Bills

Independent Commission Against Corruption (Conditions of Appointment - Integrity Measures) Amendment Bill

Second Reading

Debate resumed.

Mr TEAGUE (Heysen—Deputy Leader of the Opposition) (11:41): By reference to those eloquent remarks just now, I can say from firsthand experience that there is nothing like playing against the Sacred Heart football team. They know how to play the game for sure.

I rise to address the bill and indicate that I am the lead speaker. I also indicate the opposition's support for the bill. The Deputy Premier gave the government's speech at the end of the last sitting week. I will address the bill briefly and make some remarks about the context in which we are navigating this step. First of all, we are seeing the adaption of the act to apply what the government has said very clearly at the outset is an integrity measure, an integrity measure that applied automatically for so long as a former judicial officer was in the role of commissioner, and that integrity measure no longer carries across because for the first time a non-judicial officer, someone other than a retired judge, has been appointed to the role of commissioner. That occurred on 12 December last year.

I take this opportunity to indicate my appreciation for the service of the commissioner and for the appointment of the first non-judicial commissioner. This is a first for South Australia in the relatively short life span of the ICAC. It is also an appointment that I am particularly pleased to see, to endorse and to offer every encouragement.

In my short time in the role of Attorney, I had the occasion to appoint Emma Townsend as Director of the Office for Public Integrity, so I had the opportunity to be closely considering who would take on that role at a time when the triumvirate, if I call it that, had just been newly reformed and the person who was going to take on the role of Director of the OPI was very much taking a step that was a first. The OPI had existed, but it was wrapped up in the ICAC until then. Without unpacking all the whys and wherefores and the merits and so on, we had a newly separate OPI, and the Director of the OPI was all of a sudden cast in a significant and substantial role of senior responsibility.

Emma Townsend undertook that role with distinction and, for I think around about three years, was the first director in that new structure. Including, among other things, as a member of the Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee, I have had occasion to cross paths with the director and to understand the role that she has been navigating. I am sure she will undertake the office of commissioner now with the same dedication and, I expect, distinction. So, for the first time, we have in South Australia a commissioner who has not been a judge appointed to this very significant and senior integrity role.

The government has formed the view that in order to maintain that point of independence and integrity, as an integrity measure, the application of an equivalence to a judicial pension, albeit by way of an adapted scheme—it is the subject of clause 4—will ensure that high level of independence and integrity is maintained. I just stay with the point because what is clear in all of that and might be noted for public record is that—and I think a distinction might be drawn with what occurred for similarly meritorious reasons a few years ago, when the DPP was appointed and coming off the bench to that appointment. Arrangements were made in relation to the application of judicial pension at that time.

In this case, what the government has made clear is that this is a point the government has considered as an integrity measure, well and truly after the appointment, as I understand it. It is not some sort of enterprise bargaining arrangement. It might be that it is a good thing to place the now former director in that kind of clear air: it is not something that is specifically at the feet of the former director in coming to the role of commissioner but rather the government, as the government said in its speech, coming to this considered view on its own in terms of the application of this integrity measure to a role of independence. That is understood and appreciated.

There is no doubt that, at all times, for those of us in roles that are looked at closely and daily in terms of their capacity to be free from influence, free from corruption in all its forms, integrity measures of this kind are well to be within the consideration of government. So this occasion to apply that judicial pension structure to this role, albeit in an adapted form, is well and truly understood in terms of the government's independent consideration of that matter regardless of the particular appointment and the particular occupant of the office. I think it was important just to make that point clear.

In further addressing the government's view of the matter the minister has highlighted that we have seen a mixture, now, of judicial and non-judicial participants in anti-corruption roles around the country. It is neither ipso facto that this sort of pension arrangement applies, nor is there a complete absence of precedent, so it is important to navigate this territory. But I think for the purposes of this bill it is important to highlight—and I say so with the endorsement of the opposition—that the consideration of the application of an integrity measure of this kind is one that has important work to do.

