SELECT COMMITTEE ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE INDEPENDENT EDUCATION INQUIRY

The Hon. R.L. BROKENSHIRE (17:19): I move:

That the interim report of the select committee be noted.

I believe this committee has clearly justified having select committees within the Legislative Council. It has attracted considerable public interest in the gallery and in public commentary about its work, and there is much to be said for parliament having a committee investigating child protection issues. Even though this is an interim report, I want to place on the public record my thanks to Legislative Council members, namely, the Hon. Mr Lucas, the Hon. Mr Wade, the Hon. Mr Wortley, and my friend the Hon. Mr Kyam Maher.

Members interjecting:

The PRESIDENT: Order!

The Hon. K.J. Maher: He called me a friend.

The PRESIDENT: Do you believe he is misleading parliament? The Hon. Mr Brokenshire.

The Hon. R.L. BROKENSHIRE: I also want to again place on the public record my genuine appreciation of Mr Guy Dickson and Ms Geraldine Sladden because this committee has met every Friday for a couple of months or thereabouts, so it has been a pretty demanding workload.

On an interim basis, one of the important findings of the committee is that a lack of clear protocols and procedures for dealing with critical incidents such as this one contributed to the unsatisfactory outcomes that led to the establishment of the Debelle inquiry. It also found that the size and complexity of the department make it essential for clear protocols and guidelines to be in place, especially in relation to serious incidents such as this one.

The committee believes implementation of the Debelle report recommendations will play a critical role in ensuring that this takes place, but I do place on the public record that some witnesses have expressed concern about the size of the department now that it has to take in not only education but also early childhood development, some aspects of health, and some aspects of Families SA.

The third key finding at the moment is that, despite failure to inform the then minister for education of the serious assault, there did not seem to be any specific policies and procedures within the minister's office, once the department had sent an email across on a critical incident report, to ensure that the minister was advised and therefore (1) then able to analyse the seriousness of the matter and what from a ministerial and government aspect should be done, and (2) to actually forewarn or inform the minister so that, if the media were then made aware of these matters, the minister was not caught off guard with respect to those issues.

There still does remain ambiguity, as I see it, from the evidence so far about how serious incidents are reported to ministers within the government and, whilst I do feel more confident now after listening to Mr Harrington, who is working through procedures to ensure that—

The Hon. R.I. Lucas: Harrison.

The Hon. R.L. BROKENSHIRE: Harrison, sorry. Mr Tony Harrison, the CEO of DECD, has advised the committee that he is working through processes now and in fact, whilst I need to try to read and absorb further the evidence from just last Friday, he did indicate that there was a more appropriate process with emails going through to the minister's office and then, within three days, a detailed follow-up formal minute. Those are the sorts of structures that do need to be in place in the future.

I was visiting a school this morning before coming into the chamber for the sitting today. I saw a fantastic environment on the school campus. I saw a dedicated principal and dedicated staff, teachers, deputy principals, SSOs, speech pathologists and all the other people who work there and the children going about their normal school activities.

It is very unfortunate that it appears that for some time there has been almost a toxic culture at the top of the education department in Flinders Street, and I think that therein lies part of the problem of what we have seen. There seemed to be more of a dysfunctional culture working against the interests of driving good educational outcomes and a focus on the protection of children.

In fact, I am still not sure who blocked a letter that Ms Jan Andrews clearly drafted, which was intended to go to the school for the parents. Given that Ms Andrews was in charge of that particular area, she had drafted the letter with good intent and expected parents to know. Somewhere between that letter being drafted and the letter then being sent out, someone else in the department made a decision that the letter would not go out. Those sorts of things should never be the case in something like this. There should have been clear procedures and processes, and the fact that did not occur is most unfortunate.

I also update the council by advising that, at this time, Telstra is still working back through its South Australian government electronic messaging system (SAGEMS) data to see whether there is evidence of a controversial email being sent to someone else. This committee, which will continue to sit after this Thursday, will be able to receive that information. I do commend the Premier for cooperating with that process, at the committee's request.

