Contents
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Commencement
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Parliamentary Procedure
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Bills
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Parliamentary Procedure
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Ministerial Statement
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Question Time
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Grievance Debate
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Bills
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Bills
Sentencing (Release on Licence) Amendment Bill
Committee Stage
In committee (resumed on motion).
Clause 4.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: In response to the supplementary question asked just before the luncheon adjournment, if I could paraphrase, I think the inquiry was in relation to whether there is any protection proposed under the bill to deal with any pending applications or new applications. The question was asked in consideration of amendment to section 59 on the release on licence.
Could I invite the member to view clause 10, which sets out the transitional provisions relating to this bill and, in particular, proposed clause 3(2), which essentially deals with any release on licence and the status of any applications that were made under previous law, the current law or section 24 of a repealed act in subparagraphs that deal with applications that were made but had not been concluded at the commencement of the act. I hope that will provide some comfort to the member for Kaurna.
Mr MULLIGHAN: I have a question on clause 4, again subclause (1a)(b), phrased in the same way that these sections were phrased in clause 3. I realise I exhausted my opportunities to ask questions on that particular clause, but, fortunately, the opportunity arises on clauses worded essentially the same in clause 4. I would like to go back to subparagraph (b), Attorney, and that is again on this issue of advanced age.
I think that the last question I asked you was about how a court might make a determination regarding an individual's advanced age and you said that there may be some circumstances related to that individual's age that were relevant to a court and I think, engagingly, you used 'impecuniousness' as one of those attributes, which may be the case. However, on my very swift reading of the Sentencing Act today, and I am happy to be corrected, my understanding is that it more specifies medical issues or reports for individuals who might qualify for release under licence relevant to these sections of the Sentencing Act.
I am sorry to give you such a long preamble, but how is it envisaged that a court might make a determination with specific relevance to that applicant's age and about whether they are appropriate or otherwise to be released into the community? Is there a set number of attributes or elements?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Well, I would not say that there is an exhaustive list of elements, but what I would say is this: the whole of this legislation works on the application being made by the defendant, that is, the party who has been convicted, and they have to prove to the satisfaction of the court these elements, not the other way around. To do so, the member is quite right: it is very likely that the principal evidence, as I said earlier, would rely on medical evidence to support that, and, of course, that is coupled with the right of the court itself to call for other evidence and reports once it entertains an application of this nature.
I do not see that as any different from any other application before a court, frankly, upon which it has to make decisions every day. That relates to compensation applications of various different forms where the judicial officer has to rely on for the purposes of their assessment medical evidence and reports, sometimes with and without cross-examination, and very often competing evidence that comes into them.
They have to make determinations on questions of fact and then the applicability of that for the purposes of identifying this. What is important here, though, as I repeat, is that it is the applicant, that is, the convicted party, who has the burden of proof to establish this on the balance of probability before a Supreme Court judge, not the DPP, in making that application.
Mr MULLIGHAN: Attorney, my reading of the section 59(1) of the Sentencing Act is:
The Supreme Court may, on application by the DPP or the person, authorise the release on licence of a person detained in custody under this Division.
So it is not solely an application by the defendant, for want of a better term—or, perhaps, let us call them the applicant, the person who is currently detained in custody—but it can also be by the DPP.
I think you are probably gaining an understanding of what my concern is here. Either side of what is usually an adversarial courtroom arrangement, the DPP or the prosecution or the defendant or the applicant, can make application for release under this section. The circumstance in which we find ourselves at the moment is that the court has availed itself of the room available to it in the legislation that has been provided by this place to release someone on licence, and we are, I hope, seeking to constrict a court's ability to do that sufficiently.
My concern is that when we are considering a clause solely relating to age and there is obviously an existing discretion of the court, there does not seem to be any comfort that the bill can provide that a court would not avail itself of the opportunity to release a convicted paedophile who is unwilling or unable to control their sexual urges into the community because solely they qualify on the basis of age.
I will wrap up my comment very quickly, but I guess it relates also to the point you made about the large number of increasingly elderly people in our corrections system. The DPP may be incentivised, perhaps on behalf of the Department for Correctional Services, to want to make such applications from time to time, as some of these offenders get on in years.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I note the member for Lee's concerns. Let me hopefully allay them as follows. Firstly, the member is quite correct in that a release on licence application can be made by the DPP or the person; that is under 59(1). On the basis that the bill passes, the new (1a), which is what we are actually discussing now in terms of adding it, requires that they cannot be released unless the person—not the DPP but the person—satisfies the court. This is where the qualification comes in. Even if the DPP were to apply, the person has to satisfy the court in relation to utilising these options. I hope that is of some comfort, given the fact that this is not just a question of the DPP going along and saying, 'I am making an application here.'
It is possible that an application could be made by them. I would see that as highly unlikely. To the best of my knowledge, it has not happened to date. Perhaps the former attorney might be able to advise us if he is aware of any occasions when the DPP has gone in and applied for somebody to be released based on the fact that they are all cured in terms of their sexual urges and/or they are really old and infirm, but I have not heard of any of those cases.
In any event, this addition is to constrict the application capacity by way of its implementation. As I think I made clear in the opening, but I will repeat it, there is a process of conviction; sentence; consideration, at the conclusion, of whether there is any extension as an extended supervision order; and capacity to be released on licence. There is a process, as we move through that, and this bill is intended to act in a constricting way, to use the member for Lee's language, at the point of application for release on licence. That is when as a result of this bill it is going to become extremely difficult for that to occur, except in those very limited circumstances. But the onus remains on the convicted person to do that.
Mr MULLIGHAN: I thank the Attorney for that further advice. I do appreciate the advice the Attorney provides in that the onus is on the person to satisfy the court. However, without labouring the point, I suspect your suspicions are probably correct: perhaps an application is yet to be made by the DPP for a release on licence, but none of us can speak with complete authority on that without doing some thorough research. On the basis that for whatever reason the DPP availed themselves of the opportunity under the act to make an application for a release on licence, then I would put to you that the court would feel a level of comfort about the worthiness, for want of a better term, of the application, given that it is coming from the DPP; it is not coming from the person.
That criterion—age alone—in that circumstance becomes, I would submit, more readily persuasive to the court and hence provides an opportunity for people satisfying that condition in that clause to be released. As we discussed before the break, if the application of this clause can be made without the application of new subparagraph (a) about the control of sexual urges, willing or otherwise, then I put to you that that creates a greater risk in this bill than I suspect all of us might be comfortable with.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: If I could try to complete that as briefly as I can. First of all, in relation to the 'age alone' argument as being the basis for the exemption to facilitate being released on licence, age alone does not do anything. Age alone does not give you the right to have licence to be released exercised. The trigger that allows that to happen is that there has been a demonstrated proof that there is no appreciable risk to society. That is where I think the misunderstanding arises by a number who have raised questions here about the release being lax, I suppose, or being available to people who are old who will simply line up and say, 'I'm old, so I really should be given a chance.'
If that were the intention of parliament when the former attorney raised this concept in the current legislation several years ago, then we would have had a date—everyone over 100 is automatically able to be exempted—if age alone were the concept. The reality is that there has to be a feature of one or other or both of those items as being relevant to the applicant before they can apply and then prove there is no appreciable risk. It is not correct to say that there is a bald age qualification for access.
In relation to the DPP applying, the only circumstance I can envisage the DPP applying, and there may be others, would be a circumstance where an application had been made, it had been rejected and it then came to the DPP's attention that there was significant evidence that had been omitted in the consideration and that for the fair assessment of the matter they would seek to apply back to the Supreme Court to have that revisited. That would be a circumstance where I could imagine that would be the case.
In fact, it is almost the direct reverse of what was raised this morning, by the member for West Torrens I think, of someone who was faking it and managed to make their way through the system, pull the wool over some doctor's eyes, convince the court and then later be found playing golf at Kooyonga.