The government has already addressed the way in which the structure will apply in terms of a minimum period of service, the avoidance of having been removed or on the other hand circumstances where the commissioner might later be appointed a judge, incremental arrangements for time served and so on. That is all clear on the face of the structure.

I just indicate that while there is always an imperfect analogy when one is comparing one role to another, of course judges are appointed—and necessarily so—until a statutory retirement age of 70. The commissioner in this case is appointed for a term, and there is the possibility for extension, and there is therefore a structure about how much time is served and a rational treatment of the way in which the pension accrues. One can always point to some less than complete freedom, therefore, from the connection between time served, reappointment and so on and that complete independence. It is a balance that has been struck and a structure that has been reached that recognises both the actual amount of time served and the fact that that is done in accordance with a contract or at least a term of appointment. That is noted.

The only other broad point I would just address about the government's consideration of a subsequent appointment is one that I perhaps thought to share in terms of advancement, for want of a better word, not only from this role to a judicial appointment but from one judicial appointment to another, as has happened in very many cases now over recent decades. There is I think a respectable view that, wherever it is practical to do so, these roles of independence ought not be connected with the possibility of, as it were, seeing advancement within them.

I do not quarrel with it for a moment, but where there might be a judge first appointed to the District Court, later appointed to the Supreme Court and, these days, later appointed to the Court of Appeal—and we have not yet had a High Court judge but we have had plenty of Supreme Court judges who have gone over to the Federal Court—we have to do all we can, with in this case reference being made to the commissioner possibly being appointed as a judge, to ensure that appointments of this nature are made with the utmost independence and that we do not, as it were, establish a sort of structure in which we are seeing the search for advancement within these roles as being somehow on display from one to the other. I do not think it is and to the extent that public barracking and parochialism goes on in this space broadly, I think South Australians—rightly—are highly impatient for the appointment of a South Australian High Court judge. It is a rare thing for a High Court judge to come from a completely non-judicial starting point to that court.

To couch all those remarks in some context: the point about this whole bill is what the government has described as an important integrity measure by the application of a pension to an independent role, highly associated with integrity and in that sense the necessity for that role to be whole unto itself is important to emphasise. The government has further highlighted—and I mentioned the DPP earlier—it is also not without precedent in other roles, in terms of the arrangements in place for the Solicitor-General.

To conclude where I started: the opposition supports the bill. In particular, I draw attention to the fact that this is the government's consideration to an integrity measure that is about reinforcing what it takes to be independent in this particular role and it is not something that has arisen in the course of the circumstances otherwise of this particular appointment, except for the fact that the person appointed happens to be the first non-judicial appointee to the role. Again, I wish the commissioner all the very best in the role and I commend the bill to the house.

Mr BROWN (Florey) (11:57): It is with great pleasure that I rise to support the Independent Commission Against Corruption (Conditions of Appointment—Integrity Measures) Amendment Bill.

This bill seeks to ensure that the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption is entitled to the same remuneration as a puisne judge, which is to say an ordinary judge of the Supreme Court. The bill also seeks to provide that the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption is entitled to a pension that aligns with the pension entitlements of judges under the Judges' Pensions Act 1971.

This bill was prompted by the appointment of South Australia's third ICAC commissioner, Ms Emma Townsend at the end of last year. On 3 February this year Ms Townsend's five-year term commenced. Ms Townsend has replaced Acting Commissioner Ben Broyd, who held the role following the retirement of the Hon. Ann Vanstone KC.

Commissioner Townsend possesses extensive experience in public integrity. In 2021 she was appointed by the former Liberal government as the Director of the Office for Public Integrity (OPI). The OPI is the agency which receives complaints about public integrity. It assesses those complaints and then makes referrals to the ICAC, the Ombudsman or the police as appropriate.

The OPI was established as a standalone agency separate to the ICAC in 2021. Ms Townsend was integral in setting up the OPI as a standalone agency and she remained at the helm from its establishment until her recent appointment as the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption.