The committee recently began to focus on its reference from this council to track the implementation of the Debelle recommendations. We have heard evidence that only 26 of the 43 recommendations have at this stage been fully implemented. The deadline is just 23 working days away. Two recommendations passed this place yesterday afternoon, just in time before the parliament concludes its sitting for 2013 and, indeed, for this term, with no more sittings before the election on the third Saturday of March (15 March, I think) next year—and there will probably be no more sittings until May—certainly late April.

This is an interim report, and we will be seeking to continue doing our work and compiling a final report. We have a number of terms of reference and unfinished business to get into, and we do need to keep working on that because, at the end of the day, all members and people within the community want to see every effort being made to ensure that we have the best possible child protection into the future. Child protection is something that has to be first and foremost. When families send their children to school, or anywhere else for that matter, they do expect that their children will be protected as well as educated.

My final point is that, given the evidence at the moment, whilst commendable work is being done at schools in educating children, the good thing is that there is now a much more focused situation when it comes to protection of children and also reporting processes. However, whilst that has to occur, and I commend the fact that that is occurring, it is also important that there be a focus on good sound education policy and attention right through to executive level within the headquarters of a very large department, namely, the Department for Education and Child Development.

The Hon. K.J. MAHER (17:29): Some have claimed that this committee was in some way connected to child protection. Not a single one of the 22 witnesses who have been called before the committee so far have had any specific expertise in the area of child protection. What was presented to the committee was largely a repetition of what was publicly available in the Debelle royal commission report.

One of the positive things, and maybe the only positive thing, to come out of this committee is that we have learnt that all the recommendations contained in the Debelle royal commission report are being implemented. Having said that, many of the witnesses who appeared before the committee acknowledged that mistakes had been made in the handling of the matter that gave rise to the Debelle report and many of them acknowledged that if they had their time again, they might do some things differently.

Much of the committee focused on administrative processes—what had or had not been passed on—and as we have seen in the last week, things can happen in offices where things either do or do not get passed on against instructions or inadvertently which can lead to changes in procedures.

The Hon. I.K. Hunter: What are you talking about Kyam?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I do not know, but I am pretty sure that the grandstanding some have done in the media might not be as welcome in some sections of the media as it has in the past.

The Hon. I.K. Hunter: You are not talking about the ABC?

The Hon. K.J. MAHER: I have not mentioned the ABC. With that, I note the report but also a dissenting statement by me and the Hon. Russell Wortley on the proceedings of this committee.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS (17:31): I rise to speak to this particular motion particularly after the Hon. Mr Brokenshire spoke originally and introduced—as he describes him—his very close friend, the Hon. Mr Kyam Maher. He has used that phrase on a number of occasions this afternoon and I cannot doubt its veracity. So I am pleased to be speaking after the two very close friends have spoken on this particular issue.

I agree with the Hon. Mr Brokenshire that this has been a worthy committee. I obviously disagree with the jaundiced, biased perspective that has been put by the Hon. Mr Maher on behalf of the Labor members and in their dissenting statement. Of course, one expects them to do their best to defend the position of the government and now Premier Weatherill—then minister for education Weatherill—but it has been a forlorn task I think as they have seen the full atrocity outlaid before them in the open hearings before this committee.

One of the key differences of course, and one of the very useful aspects of parliamentary committees is that the full focus is shone on the evidence that is given. The Debelle inquiry is as worthy as it might have been as is mostly the case with royal commissions conducted in secret. I make no criticism of that, but the evidence is not given in public session and one cannot see the questions and answers.

Indeed, at this stage, members are still waiting for whatever the unspecified legal event is, for the full transcript and other information, and the unedited final report to be made public by the Attorney-General, I assume. I think it has been referred to the Attorney-General, and that is not a criticism of the Attorney, it is a specific requirement of Justice Debelle in terms of when he believes the full transcripts can be made available.

