CONSENT TO MEDICAL TREATMENT AND PALLIATIVE CARE (END OF LIFE ARRANGEMENTS) AMENDMENT BILL

Introduction and First Reading

The Hon. M. PARNELL (15:58): Obtained leave and introduced a bill for an act to amend the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995. Read a first time.

Second Reading

The Hon. M. PARNELL (15:58): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

It gives me very great pleasure to be introducing into this place today a new voluntary euthanasia bill entitled the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care (End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2010. In its most basic respects this bill is similar to the one that I introduced in 2008 which was narrowly defeated in this place at the end of last year. It is similar in format to that earlier bill, but some important changes have been made and I will explain these shortly.

The debate in Australia on dying with dignity or voluntary euthanasia, or whatever you want to call it, has progressed substantially since we last considered this issue in this place nearly a year ago. The matter is being debated in nearly every state parliament and hopefully the territories too will soon regain their right to debate and legislate for voluntary euthanasia. Bills have been introduced in Western Australia, Tasmania and Victoria, and I understand a bill will be introduced in New South Wales next week. So, there it is a great deal of momentum, both in the community and politically.

As well as the political developments in relation to voluntary euthanasia, what has also occurred—and I say inevitably—is that there has been a growing list of individual human cases that highlight how our current legal system is failing those who cry out for our compassion and our help. I do not propose to go through all of the cases that have reached me over the last 12 months, but I do want to mention one briefly, and that is a matter that was in the courts. It comes from Western Australia, and it is a case where the proprietor of a nursing home sought the guidance of the court as to whether they were allowed to let one of their terminally ill patients starve himself to death and refuse medication in order to hasten his death. The court agreed that this person had that right—that it was his right to refuse medical treatment, food and liquid.

But what a tragedy it is that a person should have to go to that length in order to end their life when their suffering has become intolerable. What a tragedy that someone should have to suffer a lingering and agonising death by starvation and dehydration, rather than a more humane option that would allow them to take some control over their final days, allow them to say goodbye to their families and allow them to depart this life with some dignity. There have been many other cases in South Australia and elsewhere where people have unnecessarily suffered because our legal system and our medical system have not allowed any intervention at their desperate request.

These cases highlight what is wrong with the current situation. The law is quite clear that we have the right to die if that is what we want. We can refuse medical treatment, we can refuse to take medicines and we can kill ourselves if that is what we want to do, but we cannot legally ask for the help of the medical profession to allow us to end our life, and that is the human tragedy this bill seeks to overcome.

Members would be aware that this is not a novel debate either in this parliament or elsewhere. I have talked about the bill I introduced in 2008, and I acknowledged at that time that I was standing on the shoulders of many who had gone before—of those more recently, certainly the Hon. Bob Such has a bill in the House of Assembly, the Hon. Sandra Kanck has brought bills in here and there were many others before that.

What I am very pleased to be doing today is working in conjunction with the Hon. Steph Key, the member for Ashford in another place. She and I are working together to make sure that the bill I am presenting today and the one she presented recently to the House of Assembly are the best we can possibly make them, and they are at this stage identical bills. I have been very pleased to work with Steph to ensure that our bills have built on the models that have gone before. I think that having the same bill debated in both houses at the same time will ensure that we are all focused on what I think is the best model yet presented for voluntary euthanasia law reform.

I am hoping that Steph Key, as a member of the government in another place, will be able to exercise some influence over decisions about the timing of debate of private members' business in that chamber and that her bill will be assured a proper debate and a vote, just as this bill is certain to receive a proper debate and, ultimately, a vote in this chamber.

I also acknowledge Duncan McFetridge, the Liberal member for Morphett in another place, and also Geoff Brock, the Independent member for Frome, who joined Steph Key and me at a media conference recently to show that this issue has support right across the political spectrum. It is not a party-political issue and, as members know, we will have a conscience vote on this bill.

In terms of the changes that have been made since the previous bill I introduced, the starting point for me is that the framework is the same. It is an amendment to an existing piece of legislation that gives us rights to make decisions about our lives and our medical treatment; that is, the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act. I still think that that is the best model for voluntary euthanasia law reform, to place these rights—as I seek to legislate: the right to take some control over your final days—into an existing suite of laws that gives us rights in relation to our medical treatment and palliative care.

