Bills

State Development Coordination and Facilitation Bill

Committee Stage

In committee.

(Continued from 20 March 2025.)

Clause 27.

Mr TELFER: Minister, if you remember, we had just started on clause 27. I asked a question specifically around the aspect in clause 27 which talks about the decision-maker having the power to do anything necessary to implement the CGO's decision. The question I asked was around the breadth of the clause and what limitations apply to the abilities of the decision-maker to implement the decision of the CGO.

At the time, you made a comment which I wanted to just briefly revisit, because I did not quite get the aspect in particular. You said that if there is any variance between the original decision and the substituted decision this power is for the CGO's decision. I am not sure if you can remember the wording that you used in particular, but regarding the aspect which we have talked about around limitations or otherwise, the limitations to the ability of the decision-maker to implement the decision of the CGO, seemingly within this clause it sets out that there is no limitation and the power to do anything necessary is in play. Can you, perhaps, for the sake of the chamber speak a little bit more about that variance between the original decision and what you called the substituted decision?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: This perhaps requires a bit of explanation, so I will do my best. If it is not sufficient, let me know and we can have another go. The bill enables the CGO to review decisions and to make decisions on behalf of other bodies, for example, the State Planning Commission or a local council and so on, depending on what the context is. If the CGO reviews a particular decision, then it is the CGO's decision that stands, not the original one, which might have been made, again, by a local council or the State Planning Commission.

It is that decision which must be implemented without limitation. That may require, for example, that original decision-maker—either the council in this example or the State Planning Commission—to give effect to the decision. What subclause (9) attempts to do is to make it very clear that it is the CGO's decision that stands and must be implemented without limitation. There cannot be, for example, a return to the original decision which has been reviewed and effectively—although this is not the correct term—overruled by the subsequent decision that the CGO has taken. Does that provide enough clarity?

Mr TELFER: I think so, on this aspect in particular, because there is a bit of ambiguity with the definition of decision-maker which we talked about earlier. After the steps that you have set out, there is a decision-maker, e.g. a council that can have their decision overruled, for want of better terminology, by the CGO, but then there is a further decision-maker, e.g. the minister, who has to actually implement the decision that the CGO has put in place. Is that correct? So the final say sits with the minister. However, subclause (11), for instance, provides:

Without limiting subsection 10(a), the decision maker has power to do anything necessary to implement the CGO's decision.

That decision-maker is the original decision-maker, which you are talking about, rather than the minister as the decision-maker?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I think that is right. If the original decision was of a council, for example, it is reviewed by the CGO, then that decision is made by the CGO, but it remains the responsibility of the council to carry out or to implement that reviewed decision. Similarly, with the State Planning Commission, if the State Planning Commission's decision is reviewed and, to use your term, 'overruled by the CGO', it still remains the State Planning Commission's responsibility to carry out that final reviewed decision. In that context, it is not for the minister to be responsible for carrying it out, it is for that original planning body to be giving effect to the reviewed decision.

Mr TELFER: For further clarification, basically this piece of legislation and this clause in particular is giving the CGO these extraordinary powers to, at their decision, come in and challenge or review a decision from the State Planning Commission, a commission that is very well respected and a process that they fit into as the final decision-maker. The CGO now sits above that Planning Commission and has the ability to review any of their decisions and overrule those decisions, and there is no other point of review or appeal from the Planning Commission and their process that they will follow? The CGO has the power above all of that Planning Commission decision-making capacity?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: That is true, with some limitations. The CGO can only take on a decision-making function on a matter if it satisfies the fundamental tenets of the bill, that is, that the development or the nature of the development that is being reviewed is of sufficient environmental, economic or social significance to the state; that it has gone through that referral process where it is either called in by the CGO itself, it is referred to them by the minister or it is designated to them by the Governor, for example; but, most critically, that the process by which a decision is reached is consistent with the process that the original decision-making body had.

It has to satisfy all of the planning decision criteria that either the council or the State Planning Commission has to go through. In effect, it can review errors that are made, either by the council or the State Planning Commission, where they have not considered appropriately all of the aspects that they are required to in reaching the original decision. So it is not a carte blanche saying, 'I don't like that decision and we are going to choose to review it because we have got a difference of opinion.'

If, to use your example, the State Planning Commission has considered a development and it has gone through the appropriate rigorous process, ticked every procedural box, taken into consideration everything it must and then arrived at a decision, then there would not be a flaw or a problem or an infelicity with the decision that had been originally made, and it would not provide the CGO the capacity to review it. It would have to be in those circumstances where there was a referral made to the CGO, either of their own volition from the minister or the Governor, based on a decision not having adequately considered one tenet of their normal process that they would otherwise do.

Mr TELFER: Just a little bit on from that, minister, that is the ideal. We could have a situation, though, because there are no measure points for that economic, social and environmental trigger point. This is the challenge of a piece of legislation like this: the CGO could actually come in and say, 'The State Planning Commission has ticked all their boxes, gone through their process, sure, but they didn't know that there was an overarching economic, social and environmental aspect or impact that this could have,' and then they could come in and follow that whole process. Is that right?

We have discussed earlier within the debate that there is not a trigger point necessarily, it is a decision for a referral and that decision can be enacted by the CGO, basically. Although you have set out the framework, there could be the potential for there to be a judgement call made by the CGO saying that there could be a greater impact beyond the checklist of the Planning Commission.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: The one overarching caveat that exists with all of this, of course, is that when the CGO is exercising its powers under the legislation we are considering now, those judgements and decisions that are made are conceivably subject to judicial review, so if there was an aggrieved person or entity or a proponent that thought that the CGO had not conducted itself according to the requirements of this bill, then they could seek that review.

I keep coming back to the colloquial example I gave in previous responses: the CGO cannot call in somebody's application to the council for a pergola extension, for example, because it will not satisfy those overarching criteria. Similarly, even if there is a development that is of statewide significance according to those three criteria, if the CGO is not able to demonstrate that it has followed those same requirements of the original planning process, then you could see how that would enliven the possibility of a potentially successful judicial challenge.

It is not that once the bill becomes law and the CGO is created that they are beyond review or rebuke; they certainly will be. I would argue that given the significance of the legislation and the new process which is being established by it, it is likely that there will be an enormous amount of scrutiny on this and the risk that anyone who is aggrieved or unhappy with the processes or the decisions of the CGO could seek for them to be reviewed.

Clause passed.

Clause 28.

Mr TELFER: Clause 28 outlines the responsibilities of the CGO in a state development area and their functions generally. Does this clause terminate the need for any other department to provide similarly defined responsibilities, given the responsibility now lies with the CGO?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: No is the answer. As we have discussed previously, it is likely that existing agencies may provide some of their resources—whether it is human resources or otherwise—to support the CGO in considering matters, including in relation to state development areas, as well as those existing agencies continuing to carry on with the work that they do. But because we are creating a new entity—the CGO, with its own resources—we would anticipate that between the existing agencies and the new agency (the CGO) we would see a greater capacity to consider matters and, in all likelihood, that matters are considered more expediently than they are currently.