So it is a nonsense for Labor members to suggest that all of this has been done before. There has been significantly different ground traversed and, as I said, in particular even where there might have been crossover, it has been done in the full glare of the public. It has not just been members of the media who have attended these meetings; there have been a number of interested members of the local school communities and others who have had interest in education issues in general who have attended some or all of the meetings of the select committee. It is unusual for select committees—having sat on many over a long period in this house—to have people who are genuinely interested in the work of the committees and who attend the public sessions of those committees.

I think the position of Labor members in their dissenting statement and the statement the Hon. Mr Maher has just made are nonsense—and he repeated it again where he says, 'Of the 20 or so witnesses, there was not one witness who had any expertise in the area of child protection.' Let me turn this back to the Labor government, in particular, former minister Weatherill and the other ministers who have attended since then.

This committee has called to give evidence members of the Department for Education and Child Development, which includes child protection, so we have called as witnesses: the chief executive; the two next most senior officers at that particular stage in the department; a manager of the legislation and legal services unit, which manages legal services in the department; the critical incident coordinator within the department (so critical incidents in relation to child protection are within this person's specifications); the director of programs and regional development, who, at the particular stage of the events of 2010, I think, was either in charge or one of two persons in charge of the school care unit, which was the first port of call in terms of child protection issues and complaints within schools; the director of early childhood wellbeing and standards, teaching and learning services within the department; and the minister's ministerial liaison officer in the area of schools and child protection.

If there is a criticism that none of these officers, according to the Labor members, has any expertise in the area of child protection, what a damning criticism of the Labor government, that all their senior officers and all the officers who work in this particular field, according to the Hon. Mr Maher, have no expertise in child protection. He is saying that the chief executive who has just been appointed has no expertise in child protection; he is saying the two next most senior officers who are in charge of those child protection areas have no expertise in child protection; he is saying the person in charge of the school care unit has no expertise in child protection; he is saying the person in charge of legislation and legal services—the person providing legal advice—has no expertise in relation to child protection; and he is saying the person who provides advice to the minister for education, the MLO, the ministerial liaison officer, has no expertise in child protection.

If you accept, and let me say I do not, that the new chief executive and others have no expertise at all in child protection—they might not be 30-year experts in terms of child protection and teaching in universities, but they are the people who have been appointed by minister Weatherill and others like minister Lomax-Smith, minister Portolesi and minister Rankine to run our child protection department. If the Hon. Mr Maher and the Hon. Mr Wortley are saying that none of the witnesses have any expertise in child protection, that is a damning condemnation of their own Premier and their own ministers. No more damning condemnation can you have from your own backbenchers that they basically say, 'Well, the people you've appointed to run this child protection department have no expertise at all in child protection.'

What do you expect the committee to do in terms of getting evidence from the child protection department—the education department? Do the members say, 'Okay, we will go through all the key decision-makers in the department and, because under the Labor member's definition they have no expertise in child protection, just say alright, well they have no expertise, there is no point in inviting them along to this particular committee'? It is a nonsense argument and, frankly, it was the best that the two of them could cobble up in terms of them trying to defend the indefensible in relation to minister Weatherill's performance in the portfolio.

Let me turn to former minister Weatherill, in terms of his abysmal management or mismanagement of his portfolio. The evidence given to this committee, which continues to be given, is a damning critique, a damning indictment of his mismanagement and negligence in terms of the management of the education department. We heard from senior officers how it continues even to this day in decisions he has taken as Premier. Senior officers have indicated, in an unprecedented fashion, that in an already complex and complicated department like education he added the child protection divisions or the old Families SA department. The committee has taken evidence from a range of people who have indicated the problems that that decision by Premier Weatherill has caused in terms of the management of the child protection function within this department and within government schools in South Australia.

The Peter Allen review, which has been referred to by the minister and others, and reported to our committee, also highlighted, in a nicely understated way, might I say, this particular issue. We took evidence from CEO Tony Harrison who indicated that he had entered into vigorous or frank discussion with Mr Allen. I think he used the phrase 'an iterative process' as they worked through various drafts or recommendations for the final report. I am not surprised that some of the recommendations are nicely understated, if I can put it politely, but it is clear that the addition by Premier Weatherill of child protection to this particular department has added very significant levels of complexity to the department and has certainly not improved the child protection function in South Australia, in my view.

