Contents
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Commencement
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Parliamentary Procedure
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Bills
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Motions
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Bills
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Motions
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Parliamentary Procedure
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Motions
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Parliamentary Procedure
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Motions
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Parliamentary Procedure
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Parliamentary Committees
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Question Time
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Parliamentary Procedure
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Question Time
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Ministerial Statement
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Grievance Debate
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Parliamentary Procedure
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Grievance Debate
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Bills
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Answers to Questions
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Road Traffic (Drug Testing) Amendment Bill
Second Reading
Adjourned debate on second reading.
(Continued from 20 June 2018.)
Mr CREGAN (Kavel) (11:09): I rise to speak on the Road Traffic (Drug Testing) Amendment Bill. I have listened carefully to the contribution made by the member for Elizabeth, who brings this legislation to the house. As the member and the Attorney-General have made clear, the subject matter of the bill was considered by the last parliament. The last parliament adopted the Statutes Amendment (Drink and Drug Driving) Bill 2017 after discarding an amendment similar to the one now proposed by the member.
The amendment did not form part of the former government's business, having been proposed, I understand, by a member of the other place. The amendment would have the effect of permitting police to search vehicles after a driver returns a positive drug test and without first forming a reasonable suspicion that a search would reveal the commission of another offence.
What amounts to a reasonable suspicion was considered by Justice Jacobs in Manley v Tucs, a 1985 decision reported in the South Australian State Reports at 1. For the benefit of the house, I extract certain remarks made by Justice Jacobs, where he said:
Not only does 'suspicion' carry less conviction than 'belief', but to say that suspicion is 'reasonable' does not necessarily imply that it is well-founded, or that the grounds for the suspicion must be factually correct.
His Honour Justice Duggan reflected in R v Rogers:
Suspicion may be grounded upon matters which the police officer has observed and circumstances which have been reported. That is not to say that every matter reported as a fact may be legitimately taken into account in forming a suspicion. The requirement of reasonableness may require the police officer to assess the reliability of the informer or the hearsay information which has been communicated [to that officer].
Reform of the Road Traffic Act needs to be considered in a global way. There are matters that the Attorney has outlined to the house which must also be considered in that context. I will not detain us now by repeating those matters.
I add to the Attorney's remarks by saying that some of the matters that ought, in my view, be considered in a global review include forensic procedures for when police undertake a roadside drug test; on-the-spot arrangements, related to my first point, to reduce red tape and increase efficiency when dealing with drink and drug drivers; or any other practical and consequential amendments that may be required in view of a global review of the act, and some of the matters I have outlined to the house. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr Speaker.
Debate adjourned on motion of Mr Pederick.
Mr BROWN: Mr Speaker, I draw your attention to the state of the house.
A quorum having been formed: