bahn, for example, where maybe the department is the one, or the South Road project with overpasses and underways and all those sorts of things; huge projects where there may well be planning decisions. Again, as I said, the Hon. Mr Parnell could probably think of any number of others.

I do not think you need a fertile imagination to imagine where the chief executive of a department is having to implement the government's project or program. That is his responsibility; he is held to account by the Premier in the terms of his KPIs, to say, 'Hey, I'm paying you $450,000 a year to get these projects done before the next election, and your salary is going to be determined by getting this particular project done before the next election, because I want to be able to open the Adelaide Oval or open the Superway, or whatever it is, in February 2018, just prior to the March 2018 election.'

So your accountability as a chief executive is clearly up that particular hierarchy; however, this same person is also the chief executive of the independent planning commission and is responsible to the commission for managing the commission's independent business in terms of assessment, etc. They can also be given any other function that the commission so determines, with no restriction on it. Again, I am not the expert on the Western Australian model but my brief understanding, listening to the Hon. Mr Ridgway, is that their model was different in that it sounded like they were completely independent and had a separate person in those sorts of positions.

I can just see inevitable conflicts for the chief executive being answerable to two different hierarchies of control; one being the minister, the Premier and the government for the project, and the other one being the independent planning commission. My question to the minister is: when they come into conflict who prevails, to whom does the chief executive respond?

If the Premier of the day or the minister says, 'I don't care what you're doing for the independent planning commission, I'm paying you half million dollars a year. Here are the key performance indicators, and one of them says that I want this project done by February 2018 and I'm holding you to account to get that delivered. You go off wearing the same hat as the chief executive to the independent planning commission and you just make sure that it gets done.' The independent planning commission says, 'Hey, you're working for me, you are responsible for managing our business efficiently and effectively. Under subsection (2) we are going to assign certain other functions to you, there is no limitation on that. We are going to require you to do certain things that are in conflict with your contractual arrangements.'

We are about to come to the close of business tonight, but I am interested in the minister's immediate response, based on advice, as to how the chief executive resolves these particular conflicts. Clearly the government, in setting up this particular model, must have been through this and contemplated how these conflicts are to be resolved. Essentially, my question is: ultimately, to whom is the chief executive responsible?

The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I guess the short answer to this query is that it is quite common; there are many chief executives who currently hold statutory positions concurrently with their chief executive position. For instance, the chief executive of DPTI is not only the chief executive of DPTI but he is also the Commissioner of Highways, and also the Rail Commissioner. Probably most chief executives would have some other statutory role or responsibility, so it is not uncommon.

The Hon. Rob Lucas is correct: the commissioner can be assigned any other function from the commission to the chief executive. However, the planning commission can only assign those matters that it has authority to, and it cannot displace the chief executive's contractual obligation to the minister or the Premier. That is the primary responsibility. That limits the ability for the chief executive to be having the major conflict that the honourable member has outlined.

The Hon. D.W. RIDGWAY: The time has reached 11pm, which was the time that we agreed we would sit both last night and tonight, so on that basis, I move:

That progress be reported.

The committee divided on the motion:

Ayes 13

Noes 6

Majority 7

Progress reported; committee to sit again.

At 23:05 the council adjourned until Thursday 10 December 2015 at 10:15.