We have also taken considerable evidence about the criticisms of many people in relation to minister Weatherill's changed approach and his staff within his office in terms of the management of critical incidents within his department. I refer to the interim report and quote:

Witnesses confirmed the lack of procedures. Mr Simon Blewett, who was chief of staff to the then Education Minister, the Hon Jay Weatherill MP, at the time of the sexual assault, said, 'there was no set protocol around dealing with incidents of sexual abuse of children'...

Mr Jadynne Harvey, a ministerial adviser in the same office, supported this view saying 'there was a varied response in relation to different incidents'. The manager of the ministerial office, who I interpose had served in a number of ministerial offices very capably, was very concerned that the monitoring of critical incidents had dropped off under minister Weatherill because of this changed approach. The report states:

While there was a written procedure for ministerial liaison officers to monitor critical incidents in the office of the immediate predecessor education minister, Dr Jane Lomax-Smith, it does not seem to have been continued by Minister Weatherill.

That was evidence from Pat Jarrett. Mr Marc Bowden, the ministerial liaison officer at the time of the sexual assault said he was not aware of such a protocol. This was damning evidence from the people in minister Weatherill's own office. Part of the damning evidence, which is not referred to in the interim report from Pat Jarrett, who was the office manager—again in a nicely understated way but pretty blunt—pointed out that one of the mistakes, in essence, that minister Weatherill made was that instead of keeping some corporate expertise and knowledge within the education minister's office in terms of the public servants, he brought with him a whole team of people who had no knowledge or background of the culture of the education minister's office and the education portfolio to run his ministerial office.

All of a sudden, you have people—who might have had experience in the environment minister's office or whatever else it was that he was in previously—being plonked into the education minister's office. It is a trap for rookie ministers that they do not understand. Clearly, minister Weatherill did not understand that he was moving to a new beast, a completely different beast, in the education department and, at least for a period of time, keeping some of the retained expertise within the ministerial office to assist in the processes, such as the managing of critical incidents and the critical incidents response system and those sort of things, would make sense.

Of course, he can bring his friends with him—the Simon Blewetts and the Jadynne Harveys, or whoever else it might happen to be—as ministerial advisers, the public servants who serve within the office, and having someone with knowledge of the education minister's office, the department and the culture, is an asset, not a liability, but minister Weatherill again made a fundamental error in terms of the management of his own office. He and his officers made fundamental errors. As Pat Jarrett reported, the monitoring of critical incidents had dropped off under minister Weatherill. There were a number of other damning criticisms of minister Weatherill's time as Minister for Education, and I will not go through all of those in this contribution today.

I refer to some comments about the unfairness of the disciplinary action procedure that minister Weatherill and the government have overseen in relation to the Debelle inquiry. A lot of concern from public servants was expressed to the committee and also, I know, to members of parliament privately about their view of the fact that senior public servants were being scapegoated so that the minister and the government could have a scalp or two to hang out publicly, whereas a couple of the key culprits, in particular his now chief of staff, Mr Simon Blewett, made the critical omission of, having received the advice in an email about the rape of the young person on a government school site, not passing on that advice and information to minister Weatherill. That is Mr Blewett's story, and he sticks to that story, whether it be at Debelle or at the select committee inquiry.

The evidence again—new evidence, not in Debelle—which was made clear, was that within 10 or 15 minutes of receiving the email at 2.45, from recollection, there was a meeting at 3 o'clock with senior public servants—I think Gino DeGennaro, the acting CEO; Simon Blewett, who was the ministerial adviser; and the minister. Within 15 minutes of having received the email, Mr Blewett, if you accept their story, did not advise either the acting chief executive or the minister at the meeting 15 minutes later. I think the Hon. Mr Maher or the Hon. Mr Wortley, trying to be helpful to minister Weatherill, said to Mr DeGennaro, 'Well, is it quite possible of course that he had not read the email?' to which Mr DeGennaro, as quick as a flash, I think indicated, 'But the evidence is that four minutes later, having read it, he sent it to the mystery person.'