Mr TELFER: Minister, I am interested in how this clause in particular exactly applies to state government responsibilities relating to AUKUS. The state is not, obviously, responsible for any physical infrastructure that is associated with the project since the land swap agreement between the state and federal governments which saw Osborne land traded to the federal government by the state in exchange for the land at the Keswick Barracks. Where does it actually fit into that responsibility?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: It does have a relevance to AUKUS-related activities. While the commonwealth will be funding significant infrastructure improvements to facilitate the AUKUS industrial endeavours, there will still need to be a planning function to consider and approve any of those developments. You would have heard me and the Premier and others talk about the need to triple the size of the shipyard at Osborne, for example, as well as to consider all of the infrastructure augmentations that that will require—for example, electricity, gas, water and so on—which are not necessarily all housed on the site.

They will be coming to the site from other locations, whether it is from across the Port River, from Torrens Island or Garden Island or whether it is coming up the peninsula, etc. So having this sort of capacity to declare a state development area would enable the CGO to undertake that work on behalf of the state as well as facilitate the commonwealth development more expediently than what we think we would be able to do without it.

Mr TELFER: As with the previous debate we had about the AUKUS expert that is legislated to be within the structure of the CGO in particular, I am trying to trying to get my head around where is the validity and importance of having an AUKUS expert on the CGO. Clause 28 obviously outlines the responsibilities of the CGO, yet the federal constitution prevents the state government from intervening in defence infrastructure matters, and any conflict between state and federal legislation is automatically, obviously, resolved in favour of the federal government, so having an AUKUS expert does not necessarily get value for the sorts of associated infrastructure that you are talking about.

Having an infrastructure expert, when you are talking about what power is needed, what water and wastewater infrastructure, etc., might be better suited than a specific AUKUS defence expert when the defence infrastructure itself is separate to what the CGO could potentially be looking at in the scenario that you have pointed out.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: No, not necessarily. The benefit of having somebody who is specifically able to advise on broader AUKUS-related matters as it comes to here—to state development areas—might mean, using the example that I have given, that if you are tripling the size of the shipyard then there is hard infrastructure and utility-type infrastructure that would be required, that you rightly point out are no doubt complex but pretty well understood planning considerations. Where do the high voltage powerlines go? Where does the gas main come in, etc?

There is a benefit of having somebody who is advising more broadly about AUKUS; for example, we have BAE Systems, which is ostensibly responsible for the construction of the submarines in partnership with the ASC. They are having to massively increase their workforce. In fact, I think during the course of this year it is some 80 additional employees per month that they are having to grow their shipbuilding workforce by. You can imagine that trying to take on a thousand workers over a calendar year is an extraordinary endeavour.

They have to be trained, so there are two training facilities that are being pursued on the peninsula at the moment. One is the federally funded Skills and Training Academy, and the other one is the broader, common-user training facility called the trades hall concept. That is something that a person with specific AUKUS advisory responsibilities would be bringing to the table, which necessarily goes beyond just what the current hard infrastructure needs of the site are. These are coming in not from the Department of Defence for the expansion of the shipyard but are coming in representing what the private-sector proponents of the shipbuilding activities will be—what their needs will be on site or adjacent to site.

For example, something that has been made clear to me, to the Premier, to the Governor and I think to the previous Leader of the Opposition and others who have visited the UK and their shipyards, is an understanding of what some of the pressure points are with the interface of the shipyard and the local community.

Not so much encroaching on housing, but if you have thousands of workers turning up there every day, firstly, how are they getting there and, secondly, if they are driving themselves where are they parking? If you have to suddenly think—and these are illustrative figures here, not precise ones—that you are going from 1,000 workers on the site to 5,000 workers on the site, and if that means an increase in the number of vehicles from this-thousand to that-thousand, that is a huge additional area that has to be accommodated, maybe not within the fence line of the shipyard but immediately adjacent to it, so that workers have ready access there—or it may need public transport augmentations.

These are all scopes of work that are immediately relevant to the expansion of the shipyard but are not necessarily the immediate planning considerations of the federal Department of Defence. That is why it is important to have the capacity to have somebody who is able to provide further advice to the CGO when they are considering something like a state development area: what else is going to be conceivably required for this broader area, and are we making provision for it when we are putting the dotted line around the land that is in question and identifying how much space is necessary for the ancillary needs of the expansion? That is probably one example I could give.

Then, of course, there is AUKUS pillar 1, which is the naval shipbuilding, and then there is pillar 2, which is the more technology-focused procurements that are already coming from the Department of Defence, including to South Australia. We are talking about developments in some of the soft technologies like cybersecurity and artificial intelligence and that sort of thing, but we are also talking about electronic warfare and the development of an indigenous capability to manufacture missiles, including hypersonic missiles, and being able to test them and that sort of thing.

So you could see how there may be a state development area-type consideration for facilities around Woomera, for example, where the Department of Defence obviously will know exactly what they want within the boundaries of that. But we would have to consider, if we were seeing a huge influx of people who are testing their missiles or hypersonic weapons in this area: what do they need outside the boundaries and are we considering that if, for example, it were to be declared a state development area?

I think that is why the government has tried to think a bit more broadly about how we can have a new entity which can consider all this but make sure we have as many heads in the room to ensure we are getting it right the first time, rather than thinking, 'Actually, we didn't think through how much land we would need in the next 10 years for this additional use that is not immediately a part of but is an ancillary function of that state development area.'

Mr TELFER: Just one more question on this one. The second example, which has a lot of technical understanding, I think is a good example. The first one is curious. You spoke about parking, public transport and road infrastructure, all of that stuff again does not feel like it is defence. That could be whatever industry having a growth point in that footprint. This is why having someone who specifically is capable and knowledgeable about defence, AUKUS, etc., does not necessarily get that level of skill transferred to something like social infrastructure, parking infrastructure or public transport. For that one, I think it would be better suited to have someone with expertise in public infrastructure delivery rather than someone with a specialty in defence.

The other example, the second one, yes, absolutely, I think that is a standalone footprint in a designated military zone, for instance, like we have seen previously at Woomera, absolutely. But with the interaction with some of that public infrastructure, would someone with that public infrastructure delivery capacity and knowledge, engineering capacity, not be better placed to be making those sorts of recommendations? You are getting your advice directly from the defence companies saying this is how big—the 80 people a month, the 1,000 people, the 10,000 people by the end of however long. That does not take a defence mind to ascertain what is socially and economically necessary for the associated aspects of that sort of development.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I disagree. The CGO itself is going to have those requisite planning skills, as you would imagine. It does not matter if you are building a facility completely unrelated to defence or something that is defence focused, having somebody who can bring a particular defence lens to the process, I would argue, is absolutely essential.