So, the framework is the same but some of the details have changed, and I will go through some of them. The most important aspect of the bill is the threshold question: who is eligible? Who is eligible to lodge a request for voluntary euthanasia? I will go through the words because they are important. The first thing to note is that it applies to adults and not to children. Whilst there are cases of people under age who are suffering terribly, as disappointing as that might be for some people, I am not proposing to go down that path. This is a bill that relates to adults.

The first type of person who qualifies is an adult person who is in the terminal phase of a terminal illness. That is probably one aspect that all voluntary euthanasia bills have in common; that is, if you like, the typical scenario of a person who is suffering from a condition: they are in their final days, there is no cure, they will not get better and, under this bill, they will be eligible to ask for assistance to end their life.

The second category is an adult person who is suffering from an illness, injury or other medical condition, other than a mental illness within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 2009, that irreversibly impairs the person's quality of life so that life has become intolerable to that person. That is very similar to the form of words used last time and it does set the bar very high. It needs to be an illness, injury or medical condition that irreversibly impairs the person's quality of life. We are not talking about any disease, condition or illness from which you might recover and where your quality of life will improve: it is a narrow field of qualification.

It is important to note, as well as what is in the eligibility criteria, what is not in there. What is not in there is a person who is simply old. Being old is not a qualification. A person who is simply tired of life is not a qualification. We could make an argument that it should perhaps be broader, but I am not making that argument here. These are narrow criteria that people need to fall within before they can lodge an active request for voluntary euthanasia.

The reference to mental illness is important because, as most of us know, mental illnesses can be treated, and can be treated successfully. Depression is the one that is most often raised; the fact of someone being depressed is not an eligibility criterion for voluntary euthanasia. That is not to say that people who are suffering from some of the awful cancers, the degenerative illnesses that cause so much suffering, will not be depressed—no doubt you would be if that was the lot that awaited you, a miserable and painful existence and then death from these conditions. However, if it is just because you are depressed that is not an eligibility criterion.

In relation to advanced requests—in other words, requests that you make ahead of time, if you like—the criteria have been narrowed somewhat from the previous bill. We are now looking only at situations where a person suffers a permanent deprivation of consciousness. In other words, you can put in an advance request for voluntary euthanasia but the trigger is that very high bar—that is, permanent deprivation of consciousness. So, it is more limited than in the past and, again, it will not be what everyone wants. I think that many people reasonably want to be able to make advance requests for a broader range of conditions, but this bill has been limited. What that means is that the majority of requests for voluntary euthanasia will be active requests; they will be made at a time that a person is already eligible and at the time that they are ready to request and then receive voluntary euthanasia.

Other changes that have been made include consultation with the medical profession. We now have at least two doctors involved, at least one of whom must be a specialist in the condition that is suffered by the person. Previous bills did have second doctors; this bill makes it clear that both doctors must be consulted. The bill requires psychiatric assessment if either of the doctors believes that the person is not of sound mind or if they are acting under undue influence. I have retained in this bill the Voluntary Euthanasia Board, but we have changed some of its composition and operation to make sure that appropriate medical and legal expertise is always available. The bill contains some stricter obligations in relation to the witnessing of documents for voluntary euthanasia.

There is a 12-month residency requirement. So, this bill is aimed squarely at South Australians. I know that some people will be disappointed by that, that it is not either a shorter residency requirement or no residency requirement, and you can understand why people might be disappointed. You could have two people lying side by side in adjoining hospital beds, one of whom is entitled to our compassion because of their postcode and the other is not. Nevertheless, there has been talk in the community that we need only to be legislating for South Australia. People are saying that we do not want death tourism, so we have included a residency requirement of 12 months.