So, whilst the Hons Mr Maher and Wortley were trying to be helpful in relation to this, it was quite clear that Mr Blewett received the email at quarter to three, read it and then sent it to the mystery person four minutes later, and 10 minutes later sat down with minister Weatherill, sat down with the acting chief executive of the department—and we are talking about a rape of a child on a government school site—and if you accept the stories—

The Hon. R.P. WORTLEY: On a point of order, at nowhere in this report does it mention rape, and the committee was very careful in respecting the nature of this committee with regard to sexual abuse. To use that word, on a number of occasions now, to give it more colourful language, is very disrespectful for all those concerned.

The PRESIDENT: The Hon. Mr Lucas.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Thank you, Mr President, but I am going to call a spade a spade. A rape is a rape. The Hon. Mr Wortley can call it an incident or try to use soft language, but a rape is a rape is a rape.

We had a situation where, 10 minutes after forwarding an email to a mystery person, Simon Blewett, if you accept their stories, sat down with the acting chief executive and the minister and did not tell them about the rape of a child on a government school site. The anger and frustration of senior public servants is because, while some of them were being hauled out publicly in terms of disciplinary action, Simon Blewett and Jadynne Harvey had no suspension, dismissal, demotion, financial penalty, or anything. They were rapped over the wrist with a wet lettuce leaf by Premier Weatherill in relation to these omissions or issues.

That is why people like Jan Andrews and others believe that they were being scapegoated by Premier Weatherill and, indeed, the government in relation to these disciplinary proceedings. In particular, I want to refer to the evidence of Jan Andrews in relation to her concerns about the disciplinary process. On page 50 of the transcript of evidence, she said:

In response to my detailed explanation of my involvement in this matter, no findings of underperformance were made against me and no disciplinary sanction has been applied, yet the cessation of my employment, in essence, a sacking, has been deliberately associated by Mr Harrison with the disciplinary outcomes following the Debelle inquiry. This is totally unjust. To me, it seems the way that I have been portrayed by Mr Harrison will affect my future prospects. Mr Harrison's action is either misjudgement or expedience, but it is certainly wrong.

I believe the evidence shows that I have been 'scapegoated' in the most blatant way in the interests of a show of leadership and a public story. In short, you cannot promote a story saying heads roll if there is only one head.

I note for the record that Ms Andrews, whatever criticism both Justice Debelle and others might make of her position, was the officer who did advise, according to the established protocols, the minister's office through the chief of staff. That is, the protocols were that the email gets sent straightaway to the minister's office to the chief of staff. It was not her fault that Simon Blewett, according to his story, never forwarded the information to minister Weatherill.

Ms Andrews also forwarded the email, as required by the established protocols, to the director of the chief executive's office and, again, it was not her fault that the email was not forwarded to the acting chief executive. As it turns out, as I said, 15 minutes later, both the acting chief executive and the minister were in an office with Simon Blewett where Simon Blewett could have and should have passed on the information directly, anyway.

Where there might be criticism of Ms Andrews is in terms of which particular version of the evidence you accept in terms of whose responsibility it was to provide the follow-up briefings to the minister. Ms Andrews' evidence was that four or five days later it was taken out of her hands and transferred to Mr DeGennaro's division, and they were responsible for the ongoing management, and Mr Debelle and some others insist that there was some ongoing role for Ms Andrews in relation to it.

What is clear in terms of the evidence—and it was not challenged by Mr Harrison—is that having initially accused Ms Andrews of underperformance or nonperformance (I think that was the phrase) or, in essence, nonperformance of what she should have been doing as a senior executive, according to the evidence of Ms Andrews, in the final letter he changed his position completely and indicated that he was not instituting a disciplinary sanction against Ms Andrews.