Take car parking for example, you would think any planning officer worth their salt should be able to make a judgement of: if you have a thousand workers turning up every day, what is the planning rule of thumb for how many people are going to drive versus how many people are going to carpool versus public transport or whatever? I get all of that.

Mr TELFER: That was just an example that was given.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Yes, but putting a defence lens over it, for example, we are building some of the most sensitive and secret machinery in existence on the planet today: nuclear-powered submarines. The technology that goes into these things is very closely and jealously guarded by those countries that have developed it. The nuclear propulsion system which is going to go in the SSN-AUKUS is the most modern, current nuclear propulsion technology that the United States has generated in modern history and it has only just been shared in recent times with the UK, let alone being shared with Australia.

When you have workers driving to work each day and you have an Australian economy, for example, which is seeing more and more people buying Chinese-made electric vehicles with cameras all over the inside and the outside of them, you need a defence lens to say, 'Well, what is the appropriate car parking facility?' We probably do not want cars parked outside the enormous window shining into the hall that is installing the nuclear propulsion unit. You probably want it the other side of the fence. You want it close to the fence, but you want it the other side of the fence so as to decrease the risk of there being any nefarious surveillance-type opportunities from these vehicles.

Is that a realistic risk or not? Maybe, maybe not, but you have to put on the table how you are designing and approving these sorts of large-scale developments to make sure you are making additional considerations and accommodations for these sorts of defence-specific sensitivities. That is something I would argue is not able to be picked up by a regular planner.

I guess the other example I would give, and the reason why I gave those examples of the Skills and Training Academy and the Trades Hall, is that we are trying to support those people who are going to be active on the site. The big part of this push by the federal government and, of course, also by state governments is that, regardless of what the defence spend is, we want Australian supply chain involvement. We want local businesses in South Australia on South Australian-manufactured programs as engaged as possible, and it might mean that it makes sense to have the capacity around the shipyard—to continue using that example—for those involved in the supply chain to be present and active in the vicinity of it rather than dispersed across other parts of South Australia where you have all sorts of freight and logistics inefficiencies inherent with that organisation, etc.

I think that is why we have tried to identify the utility of having someone who can apply that defence lens to what you quite rightly point out in any other context would just be a kind of regular planning assessment because there are characteristics of this which are unique to a defence consideration.

Clause passed.

Clause 29.

Mr TELFER: This clause, minister, is state development areas—planning functions. Clause 29(1)(b)(ii) provides that the CGO may publish a state development plan that identifies essential infrastructure required in the area. By virtue of the fact that the CGO has power—obviously, as we have spoken about—to order compliance of other departments, does this mean the CGO in a state development area has the power to order government agencies to provide specific infrastructure necessary for development? With the ones we talked about before, SA Water for instance or SAPN and the like, does the CGO have the power to actually order the agency to provide that infrastructure?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: No, it is to plan for the infrastructure. If you have a highly energy intensive use within that state development area and it needs for that development to occur a certain amount of energy, electricity, to be provided to it of 1.21 gigawatts or something similar, then they have to have the capacity to, in that plan, accommodate the delivery of that sort of electricity. You could say the same thing for gas, water, as well as anything else conceivably, such as waste removal and road access, etc., which may be required for a large area, let alone one that is undertaking industrial activities.

Mr TELFER: So it has the ability to be able to identify it, require the planning for it, but not order that it be delivered. I am also curious as we talk about the SDA planning functions in particular: what does the minister envision the size of the scope of an SDA could be? Could it be technically possible under the bill to declare the entire township of Mount Barker, for instance, or the Upper Spencer Gulf; across the water, the three cities together, for instance? How big could a state development area be?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I do not think there is a particular guideline or sliding scale of areas. It really depends what the use would be. We would not envisage that all of Mount Barker would be designated a development area because much of it has been developed.

Mr TELFER: Or Woomera, for example, or whatever.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: It might be that there is an area of undeveloped land—

Mr TELFER: North of Adelaide.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: —for housing, for example, which might be declared a state development area, so that that entire housing development, regardless of who the proponent or proponents are, can be planned thoroughly from day one, rather than piece by piece depending on who has what bit of land, and when they choose to bring it to market, etc.

Putting housing aside, if it is an industrial development, if there was a new industrial use for the Upper Spencer Gulf—again, to use your example—then it might declare an area to be a state development area and all the planning necessary for whatever that envisaged particular industrial use is, and make sure, subject to your previous question, that for that proposed industrial use, all of the essential infrastructure is understood and planned for to get to site or to get to different parts of the site and so on.

If it is defence-related, obviously that will be considered within the parentheses of what the defence department would tell us is feasible or likely or they are going to approve of. If it is an expansion of a testing area, or another activity adjacent to a testing area, like a staging area or an accommodation complex that is not currently available, whether it is near Cultana or Woomera, for example, or whether it is some development that would occur out at one of the rocket and satellite launching facilities that we have, like Koonibba—it would just depend on what the use is. If it is for something else, such as renewables, it would be trying to make sure that area is set out and any impacts on Crown land, or native vegetation, or even primary production land, is understood from day one and there is an appropriate process, including mandatory consultation, to go through in designating that. It will just depend on the use.

Mr TELFER: With your explanation, a state development area does not need to be contiguous. There could be a state development area designated which grabs little pieces of South Australia from all over which are grouped together. I am trying to work out the scope of what is envisioned within this, because the example that you give about satellite operations, for instance, could have multiple different areas; obviously that is not going to be contiguous. We talked before about the Upper Spencer Gulf, where you could have an area designated within the outskirts of Whyalla and then further up at Cultana and then maybe something at Port Augusta, or Port Pirie. So you could have different sections of South Australia grouped together under an SDA; is my understanding correct?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: That is not how the bill is drafted. All the references to a state development area are discussed in the singular; it is one area, rather than a collation of separate areas. It is not our view that the legislation would support that, if indeed it is passed. Because this is the most significant way that the Coordinator-General can exercise their powers, it is likely to be the physically largest area of land that is designated, it is likely to be undeveloped land, or it is likely to be a redevelopment of a brownfield site if it is not undeveloped.

Going to the effort and the resource intensiveness of the process that is required in order to successfully designate a state development area is unlikely to lend itself to someone putting forward a grab bag of non-contiguous or disparate areas, either in a geography or across the whole state. Instead, what is provided for in the bill is that there would be a designation, or that an investigation is required for the designation, of a particular area singular.