Prior to joining the OPI, Ms Townsend spent more than 18 years as a prosecutor with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, as well as other roles within the Attorney-General's Department and with the commercial law firm of Thomson Playford.

In her role at the DPP, amongst other responsibilities, Ms Townsend was responsible for establishing the office's vulnerable witness team, which manages the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases and other matters involving vulnerable victims and witnesses. As Director of the OPI, Ms Townsend was responsible for assessing complaints under the ICAC Act, the oversight of complaints and investigations under the Police Complaints and Discipline Act and for broadly managing the complex work undertaken by an integrity agency.

Commissioner Townsend's appointment has followed a public expression of interest process and a period of nationwide advertising. Although it is the case that Commissioner Townsend's two predecessors, those being the Hon. Bruce Lander KC and the Hon. Ann Vanstone KC, were both former judges of the Supreme Court of South Australia, it is not unusual in other jurisdictions around the nation for anti-corruption commissions to be headed by persons who have not previously served as judges. In fact, it is the case that a majority of Australian jurisdictions now have anti-corruption commissions headed by persons with backgrounds other than having served as judges.

The Independent Commission Against Corruption Act provides that where a person has served as a judicial officer prior to being appointed as South Australia's ICAC commissioner their conditions of appointment must be no less favourable than the conditions of their judicial office. This provision effectively entitled commissioners Lander and Vanstone to the same level of remuneration they received as judges of the Supreme Court.

In the case of Commissioner Townsend's appointment, this represents the first time the South Australian government has had a discretion in relation to the level of remuneration for the commissioner. It is also the case that the judges of the District Court and the Supreme Court are entitled to a pension in accordance with the Judges' Pensions Act 1971. The ICAC Act under current arrangements provides that when appointing an ICAC commissioner the Governor of South Australia may entitle the commissioner to a pension under the Judges' Pensions Act, but it is not a requirement that such an entitlement be given.

The bill seeks to achieve this by providing that the ICAC commissioner is entitled to remuneration at rates which are commensurate to those of judges of the Supreme Court. This includes not only the commissioner's salary but also allowances, such as the security allowance that is payable to judges. It is worth noting that the level of remuneration for judges is set by the independent Remuneration Tribunal. The bill also entitles the commissioner to a pension by applying the Judges' Pensions Act, albeit with some necessary modifications.

The Malinauskas government has elected to pursue this reform as an integrity measure aimed at ensuring the ability of the ICAC commissioner to undertake their duties fully and freely and to ensure consistent remuneration befitting the position and reflecting the service of all those who hold the office. It is worth noting that Victoria, Western Australia and Queensland all have legislative provisions for a pension payable to persons occupying equivalent roles to our ICAC commissioner.

Under the provisions of the bill before the house, the pension will apply as follows. The pension entitlement will accrue after five years of service. Once that period of five years' service has been reached, there is an entitlement to a pension of 50 per cent of salary with incremental progressions of 1 per cent for each additional six months of service up to 60 per cent at a maximum of 10 years of service. A period as acting commissioner under section 11 of the ICAC Act is to count as service for the purposes of calculating the pension entitlement. The pension entitlement is not to be paid out until the commissioner reaches 60 years of age, consistent with the manner in which the Judges' Pensions Act applies to judges.

Spouse or domestic partner entitlements and child entitlements are to apply as they do for judges under the Judges' Pensions Act but with any necessary modifications to the application of that act to tailor it for the bespoke accrual and qualifying periods for the commissioner pension. In the event that a commissioner is suspended, time under suspension does not count as service for the purposes of the pension. In the event that a commissioner is removed by the Governor, the pension is not payable unless the Governor otherwise directs.