Mr Koutsantonis interjecting:
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I am just making the point, though—I think it is in your electorate actually, but nevertheless—
Mr Koutsantonis: Not anymore.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Not anymore—well, there you go. In any event, there could be a circumstance, but I just urge members to appreciate here that, whilst advanced age or infirmity is a factor that must be present before you can make the application, you still have to make the application and demonstrate to the judge hearing the application that there is no appreciable risk. That is the hurdle that we see as being almost insurmountable, and rightly so, because on all the advice we have had this is the best model to progress. Even both the draft bills that have now come to light in relation to the private member's bill attempted to deal with it at that end, but obviously there are deficiencies in the other one, as we see it.
I will say this again: if there is a genuine concern about how we might make that more watertight, if that is necessary, then we are happy to take further advice on this between the houses, as I said this morning.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: I move:
Page 3, lines 16 to 18—Delete subparagraph (b)
Just to briefly give the committee some—
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: Can we have a look at it?
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Yes, it is being circulated.
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: Well, I haven't got it yet.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: All it is is simply a deletion of subparagraph (b).
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: In clause 4 or 3 or both?
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: In 4.
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: Only in 4?
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: We cannot in 3, unless you agree to it; then we will go back. I have heard what the Deputy Premier has had to say and I can see that she is attempting to do the right thing, but the part the opposition is most concerned about is the Attorney's concession to the house that a sexual predator who cannot control their sexual urges may still be released if they are able to demonstrate in court that they are either of advanced age or that they have an infirmity that makes it unlikely that they will be able to offend. The opposition views this as a loophole that deserves tightening.
I do not believe it is the Attorney's intent to introduce legislation that allows the release of infirm or aged paedophiles who have absolutely no intention of stopping their pursuit of young prey. I have heard what the Attorney-General said when she told the house that, yes, someone who was unable or unwilling to control their sexual instincts could still be released, and I think it is important that the opposition moves this amendment, first, to signal our intent. Secondly, we are all here for the same reason; we all want the same outcome. No-one in this parliament believes that someone who is unwilling or incapable of controlling their sexual instincts to harm or prey upon children should be released on licence.
Our amendment makes it completely clear that age and infirmity should not be a consideration. It should be entirely on the ability of this person to no longer have these instincts or urges, and give maximum scope to a court to keep these people behind bars.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: In respect of the amendment, I indicate that we will give it consideration and obtain advice on it. I think there would have to be significant correction to other aspects of the bill if we go down this line, probably including repealing the provisions that the former attorney put in the act. Nevertheless, we will have a look at it because it would probably create another inconsistency if we were to remove it for this purpose and not for others. In any event, we will give it some consideration.
For today, of course, we will not be supporting it, but note that you may wish to reintroduce it in another place. We will keep you posted as to our view on it.
The committee divided on the amendment:
Ayes 18
Noes 24
Majority 6
AYES | ||
Bedford, F.E. | Bettison, Z.L. | Bignell, L.W.K. |
Boyer, B.I. | Brown, M.E. | Close, S.E. |
Cook, N.F. | Gee, J.P. | Hildyard, K.A. |
Hughes, E.J. | Koutsantonis, A. (teller) | Malinauskas, P. |
Mullighan, S.C. | Odenwalder, L.K. | Piccolo, A. |
Picton, C.J. | Stinson, J.M. | Wortley, D. |
NOES | ||
Basham, D.K.B. | Bell, T.S. | Brock, G.G. |
Chapman, V.A. | Cowdrey, M.J. | Cregan, D. |
Duluk, S. | Ellis, F.J. | Habib, C. |
Harvey, R.M. (teller) | Knoll, S.K. | Luethen, P. |
Marshall, S.S. | McBride, N. | Murray, S. |
Patterson, S.J.R. | Pisoni, D.G. | Sanderson, R. |
Speirs, D.J. | Tarzia, V.A. | Teague, J.B. |
van Holst Pellekaan, D.C. | Whetstone, T.J. | Wingard, C.L. |
PAIRS | ||
Rau, J.R. | Pederick, A.S. | Weatherill, J.W. |
Gardner, J.A.W. |
Amendment thus negatived; clause passed.
Clause 5.
Mr PICTON: I asked the Deputy Premier a question before the lunch break. She may well have answered it in the few minutes that I was not here at the start of this debate.
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: The member for Lee took notes.
Mr PICTON: Did he? Excellent. I am sure he will pass them on and we will check them.
Mr Mullighan interjecting:
Mr PICTON: He was noting all the conversations. Can the Attorney give me a brief summary of that? Also, in the couple of hours since we last discussed this, has she been able to obtain any advice on the subject of whether she can provide the house with the advice on the amendments recommended by the Director of Public Prosecutions?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The answer to the latter question, first, is no. In relation to the first question, please see page 4 of the bill, proposed section 3(2)(a), (b) and (c).
Mr PICTON: I appreciate the Attorney's brevity, but just to confirm: is the Attorney saying that those sections of the bill satisfy her that they will be applicable and will provide the government comfort in the case of an application to be made in a case such as the Schuster case, and we would not need to come back here again?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Correct; except that I am advised that, specifically for Schuster, you would need to go to clause 11 under schedule 2. I am advised that it depends on when this legislation passes: if it passes before the final determination, when the conditions are set, or after. Two separate sections apply. Does that make sense?
Mr PICTON: Not quite.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Okay; in short, Schuster is still before the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice has indicated what he is proposing in relation to licence. He has to take into account cost and things of that nature. He has outlined what he thinks is appropriate. The bill, for reasons I have explained, is somewhat delayed or truncated because of the planning identification problem of Renewal SA being the owner—that is not a reflection on them, but just to introduce a different process. So it has not been built yet, but if the determination just passes pre, then I think clause 11 applies. If this passes post the final decision of Schuster, clause 10 applies. That is the way I understand it.
Mr PICTON: So either way?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Correct.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: In terms of the amendment 'Court may obtain reports', are there any reports into a prisoner that a court may not have access to?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Can you repeat the question?
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Are there any reports into the conduct of a prisoner, whether it be their medical health, their mental health, or any other aspect of their well being, that a court may not inquire into?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: In relation to an application for licence, release on licence?
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Yes.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I am trying to think about what they may not have access to in relation to the primary reports on medications taken or conditions prior to them entering prison, for example. That is possible. They may not have access to them because they would not have been treated for those conditions necessarily during prison. Bear in mind that, in the event of an application, two medical reports are presented and the Parole Board assessments during incarceration are presented, as is the Parole Board's recommendation, etc., as per the general applications. There is also the catch-all that says it can be any other reports called for by the courts. Should they be alerted during the course of the submissions put that there may be some other forensic or medical information that would assist them, then of course they have the capacity to call for it.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: I hate starting a question with 'if', but if a prisoner made an application for release on licence and did not submit medical reports, could they still be considered for an application for a licence to be released?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I think I have previously outlined what the conditions precedent are, and there are two medical reports required. That is the first on the list. There is no exemption to that. They have to produce that evidence. Remember that the release on licence is considering whether there is a paramount concern established as to the risk to the safety of the community based on the fact that they are unable or unwilling to control their sexual instincts. That is a medical matter, so it is unsurprising that that is on the list. It is mandatory in the sense that the application would fail for not complying with section 1.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Is the Deputy Premier telling the opposition that a justice hearing this matter cannot disregard the medical advice before them and, if the medical advice is not provided to the court, cannot issue a licence for release?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Under the current act, the Sentencing Act, section 59(1) states that, as we were discussing before, the Supreme Court may hear, on application by whom, etc. Subsection (2) provides:
The Supreme Court must, before determining an application under this section for the release on licence of a person detained in custody under this Division, direct that at least 2 legally qualified medical practitioners (to be nominated by the prescribed authority for the purpose)—
sometimes that is the AMA or others, as you know—
inquire into the mental condition of the person and report to the Court on whether the person is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, the person's sexual instincts.