We have also included in this bill a prohibition on excessive charging. In other words, we are not looking at people creating unreasonable profits out of either the request for, or the administration of, voluntary euthanasia; we need it to be part of normal medical treatment and subject to normal medical charging. Some of the other changes that have been made include, for example, the removal of dentists from the definition of 'medical practitioner', which was in the existing act, it was not part of the bill. Whilst there was no conceivable circumstance where a dentist would have been the dominant medical practitioner in relation to voluntary euthanasia, in order to remove any doubt and to remove that however misguided ground of criticism, we have removed dentists from the application of these laws.

Penalties have been increased, including imprisonment for up to 20 years for people who make misleading statements or act improperly in a way that causes the death of a person outside the narrow constraints of the act. There are protections in the legislation, necessarily, for people who are involved in voluntary euthanasia, they need the protection of the law, but there is also protection for those who do not want to be involved in voluntary euthanasia.

The key element, and I have said this as often as I can when talking about this, is V for 'voluntary'. It is about voluntary euthanasia. I distinguish it from straight euthanasia, which is where you take your dog to the vet and ask for it to be put down as an act of compassion. The dog is not the one making the choice, you are. Voluntary euthanasia is all about the patient themselves making a choice about their life.

I do not propose to go through all of the arguments that are raised against voluntary euthanasia. We have had those in the debate last year, and we will probably have some more of them in the debate this year. What I will say is that I have listened, and I know that Steph Key has listened very carefully, to all of the arguments that have been raised. We have addressed those aspects that can be reasonably addressed and we have incorporated changes into this legislation, and I gave the example of the removal of dentists from the definition of 'medical practitioner' when it comes to voluntary euthanasia.

I know that some people will not be happy until enough hurdles are put in place to make the laws unworkable, and that is always the tension in law reform like this. We want safeguards. We want strong safeguards, but the safeguards need to have a purpose behind them, and the purpose needs to be the prevention of misuse or abuse. There is no point in putting hurdles in the way just because we can, just for the sake of hurdles. So, the focus in this bill is very much on safeguards.

In parliament, we focus on the detail, especially when we get to the committee stage of a bill. We focus clause by clause on the legislation, but what we need to do, especially at this stage of the debate, is focus on the bigger picture. We must not lose sight of the bigger picture. That bigger picture is that South Australians are suffering. They are suffering intolerably and, despite the best efforts of palliative care experts, medical experts, hospitals, nurses—you name it—their suffering cannot be alleviated. Every day, every month, every year that goes by without appropriate law reform guarantees that more people will die a horrible death, a more horrible death than they need to if we were a genuinely compassionate society.

We have to remember that most of us want to live, and most of us want to live as long as we can. Most of us, if we are suffering from some condition or disease, are going to fight as hard as we can to give ourselves the best quality of life and the best chance of prolonging our life. We do that for ourselves, for our family and for our friends. I have no doubt that, even with legislation such as this in place, palliative care will continue to be the overwhelming first and last choice for those who are dying. Voluntary euthanasia is not an attack on palliative care. Voluntary euthanasia is an option for those people for whom palliative care does not work. We know that there are some people—a minority for sure—for whom palliative care does not work, and it is those people we are reaching out to and helping with legislation such as this.

I would like to acknowledge and thank some of the people who have been involved in this debate recently. I am very excited that a range of people in the medical professions and people of faith are now coming out and saying that voluntary euthanasia law reform is an idea whose time has well and truly come. Recently, five groups got together to express their support for this legislation. South Australian Nurses Supporting Choices in Dying was one group. Another group was SA Doctors Supporting Choice for Voluntary Euthanasia, and I am very pleased to acknowledge the contribution of Emeritus Professor John Willoughby as a leader in that group.

There was also the group called Doctors for Australian Medical Association Neutrality on Voluntary Euthanasia, and I acknowledge the work of Dr Rosie Jones there. It is difficult for many medical practitioners to see that their representative body does not represent their views. So, an organised group calling for neutrality, I think, is the appropriate way to handle it. Just like we here have a conscience vote on voluntary euthanasia, so too should the medical profession and their peak bodies.