So, it is quite clear in the initial letters that they were undertaking a disciplinary action or sanction against her. However, in the end, because Ms Andrews came back very strongly and clearly challenged both the Debelle version of events and Mr Harrison's or the CEO's version of events as to why she had not performed, Mr Harrison then backed off completely and explicitly said that this was no longer a disciplinary sanction. He then introduced the more general accusation, which in the end only occurred in the last letter, which was that she still retained overall responsibility for managing the school site and she had not done a good enough job in terms of managing it. That was a more general criticism at the end, as opposed to specific criticisms covered by the Debelle inquiry. Ms Andrews has criticisms of that accusation coming right at the end anyway.

If you accept that version of events—and, as I said, Mr Harrison did not challenge it; I think he took one of the questions on notice, to check his actual letter which was sent and which I read back to him, an exact quote from a section of the letter—he makes it quite clear that he was no longer pursuing a disciplinary sanction against Ms Andrews. Yet, as part of the public parade of villains, in essence, Mr Harrison and the government publicly referred to Ms Andrews and Mr DeGennaro in terms of their strong response to the Debelle royal commission. As I said, Ms Andrews put on the record her significant concern about what she saw as scapegoating.

I think the other issue in relation to Mr DeGennaro—and I place on the record that Mr DeGennaro was an extraordinarily competent officer in the Treasury portfolio back in the period of the Liberal government—is that, whilst a lot of people might not have been supportive of him in the context of the education portfolio, I think they have always acknowledged his outstanding capacity in terms of finance and finance-related issues, whether it be in Treasury or in the finance area of the education department.

There was no answer given at all to the question put by Mr DeGennaro in his evidence, and that is whether or not Mr Harrison and the government were prepared to take a different disciplinary sanction against him, given his long history of loyal service to governments of both persuasions over many years; that is, remove him from his current position and put him in another department, in a finance-related portfolio, which clearly would be seen to be taking some disciplinary sanction but would not have been, in essence, the ultimate sanction of removal from the public sector.

As it turns out, Mr DeGennaro had the gun pointed at his head and he resigned before the government or Mr Harrison took action against him. However, that was clearly an option that was open to the government, and Mr Harrison in particular, and no satisfactory response has been given as to why that particular option was rejected.

[Sitting suspended from 17:59 to 19:47]

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: I want to address some comments to the evidence given by Mr Simon Blewett, in particular the evidence of Mr Blewett, and also Mr Craig Stevens, an executive solicitor from the Crown Solicitor's Office. What certainly was not covered by Justice Debelle in the Debelle royal commission was information provided to me which indicated that there had been a conversation between Simon Blewett, on behalf of Premier Weatherill, and the Crown Solicitor's Office in relation to disciplinary action being taken against education department officers.

Over a series of, I think, a couple of weeks, we asked a series of questions in the House of Assembly in relation to this particular issue. The Premier was very cautious in terms of his responses and, I guess, in summary, was indicating that, if Mr Blewett was having conversations with the Crown Solicitor's Office, it was an entirely defensible and natural course of action for the chief of staff to the Premier to be having those discussions with crown law.

Can we make it clear that the chief executive officer of the education department, Mr Tony Harrison, had legal advisers and those legal advisers were crown law. He was considering taking action against up to 11 education department officers, and he was taking advice from his lawyers—crown law—as to what charges he might be able to make against individuals and, if he was to make charges, what penalties should apply in relation to those individuals.

It was only the questions raised by the Liberal Party firstly in the parliament, but then, more particularly, directly to Mr Blewett and to Mr Craig Stevens, that enabled us to place on the record the fact that the chief of staff to the Premier had rung the legal advisers to the education department CEO Mr Harrison, and had had a discussion with what we were told was at least one public servant in relation to the disciplinary action that was proposed to be taken against that particular individual.

The information provided to me was that Mr Blewett inquired of Mr Stevens as to what his recommendations were about an individual public servant, and, when he was told that that did not include the sacking of that particular public servant, Mr Blewett expressed very strong negative views to the executive solicitor in the Crown Solicitor's Office in relation to that position.