So the judicial party hearing this is prohibited from progressing without directing that that happen.
The CHAIR: Member for West Torrens, last question.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Yes. Thank you very much for your indulgence, sir. Again, I hate starting a question with 'if', but if an applicant were to submit themselves to these two examinations but not cooperate, and the examinations were presented to the court—the statutory function of the reports has been fulfilled, but the prisoner, or the applicant, had not cooperated in any way—could the court still hear the application and grant licence?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I would say no, and the reason for that is that if the prisoner either refused to attend—which is probably the more likely—or attended but refused to answer any questions, or issued some expletives to the nominated psychiatrist and refused to cooperate generally, then in those circumstances I would expect the report to say that they were unable to complete the assessment and therefore unable to make the determination, therefore the application would fail.
Mr MULLIGHAN: To pick up on the point that the member for West Torrens raises with regard to clause 5, on my reading of the Sentencing Act the court must obtain those reports into the applicant's mental health from at least two practitioners, and the court may or may not also seek other reports. But the intent of the bill, as it relates to clauses 3 and 4, is not to impose the findings of those medical practitioners on the court in making a determination about the application, is it? The medical practitioners could find that the applicant is unwilling or unable to control their sexual urges, but that does not bind the court into making a particular type of determination with regard to that applicant.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: In short, the court must order that this be presented before them. If the report turns out, for whatever reason, to say that the convicted person is either unable to be assessed or remains in that category of being unable or unwilling to control their sexual urges, that would result in the failure of the application for release on licence.
Again, we are not talking about lining up the medical reports to identify whether or not they are unwilling. In the first instance, they are presumed that. The application is to prove that they are now cured and/or willing to control their urges. That onus is on the convicted person. So a convicted person who does not cooperate, and who renders the process of a medical assessment unassessable, faces the prospect of the failure of their application.
Mr MULLIGHAN: I appreciate that. I was not framing my question about an applicant who is unable to be assessed. My question was more about an applicant who is assessed by medical practitioners and is found by those medical practitioners to be unwilling or unable to control their sexual urges, and hence those reports are submitted to the court. Even in receipt of those reports, the operation of the preceding two clauses still enables that court to release that person on licence by virtue of subclause (1a)(b).
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The arbiter in this matter is the court. That is clearly the model we are proposing. There are mandatory obligations on that court on hearing an application to do certain things, and it has discretionary powers to order other things in that list. The arbiter, however, is the court, not the Parole Board, not the medical practitioners and not any other person who prepares a report. The arbiter is the court. The mandatory consideration of the court is that they are obliged to consider and make a determination. As I understand it, the opposition put forward the proposition that essentially the arbiter in these matters should be the Parole Board, saying that unless the Parole Board agrees it cannot proceed.
We do not agree with that model. I am not sure that even the Parole Board does, but I will speak to Ms Nelson about that between the houses now that we know that that is what is in the opposition's proposal. It would seem unusual. I will tell you why it seems particularly unusual: even when the former government proposed changes to the law in relation to persons with life sentences, they determined—having given up, by cabinet decision, their executive power to hold people in custody—that the Parole Board should not be the sole arbiter of decisions in relation to release.
The former government proposed, and we supported it, that if the recommendation of the Parole Board were to release then that would occur, subject to the appeal that could be made by various parties, such as the victims of crime commissioner, the DPP and, I think, the police commissioner, although it might be corrections—one or the other. There are several who can apply to a person who is appointed. That position is held by the Hon. David Bleby, a former judge of the Supreme Court, and that is the process we have.
This government considers that this matter, where we are dealing with persons who have demonstrated both illegal behaviour towards children and an incapacity to control their own instincts, needs to have a very clear determination. We would not leave it as something that is mandatory in respect of the Parole Board because, of course, the Parole Board does not always make a decision in relation to recommendations. They sometimes say, 'We don't put a recommendation,' or sometimes they say, 'We strongly oppose it,' as they did in the Humphrys case, or sometimes they say, 'We support it.'
Even if they indicated that they supported it, we value their consideration because they usually get to see the offender, plus the reports they have had updated through the course of the incarceration. They have the capacity to closely examine the behaviour of the prisoner while incarcerated and, presumably, in the experience they have, to make some assessment in relation to the offender when they come in to be questioned by the Parole Board.
I do not know whether the members have ever sat in on a parole hearing, but it is quite illuminating. If you have not, I recommend that you do so because I think every member of the house should see how the operations of our government work. The Parole Board's job is a very special one. It is a difficult one, obviously. I have sat through an interview involving the apparent rehabilitation of someone who had seriously assaulted their former spouse and even burned her house down. When asked about whether that was something they felt was inappropriate now, after some years of incarceration, they clearly indicated that they thought it was appropriate to do so and that they would do it again if they had the chance.
It is important for that process to take place and for the Parole Board to have an opportunity to make those assessments and then present a recommendation to whatever body is considering what may be of assistance in the ultimate determination of the release of that prisoner on parole or otherwise. They play an important role, but they are not the arbiter of everything; therefore, under our model, it is important that the judicial arm is the final determinant.
Mr MULLIGHAN: That was illuminating context about the Parole Board, but of course my question was nothing to do with the Parole Board. It was about medical practitioners; nonetheless, we can pursue that in further detail shortly. I just want to be absolutely clear. The court must seek and receive reports from two medical practitioners, and those reports, either or both of them, can find that the applicant cannot control their urges, but the court is still able to find that that person should be released on licence.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Yes, they could, but of course that is not the only thing they are bound to take into consideration because there is a whole list there.
Mr PICTON: In relation to clause 5, which I think we are still on, and requesting reports from the Parole Board, which the Attorney went into some detail about, I would say that I have also sat in on a Parole Board meeting and it was very enlightening. Frances Nelson QC runs a very tight ship, and you do not want to be on the wrong side of her.
My understanding of the reading of this clause is that it is up to the court to decide whether or not they would like to request a report from the Parole Board. I am wondering whether, given the serious nature of the matter, the potential decision the court would have to make and the seriousness parliament is putting into this, we should in fact be saying that the court should have to seek that report from the Parole Board in those instances.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I would ask the member to look at the current section 59(4)(c), which requires the court to do just that. They have to ask for the report and must take 'the following matters into consideration', which includes medical practitioners. The section then goes on to take into account the opinion, if expressed, of the Parole Board.
In the Humphrys case, the Parole Board made it very clear to Justice Kelly that, in their view, Mr Humphrys should not be released. They obviously found him to be quite in a state and that, in their view, he was 'manipulative', to use the public word of Ms Nelson, the Parole Board chair, which is probably the first thing that alerts some surprise as to the judgement.
Her Honour then takes into account and balances other matters. Those matters, of course, are all before the Full Court and the Full Court may or may not have a different view about that. Two things surprised me—and I am sure others—about that decision, and one is that nobody that I could see on the evidence before them had applied a request or presented a recommendation that he should be released. The judge made that decision based on her assessment of social opportunities and others, and I paraphrase now her judgement. That was the first surprise then.
The second surprising thing, to me at least, is that Her Honour named the precinct, the geographical area, within which she proposed that he be released, which is not a common practice in my understanding. The former government released a number of life sentence prisoners, for example, out into the community over the last 18 months or so since the member for Light was the minister for corrections. We dealt with the review in relation to life-sentence matters, that is, people convicted of murder, and a whole lot of people have been let out and they are presumably living quite successfully in the community at places which have not been made public.
There may need to be a bigger debate ultimately on whether these matters should be made public. The school of thought is that, by making it public, everyone knows who they are and therefore ought to be able to keep an eye out for him or her. If they are going to do that, frankly, they ought to be publishing a more recent photograph, because this bloke now is 66 years of age and I cannot imagine that he would look the same as the photographs in the paper every day. How the people of Bowden and Brompton are able to identify this person is beyond me.