If a commissioner is later appointed as a judge, any pension payments from their appointment as commissioner cease upon their appointment as a judge; however, previous service as commissioner is to be counted as judicial service for the purposes of the judge's pension. If a former commissioner is appointed to a judicial office with a salary less than that of a puisne judge of the Supreme Court, they will be entitled to a pension that reflects the salary of a Supreme Court judge.

The Malinauskas government considers that for such an important position for our community and for the integrity of our public institutions as the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption, it is essential that persons who serve in the role are appropriately remunerated. What is proposed in this bill reflects reasonable arrangements for remuneration and for the provision of a pension such that a person need not to have been a judge in order to have their service as ICAC commissioner recognised on equitable terms to others who have served in a judicial office.

I trust that South Australia's Independent Commission Against Corruption will be well served by Commissioner Townsend's wealth of experience as a prosecutor and as the head of the Office for Public Integrity, and I wish her the best in the role. I also commend the service of Mr Ben Broyd as acting commissioner over the past several months prior to the appointment of Commissioner Townsend. I am pleased to commend the bill to the house.

Ms O'HANLON (Dunstan) (12:04): It is a great pleasure to rise today to speak on the Independent Commission Against Corruption (Conditions of Appointment—Integrity Measures) Amendment Bill 2025, a significant piece of legislation that strengthens the foundations of our anti-corruption framework in South Australia. At its core, this bill is about integrity. It ensures that our ICAC commissioner receives remuneration and pension entitlements commensurate with the gravity and independence of their role. Specifically, it aligns the commissioner's entitlements with those of Supreme Court judges, continuing a tradition of ensuring our anti-corruption watchdog operates with complete autonomy and security.

The ICAC Act stipulates that if a person has held a judicial office before being appointed as an ICAC commissioner, their conditions of appointment cannot be less favourable than those of their judicial office; hence, commissioners Lander and Vanstone were effectively entitled to receive the same salary as a Supreme Court judge.

This bill was prompted by the appointment of Ms Emma Townsend as South Australia's third ICAC commissioner on 3 February 2025. Ms Townsend brings to this role an extraordinary depth of experience in public integrity and law enforcement that makes her uniquely qualified to serve as our state's chief anti-corruption officer. Unlike her predecessors, the Hon. Bruce Lander and the Hon. Ann Vanstone, Commissioner Townsend comes to this role not from the Supreme Court bench but with a rich background in public prosecution and integrity oversight.

For the past four years, she has served as Director of the Office for Public Integrity where she played an instrumental role in establishing it as a standalone agency. Her leadership in this position demonstrated her commitment to maintaining the highest standards of public sector integrity. Before her role at the OPI, Ms Townsend spent more than 18 years as a prosecutor with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. During this time, she showed particular dedication to protecting our most vulnerable citizens, establishing the office's vulnerable witness team. This initiative has been crucial in managing the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases and supporting vulnerable victims and witnesses through the justice system.

Commissioner Townsend's appointment, following a rigorous nationwide search, reflects a broader trend across Australia. Many jurisdictions now recognise that the leadership of anti-corruption bodies need not be limited to former judges but can benefit from diverse legal and investigative backgrounds that bring fresh perspectives to this critical role. Indeed, with this appointment, South Australia now joins the majority of jurisdictions in Australia who have anti-corruption commissioners from backgrounds other than the judiciary.

This bill ensures that, regardless of their professional background, future ICAC commissioners will receive consistent and appropriate remuneration. It provides for a pension that accrues over time, reaching 50 per cent of salary after five years of service, with the potential to increase to 60 per cent after 10 years. These provisions mirror those available to Supreme Court judges and include appropriate protections for the commissioner's family.

This legislation sends a clear message: we value the independence and integrity of our anti-corruption commission. By ensuring appropriate remuneration and security for those who take on this crucial role, we strengthen the commission's ability to serve the people of South Australia without fear or favour. The appointment of Commissioner Townsend marks a new chapter in South Australia's fight against corruption. This bill ensures she and all future commissioners can fulfil their duties with the same independence and security as their predecessors.