I would like to acknowledge the group Christians Supporting Choice for Voluntary Euthanasia and, in particular, the Reverend Dr Craig de Voss. I find it very comforting to know that the voice of people of faith is a broad one. In the past we have heard only from church leaders who have said that their faith is against voluntary euthanasia, but we are now finding that groups like Christians Supporting Choice for Voluntary Euthanasia are coming out and saying that their God of compassion does not require people to suffer unnecessarily.

We know from the opinion polls that have been conducted over many decades now that, whilst the majority of Australians and South Australians (81 per cent) support voluntary euthanasia law reform, a majority of people of faith also support voluntary euthanasia law reform. A majority of Catholics, a majority of Anglicans and a majority of Presbyterians support law reform.

Finally, I say to members of this Legislative Council that I do not take any member's vote for granted on this issue. I have spoken to some but not all members about this, and I appreciate that all members will need to go through the detail before deciding on a final position. For those who supported the bill last time, I hope that you can support the changes. I know that some members will be disappointed that the eligibility criteria are tougher and it might seem that some of the safeguards look a bit more like hurdles, but I still urge those who have supported the legislation in the past to continue to support it.

For those who have not supported voluntary euthanasia law reform in the past, I hope you will come to this bill with an open mind, and I ask you not just to think about what you might want for yourselves but also to think about what your constituents want. As I have said, the results of surveys conducted by professional pollsters, by newspapers—you name it—consistently show that a majority of the people we represent say they want law reform for voluntary euthanasia with appropriate safeguards.

The question for members who have not supported a voluntary euthanasia bill in the past is to ask yourselves whether, despite your own personal views, you are prepared to deny South Australians what they want, to deny South Australians their basic human right to live and to die in a dignified way. For those members who are new to this place, I urge you to go through the detail of this bill, talk to people who have a long history with this issue (I have named some of the groups already), and to be prepared for a very healthy and wholesome debate in this place. It was an excellent debate last year, and I was disappointed the bill was not passed, but I would like to think that we will have an equally robust and genuine debate in parliament this time. Finally, I commend the bill to the council and seek leave to have inserted in Hansard a brief explanation of clauses in relation to this bill without my reading it.

Leave granted.

Explanation of Clauses

Part 1—Preliminary

1—Short title

This clause is formal.

2—Commencement

This measure will commence on the making of a proclamation by the Governor, or, should that not happen within 6 months of assent, it will commence on the 6 month anniversary of assent.

3—Amendment provisions

This clause is formal.

Part 2—Amendment of Consent to Medical Treatment and

Palliative Care Act 1995

4—Amendment of long title

This clause amends the long title to reflect the fact that the scope of the Act is broadened by this measure.

5—Amendment of section 1—Short title

The short title of the Act is amended to reflect the changed scope of the Act.

6—Amendment of section 3—Objects

This clause inserts new paragraph (d) into section 3 of the Act, setting out the objects of the Act as amended by this measure.

7—Insertion of Part 2 Division A1

This clause inserts new Part 2 Division A1, consisting of new section 5A, which provides that Part 2 of the Act, dealing with medical treatment, does not apply to, or in relation to, medical treatment consisting of the administration of voluntary euthanasia to a person, and contains relocated section 18 of the current Act.

8—Amendment of section 14—Register

This clause makes a consequential amendment following the insertion of new Part 4 Division 2.

9—Repeal of section 18

This clause repeals section 18, as the provisions of that section are now to be found in new section 5A.

10—Substitution of Part 4

This clause substitutes Part 4 of the current Act (currently only a regulation making power) to insert a new Part 4 dealing with the end of life arrangements of certain people as follows:

Part 4—End of life arrangements

Division 1—Preliminary

18—Interpretation

This section defines key terms used in the Part.

19—Object and principles

This clause sets out the objects and principles of the Part.

20—Approval of interpreters

An interpreter of a particular language, in relation to interpreting and translating services required under the Part (for example, in relation to making a request for voluntary euthanasia), must ordinarily be a person accredited as a translator or interpreter (or both) in that language by the National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters Ltd. However, if such a person is not reasonably available, then the Minister may approve a person to act as the requisite interpreter in relation to a particular request.