Mr TELFER: For further clarification—and you gave a few examples before about renewables projects, for instance, or some of the satellite launch projects—if there were going to be different areas within the state that had to have their own SDA declared for those pockets, maybe with the same sort of framework but actually separate SDAs declared, the Coordinator-General would have to manage them individually.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Yes; for example, taking the bottom of the Eyre Peninsula in your electorate versus Koonibba—I am not sure if that is in your electorate or in Giles—

Mr Telfer: Absolutely.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: So it is in your electorate as well—

Mr Telfer: It's 220,000 square kilometres.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: They are geographically quite disparate, and different from one another; different local communities, for example, different geographical features of the land, different infrastructure requirements, and different existing infrastructure that is able to service them now. So yes, it is my advice that they would certainly be separately considered in the same way that, to use your earlier example, considering a state development area for a major housing land release either in the north of Adelaide or in some other part of non-metropolitan Adelaide would be considered separate areas and would have their own considerations as well.

Clause passed.

Clause 30.

Mr TELFER: This clause in particular is talking about the division of land in state development areas, under the subdivision heading of 'Interactions with other Acts' and what impact that has on other different aspects of legislation.

Councils use the powers contemplated in clause 30 to ensure that developers take certain steps before a decision is made; that footpath land, for instance, is transferred to ownership of the council, or that there is provision for the creation of open space or recreational reserves, as we have spoken about previously.

Before land is vested in a council, councils will often require that standards are met or actions are taken; for example, that the footpaths are properly designed, that the infrastructure they are taking on is proper engineering, or if there is contamination of land that it is first remediated. Can you give me some context, as far as this goes, of the impact this change could have on that capacity?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I guess it is coming back to that core requirement that the exact same process has to be undertaken by the CGO that otherwise might have been undertaken either by council or the State Planning Commission. All those requirements of that process will be adhered to, but all those considerations that may also be taken into account are also able to be ventilated through the mandatory consultation period and engagement of the original planning bodies. It is our expectation that the process facilitates all the matters you have raised to be incorporated into the process.

Clause passed.

Clause 31.

Mr TELFER: This runs on a similar sort of line, and it may be a very similar sort of answer. Regarding the category of impact assessed development—and obviously this is something that is pretty specific within the PDI Act—is the answer to the previous question similar to this one, that the obligations under the impact assessment development aspects of the PDI Act still need to have that overarching impact that they would with the CGO SDA, for instance?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: The answer is yes.

Clause passed.

Clause 32 passed.

Clause 33.

Mr TELFER: At clause 33 obviously there are quite complex different aspects of the Mining Act, and there is always a lot of public and industry interest in particular. Clause 33(5) specifically removes the ability of this parliament to disallow specified decisions in the bill, such as the ability to call in a power pursuant to clause 25. Can the Treasurer now explain why the decisions contemplated by this clause are so important that we need to exclude the usual oversight and scrutiny of parliament?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Again, this provides for the capacity of the CGO to undertake the functions otherwise undertaken by the Mining Act. That subclause makes it absolutely clear that the Mining Act process and requirements must be followed by the CGO and that there cannot be any diversion or deletion from the process that is required under the Mining Act.

Mr TELFER: Obviously, within the structure given here there are significant decision-making powers given to an as yet unnamed body of government officials to override entire legislative schemes enacted by this parliament. Could there be justification for oversight to be enhanced rather than removed or are you confident that the parliamentary oversight that is built into the CGO act will be enough to balance out that oversight aspect, which seemingly could potentially be removed with this aspect?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: It is an important question, particularly with respect to this clause because this clause does talk with particular reference to the Mining Act, and I know for those members who represent regional South Australia where—

Mr Telfer: Mining happens.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Yes, but in particular where agriculture happens as well. Sometimes there is friction between those two different land uses. It is important that the member has raised it.

It is important to realise that all the requirements in the provisions of the Mining Act absolutely must be applied by the CGO, but they can only be undertaken by the CGO if it satisfies that early test in the legislation that this is a proposition that has statewide significance under one of those three limbs: economic, social or environmental. You would not imagine it being enlivened for a regular Mining Act type application, only if it satisfies that test of statewide importance.

Secondly, I think we have also spoken in the committee stage about the CGO calling on the resources of existing agencies within government to enable it to do its role and whether they are, for example, environmental agencies, infrastructure agencies, utility-related agencies or, in this case, mining-related agencies. So there is, at the very least, a minimum level of rigour in the process which replicates the current arrangements.

Because we have an additional body and more arms and legs dedicated to this process, we would anticipate that we will get quicker decision-making, which is not just in the best interests of the proponent, it is also in the best interests of the community or communities that are affected by whatever the proponent is putting forward. As I have said before, having this process is not a guarantee to approval or to an answer of 'yes'; it might be that despite all of the work undertaken in the investigations that the answer is no. So I think having this extra capacity within government, established by legislation, will ensure rigour.

The existence of this function within government itself will attract a high level of attention. Everyone will want to know what the CGO is working on and why, and in particular what decisions are getting made by the CGO and whether they are reasonable or not. So I think in terms of rigour and transparency as well as expediency, this is going to be a much better outcome than what we currently have.

Mr TELFER: I would probably say that we might have more to dissect in that in the other house. Although there is some reassurance that the minister is trying to give the house on that through a few of those bits of language such as 'the statewide importance', how many mining companies and the like have come to you as Treasurer and in other roles previously, or to me as a local member, and said, 'The economic opportunity for the state because of this project is significant,' so, tick, it hits the economic aspect for a CGO to look at it? I can count multiple just within my electorate that could potentially tick an economic box and ask the CGO to consider a project such as that.

It is going to be interesting. You are right, there is going to be oversight from outside watching what the CGO prioritises, but sometimes public servants can overstep the mark or get it wrong or be talked into a narrative around economic opportunity, whether it is where we have seen Olympic Dam come and go in its iterations before. You have the hydrogen industry at the moment, for instance, and the conversations that were had five years ago: I had them and the current government—then opposition, obviously—had them as well where, because of perspective, a judgement could be made that there is an economic opportunity and a potential for statewide importance for this to come.

I think the aspect of excluding formal parliamentary scrutiny is a big step. This is why I am adding an extra spotlight onto it, specifically with this Mining Act aspect, because I am cautious—and I will consider the ramifications for what we may ask for in the Legislative Council—that we could get a scenario where we could have a system which is not effective for that expectation of the community when it comes to mining companies, in particular, that could be trying to either supersede or shortcut a process that needs to have that community rigour, firstly, but then the parliamentary rigour that comes with it representing the community.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I think it is legitimate to raise that concern from your perspective: in reality or in practice, what is going to satisfy that test of statewide significance? The member uses, for example, in the mining context Olympic Dam—well, you would like to think yes. Without being inflammatory about it, if it is a discrete gold mining operation in the Adelaide Hills that potentially subverts a winery, probably not.