There is no doubt that members of my community are interested in very strong protections for the integrity of the ICAC. I feel confident they will support this integrity measure. I commend this bill to the house.

Ms STINSON (Badcoe) (12:08): I rise to lend my support to this bill, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (Conditions of Appointment—Integrity Measures) Amendment Bill 2025. There are a few key points I wanted to make in relation to this, but I wanted to start by congratulating Ms Emma Townsend, who, just in the last few days, in fact, has become the new commissioner.

I have to confess, I did not know a lot about Ms Townsend and have taken the opportunity to do a little research about her career and her contributions. As those in this house have heard from the previous speakers, she has quite a deep knowledge of the integrity area and some quite striking experience, which puts her in an exceptional position to carry out this very important role.

Ms Townsend obviously has an extensive legal background, including 18 years as prosecutor with the Office of the DPP, other roles in the Attorney-General's Department and also experience with the commercial law firm Thomson Playford. Most recently, and maybe most notably for this role, she has been at the helm of the OPI since shortly after it was established as a standalone entity in late 2021. From a personal point of view, the thing I find most impressive that Ms Townsend has done in her career is establishing the DPP's vulnerable witness team. That is a team that manages the prosecution of child sex abuse cases and other matters involving vulnerable victims and witnesses.

Having spent a large proportion of my career working as a court reporter and bearing witness each day to the cases before our courts, I know the incredible volume, sadly, of work in relation to sexual offences, particularly sexual offences against children in our state—contemporary offences but also offences that date back many decades. I have also seen the incredible, absolutely heart-wrenching pain those offences have caused for victims and their families, even for partners and children of victims. It really is an offence that impacts and spans a victim's life and has such incredible complexity to it.

The establishment of this office has done an incredible amount of good in our state, and Ms Townsend, amongst her many achievements, should be particularly commended, from my point of view, for establishing that vulnerable witness team, which obviously works to ensure not only that matters are investigated and justice is applied but that witnesses and vulnerable people are supported. Certainly, I have seen the depth of support that some people need, and I think we as a community owe a great deal and should be spending our time and energies supporting people who, unfortunately, have had to endure such treatment, whether or not they achieve a conviction.

My congratulations go to Ms Townsend and we in this house wish her well in the work she has ahead. Obviously, her experience, particularly as the director of the OPI, puts her in the perfect position to be able to take up the ICAC commissioner role as well. That is an agency that is responsible for assessing complaints under the ICAC Act, as well as oversight of complaints and investigations under the Police Complaints and Discipline Act and managing the complex work of an integrity agency. There are not that many integrity agencies at this level, but the OPI is certainly one of them, and that would have afforded her great experience and knowledge that she will be able to carry into this role.

Secondly, I want to go to the point of fairness. This bill aims to ensure that the ICAC commissioner is entitled to the same remuneration as a puisne judge of the Supreme Court, both in terms of their pay and also in terms of their pension and even some of the allowances they might be afforded, for example, in relation to their security. It is obvious really. I do not know that there is any great case why someone who has a background as a judge should receive different entitlements from a person with a different background who has come into this role.

I deeply respect the work of judges: they have an incredibly difficult task, they do a great service for our state, but if the government and cabinet have judged that a person is of the calibre that they should be appointed as ICAC commissioner, then they should be afforded the same remuneration as someone with a background as a judge. This is a measure of making sure there is an even playing field between people who are ultimately appointed to this very high office, this very responsible, important job in our system.

I might also point out that these days ICAC commissioners are not always judges. I think there has been a custom over the years of looking to our former judicial officers or even serving judicial officers—judges—to fill roles of importance, whether that be as royal commissioners or others who are doing special investigations. Obviously, often judges do have the skills and experience to be taking up those very serious and very weighty positions. But I do not think that should mean that we as a parliament, a government or a society should be overlooking those who may have different backgrounds, who bring the necessary skills, experience and integrity to be able to lead agencies such as ICAC.