Division 2—End of life arrangements other than voluntary euthanasia

21—Refusal of future medical treatment so as to bring about death

This section allows an adult person of sound mind to give an anticipatory direction that he or she refuses to consent to certain medical treatment, and further that he or she be allowed to die. The direction only enlivens if the person is incapable of making decisions about medical treatment when the question of administering the treatment arises. The section also makes procedural provisions in respect of such a direction.

22—False or misleading statements

It is an offence for a person to make a false or misleading statement in, or in relation to, a direction under new section 21. The maximum penalty for such an offence is, where a person has died as a consequence of the statement, 20 years imprisonment. In any other case, the maximum penalty is 10 years imprisonment.

Division 3—Voluntary euthanasia

Subdivision 1—Administration

23—Establishment of Board

24—Composition of Board

25—Terms and conditions of membership

26—Presiding member

27—Functions of Board

28—Board's procedures

29—Conflict of interest etc

These clauses establish the Voluntary Euthanasia Board of South Australia, and deal with matters related to the establishment etc of the Board. The Board has the function of advising the Minister and is to carry out any other functions assigned to it under the Act or by the Minister. Of particular note is the conferral of powers to conduct inquiries, and make declarations and orders, under section 41. However, the Board is not required to inquire into or approve each request for voluntary euthanasia, rather it only acts in relation to a particular request following an application for a declaration, or following an inquiry (whether the inquiry was a result of an application for a declaration or was conducted on the Board's own motion).

30—Other staff of Board

The Board will have such staff as it thinks necessary, and may make use of the services or staff of an administrative unit of the Public Service under an arrangement with the relevant Minister.

31—Annual report

The Board is required to prepare an annual report into its work in the preceding financial year. This report must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.

Subdivision 2—Register

32—Registrar of Board

This section establishes that there is to be a Registrar of the Board.

33—Register

This section requires the Registrar to keep a register that contains the specified information in relation to each request for voluntary euthanasia.

The section also sets out what must happen should the Registrar become aware of a revocation or purported revocation of a request for voluntary euthanasia.

34—Registrar may require information

This section enables the Registrar (for the purpose of preparing and administering the Register) to require a person to provide the Registrar with such information as the Registrar may require.

Subdivision 3—Voluntary euthanasia

35—Active requests

This section provides for the making of active requests for voluntary euthanasia.

Subsection (1) sets out who can make an active request.

Subsection (3) sets out matters that must be complied with in making a request, including the information that must be given to the person making the request, the medical examinations or consultations that must occur (there must be a minimum of 2 independent examinations, 1 of which must be conducted by a specialist in the relevant area of medicine) and a requirement that the applicant be resident of this State for 12 months prior to making a request or have made a current request under the law of another jurisdiction.

The section sets out a requirement that, if the request practitioner or specialist practitioner suspects that the person is not of sound mind, or their decision making ability is affected by their state of mind, or they are acting under duress, inducement or undue influence, the person must consult a psychiatrist and obtain a certificate as to specified matters prior to making their request.

The section further sets out procedural matters in respect of making a request where the person is not able to write, or is not fluent in English.

The section sets out requirements as to the form that a request must take, and the documents that must accompany it.

An active request has effect from the time that it is entered on the Register (that is to say the Board or the Registrar is not required to approve the request before it takes effect) and remains in force until it is revoked.

36—Advance requests

This section provides for the making of advance requests for voluntary euthanasia to be administered should the person who made the request suffer a permanent deprivation of consciousness.

The requirements in relation to making an advance request are largely the same as for active requests, with the difference being that, because a person need not be suffering an illness etc at the time of making the request, the second doctor is not a specialist, rather their role is to independently consider the person's soundness of mind, whether their decision making ability is affected by their state of mind, or whether they are acting under duress or inducement.

37—Request form etc to be forwarded to Registrar

This section requires the medical practitioner who accepts a request for voluntary euthanasia to forward the specified forms, documents and records to the Registrar. Failure to do so, without reasonable excuse, is an offence.

38—Variation of requests

This section provides that a request for voluntary euthanasia may be varied with the authority of the Board. However, a request cannot be varied if the proposed variation significantly changes the nature of the request.