Nevertheless, that is a bigger debate I think we need to have ultimately as to whether that is something in the public interest or whether the alarm and concern that it might raise, perhaps unnecessarily, for people may outweigh that, but we will have that debate another day.
Mr PICTON: Given that, and I think the Attorney is basically saying that she was surprised that the court made this decision in light of a very strong recommendation from the Parole Board, and also given the high respect that she places in the Parole Board and its work, and she went through some detail about how the members get to understand the behaviour of prisoners within the corrections system, would it not be prudent to insert a provision in the bill where we can quite definitively say as a parliament that if the Parole Board does not believe that somebody should be released then you do not pass that gate to be able to be considered before the court?
That, of course, leaves open for the court the overall determination, but it is a prerequisite that you would not be opposed by the Parole Board before getting to that final consideration by the court given that the Parole Board, as you outlined, would be the most likely source of up-to-date information in terms of that person's behaviour in the corrections system?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: In relation to the Parole Board and its valuable contribution, can I say that, as I have indicated (and we will consult with Ms Nelson as to her view on this), and let us be quite clear, as valuable as that is it only and can only relate to the conduct of the prisoner and the presentation that they give within the parameters of understanding their compliance while they are incarcerated, etc.
That is a very valuable piece of information to have. I would have thought that, if we were prioritising value, the medical evidence will be absolutely critical here because that is really a prerequisite to be able to establish a change to the otherwise position, and that is that they are unwilling and unable to control their sexual urges, and that will require somebody to be able to make that assessment. As good as the Parole Board is, they are not competent to do that, clearly. They are not all psychiatrists.
However, the Humphrys case illustrated to us that the situation needed to be tightened. Irrespective of what the Full Court do in that regard on that particular case, it highlighted a situation where we felt there were weaknesses which, if they had not been applied with sufficient consideration, could result in a situation of someone like Mr Humphrys being released and into a known area.
Whatever the Full Court do—they may grant the appeal; they may identify that the appeal will stand but that there is an aspect in relation to the disclosure of the geographical area which needs to be revisited, so they could send the matter back to the applicant judge who heard the matter, Justice Kelly; and/or they could dismiss the appeal—we as a government felt that situation should be tightened. That is why we have imposed a whole lot more things that have to be taken into account and we have made it harder—doubly—by making the applicant prove it rather than the other way round.
Clause passed.
Clause 6.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: With your indulgence, given that the minister quoted from schedule 2 earlier, I understand, proposed section 1(8)(e) of schedule 2 says—and this relates to a previous answer the Attorney gave me:
The Supreme Court must also take the following matters into consideration when determining an application under this clause…
And we talked about the medical practitioners' reports. Proposed subsection (8)(e) says 'any other matter that the Court thinks relevant'. I believe in the independence of our courts as much as anyone else, but that does alarm me slightly—that any other relevant matter the court thinks fit to consider can often be things that are not prescribed—
The Hon. V.A. Chapman interjecting:
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Exactly, yes. The opposition's concern—or my concern in particular—is that some other matter may, despite an applicant not having met the required criteria through medical reports or being aged or infirm, constitute some other relevant matter due to which this person would be released, which could be an additional one that the court decides to legislate for itself, for example, in its reasoning. Yes, it is open to appeal and, yes, there would be great risk for the court in terms of appeal, I am assuming, if it did so, but is 'any other matter that the Court thinks relevant' absolutely necessary when we are dealing with something as delicate as a licence for release for someone who cannot control their sexual urges?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Can I just say that (e) is in addition to all the other matters. It is not something where they can simply ignore all the rest and just say, 'Well, I'll just take into account what I've read in the newspaper.' That is not the way it works. This is a common addition in relation to factors to be taken into account. In the Sentencing Act itself, you will see it is often referred to—of all the things to be taken into account, such as age, antecedents, etc., and other things that may be relevant.
I have not personally seen any abuse of that or any criticism of it, and nobody at this stage has raised it as a concern, but the acute mind of the member for West Torrens might have some information that would persuade me to consider it or get some further investigation on it. But I just hope I am reassuring you by saying that this does not mean that a court can do whatever it thinks is relevant and then ignore all the rest. It is to catch all in terms of anything else that might come to their attention, only once they have determined that it is relevant—to add to that obligation of consideration not detract from it.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: I accept the member's explanation. It has just been my experience over 20 years that every time a cabinet or a minister or a department devises an amendment to try to attempt to do something, usually the opposite ends up happening.
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: It's already there.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: I understand it is already there. We are talking about inquiries by medical practitioners now and the amendment. In terms of the inquiries by medical practitioners, the Deputy Premier spoke earlier about prescribed lists, either from the AMA or other recognised bodies. Can an applicant obtain a medical practitioner's report submitted to the court by people other than those previously approved by the courts, that is, another medical practitioner who is not necessarily licensed in South Australia, or a medical practitioner who might not be practising any longer, or a medical practitioner who is now an academic and doing studies into known sex offenders? Is there any limitation to applicants on who can submit a medical report by a practitioner?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: No, we do not limit them to do that. I am advised, incidentally, that the prescribed authority at the moment is the head of Forensic Science SA, who provides the nominated names for the purposes of medical reports in this area. In any event, obviously it is a reputable agency. It has to be independent, and they obviously have a list of people who can provide neurological or psychiatric references. If anything, we have a shortage of them in South Australia and sometimes have to call on people from interstate.
Of course, we do not stop people from applying to put matters before a judge. A court would consider that, but this is an independent identification, assessment and presentation. Bear in mind, of the cohort of applicants who come up for this release on licence, it would be extremely unusual that they would have the financial wherewithal themselves to actually pay for anything in relation to that. It could happen, I suppose, but largely these people are in an impecunious state because they have been in custody for a very long time. Nevertheless, we do not prohibit them from presenting that. If the courts say, 'It is irrelevant and we are not interested in taking that into account,' or, 'This is a mate of yours, or a relative—they are not independent,' that is a matter for the court.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: What is the cost and who bears the cost for an application for licence when medical reports are sought? Is it the Department for Correctional Services? Is it the AGD? Is it out of the general Consolidated Account? Is it budgeted for per year? Does the government have a current budget in place for the number of applications to be put in place? Is any of the cost borne by the applicant and is there a fee for the applicant to seek a forensic examination by a medical practitioner approved by the forensic group that you choose?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Usually, there is a capped fee, which is probably one of the reasons why there is such a shortage of people available to do these reports, because they require assessment, sometimes reviewing a whole of material interview of the party, etc. But, largely, that is funded, those two, by the taxpayer. The member for West Torrens, you have probably signed authorities in the past for budget allocations for these.
I am happy to identify what it is, but I did meet with Forensic Science SA head, Mr Chris Pearman, just recently and we went through a number of budgeting pressures he had. One of the areas of responsibility is allocation of these people. Whether it happens through the Legal Services Commission or via Forensic Science SA, I imagine if they are employed—and I think there is one neuropathologist who was employed—they may or may not be useful in these cases, I do not know, but we can get that information between the houses. I have a correction, I am sorry: Mr Pearman is head of Forensic Science SA, not the Forensic Mental Health Service. They are a different party. They are the ones who nominate them.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: So forensic mental health?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The Forensic Mental Health Service do the nominations as the prescribed authority, not Forensic Science SA.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: How do you get on that list? Is it a tender per year?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: We can find that out for you.
Mr PICTON: I note when we were discussing the Parole Board, the Attorney referenced the medical reports as being of superior value and even referred to them as a prerequisite. Given that she holds them in such high value, and going further to the previous questions from the member for Lee, is that not a reason why we should be increasing the value of them in this legislation, and I would argue to the point of saying that you would need a positive check from the medical reports to be able to successfully apply for this licence and to limit, in that regard, the possibility that a court might decide that somebody should be released even if there are two reports saying that this person is unwilling to do that and the court could replace those medical practitioners' opinions with their own opinion?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: That is exactly what we have done: tightened those provisions and made it mandatory to call for these two reports. That is exactly what we have done with this bill.