Certainly, other jurisdictions have obviously felt the same, and we are certainly no orphans in appointing someone with a non-judicial background to fill now this ICAC position in terms of Ms Townsend's appointment. Commissioner Townsend was appointed following a public expression of interest process and nationwide advertising. Her two predecessors, as the house would know, the Hon. Bruce Lander and the Hon. Ann Vanstone, obviously were both former judges of the Supreme Court, but around Australia it is not unusual for anti-corruption commissions to be headed by individuals who have not been judges.

With this appointment of Ms Townsend, it actually means that a majority of jurisdictions now have anti-corruption commissions headed by those with other backgrounds. I think that is a good thing. I think we should be looking for the right person for the right job, the right background and experience, the right expertise, the right temperament and someone who, above all, the community can have utter faith in.

This is a job not like many others in terms of the utter faith that the community has to have in this role. Obviously, this role is about investigating when there are allegations of corruption or other forms of maladministration and misbehaviour. Of course, the person who sits at the top of that process needs to have the absolute confidence of the community.

While that could be said of our judges, absolutely—I think the community does have great faith in our judges—it also can be said of others in our community, for example, someone with the experience that Ms Townsend has, in particular leading the OPI and the extensive legal experience she has in the DPP. We should not be ruling out people with the skills and knowledge to do an excellent job simply for the fact that they have not actually served as judges.

The ICAC Act provides that where a person is a judicial officer prior to being appointed as the ICAC commissioner, their terms and conditions of employment must be no less favourable than the conditions of their judicial office. This effectively entitled commissioners Lander and Vanstone to the same level of pay as they received as judges of the Supreme Court.

The appointment of Commissioner Townsend is the first time the government has really had discretion as to the level of pay for the commissioner. Judges of the District and Supreme courts are also entitled to a pension in accordance with the Judges' Pensions Act 1971. The ICAC Act currently provides that the Governor, when appointing an ICAC commissioner, may entitle them to a pension under the Judges' Pensions Act, but that is not actually a requirement.

This bill is obviously an integrity measure. That is how the government sees it. It may be a bit odd to some that this would be considered as an integrity measure. I am sure all of us would expect that our ICAC commissioner would have integrity in applying the role, despite what their pay or conditions might be. Of course, this house has an important role in considering all circumstances, in considering the possibility of bad actors and of considering the worst-case scenarios.

I cannot help but think about some judicial systems overseas, through parts of Asia where I have been lucky enough to travel, report and work, where there are not the same levels of integrity, where in fact judges are paid quite poorly and judicial officers are paid very poorly and that has actually resulted in the opportunity for bribery, for misbehaviour and for some quite scandalous behaviour that certainly would not be accepted in the Australian context. It is horrible for those communities, those overseas nations that do have those issues pervading their justice systems, and I would hate to think that there was ever an opportunity for that to happen in our judicial system in Australia.

Although this idea of integrity being linked to pay and conditions may seem a bit silly in the Australian context, I think that we have that view because we are so lucky to have judicial systems and judicial officers who have come up through a culture of great integrity, and we cannot really imagine that these circumstances might arise in Australia. But as I said, we need only look overseas, sometimes to some quite developed nations, to see that opportunities arise where we do not have systems that are really focused on maintaining integrity.

This bill tries to ensure integrity by providing that the ICAC commissioner is entitled to a salary and allowances at the rate of judges of the Supreme Court. This includes not only salary but also allowances, as I mentioned, such as the security allowance payable to judges. Again, it is quite a sad thing that in our modern society we do have to think about additional and exceptional security measures being allowed and funded for people who hold high office like a judge.

Unfortunately, we are seeing, I think, an increasing environment where there are threats made against those who take up these roles, these high offices, and find themselves in judgement of others. We need them to do that. We need them to feel safe doing that, and so we need to make sure that we are providing them with the means to be and to feel safe, through things like security provisions.