39—Interaction between requests

A person's request for voluntary euthanasia revokes all earlier requests for voluntary euthanasia made by the person.

40—Revocation of requests

This section sets out how a request for voluntary euthanasia can be revoked. A person's request will be taken to be revoked should the person make any indication whatsoever that he or she wishes to revoke the request, whether or not the person is mentally competent at the time the indication is given.

The clause then sets out the responsibilities of medical practitioners and others to advise the Registrar upon the person becoming aware of a revocation. It is an offence carrying a maximum penalty of up to 20 years imprisonment for a medical practitioner or other person to refuse or fail, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a requirement under this section.

Subdivision 4—Board declarations and orders

41—Board declarations and orders

This section sets out the powers and functions of the Board insofar as they relate to the Board's ability to make declarations and orders.

The Board may, on the application of a person of a kind specified in subsection (1) but not otherwise, make declarations of the following kind under subsection (2):

(a) a declaration that a person who made a request is, or is not, a person to whom section 35 applies;

(b) in the case of an advance request—a declaration that a person who made a request is suffering from a permanent deprivation of consciousness;

(c) a declaration that a condition specified in the request has, or has not, been satisfied;

(d) a declaration that a requirement under this Act in relation to the making of the request has, or has not, been satisfied.

Medical practitioners who may administer voluntary euthanasia to a patient, and other persons specified in subsection (1), can seek a declaration so as to provide certainty in respect of actions they may take in relation to the administration of voluntary euthanasia.

The Board may also make the kinds of orders set out in subsection (7). Unlike the declarations, the Board can make these orders following inquiries undertaken on the Board's own motion, in addition to inquiries arising out of an application for a declaration under the section. Failure to comply with an order under the section is an offence carrying a maximum penalty of up to 20 years imprisonment.

The section does not, however, require the Board to inquire into every request for voluntary euthanasia.

The section further sets out procedural matters in relation to the consideration of applications, including requiring matters to be heard as a matter of urgency, and not be open to the public.

42—Powers of Board in relation to witnesses etc

This section is a standard provision setting out the powers of the Board in relation to witnesses, including the power to require persons to appear before, and documents to be provided to, the Board.

Witnesses before the Board have the same protections as witnesses in proceedings before the Supreme Court.

43—Access to Board records

The persons specified in section 41(1) can inspect records of proceedings of the Board in respect of a declaration under section 41. Other people can only inspect the records if the Supreme Court authorises them to do so.

Subdivision 5—Appeal

44—Right of appeal to Supreme Court

This section sets out appeal rights to the Supreme Court in respect of declarations or orders under section 41. Only the persons specified in section 41(1) can institute such an appeal.

Subdivision 6—Administration of voluntary euthanasia

45—Administration of voluntary euthanasia

This section sets out when and how a medical practitioner may administer voluntary euthanasia. Subsection (1) provides a list of matters that must be satisfied before voluntary euthanasia can be administered to a person.

Subsection (2) sets out the methods by which voluntary euthanasia may be administered.

The provision also sets out procedural matters relating to the administration of voluntary euthanasia, including the handling by medical practitioners of drugs used, or intended for use, in the administration of voluntary euthanasia, and a requirement that the medical practitioner administering voluntary euthanasia examine the person to whom voluntary euthanasia has been administered to ensure the person has died.

46—Report to State Coroner

This section requires a medical practitioner who has administered voluntary euthanasia to a person to submit a report to the State Coroner, and sets out what the report must contain.

The State Coroner must forward a copy of the report to the Board.

Subdivision 7—Offences

47—Undue influence etc

It is an offence for a person to induce another to make a request for voluntary euthanasia by means of dishonesty or undue influence. The maximum penalty is up to 20 years imprisonment (where a person has died as a result of the inducement).

48—False or misleading statements

It is an offence for a person to make a false or misleading statement in relation to a request for voluntary euthanasia. The maximum penalty is up to 20 years imprisonment (where a person has died as a result of the statement).

49—Limitation of fees

This section prevents a medical practitioner or other person from receiving fees in relation to requests for, and administration of, voluntary euthanasia that exceed the reasonable costs they have incurred in relation to their actions.