Mr PICTON: But it is still up to the court to determine that. There is not a gate that has to be passed. As I understand it from this legislation, there is still the possibility that there could be reports made that are not glowing about the applicant and that do raise some risk, but the court could replace the medical practitioner's opinion with their own opinion and decide that on the court's own judgement, weighing up all the evidence, this person is able to control their sexual instincts in this matter and should be released.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The further tightening in the bill is that now they cannot be released unless they prove that they are willing and able to control their instincts—we keep starting from this premise—or that there is an appreciable risk to the safety of the community that must arise out of one and/or two physical circumstances.
Let's be clear: our model requires that a judge makes the decision. We have tightened what he or she has to take into account for the purposes of considering that. It is now much tighter than what applied when Justice Kelly heard this matter. As I see it, if you are going to let a judge make the decision, they have to have the list of things they have to take into account and then make that decision.
If you want the Parole Board to make that decision—we do not; the opposition may—we think that they have a valuable input, but we do not think they should be the arbiter. If you want one or two doctors to make the decision, that is fine, but we do not support that. We say that a judge should make this decision. That is what they are there for, that is what they are equipped to do and they have to take that into account. We think the level of medical evidence and the Parole Board is so serious that we are making it mandatory, firstly, that that information be obtained and that it be given consideration—not optional, not think about it, must do it.
Mr PICTON: In relation to those medical reports, I am wondering if the Attorney could outline for the committee, perhaps with the benefit of her advisers, what level of scrutiny the medical practitioner applies as part of those investigations. Do they just meet the person once? Do they have to meet them several times? Do they have to meet them over the course of months or a year? Do they consult with family members? Do they consult case records? What is meant by obtaining that report from the medical practitioner and how thorough is it?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I will provide the detail of that between the houses. As with professionals, of course, usually there is a requirement to interview the party. Sometimes that can be done by video link and it may require more than one or two interviews. Nevertheless, we will get the detail of that between the houses.
Mr MULLIGHAN: I want to pick up on the points and some of the responses made in the questions from the members for West Torrens and Kaurna. We have established that either the DPP or the person can apply. It is not incumbent on the person to apply.
It can be very useful, I think we have all agreed, that Parole Board report. The Parole Board report, as the Attorney has informed the committee in the case currently causing this consternation (the Humphrys case), can recommend against release into the community. There must already be—and this is not a new provision of this bill—the provision of two medical reports. Those two medical reports could both also find that the person cannot or is unwilling to control their sexual urges, and the court is still open to releasing this person into the community.
I prefaced one of my questions before saying that we are here discussing this bill because we have had the Supreme Court exercise a discretion within the bounds of the legislation.
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: Previous legislation.
Mr MULLIGHAN: Previous legislation—current legislation. I think what we are now establishing is that the amended legislation via this bill will provide a similar if not almost identical discretion to the court to make these same decisions to the risk of the community.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: No, I do not accept that contention because I do not accept that it is a question. It was not a question. That is what you assert; we do not agree with it. We think we are significantly tightening it, and we have had the best legal minds in the state working on it to do just that.
Mr MULLIGHAN: I am sorry that I did not end my comment with a question mark. I will try to do so now. In any of the nine drafts or in any of the discussions or consideration about how this issue is best addressed, has there been any consideration to ensure that there is a threshold or series of thresholds imposed prior to the court exercising its discretion in these matters?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: That is exactly what has been considered and that is why there are significant amendments by way of thresholds of obligation of what is to be considered and the complete reversal of onus—they do not get let out unless they can establish themselves that that hurdle has been overcome—so that is exactly what we have done.
Mr MULLIGHAN: With all due respect, Deputy Premier, would you not agree that that is not true?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: No, I do not agree.
Mr MULLIGHAN: Because the hurdle that you continually refer to is the requirement that the person can satisfy the court that they can control their sexual urges when, as we have found out in the course of questioning about these clauses, that is simply not the case in this bill. A person can be approved for release on licence by a court merely by being old.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: That is not right. I keep saying to you that is not the way we read it. I will put it on the record: that is not right.
Clause passed.
Clause 7.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Picking up where the member for Lee just finished off, the Deputy Premier just told the house that she does not accept the opposition's assertion that an application can be made simply on the basis of age or infirmity. The Deputy Premier told the committee that she would consider amendments between the houses on this matter.
What I do not understand is if the Deputy Premier, and I take her word for it when she says she will consider the amendments between the houses, just told the committee, 'No, the opposition is wrong on this matter about the position of age or infirmity, but we will consider the amendments in the upper house,' I cannot reconcile those two statements. Either the Deputy Premier is right and the amendments are flawed or the Deputy Premier is giving earnest consideration to our amendments between the houses and will accept them.
I think the point the member for Lee is making is a very valid one that the opposition has been talking about. What we are concerned about is that the only test that the court should be considering is whether an applicant for a licence to release into the community can control their sexual urges and is no longer a predator. I would ask the Deputy Premier to explain the contrast in her two answers and her assurance to the committee that she will (1) consider the amendments we have moved and (2) her most recent answer to the member for Lee.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: As indicated, we do not agree with that assertion. The incorrect repetition of what we allegedly said was that they can apply: what we said was that they cannot be released based on age or infirmity.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: That is not what the amendment says.
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: Read it again.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: I will:
Release on licence…
(a) the person is both capable of controlling and willing to control the person's sexual instincts; or
(b) the person no longer presents an appreciable risk to the safety of the community (whether as individuals or in general) due to the person's advanced age or infirmity.
It is not 'and': it is 'or'.
The Hon. V.A. Chapman interjecting:
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Exactly; we have been through this. What I do not understand is the minister's comments to the committee that she will consider our amendments between the houses—which I thought was very generous of her, to consider those amendments—but her last two statements say the exact opposite, that she is not taking our amendments seriously and that she thinks there is no error in the legislation. She needs to explain the difference.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Yet again I do not agree with those assertions. We have the principal discussion about whether we allow for appreciable risk based on advanced age or infirmity to be removed from the act altogether—that is the Rau proposal—which is in the legislation as we speak, that is a matter that we will consider.
Mr Mullighan interjecting:
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Absolutely, notwithstanding the rather poor example he gave, and I recounted this morning why I did not accept Judge Barrett's decision. Nevertheless, we will review whether it is appropriate to leave it in at all. We will do that, but that does not mean I agree with the rest of your assertion, because you continue to fail to read out, in your own mind, and I understand this, that the tightened clause requires a reverse. You continue to read (a) and (b) without reading the first part of proposed (1a).
I do not know whether that is because you do not understand it or will not take any advice on it or whether you are just plain incapable of understanding, member for West Torrens. Whatever the case is, if I cannot convince you that there is a way forward with this and that it is a significant tightening that, on all the advice we have had, we think is necessary then, as I have said before, when Mr Maher comes along to get his briefing—I think he was actually given one during the lunch adjournment today, and he seemed to understand—there is not much more I can do. You have made your point 100 times. We do not agree with you. That is the position.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Not quite 100 times but, as the member for Lee said, we are getting there. I think the personal reflections speak volumes about the member for Bragg rather than about me. I refer her to Hansard and her own answers to this committee.
I take this parliament pretty seriously. This parliament is now in the committee stage and the committee stage is the opportunity for members to seek answers from ministers, and those answers are required by parliamentary practice and procedure to be accurate to the best knowledge of the member. We have contradictory statements from the minister, which she claims are not contradictory.
That is fine. I am not proposing a privileges committee. I am not proposing that she has misled us. What I am saying is that her own answers to this committee have been that a person can be released into the community, on the basis of their age and infirmity, who cannot control their sexual urges or will not control the sexual urges. It is on Hansard.