Mr Telfer: But that is a judgement call, so this is the risk.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: It is a judgement call. Using the housing example, is it a Riverlea or, winding the clock back 15 or 20 years, is it a Mount Barker? Arguably. Probably. Is it a two for one? Of course not. But is it something in the middle? Take my electorate, for example. Is it a WEST development, redeveloping the land around Football Park, or the redevelopment of the old Port Adelaide wastewater treatment plant? Or going into the member for Colton's electorate, is it the Kidman Park former Metcash site? Maybe. Maybe not.

If you want to take any comfort from this, there is the fact that it has to satisfy that statewide test. Is the wastewater treatment station or Metcash or the WEST development of statewide significance? It is of significance, but I do not know that you would say it was of statewide significance. Is Riverlea or Mount Barker? Probably, yes; you could tick that box. There will be matters of judgement, of course, and it will not just be the CGO that is going to be responsible for answering whether they have made the right call or not. It will also be the responsibility of the minister, if they have referred it to the CGO or the Governor or, perhaps more practically speaking, the government of the day, if they have made the reference there as well. But I guess I come back to—

Mr Telfer: The mining one.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: —or the mining one—the scrutiny that is going to be attracted to what the CGO is doing. All the decisions of the CGO, firstly, in taking the referral, let alone making a decision after getting the referral, are gazetted in real time. Secondly, there is an ongoing requirement for an annual report as well, so the parliament and the public get full transparency around what the CGO is doing.

I think there should be enough built-in protection with it, even in the process itself, mandating minimum consultation periods for each of the three different processes that the CGO can undertake. For example, going back to mining and the potential friction with other land uses like agriculture, there is a process in real time for those voices to be heard as well as understanding what the decisions are along the way and, of course, at the end. Coming back to another example I gave, if there is any concern that the CGO has not followed the legislative process or the initial process, of what would have been the agency or decision-maker, their judgements and decisions can be subject to judicial review as well.

Clause passed.

Clause 34.

Mr TELFER: I have not pre-prepared a lot of these questions. It is coming from the answers that I am getting. On this clause, in particular, it is only my first term in parliament to see a definition clause which refers to a future clause, which we will be considering, but then that future clause does not really provide much definition in itself. A facilitated project, for instance, refers to 'a proposal for a project in a State development area'. In the definition of 'statement of regulatory requirements' it says 'see section 35(2)'. When I flick to section 35(2) all it says is the CGO would be responsible for preparing a statement of regulatory requirements. It does not actually specify or define what a statement of regulatory requirements would be. Is the way I am reading it accurate, or is there a further definition somewhere beyond the section that it refers to in particular? If so, should it be changed to include that definition in its specificity?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: As Tim Smith from Demtel would say, 'Wait, there's more'. If you go to 35(6) it articulates what a statement of regulatory requirements must include.

Mr Telfer interjecting:

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: If I am reading a whodunnit I do not like to skip ahead, but if you do read the entirety of clauses 34 and 35 then you can see that, while it might not be upfront in clause 34, there is a requirement, and that would itself require some further examination of other pieces of legislation. But, effectively, what the statement of regulatory requirements will be is an articulation of all of those things necessary in order to consider a matter under its original act. Setting that out in one document then provides not only a rigour for the CGO to make sure they have a list where they have to tick every item on the list in considering that but also some transparency whereby, if you were particularly interested in a matter that the CGO has considered, you have got the CGO's checklist, so you know all of the matters that they have to consider and satisfy before they can make a decision on it.

In that respect, it provides an enhanced level of transparency from somebody on the outside looking into the process, trying to understand whether the CGO is looking at this properly. I will give you an example: if the CGO was considering one of these state development areas and it was likely to have an impact in an undeveloped area on some native vegetation and you were one of those organisations like the Conservation Council or friends of buffel grass, or whatever, you would be able to see—

Mr Telfer: It's a basic species.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: It depends what part of the state you are in, apparently. I have seen some roads where it is celebrated, some roads where it is identified as a pest, but what would I know? Then you will know what the CGO has to do in order to adequately assess that. If you think that the CGO has not adequately assessed each of those items on the statement of regulatory requirements, then that would be the capacity to highlight a shortcoming in the process, if not subsequently challenge it by judicial review.

Clause passed.

Clause 35.

Mr TELFER: My appetite was whetted by the discussion on 34 and for 35 to come, because it is the aspect around the statement of regulatory requirements, facilitated projects. Clauses 34 through to 36 are cascading. As the minister set out in the previous answer, the statement of regulatory requirements for facilitated projects, once again I was curious as there is a specific clause around a definition that does not actually provide the definition within the clause, but that is fine—I am not a parliamentary counsel member. Clause 35(1) states:

CGO may, for the purposes of promoting development in the State, prepare and adopt a proposal for a project in a State development area…

Is the CGO, by virtue of this clause, now a development arm of the state government? Is it direct or a subsidiary designed as a consultancy firm to conduct business with private developers, because the preparation and adoption of a project is far beyond the scope of simply ensuring the CGO can conduct essential infrastructure works to facilitate a project?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: There are two parts to it. No, this is not the CGO in that respect being used as the arms and legs of a proponent or a developer. After particularly a reference by a minister or the Governor, or even of their own volition, if there is to be a certain type of development that would require accommodation within a state development area—for example, as we have discussed, a large-scale industrial development, housing development, mining development or whatever—then rather than wait for the private sector to come to government in an ad hoc and uncoordinated manner suggesting that those forms of development happen in disparate different places around the state or in a particular geography of the state, it instead enables the CGO to do two things.

One is to say, 'This is the state development area which that sort of activity must occur in.' Then, having done that, it can go to each of the regulators that would otherwise have considered an application—whether it is, for example, the Department for Energy and Mining or SA Water or with respect to other utilities and transport and so on—and say, 'What would you require in order to favourably consider a development that is to occur for this purpose in this area?' Then you are able to say to anyone or any proponent, 'If you want to develop this particular land use, in this particular state development area, these are all of the boxes that your proposition has to tick.'

On that basis, when the proponent turns up for the first time to propose something to occur in that state development area, they have already been advised what they will require in order to be considered. It is likely to expedite the process for the proponent, let alone for the CGO and, I guess in that respect, the planning process itself, so you are providing greater clarity up-front as to what is going to be required for the development. It is likely to then mean that you do not have what you quite often have at the moment, and that is someone coming forward saying, 'I want to build this over here,' and then having to find out iteratively from different agencies, 'Well, you are going to require that, and we are going to require you to have that,' and so on. Does that make sense?

Mr TELFER: Yes. To follow the bouncing ball, in making a request of a responsible entity which would normally be responsible for granting the approval but the CGO has now superseded or taken over that process, there are a lot of timelines around the responsibility of the CGO. There are obviously no timelines that I can read—maybe I am missing it; it is an extensive clause—for there to be a time for the responsible entity to be replying to the CGO.