To be fair, both Mr Blewett and Mr Stevens put different complexions on the conversation. Mr Stevens' position was that he believed, when he was contacted by Mr Blewett, that Mr Blewett already knew the nature of the advice that Mr Stevens was giving Mr Harrison. Now, that is a curious defence mounted by Mr Stevens in terms of his position, because Mr Harrison made it clear that from his viewpoint there were only two or three people in the education department that would have been privy to the advice being provided to Mr Harrison about this particular public servant, and one would assume that Mr Stevens was not having a broad discussion with all and sundry at the Crown Solicitor's Office in relation to the nature of his advice to the chief executive. But nevertheless that was Mr Stevens' evidence, and here are his exact words:

I can confirm that I received a telephone call from the chief of staff at approximately 10.30am on Friday 6 September. The conversation was brief, lasting around about two minutes.

He says a number of other things and then he says:

But in light of some of the questions that some of the honourable members have asked, it was clear to me when the conversation started that Mr Blewett knew what my advice was. He wasn't seeking for me to give him that advice or inform him of that advice, but he sought to inquire about it.

Now, as I said, that is an extremely curious defence from Craig Stevens about this particular telephone call. I put the further question to Mr Stevens: 'Well, if Mr Blewett already knew what your advice was, why was he actually ringing you?' So, the position of Mr Blewett, the chief of staff to the Premier, had been, 'Well, look, I was just inquiring about the process, trying to find out and to brief the Premier as to where things were up to,' yet Mr Stevens is saying that Mr Blewett already knew the nature of the advice prior to the conversation. If that is the case, that is entirely inconsistent with the position of Mr Blewett and Mr Weatherill that Mr Blewett was just inquiring as to the general natural of the process and how things were proceeding.

Clearly, if Mr Blewett knew the nature of the advice, he had no purpose or reason to ring the legal adviser to the CEO about an individual public servant. Everyone is consistent that he did not ring up generally about the process; there is a concession that there was a brief conversation about the circumstances of an individual public servant.

I certainly cannot believe the manufactured position, it would appear, that Mr Blewett already knew the advice when he rang Mr Stevens. As I said, Mr Stevens has no response or explanation as to why Mr Blewett was therefore ringing him if he already knew the nature of the advice. In essence, he was saying we would need to ask Mr Blewett why he was ringing if he already knew the nature of the advice.

There are a number of curious things in relation to a number of the circumstances that relate to Mr Blewett. For example, Mr Blewett's position was as clear as mud in relation to the mystery of the missing email. Mr Blewett's position to Debelle, evidently, and certainly to the select committee, was that he obviously received the email but he does not remember receiving it, and he does not remember to whom he sent the email, even though there is clearly a mystery person who received the email four minutes later. He does not remember who he sent it to, but the one thing he remembers is that he did not send it to the minister for education.

We put the curious conflict of positions to Mr Blewett: how do you defend a position where you say, 'I can't remember what I did with the email or to whom I sent it,' yet, at the same time, you say, 'I'm quite sure that I didn't send it to minister Weatherill'? I think the absurdity of that position is apparent to everyone, with the possible exception of Mr Blewett and maybe minister Weatherill, yet that was the position that Mr Blewett sought to defend when the wood was put on him in the select committee. He was decidedly uncomfortable in his response, and it is unsurprising that he was decidedly uncomfortable, because, as I said, he had no response to the simple question as to how he could justify the conflict between those two positions.

There is then the issue that the Hon. Mr Brokenshire has addressed, and that is: to whom did this mystery email go? We have now been advised that Mr Andrew Mills has either recently left or is about to leave his position in South Australia to head to Queensland. In a letter to the committee dated 14 November, he says:

It is not appropriate for Telstra to undertake a search of the mailboxes that they manage. The Office of the Chief Information Officer will arrange for the requested SAGEMS email boxes, identified in your letter, to be recovered to disk by Telstra from their annual backup that covers 2 December 2010.

I have requested that the South Australia Police undertake a technical search of that disk to ascertain whether any copy of the email exists within those mailboxes.