I suppose it is easier to try to attack me personally rather than to accept what the minister herself has said. The question is: between the houses, while the minister has said she will consider our amendments, can the minister please provide an answer to the committee as to why she said previously that an applicant may be released who cannot control their urges and reconcile that with the last answer she gave me just now?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Well, I have done that.
Mr PICTON: My question is in relation to the parties and section 63. My understanding is that the current legislation is strict in terms of the parties, being the applicant and the DPP. I view that as a bit of an awkward position for the DPP, because it is not necessarily a prosecution with the DPP.
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: Who do you recommend?
Mr PICTON: Well, I am getting to that—don't cut to the chase.
Mr Duluk: Are you asking a question or making a statement?
Mr PICTON: I'm asking a question.
Mr Mullighan: Oh, you're here, are you?
Mr PICTON: You are here. Come to the front bench, Sam.
Members interjecting:
The CHAIR: Order! Member for Kaurna, back to the question, please.
Mr PICTON: I am so sorry; I was distracted by the member for Waite, who I think will do an excellent job on the front bench.
An honourable member: The member in waiting.
Mr PICTON: The member in waiting.
Mr Duluk interjecting:
The CHAIR: Order! The member for Kaurna will be heard—question.
Mr PICTON: Thank you. It is a serious question. The current parties are the DPP, who, essentially, is the Crown's representative in that matter. The DPP obviously needs to act with a certain independence, as per his or her statute and laws in this place. Of course that means that there is not necessarily a view for the government or the Attorney-General to have a say in an application that might be made. I wonder whether there might be a situation where the DPP's view on a matter does not necessarily correlate with the Attorney's view, the government's view or the Solicitor-General's view, and whether this section, in limiting the parties to the applicant and the DPP, would necessarily prevent the Attorney or the Solicitor-General from making an application as to the government's view on a particular case.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: No, only the DPP or the person who is relevant are the parties. As the member well knows, there is authority for the fact that the DPP can be directed in certain circumstances, and we had that determined by the Full Court under the stewardship, I think, by majority decision of Justice Vanstone and another and Doyle J. dissenting, is my recollection. It was about 15 years ago. There is the power to do that, but the parties are the applicant and the DPP.
Mr PICTON: So in a situation where the DPP has given a view—for instance, they may want to release a particular person—and the Attorney was of a view that there was a public interest that the government not support that, would the Attorney therefore direct the DPP to oppose a release under this section?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: That is technically possible, but obviously I cannot make any judgement on whether I as Attorney-General, or anyone else in the future, would direct a DPP to do something or to abstain from doing something, but there is authority for it to be done. It is rarely exercised.
Mr Koutsantonis: Once.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Well, no, once in your time here, member for West Torrens, but we have not had a Director of Public Prosecutions historically. Prior to that, we had a different role, where there was no director of public prosecutions position, so you had a Crown prosecutor, but they were not a statutory body that enjoyed the protection of legislation, which provides for independence. The principles behind that of course are well known. You can look at the act if you want to get an update on that. There is a power of direction that is rarely exercised, and I could not make a judgement as to under what circumstances I or any future Attorney would do that.
Mr PICTON: In relation to this section as well, the limitation in terms of the parties I would have thought limits the ability for any potential victims to have their say in relation to whether an offender should be released. I wonder whether the Attorney thinks that it should be reasonable that those victims should be able to provide a statement to the court on their view as to whether a release should happen, or the circumstances of a release, and would the Attorney consider a change to this section, if necessary, to allow that?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The victims of crime commissioner has certain statutory powers to present arguments. They do not get consulted, for example, on plea bargaining, but there are aspects in relation to a victim's position on matters that they can present. Under the DPP Act, the DPP has certain obligations to inform victims and/or survivors, and sometimes it can be the spouse of a deceased victim in an offence. There are avenues for that to occur in relation to specifically these applications, though they are not listed here. I will look at the general act in that regard, but the Sentencing Act does make extensive provision for victims to be taken into account in sentencing.
Mr MULLIGHAN: In the circumstance that the DPP is the applicant for a person's release, and presumably the person, for want of a better term, falls in behind the DPP in making that application rather than opposing that application, who opposes such an application?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: An application can be made to a court to which there is no objection. Perhaps even a greater reason why it is important for the judge to make the decision is that he or she, as the judge, still has to consider all the matters which are before them as prescribed in the act, and which we are trying to tighten. It is not a matter of saying, 'Here comes the DPP. He's made an application,' and the prisoner is sitting on a video link saying, 'Yes, that's a pretty good idea. I'm happy to get out of here.' Obviously, the obligation is still there to consider all those matters.
Mr MULLIGHAN: Given that the DPP is a party under section 63, and I think you mentioned that the DPP is away at the moment—
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: Apparently, he is back today, I was told during the lunch break.
Mr MULLIGHAN: He miscalculated that leave, didn't he? Did the DPP advise the Attorney whether additional provisions or further tightening needs to be made in this bill to restrict the discretion of the court?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: That is the matter about which I indicated earlier this morning I am making an inquiry.
Clause passed.
Clause 8 passed.
Clause 9.
Mr PICTON: Obviously the appeal is ongoing before the Full Court, and while this has all been quite rushed—and I have not gone through the detail—is there any tightening of the provisions in relation to appeals in the future that the Attorney is considering, whether they be in terms of the length of time that would be needed for appeals or the evidence that would be needed for appeals in the future?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: In short, the answer is no because we are not proposing to abolish or remove the appeal power. We see it as an important check on the determination of a single judge or justice. So we are not anticipating any change in that regard.
Clause passed.
Clause 10.
Mr MULLIGHAN: I guess the application of this is critical. In proposed part 3(1), (a), (b), and (c) set out those different matters to which this bill will apply. There are ones which have not been made but are to be made after it commences—that is pretty obvious. There are those where the application has been made but not finalised before this commences—that will be caught. Proposed part 3(1)(c) states:
an application under section 23A of the repealed Act for the discharge of an order for detention under section 23…where the application was made but not finalised...
My question is: could you just talk the house through how new subparagraph (c) is envisaged to apply—that is, to what is it to apply?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Proposed part 3(1)(c), like the Schuster case, applies to any applications made but not completed at the time of the passage of this bill.
Mr MULLIGHAN: Has there been any consideration of further retrospectivity in the application of this bill?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: This whole question of capturing those cases that are either pending, on appeal and/or to come are all important to us, and that is why there has been extensive work done in relation to these schedules, both under a section 58 application and under section 59, which is also referred to here in the transitional provisions, and obviously for the reasons in relation to an alternate scenario under schedule 2.
The reason for that is that the new Sentencing Act we are actually amending in this bill has only just come into effect. It was passed some time ago. It has come in in two tranches, from memory. It started 30 April, my adviser says—she would know; it is very recent. We passed it some time ago, but obviously there needed to be matters put in place to ensure that it was being activated. So the old sentencing law, which was repealed some time ago but effective from the end of April—the applications can be pending under those, which is why you see frequently in this transitional clause current applications and those under the former act.
Mr MULLIGHAN: Now that I cast my mind prospectively forward to clause 11, this may well be captured in that. I am happy to ask the question when we come to clause 11, but my understanding is that, after the commencement of the schedules, there is the opportunity, on application by the DPP, to cancel the release on licence of a person that is currently out in the community.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Yes, to apply back to the Supreme Court to do just that.
Mr PICTON: Obviously this transitional provision is in relation to try to capture those cases that are currently before the courts or are in the process of applications being made. I wonder if the Attorney—and I presume she has been briefed in relation to this over the past couple of weeks—could give the house some information in terms of how many cases are currently before the courts, how many applications have been made that are not currently before the courts, or how many applications we are expecting to come in the near future.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I can provide that information as best we can, between houses. We do not have it here before. But I know I have to deal with a number of applications on an almost daily basis—to authorise applications to be made for extended supervision orders and continued detention. A number of these cases are in that category.
