INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION BILL

Introduction and First Reading

The Hon. SANDRA KANCK (17:11): Obtained leave and introduced a bill for an act to establish the Independent Commission Against Crime and Corruption; to define its functions and powers; and for other purposes. Read a first time.

Second Reading

The Hon. SANDRA KANCK (17:11): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

Criminologists say that the preconditions for crime are motive and opportunity and, on that basis, one would have to assume that South Australia is vulnerable to corruption. There is motive: billions of dollars in development and mining contracts, political parties eager to fill their war chests, and decision-makers seeking to line their pockets or simply cut corners and make life easier for themselves.

There is opportunity because of the lack of any effective watchdogs. Contrary to what the Minister for State/Local Government Relations said in question time today, the Police Anti-Corruption Branch cannot compel witnesses to testify. As MPs, many of us know that FOI requests are treated with contempt by some agencies. I have certainly found that with some requests that I have been trying to get through SAPOL basically all year.

The Ombudsman (at least until this morning) and the Auditor-General have not been vocal on these issues. It has been said to me by a constituent that these agencies would be expected to be in the news reporting on their investigations but, as I say, until this morning there have not been any recent public comments from them in this regard. Our state government keeps telling us that organised crime is flourishing and it keeps introducing legislation to contain it so, clearly, there is opportunity.

As for corruption, commonsense and history show us that corruption is the natural partner of organised crime. This bill is an opportunity for members to show that they are serious about tackling not just crime but corruption as well. It is based on the bill which I introduced last year but which then lapsed when parliament was prorogued. However, I have taken the opportunity to make some improvements, after feedback from both inside and outside parliament. I will briefly outline four key features of the bill. First, it defines corruption as follows:

'Corrupt conduct' means conduct of a person that adversely affects or could adversely affect, directly or indirectly, the honest exercise of an official function by a public officer or public authority.

The definition goes on to include 'dishonest or partial exercise of official functions,' and 'breach of trust,' or, 'misuse of information'. This is important because often corruption is seen as restricted to cash in a brown paper bag. However, corruption occurs on a continuum from the brown paper bag to the offer of a job in the future, to courting officials in corporate boxes. An act does not need to be motivated by financial reward to be corrupt. It could be the result of an official who was zealously pro or anti-development breaking the rules to achieve a certain outcome.

Secondly, I want to highlight the broad role of an ICACC. The ICACC proposed in this bill is based on the New South Wales model. This involves investigation, examination and reviewing laws and practices of authorities and officers who could be in a position to facilitate corruption and educating and advising authorities and the public. This is because an effective anti-corruption authority takes a broad approach that includes strategies to prevent corruption. There is nothing like this in South Australia.

In the absence of this sort of corruption prevention and education role, we can see how easy it is for an authority, particularly a council that might want to develop its area, to gradually slide away from putting out the red carpet to accepting gifts and favours, to bending and eventually breaking the laws. One gets the impression that local councils see an ICACC as a threat when, in fact, I would argue that it will eventually be their best protection.

Thirdly, I stress that this model has real teeth. Witnesses can be compelled to testify; authorities can be compelled to produce documents; premises can be searched; a person who prevents a person who is being summonsed from attending a commission hearing can go to gaol for four years; and a person who bribes a witness can go to gaol for seven years. Finally, this ICACC is genuinely independent. It operates under the oversight of a parliamentary joint committee. It has a direct line to parliament and cannot be silenced or subverted by the government of the day.

I urge members to support this bill. Its need is widely accepted by a wide range of public figures, including former Labor MPs such as Rod Sawford and Chris Schacht. It is also now accepted by the state Liberal Party. After years of opposing an ICACC the members of the Liberal Party in South Australia support one, and I commend them for that. I note from their website that, in their basic requirements for an ICAC (the Liberals' is a one 'C' ICAC—the one 'C' stands for 'corruption'—whereas mine is 'crime and corruption', with two 'C's), they propose that it be an offence to publicly disclose the fact that a complaint has been made about a particular person to their ICAC.