It is important to note that the remuneration for judges is set by the independent Remuneration Tribunal. When I speak with members of my community about the justice system, sometimes people have the misconception that parliament sets the pay for judges. That is not the case, and nor should it be the case, but a lot of people do hold that opinion.

In fact, I was listening to the radio this morning and there was quite a lot of discussion about civics education. I am glad the Malinauskas Labor government, and particularly the education minister, Blair Boyer, is devoting quite some time to ensuring that we improve civics education in our schools. Things like whether we have a President, whether judges are the Speaker of the House of Assembly, indeed the role of judges and how they are paid and how their pay is set, are all things that there seems to be confusion about in the community. A bit of civics education, I am sure, would help shine some light on that, maybe not just for students but for others as well.

The bill also entitles the commissioner to a pension by applying the Judges' Pensions Act, as far as it can be applied, in the circumstance where an ICAC commissioner does not have a background of being a judge. There are some necessary modifications to that act to make sure that it accords with that different experience.

The pension entitlement is to accrue after five years of service, the pension entitlement of 50 per cent of salary after five years—that is what it will be—with incremental progression of 1 per cent for each additional six months of service, up to a 60 per cent maximum for 10 years of service. The pension entitlement is payable after the commissioner reaches 60 years of age, consistent with the Judges' Pensions Act. A spouse or domestic partner and children are entitled to the same provisions as under the Judges' Pensions Act, but with any necessary modifications, as I mentioned.

Importantly, if a commissioner is suspended—and this goes to the government's aim of ensuring integrity—the time under suspension does not count as service for the pension, so a suspended commissioner would not be accruing pension entitlements while they were in a period of suspension. If a commissioner is removed by the Governor, the pension is not payable at all, unless the Governor directs otherwise. That is consistent with the integrity objective that the government is trying to achieve here. Obviously, it would not be consistent for this measure to be applied to ensure integrity while also rewarding or being seen to reward a breach of that integrity.

If a commissioner is later appointed as a judge, any pension payments from their appointment as commissioner cease upon their appointment as a judge. Effectively, to use common language, there is no double-dipping. You cannot have it both ways; you can only be getting your pension from one source to do with one job.

It is worth noting that those are generous provisions. They are very generous. Certainly, those pension entitlements exceed what your average person would be receiving in their positions, but I think that does reflect the gravity and the status that this parliament attaches to this role. It is an incredibly important role. It is incredibly important that the public has faith, that this house has faith, in the workings of the ICAC commissioner; that they are doing all they can to execute their role independently, without bias and without external influence; and that they are assessing matters as they should be—thoroughly—and applying the law as the public would expect it to be. For that reason, these pension provisions are what I think most people would consider generous.

As I mentioned, other jurisdictions are similar to what we are doing and achieving here. Victoria, Western Australia and Queensland all have legislative provisions for a pension payable to their ICAC commissioner even if they did not have a background as a judge. Following the Albanese Labor government's creation of the NACC, the National Anti-Corruption Commission, all jurisdictions now have some form of anti-corruption watchdog.

I will leave my remarks there; needless to say, I do support the bill. I commend those who have worked on it, particularly the Attorney-General and the Attorney-General's office, and I commend this bill to the house.

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE (Port Adelaide—Deputy Premier, Minister for Climate, Environment and Water, Minister for Industry, Innovation and Science, Minister for Workforce and Population Strategy) (12:26): I am pleased to close the debate. It is one of those bills that I think everyone has recognised as being a useful and sensible piece of legislation. I am pleased that it has enjoyed the support of the house in the speeches thus far, and I commend the bill to the house.

Bill read a second time.

Third Reading

The Hon. S.E. CLOSE (Port Adelaide—Deputy Premier, Minister for Climate, Environment and Water, Minister for Industry, Innovation and Science, Minister for Workforce and Population Strategy) (12:27): I move:

That this bill be now read a third time.

Bill read a third time and passed.