It is fair to say we have a significant cohort of people in our prison system who could apply for release on licence. Sometimes it is a bit like the fact that life sentence people can apply for parole if they are past their parole period, which is now a mandatory 20 years. Some of our prisoners do not ever apply because they know they will never get out, but they would never get through even the Parole Board at this stage; von Einem springs to mind.
In relation to this category, where we have a cohort, my recollection from reading somewhere is that we have something like 27 in custody who at some stage or another may be eligible to apply. Whether they ever do or not is another matter. For the reasons I indicated earlier today, there are quite a significant number of people in custody who are serving terms of imprisonment for serious sexual offences, and we need to get this legislation in place and right to make sure that we protect the community in those circumstances.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Out of that answer, on indulgence Mr Chairman, can the Attorney inform the house about who is eligible to apply for release on licence? Is it only people who have served their head sentence or can people, before they have completed their head sentence, apply for release on licence?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The people who are eligible to apply have to have completed their sentence and be the subject of an order of detention, not the ones who have completed their sentence and there is no justification for keeping them in; they do not apply. If an order for detention has been made that goes past the period of their time, then they may apply for release on licence. We are going to make a very hard for them to get it if they are in that category.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Can the Deputy Premier advise whether there is anything in her amendments that puts a requirement on the court, the DPP or the government to inform victims of the impending release of a perpetrator on licence? Are there automatic conditions put in place to stay away from past victims, or the use of the internet, or access to certain magazines? I know when I was involved in Corrections certain magazines were withdrawn from certain offenders' view so they could not excite themselves with certain images. Are there also restrictions put in place? The question I want answered most is: are victims informed of the impending licence and conditions and how is that notice given to those victims?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: There are provisions for obligatory notice to victims in the course of both sentencing and release. One of the difficulties that arises is if the victim is not known to the DPP. Recently, in the case that has been the subject of discussion today (the Humphrys case), a person came forward and contacted The Advertiser and said, 'Look, I was a victim many years ago of this man, Mr Humphrys,' and obviously expressed his view about what he thought, 'and nobody has ever spoken to me'. As became evident, he had never come forward to identify him. He was a child at the time, and, for whatever reason at the time, his mother did not see it as appropriate to expose her child to publicity or anything else and therefore had not made any effort to register for the purposes of getting information, and they were interstate.
The person now comes forward as an adult and says, 'Well, I'm okay now, and I have sorted my life out and I now want to have my say.' It was unfortunate that he went to the press because that is a fairly bruising experience. Nevertheless, I have met the young person and his partner. Now that he is known to us, obviously the relevant authorities will be able to keep him informed. So there is a process but the victims and/or their families need to be known to the DPP's office to be able to maintain the information on it.
The second matter is the restrictions, but we would have to come back to you on that. Frequently, in the orders I have seen in relation to these, and I suppose it is similar to parole and other circumstances where someone is actually released from custody, there are conditions: stay away from the victims and do not have access to the internet. I do not know about magazines; I suppose it is a bit old fashioned these days; nevertheless, images online are obviously accessible. I have seen orders such as the prohibition on having any electronic communication tool that has any access to the internet, as an example.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: That is a perfectly reasonable answer for people who have not identified themselves, but I imagine Mr Humphrys is in prison because he was charged successfully with victims who came forward and provided evidence.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: They have been kept informed.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Good. I would like to know what the process is for that. Is there a statutory process or is it a voluntary process that the government is undertaking?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I will get back to you with that.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Good, I am glad you will get back to us on that. I would also like to know how those victims are informed about the conditions. My final question to the Attorney is: if someone who is granted release on licence under your new proposed legislation has breached their licence conditions, is there a limit on how soon they can reapply for a licence again, or are they prohibited from applying for release on licence again, or is there a time frame between when they have breached conditions, are apprehended, recommitted, and can apply again for another licence for release?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: In relation to a time period which is to expire, as I understand it, from an unsuccessful application to being able to apply again is six months. In relation to a breach, that of course triggers the capacity for them to be brought back into custody.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: How soon can you apply again after the breach?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I would have to come back to you on that. It would be in the principal act. It is not something that we are dealing with today in the bill, but I will check on that for you.
Mr PICTON: Further to the question and answer in relation to victims and consultation with victims, I am wondering whether the Attorney can outline what the consultation process is with victims in terms of the location for release, whether the victims get a say in terms of being able to prohibit certain locations for an inevitable release of a prisoner on licence, and whether that process is a legislative one or just a practice that happens.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: At present the law provides for the victims to have a say, to present their position.
Mr Koutsantonis interjecting:
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Sorry, I am addressing this to the member for Kaurna. It is not something which they can direct and say, 'I don't want them to move into my electorate or my area or my street,' but they are matters to be taken into account, if they elect to present something of course. What was the other question?
Mr PICTON: In relation to that, the Attorney was outlining that she is receiving lots of applications and that a lot of orders come before her. How is that being tracked within the government in terms of being able to identify that these premises and locations that would be identified, presumably either by the government side or by the applicant themselves, are appropriate and meet community standards?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: In relation to the geographical location of residences that they are to attend upon release, I suppose if one were to identify where the files would be, I expect that Corrections, because they have a significant role in this, would probably have the best resource as to where they might currently be living—not just under the release of licence for these cases but in relation to others who are on parole and under conditions or on bail, or where there has been an extended supervision order for someone who has completed their sentence but there is a supervision provision for which Corrections are providing supervision services.
The ones I have to deal with as Attorney-General are those where there is an application for instructions to be given to seek an extension of supervision or detention post sentence. I think that is the total of the category that comes to me. Basically, I then give instruction to either the DPP or the Crown Solicitor's Office to act on that. Is there a map somewhere with little dots where they all are in South Australia? I do not know that. I will make some inquiry as to where they are.
Certainly, other than in this case of Humphrys, I am not aware of any case where a detail has been released in the judge's determination as to where they are going to be released. As I say, that seems to be a fairly new initiative, and I think we need to have a broader discussion about whether that is something that is appropriate or not and, if it is, whether we are going to have such requirements as recent photographs of the person released.
The CHAIR: Last question, member for Kaurna.
Mr PICTON: That is a shame. In relation to the location of the proposed release, say, for instance, person X was released in suburb Y. For whatever reason, a year down the track or however long, there was an issue with that house and the person needed to move somewhere else. I wonder if you can tell us what the process is in terms of getting approval for another location in those circumstances. Is that something that has to go back to the Supreme Court? Is that something that goes back to the Parole Board to determine, or to the Attorney-General or the DPP, and does the consultation then need to occur again with the victims after that process has been interrupted with the new location?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Depending on the condition, they will need to go back. Conditions such as remaining in the state of South Australia are obviously the type that usually go back to the determining body. There would be some, of course, that are able to be managed by Corrections. I would mostly expect that the location/residence would need some determination by the independent arbiter but, if you can give me an example, I will take it on notice and follow it up. Generally, these things are delegated down for the smaller matters as to the particulars, whether it is home detention or the conditions on licence, but we are talking about a pretty serious category here. Most of it, I would expect, would need to go back to the judge.
Clause passed.
Clause 11.
Mr PICTON: I understand that the Attorney is going to take that matter on notice, but can I ask her, when she does so, to please clarify the situations in which victims would be consulted about those as well. She outlined that it may be that some of them are determined, as she said, by a low-level person in the Corrections department, or it may go all the way up to the court. I would be particularly worried if some of these matters were not legislated for future moves and we could see moves happening without consultation with victims. Specifically, can the Attorney provide some detail in relation to the victim consultation under all levels of approval for a move after a person has been released on licence?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: There would be myriad options. We cannot answer all of them, but we will certainly endeavour to get you some explanation of how that works. I am also advised that in relation to conditions set, after a release on licence has been considered by the court, largely they are under the general management of the Parole Board. It is just that in the unusual case of Humphrys, my recollection is that Justice Kelly had actually made a determination that it would be within the Bowden Brompton area which all became public anyway, and it caused some alarm generally in the community.