Should a person be convicted of an offence against the section, a court can require them to account for any fees received in contravention of the section.

Division 4—Miscellaneous

50—Certain persons to forfeit interest in estate

This section provides that a person who commits an offence against new section 47 automatically forfeits any interest they may have in the estate of the person who was induced by them to make a request for voluntary euthanasia.

Similarly, a court has the discretion to order, on the application of the prosecution, that a person who commits an offence against new section 40(4) or 48 forfeit any interest they may have in the estate of the person who made a request for voluntary euthanasia as a result of their conduct.

51—Protection from liability

This clause confers immunity from civil or criminal liability on a person for an act or omission done or made in good faith, without negligence and in accordance with a direction under new section 21.

Similarly, persons involved in, or in relation to, a request for, or the administration of, voluntary euthanasia incur no liability of the kinds, and in the circumstances, set out in subsection (2).

The protections under the section extend to disciplinary or similar proceedings.

52—Imputation of conduct or state of mind of officer etc

This provision imputes the conduct and state of mind of an officer, employee or agent of a body corporate, or an employee or agent of a natural person, to the body corporate or person. This allows the body corporate or natural person to be held accountable for the actions of their employees etc to the extent that they were acting within their usual or ostensible authority.

However, there is a defence available to the body corporate or natural person if they prove that the alleged contravention did not result from any failure on the defendant's part to take all reasonable and practicable measures to prevent the contravention or contraventions of the same or a similar nature.

53—Liability of directors

This section extends the liability of a body corporate, in relation to a particular offence committed by the body corporate, to each of its directors (except where the principal offence did not result from failure on the director's part to take reasonable care to prevent the commission of the offence).

54—Cause of death

Subsection (1) is a restatement of current section 17(3).

This section provides that, where voluntary euthanasia is administered to a person, the cause of death will be taken to be the underlying illness, injury or medical condition, and not suicide or homicide.

55—Insurance

This section prevents an insurer who may be liable to make payment under a life insurance policy following the death of a person from refusing to make the payment simply because treatment was withdrawn etc in accordance with a direction under new section 21, or because voluntary euthanasia was administered to the person.

It is an offence for an insurer to ask a person to disclose whether they have made a request for voluntary euthanasia.

Moreover, an insurer must not, in any way, encourage or promote voluntary euthanasia as alternative to other treatment. A person convicted of an offence against this provision will be liable to up to 5 years imprisonment if they are a natural person, or a fine of $600,000 if they are a body corporate.

Finally, subsection (5) provides that the section applies despite any agreement to the contrary between an insurer and a person.

56—Person may decline to administer or assist the administration of voluntary euthanasia

This section makes it clear that a person who does not wish to take any part in relation to voluntary euthanasia can do so without suffering adverse consequences, whether to their employment or otherwise.

However, certain institutions need to advise prospective patients or residents before they enter the institution that they will refuse permission to administer voluntary euthanasia on the premises (and must give the patient the name of an institution that does permit voluntary euthanasia to be administered), This will assist the patient to choose whether or not to enter the institution.

57—Victimisation

This section is a standard victimisation provision preventing people who take part in a request for, or administration of, voluntary euthanasia in accordance with the Act from being victimised for doing so. What constitutes victimisation or detriment is set out in subsection (4).

58—Review of Part by Minister

This section requires the Minister to cause a review of the operation of new Part 4 to be conducted within 2 years of its commencement, and for the report to be laid before both Houses of Parliament.

Part 5—Miscellaneous

59—Confidentiality

This is a standard confidentiality provisions protecting the privacy of information gathered in the course of the administration of the Act.

60—Service

This section is a standard provision setting out how service of documents etc may be effected.

61—Regulations

This clause provides a regulation-making power for the Act (as amended by this measure) that is consistent with modern drafting practice.

Schedule 1—Active request form

This Schedule sets out requirements in respect of the contents of an active request form.

Schedule 2—Advance request form

This Schedule sets out requirements in respect of the contents of an advance request form.

Debate adjourned on motion of Hon. I.K. Hunter.