This is all about fast-tracking a process, making sure that a developer or a project will have the framework and understanding of exactly what their obligations are under all the processes. But if a CGO went to the department for mines or went to the planning department and requested all the different aspects of regulatory requirement that would be necessary for the facilitated project, there is not a real obligation written within this legislation for that entity to make it a priority or try to streamline that process.

This could be a sticking point for the poor old CGO in trying to fast-track a process because in the end the department or entity is obviously one where the CGO is not confident in their capacity to be able to fast-track a process, because they have come in and taken over the process. They still have to rely on that original entity to prepare all the regulatory requirements that will be necessary. There are responsibilities within the legislation for the CGO and the timeline that they have for different aspects but not for that entity. Is my reading of it correct?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: In clause 35(3), it enables the CGO to require a specific period for that responsible entity, but in 36—

Mr Telfer interjecting:

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: That is right—that old chestnut. In clause 36(4), it talks about providing within 10 business days advice to the CGO from that responsible entity. So the CGO—I think I understand this properly—can specify another timeframe, but in any event it has to be within 10 days unless the CGO says they can have an alternative period of time. But in that respect, for the benefit of the proponent, it is clear what that timeframe is and when they can expect that those entities are providing their advice back to the CGO so that it is not left drifting, as can sometimes be the case in some government agencies when they are not considering things very quickly.

Mr TELFER: Minister, you have jumped ahead to the facilitation certificate, but this is specifically talking about the statement of regulatory requirement, the development of that. So, yes, it is 10 business days once the regulatory requirement process has been gone through and the facilitation certificate issued—it is 10 days at that point, not when the CGO is requiring the regulatory body to be putting together the framework for the regulation. Is that right? This is an early step. You are pointing to the timelines around the further step, but this is the early step that we are specifically focusing on here.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Yes, apologies, that is my mistake. I thought you were making reference to the fact that there were no timelines, but there is also within clause 35 itself a timeframe of at least 14 days under subclause (2) to give a copy of the proposed direction to the responsible entity. Your question appears to be, 'What is the timeframe under which a statement of regulatory requirements specifically must be provided?'—is that correct?

Mr Telfer interjecting:

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I am advised there is not a set timeframe for that because it depends on the nature of the development. For example, if it is a very broadscale housing development or industrial development that requires many different elements to be considered and contemplated, that might be a period extending into months. If it is a simple requirement—for example, an access road—that is the sort of thing that you would envisage the CGO requires within perhaps a couple of weeks.

Clause passed.

Clause 36 passed.

Clause 37.

Mr TELFER: This is subdivision 5—Other functions. Clause 37 speaks of when the CGO may be authorised to undertake essential infrastructure work. We spoke earlier about the capacity of the CGO to require planning for these sorts of works, and you specifically spoke about the planning aspect, making sure that it was prepared for. This is where the CGO may be authorised to undertake that work.

Maybe I should have asked the question on clause 36. There is provision within the act for appeals against the decision of the CGO. I am curious around the process for what that might look like. Who would conduct the defence? You spoke about judicial appeals and judicial challenges previously in some of the other answers. Who would conduct the defence against such an approval? Would it be the CGO, or would it be the designated authority whose powers have been called in?

That judicial appeal may not seem a big deal when it is a CGO that is part of the state government and then, for instance, in the examples that you have given previously, the Planning Commission, which is the responsible entity for that approval. I will make sure you get your head around it.

If there is a judicial appeal, you said that the CGO requires the responsible entity to be doing the work of approval and the like, which is fine if it is the CGO with the Planning Commission, state government or whatever. But if it is a CGO requiring the responsible entity, which is a local government, a council, and there is a judicial appeal against a decision of the CGO, who is responsible for the defence of that? Is it the CGO who is the state government body responsible or is it the local government, which has not been involved in any of the decision-making processes, but it is under their powers that the decision has been made?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: It is a good question and there is not an answer that fits every circumstance. It would depend on what the judicial review is seeking to interrogate. If it is a function that the CGO has carried out, if it is a decision that they have made themselves, then it is likely that the CGO would be the respondent. The Crown will be the respondent, but the CGO would be the respondent.

If, to use your example, the CGO has had an involvement in taking on or reviewing a decision that has been made by council, it will depend on what is being reviewed in the overall application for approval. Was it a function that was exercised by the council or was it a function that was exercised by the CGO? That may mean that there has to be some determination reached between the CGO and the council about who undertook what part of the planning function and then who is best placed to respond to the request for review of how that particular function was undertaken.

I cannot really give you a hard and fast answer that it is always going to be the CGO or it is always going to be the responsible entity, but hopefully that gives you an idea that it could be one or the other. If it is something that the CGO has taken on responsibility for, then of course they will, but if part of the process has been superintended and undertaken by another entity then conceivably the other entity either would be the respondent or would support the CGO in their role as the respondent.

Mr TELFER: With your indulgence, I think we need to unpack this a little bit more, because it may well be that when there is a challenge to these decisions this conversation is reflected on to try to understand the intent of the legislation. We can only hope, minister.

If the CGO is coming over and above a decision of a local government entity—I want to focus on council in particular because I think the state government aspect is probably in hand within the capacity of the state—local government has followed a process and done some steps along the way. The CGO comes in and says, 'No, I want to challenge this process because of the economic, social, environmental,' etc. If the CGO then adjusts aspects of that decision and leaves other aspects, is the CGO taking responsibility for the whole decision? Because basically within that review they are accepting that we agree with these aspects, this is where we want to change—whatever it might be. I am talking hypotheticals, but I am talking about a process.

Does the CGO then take responsibility for the entirety of that decision? Thus, if there is a judicial appeal against the decision, the CGO has taken responsibility for that. It is the whole process that the CGO has taken over rather than there being aspects that have previously had a decision from local government. I want to ensure that there is some clarity around responsibility because we do know that individuals can get judicious with local government more readily than with state government.

I am just trying to delineate between this responsibility, especially with some of these potentially significant developments that would have potentially significant economic upsides or downsides for the developer in particular if they are considering one of these.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: The advice I have with respect to the particular example you give, where the council is otherwise the planning authority or the decision-maker, is the involvement of the CGO is likely to come about to rectify an error in the process of considering an application for development by that council. So they may not be calling in the entire decision, they might be called in to consider one element of the decision that has been undertaken by the council and, in reviewing that discrete area and potentially coming up with another alternative decision about that discrete part of the application, they then hand it back to the council and say, 'Well, we have fixed that up now. It now remains with you in order to continue conducting your role as the decision-making authority.'

My advice is that that is how we most likely consider the interaction with local government to go. This is not designed to consume the development considerations and responsibilities of local government, otherwise the CGO would be quickly utterly consumed with demand. It is here as a separate and independent decision-maker in order to consider matters where the council might not have considered things appropriately.