I estimate that these actions will take several weeks.

I will provide the findings to the Select Committee on completion of the search...

As has been explained by Telstra, this search of the mailboxes is just a snapshot at the end of June 2011. If the person who has received the mystery email from Mr Blewett has deleted the email prior to the end of June 2011, then this search will not show up the recipient of the email. Given that the government's position and Mr Blewett's position is that they cannot remember who they sent it to, other than he is sure he did not send it to the Premier, and given that no-one else has 'fessed up that they have received the email, I think most of us are assuming that whoever received the email has deleted it prior to the end of June 2011 and therefore it will not show up. Nevertheless, there are only, I think, 30 or so mailboxes that need to be searched—

The Hon. R.L. Brokenshire interjecting:

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: How many?

The Hon. R.L. Brokenshire: About 20.

The Hon. R.I. LUCAS: Twenty, I am told, or 30 mailboxes that need to be searched, so it is a modest task from that viewpoint. It was certainly something that was not undertaken, again, by the Debelle royal commission. The searches undertaken for the Debelle royal commission did not pursue this particular line of inquiry, and I congratulate my colleague, the Hon. Mr Wade, who as always has been meticulous and assiduous in terms of his pursuit of the truth and facts. In relation to this particular issue, his IT knowledge has assisted the other members of the committee, and we were able to establish that there was the potential for this additional search of the snapshot at the end of June 2011, and indeed that is a task that is being undertaken, we would hope, as we speak.

The final point I would make in my contribution this evening is a specific point to highlight the absurdity of minister Weatherill, the Weatherill government and the education department's handling of this issue. We took some evidence, again, which was not part of the Debelle inquiry evidence, in relation to the handling of events when the person was convicted 15 or 16 months later in February 2012.

As members will be aware—again, this was not pursued in any detail by Mr Debelle—a subsequent search of emails through FOIs from the member for Unley indicated that Ms Kate Baldock, a government spin doctor and a spin doctor for minister Portolesi at the time, had received copies of emails in relation to these events in February 2012, yet, curiously, minister Portolesi said she knew nothing about it until March 2012, a month later. When Ms Baldock was hauled before the committee, Ms Baldock's defence was that she did not have to advise the minister, because it was already a matter of public record that ABC radio had briefly published some details of the matter.

We also had copies of emails from within the department which indicated that a letter had been drafted to go to parents in the local school community, but the trigger point, according to the department's spin doctors working for the Weatherill government, was that they would only send this letter to the parents of the school community advising them of the details (this was in February 2012) if the media ran the story. Now, they were referring to Channel 7, I think it was, and The Advertiser running the story.

Clearly, when we put the question to the education department, 'Don't you consider the ABC part of the media?' Ms Baldock and others have said the ABC had already run the story, and that is why they did not have to advise minister Portolesi of the issue. They assumed she would have known about the story anyway, but then you have this email which says, 'We'll send the letter to the parents if the media run the story,' and they decide not to send the letter to the parents in February 2012, because Channel 7 and The Advertiser (the media in the education department's viewpoint) did not run the story. I mean, the stupidity of this whole process was that the education department and the Weatherill government's view was that the ABC does not constitute a part of the media. In the education department's terms, it is only Channel 7 and The Advertiser that have any weight in terms of whether or not there is a media story.

There are many other examples in the evidence which were not made clear in the Debelle inquiry which this select committee has brought to the surface and highlighted in terms of the dysfunctionality of the department, the minister's office and the government's processes. For all those reasons, I support the tabling of the interim report today.

Members of the committee are looking forward to the evidence to be given on Friday from an acknowledged specialist child protection expert, Professor Freda Briggs, on the issue, and I am sure that will be interesting and informative evidence. My personal view is that there are only a limited possible number of future witnesses to the committee, but the Chair and others may well have differing views, and I will, of course, always listen to their views before making a final decision on these issues. Clearly, we are also awaiting the results of the SAPOL investigation into the possible identification of the recipient of the email.

Motion carried.