I discussed with parliamentary counsel having a provision of this nature in my bill, but there was a degree of complexity to it that has resulted in my bill's having a less restrictive approach. I will just go through some of the measures that I think address what the opposition wants with its ICAC. First of all, clause 31 relates to public and private hearings. Clause 31(1) provides:

A hearing must be held in public unless the Commission directs that the hearing, or part of the hearing, is to be held in private.

Subclause (2) provides:

If the Commission directs that a hearing or part of a hearing is to be held in private, the Commission may give directions as to the persons who may be present during the hearing or part of the hearing.

Clause 93 relates to evidence and procedure, and subclause (1) provides:

The Commission is not bound by the rules of evidence and may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it considers appropriate.

Clause 96 relates to secrecy, and subclause (2) provides:

A person to whom this section applies must not, directly or indirectly, except in connection with the exercise of the person's powers or functions under this act—

(a) make a record of information; or

(b) divulge or communicate to a person information,

being information acquired by the person by reason of, or in the course of, the exercise of the person's powers or functions under this act.

There is a maximum penalty of $5,000 or imprisonment for one year. Clause 97 relates to publication of evidence, and subclause (1) states:

(1) The Commission may, where it considers it desirable in the interests of the administration of justice to do so, direct that—

(a) evidence given before it; or

(b) the contents of a document, or a description of a thing produced to the Commission or seized under a search warrant issued under this act; or

(c) information that might enable a person who has given evidence before the Commission to be identified; or

(d) the fact that a person has given or may be about to give evidence at a hearing,

must not be published or must not be published except in such manner, and to such persons, as the Commission specifies.

Anyone who breaks that is also liable to a penalty of up to $5,000 or imprisonment for one year. Clause 99 relates to disclosures prejudicing investigations, and subclause (1) provides:

(1) A person who is required—

(a) by a notice under section 22 or 23 to produce a statement of information or to attend and produce a document or other thing; or

(b) by a summons under section 34 to give evidence or to produce a document or other thing,

must not disclose information about the notice or summons that is likely to prejudice the investigation to which it relates.

Maximum penalty: $5,000 or imprisonment for one year.

I recognise that this may not completely cover what the Liberal Party is asking for, but I am open to considering amendments, if the opposition wishes to move them, when we reach the committee stage. Similarly, I know that with my previous bill the Hon. Ann Bressington wanted some changes to gain her approval for its passage at the third reading. I have met with her and I have incorporated some of the things that she has suggested. I am also open to considering further amendments from her (or, for that matter, from any other member in this chamber) to facilitate this bill's passage.

The cost of an ICACC is only a fraction of a per cent of a major project such as The Dunes development on the Copper Coast or the $2 billion public transport modernisation announced in the last budget. I note that the Liberal Party's position paper has costed its ICAC at $15 million.

Every time the issue of an ICACC is raised, the government disingenuously uses the running cost of the New South Wales ICAC, in its entirety, as being the exact same cost that South Australia would have to pay. But, quite clearly, the body charged with overseeing a population of 1.6 million in South Australia would not require the same resourcing as the body checking on crime and corruption in a population of 6.9 million.

As the Minister for Road Safety said in this place yesterday about the relative cost of different crash barriers, this is not about the cost. The lack of a corruption watchdog leaves many complaints unresolved because the community does not have faith in investigations conducted by our range of toothless authorities.

I want to appeal to the Liberal Party in particular. This is the Democrats' fifth attempt in 20 years to introduce legislation for a corruption watchdog in this state. Each time the major parties have opposed an ICACC—although I note that in-principle support was given by the Liberals to my attempt in 2007. If the Liberals, smaller parties and Independents in this chamber pass this bill, the government will stand exposed as the primary beneficiary of political donations and the main obstacle to the cleansing effect of a real corruption watchdog.

Debate adjourned on motion of Hon. J.S.L. Dawkins.