I am tempted to give examples where that might occur but, given you point out that our remarks may indeed be subject to judicial review, I am reticent to. I think the only thing I can say is that this of course is entirely untested. We are setting up a new entity that has not yet conducted any functions, let alone had any of its functions subject to judicial review, but with respect to local government, the advice I have is that that is how we anticipate it is most likely to be effected. Of course, as I said in my previous response, there is likely to be some interaction between the local government entity and the CGO in confronting that particular circumstance.

Mr TELFER: In that circumstance, you are talking about when the CGO—as per clause 25—may call in a designated function or a specific aspect of it. I think we need to be clear: if a council incurs legal costs through no fault of their own, would there be an expectation or a responsibility that the CGO covers these costs or is involved in that process? If the CGO potentially conducts a legal defence of a decision that has been appealed, would they be able to do this in a manner that is potentially inconsistent with what the preferred approach of the council would be, if the conduct of the defence or the settlement reached would have potential long-term cost implications for the council?

It might be in the best interests of the CGO to rectify the situation with an appeal, but it may not be potentially in the best interests of the local community and the local council. This point of interaction, I think, is a really important one that you speak about. Would there be a scenario that could potentially be in place where the best interests of the local council and community may potentially be ignored by the CGO to try to defend a decision that they were a part of?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: There are a couple of things in that which I will try to answer. If you cast your mind back to clause 4 where it talks about the primary principle, within that clause it also requires that the CGO must consider the interests of the locality—I think that is the term that is used in there—as well, which I think is probably a pretty good proxy for what you are articulating, and that is: what would otherwise be local government's concerns with respect to a particular development application or similar?

Secondly, I have tried to be at some pains to make it clear that the CGO is not being established to undertake the regular development approval roles of council, and it is only likely to be enlivened if somebody is able to highlight the fact that there has been an error in the process that has been undertaken by the council.

You also raised the question as to whether there would be some form of indemnification of local government for legal costs. That is not canvassed in this bill. I think it would be difficult for anyone to say, 'Don't worry, if there's any problem in this, if there's any legal challenge, the state will pick up the costs,' because I think you could anticipate that that may incentivise a behaviour from some local councils to not be as rigorous or as prudent in carrying out their lawful responsibilities as responsible entities. I would not say that all councils would do that, of course.

Mr Telfer interjecting:

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Yes, that is right. Of course, it would then depend on the circumstances, firstly, of what is sought to be reviewed, but also what the role of the CGO has been in considering what would otherwise have been considered by the local government entity. I am sorry that I cannot be definite about whether there would be a cost-sharing arrangement and how that would be entered into, but I think it would be the intent of both parties in that respect—the local government entity and the CGO—to be reasonable and to act in accordance with their respective roles within the process.

Clause passed.

Clause 38.

Mr TELFER: Clause 38 is an interesting one. It talks about entry onto land, etc., and speaks about the capacity for a person authorised in writing by the CGO for a designated purpose to enter and pass over any land and to bring onto any land any vehicles, plant or equipment and the occupation of land, etc. Clause 38(4) states that:

(4) A person must not, without reasonable excuse, hinder or obstruct a person performing a function under this section.

Given that clause 38(3) does not require persons entering land to outline to the landowner what functions are to be performed but only that the CGO has permission to enter that said land, how is this different from giving police powers of entry, for instance? Who or what power decides what a reasonable excuse is for entering of the land if there is not that specification within subclause (3) of what the requirement is or the functions are that are to be performed by the person entering the land?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: The provisions in clause 38, I am advised, have been modelled very closely on existing powers of land access that, for example, the highways commissioner has as well as other entities in government. There is, importantly, a notice period that is provided. There is a process to ensure that, in the event that there is any damage to land or any loss that is incurred by the owner of the land as a result of that access, there is a compensation regime, and if the compensation cannot be mutually agreed then there is an arbitration process that is available to the owner of the land.

But it is important that we look at subclause (8) of the clause, which reaffirms that this can only occur for a designated purpose under the act. This is not providing a right of entry in the same vein that law enforcement has. Law enforcement does not have to provide a seven-day notice period if they are going to raid a drug lab, for example, let alone compensate them for damage and so on. So I think this strikes the right balance of providing lawful access to land in which the CGO has been obliged to undertake functions and also balances that with the interests of the owner of the land, including ensuring that any damage or financial impact is made good.

Mr TELFER: Looking at the notice period in particular that you speak about, seven days is certainly not as long as, for instance, a mining right of entry period of time, which is longer and allows people to have a bit more certainty. Also, I cannot find any definition or direction as to exactly what that notice to the owner and occupier of the land looks like. I guess this is the sort of thing that may well be developed in regulations, but can the minister set out what his expectations would be of what form notice can be? It is easy to knock on a front door and find an occupier of a land, but sometimes it is a bit harder to find the owner; especially in some of the more challenging areas of the state it may be a bit harder to find an owner of land. What is the process that the minister envisages the notice process will look like?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: You are right. This does not set out what the process is, beyond what we have in front of us here in terms of what the contents of the notice have to be, or to what extent activities by the CGO have to be set out. Practically and reasonably, I think we would expect that in carrying out this function, if it is required, it would be a regular course of interaction between the CGO or their designate and the landowner or the land occupier.

You might imagine, for example, that the CGO contacts a landowner and says, 'We've got your development application for something you want to do on your land. We are going to come out and look to see if it's suitable.' If it is a farmer they might say, 'Could you just hang off, because we are about to bring in the harvest. Give us a few weeks,' or 'Actually, we're moving our livestock and it's not an opportune time.' We would anticipate that that would be worked through. I cannot imagine, unless it is Crown land, of course, that there would be many circumstances where there is an application made for development on land that is not put forward by the owner of the land. So you would like to think that the actual requirements of each individual circumstance would lessen the tension that would otherwise be enlivened by this clause.

Mr TELFER: Subclauses (5) through to (8), as you pointed out, outline the process for aggrieved landowners to obtain compensation from the CGO or the individual organisation entering the owner's land on behalf of the CGO. Given the rules of the Supreme Court require the landowner to bear the burden of proof for such compensation, why was there not provision for the reversal of that burden of proof where the landowner is presumed to be the aggrieved party? I know that has been the case for some of the other pieces of legislation that have been considered during this term of government.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: As I said in a previous response, these provisions are trying to mirror the other lawful land access arrangements in other pieces of legislation. Of course, this is about land access only, most likely for the purposes of surveying, for example, or perhaps taking some assessment of where utilities might best be able to be provided to the subject land, or maybe even some testing.

I think it is not unreasonable to say that if there is any damage done to the land then there will be a compensation regime, but I do not think it is reasonable to reverse the onus of proof for them to say, 'Well, we haven't damaged anything.' I think if the landowner thinks that something has been damaged then they should be able to highlight that and say, 'This is the damage that you have caused. This is the value that I attribute to that damage and can you please compensate me.' I think that is a fairly consistent and orthodox way in other forms of property law that most parts of the community would be familiar with.

Mr TELFER: So the example you give is the differentiation between someone who has put forward a development process themselves as the landowner. You spoke a bit about the associated infrastructure that goes with it: where do you get the access for water, for wastewater, for electricity? This is where third-party owners and occupiers of land can certainly come into play without any knowledge of the project, with a process that we are still uncertain about, that seven days of notice.

I give the example of SAPN, for instance, going through an inspection process for powerlines. They have an existing easement and there is an existing compensation process already set out and is not as onerous on the burden of proof to a landowner. So you could have a scenario where a CGO, or a representative the CGO has given the power to, do their best endeavours to find the owner of the land: a notice was put on the front gate seven days ago—that is good enough notice—then go through the property, damaged crop, cause land degradation. Often, if there is a longer period of time and a specified body of work that is going to be done, a landowner could go and take photos, take a video, prepare, and if there was a scenario where there was damage, they could have a basis for proving what has happened: here is a before; we will do an after.

But if we have a process which is only seven days, I am not sure about the notice aspect, then the requirement of the burden of proof is on the landowner or land occupier, and there is no existing process in place, and it is a landowner or occupier not involved with the project as a whole, I think this is where there could be some uncertainty about this aspect in particular from subclauses (5) to (8). This is why I am asking you: if you are not shifting the burden of proof then do you envision that within the regulations potentially it could set out what a compensation process could be further to what subclauses (5) to (8) have already set out?

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I think it is appropriate that you raise the concern and it is a curious point, I guess, about giving notice as opposed to attempting to give notice.

Mr Telfer: Hence why I brought up the example of the mining because it is front of mind for the notice.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: Of course, we are talking in presumably the rare circumstance where there is a private landowner who is entirely separate from a proponent that is causing the CGO to be motivated enough to want to enter the land to do some investigations or whatever. I would think in that perhaps relatively rare circumstance, it is most likely that notice will be given—not attempted but given—and that, like you would, when SAPN says, 'By the way, I am shutting your power off for four hours,' you think, 'Well, 6am to 10am, I have to get the kids ready for school, etc.,' there might be some correspondence entered into. You might ring them and say, 'That might suit you blokes but for the rest of us participating in society, maybe you could think about doing it at a time that is convenient to us rather than to Joe on the cherry picker.' Similarly, I guess, there is likely to be a discussion which is enlivened about: well, why and what do you need and for how long, and could you consider perhaps changing what your intention is to accommodate how I need to use my land and so on.

You are right in that the bill does not go into fine detail about how that is to be required. I cannot answer off the top of my head whether it is the outset intention to codify that in regulation, but I would like to think that this is probably a more amenable process for land access than, for example, what causes perhaps some of your constituents the most friction, where you might get a mining company come into agricultural land and conduct themselves in a way which only enhances the friction that is inherent in those two competing land uses. I am happy to give that some further thought, if that is of interest to the member.

Clause passed.

Clause 39.

Mr TELFER: This is a step on again, minister, from the process that we have talked about in clause 38. Although you say it is relatively rare, one of the purposes of this legislation as a whole is to try to fast-track processes, especially with essential infrastructure works. The compulsory acquisition of land obviously is not with projects for which the proponent is the one who has put the application in; it is for people who are within an infrastructure corridor, for instance, similar to what we spoke about in clause 38. Are there enough protections in place within that existing Land Acquisition Act?

The Land Acquisition Act talks about essential state infrastructure, and we see examples with the north-south corridor of going through this land acquisition process and how challenging it can be. Although a CGO does have a threshold for importance for economic, social or environmental, there could still be questions as to whether that is important enough for compulsory acquisition of land, especially when it is for the advantage of a third party, not necessarily a government project. Are there enough protections in place within this section? This is a different scenario to some of the other land acquisition processes the government goes through.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: My advice is that clause 39 essentially reflects powers which exist in other acts as they stand at the moment. So whether it is essential infrastructure works, for example, whether it is road infrastructure with the provisions under the Highways Act and the Land Acquisition Act, whether it is for a state project—building a hospital, for example, or other major state government developments—or a designated project, this provision essentially will reflect the provisions that occur in the Highways Act, the Planning, Development and Infrastructure Act, the Harbors and Navigation Act, and the Urban Renewal Act.

All of these powers currently exist; in particular, under the Urban Renewal Act it is possible for the government, through Renewal SA—or the Urban Renewal Authority, as it is legislatively called—and its minister, to compulsorily acquire land for development purposes. It has rarely, I think if ever, been exercised, but it remains allowable under law and then there is a process that must be followed under that law.

In particular, with the Land Acquisition Act and the compensation provisions under the Land Acquisition Act, there are some requirements, of course, that the state essentially tries to arm the landowner so that they are in a position to be able to negotiate equitably with the state. The state is obliged to pay for the owner to procure their own valuations and their own legal advice in order to represent their interests in such a process. I think while some may see the existence of this clause as being somewhat affronting, I reiterate to the house that this is replicating existing powers which would enable this for other entities in the event that the CGO does not exist.

Mr TELFER: Can I run a scenario, because I think it is important to try to understand. The compulsory acquisition of land is an emotive issue. One of the three goals of the CGO is around economic, social and environmental aspects and I want to just focus on the environmental aspect in particular, because economic is pretty easy to measure and social is a bit harder, but there is a community that goes around it.

I think if you start to unpack environmental there would be a little bit of ambiguity and uncertainty that comes with this. Potentially there could be a scenario where—I am not saying this government—an ideologically driven government could be making decisions about environmental investment; for instance, native vegetation plantings, or whatever it might be, offsets, that sort of thing.

There is scope within this act, from my reading of it, for the CGO to be requested by the minister to make a prioritisation of an environmental project: 'Go out into the electorate of Flinders and find me 1,000 acres for us to be able to make this environmental planting for the environmental advantage of South Australia. This aspect gives the CGO the ability within a state project to compulsorily acquire land to suit that which does not have the same level of accountability, from my perspective, as an economic or a social outcome. I know I am extrapolating out, but we are talking about powers within a piece of legislation.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I do not think it is unreasonable that you provide that scenario and raise the concerns that that scenario enlivens. In that scenario, a piece of private land is bought in an effort to dedicate it towards some sort of ecological conservation or whatever. You can quickly rule out a private interest trying to undertake that just because of the cost. What is the financial or economic incentive for a private entity to do that? They would have to be an extremely wealthy entity to want—

Mr Telfer interjecting:

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: But most of them tend to derive their financial wealth from not so much the conservation of the environment but the alternative.

Mr Telfer: Correct.

The Hon. S.C. MULLIGHAN: I cannot see that it is likely that private interests would do it.

Progress reported; committee to sit again.

Sitting suspended from 13:00 to 14:00.