Having announced that, if it goes back to anyone, I would think something like that would have to go back to Justice Kelly because it is part of a judgement, unless it is overturned or that portion of it is overturned, and the Full Court would send it back for further consideration. On the day-to-day conditions, they are set and supervised by the Parole Board, I understand.
Mr PICTON: In relation to the disclosure of that location, I acknowledge that the Attorney has said that it is something she will consider further in terms of whether that was a good idea for that to be disclosed or not. Potentially, though, is there not a risk that if this is being debated or discussed in open court, then somebody could go along—a journalist or other person—and disseminate that information in the community anyway, whether or not the judge has decided that information would be public? Therefore, does that mean that the deliberations by the court in relation to location are restricted to closed court discussions at the moment or are they in open court?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: The courts are open. It is still the discretion of the judicial officer to determine what is allowed to be published, and that frequently happens. Permission could be given for them to publish but the detail usually is not. As I said, that was the unusual aspect of the Humphrys case, that that particular information was made available. Whether an application was made to suppress the particular area or location, I do not know the particulars of that. But, as I said, we are in a new era now. If we are going to have these publications of geographical location of release, then I think we need to have the debate.
Mr MULLIGHAN: My reading is that schedule 2 mirrors what is included in section 59 of the act. Was there any consideration given in the various drafts to further tightening these provisions as it related to those already out in the community who could be the subject of these determinations by the court?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: What consideration was given was how we deal with people who are already released in the community and the capacity for the DPP to apply to bring them back before the courts and for the new tests to apply. That is what the purpose of this is.
Mr PICTON: Further to that, has the Attorney had discussions with the DPP about whether there are cases that he views, if this schedule was passed, he would bring before the court in relation to people who have already been released?
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: No.
Clause passed.
Title passed.
Bill reported without amendment.
Third Reading
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN (Bragg—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General) (17:45): I move:
That this bill be now read a third time.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS (West Torrens) (17:45): The opposition is pleased that the government came to its senses and introduced this legislation today. I have to say that I was horrified to read the media reports of what the Deputy Premier had said to the people of South Australia yesterday. I have to say that it was a confused response. It was a response that gave no clarity to the people of South Australia about what the government's intentions were.
It was left to the opposition to lead, and the Leader of the Opposition did just that. He immediately gave notice that we would be moving a suspension of standing orders today to introduce legislation forthwith to keep this man behind bars. This man should not be released into the public. This man is someone who has shown no willingness to reform. We believe that it is unsafe to have this man in the community.
I think that what the Deputy Premier has learned today is a very cold, hard lesson in politics. Often people say that politics and good policy do not coincide. I disagree. I think that good policy is good politics. I think that there is not a person in this chamber who did not think that the government should walk in here today and introduce legislation to make sure that we tightened up the ability of this man to get a licence to be released. I do not think that there is a politician in here who agrees with the decision of the court to release this person. But that is on appeal, and I am pleased that the DPP has taken it upon himself to do so. That is, I think, a wise decision.
What I do not understand is why the government told the people of South Australia yesterday that the legislation was a publicity stunt yesterday but is good policy today. I submit to the house that it was good policy yesterday and it is good policy today, not a publicity stunt. What I suspect has happened is that backbenchers and other cabinet ministers were horrified at the Deputy Premier's performance on radio and in the media on this issue. They were horrified that the government were being portrayed as an organisation leading this state that was uncaring about this person's imminent release into the community. They were uncaring and not ready to lead by example and have legislation ready to go.
We have learnt today that there were nine drafts of this legislation. I am not sure whether those nine drafts were from the time of coming into office or whether they included drafts considered by the previous government.
Mr Duluk: This is the third reading, not the second reading, Tom.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: That's right. I think the government's realisation that they needed to act is a little bit humiliating for the Deputy Premier. But I think she has also risen to the occasion and submitted and relented to pressure from backbenchers. I can only imagine the horror on backbenchers' faces when they saw the paper yesterday—that the government had been outmanoeuvred and outfought and was, quite frankly, out of touch with the views and aspirations of ordinary South Australians. But it took the Leader of the Opposition to prod the government into action.
Let's face it, this government is becoming renowned for being missing in action. Journalists are talking about it. We have certainly noticed that the government was not exactly light of foot in making announcements. It is certainly not setting the agenda. It is certainly not giving the state direction. It seems that all its energy and focus were put into the election campaign and that the next four years can just somehow take care of themselves. Unfortunately, politics abhors a vacuum, and that vacuum has been created not by the opposition but by the government.
Mr Picton: 'It's time.'
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: It's not time yet, but it will be soon. I can imagine the cabinet discussion on Monday morning because if I were still in the cabinet and I woke up to that front page, that our Attorney-General had been outsmarted, outfoxed and outmanoeuvred by the opposition, I would not have been very happy. I can only imagine the views of the backbenchers.
Alas, backbenchers' emails are exempt from FOI. Backbenchers' SMSs are exempt from FOI. If backbenchers were to relay to me some of the stories that they perhaps relayed to the Attorney-General via their constituents, that the government was somehow going to sit on their hands while this person was going to get out of gaol on licence, and that the opposition was leading the agenda, I would love to know what some of those emails said. I bet that the people of Newland would have been horrified to know that the government was not acting. The constituents of Colton would have been outraged. What would the constituents in Heysen have thought about this, let alone the constituents of Elder, that the government was not acting?
I have seen in my 20 years of parliament many second reading explanations. Most of the second reading explanations are matter-of-fact. Most second reading explanations come into the parliament and they talk about the bill, about the government's policy, its agenda and why it wants to introduce this legislation or amendment. Generally, the second reading explanation is inserted into Hansard without reading because it is just matter-of-fact. This morning's second reading contribution by the Deputy Premier was that of an Attorney-General under extreme pressure—pressure because they had been forced into this position.
Mr DULUK: Point of order: I think the member for West Torrens is straying. He is not even talking about the bill. He is reflecting on the Deputy Premier, not on the substance of the third reading.
The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Yes. Another point of order?
Mr PICTON: Point of order: this is entirely consistent with what the Speaker ruled in relation to the Deputy Premier's speech from this morning.
Mr DULUK: The Speaker this morning ruled in relation to second reading speeches, not the third reading.
The DEPUTY SPEAKER: I ask the member for West Torrens to continue his speech and consider that it is the third reading speech and should pertain to the bill.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Again, the office has risen you up to elevated heights, sir. Thank you very much again for your wisdom. I really do appreciate your guidance here because, given the Deputy Premier's—
The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Just as long as you take it on board, member for West Torrens.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: I will, sir. I have to say that you are one of the most respected members of the government. Your community has overwhelmingly endorsed you to be in this place, I think by a ratio of nearly seven out of 10, which is a remarkable feat for anyone. The closest I got to that was in Torrensville one election, when nearly 7½ out of 10 people voted for me, which was excellent.
The DEPUTY SPEAKER: As I said, member for West Torrens, back to the remarks.
Mr Duluk: That's because they had never met you.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: No, they had met me. I grew up with them; they knew me. This legislation is not only timely and urgent but, most importantly and regrettably, forced on the government. What concerns me the most about the way this legislation was introduced and the manner in which was introduced goes to the decision-making processes of the cabinet. It goes to the fundamental core of this new government.
Are they proactive or reactive? Reactive governments are dangerous. Reactive governments are lazy. Reactive governments get themselves in lots of trouble. Proactive governments that anticipate debate, anticipate issues, seize the agenda and use the bully pulpit for the purposes of the state and, of course, the advancement of their own agenda, are by far much better governments.
Confidence is everything because confidence begets confidence. I think anyone who has followed this debate would know quite clearly that the government has been dragged to this position kicking and screaming by the Leader of the Opposition, which is a matter of concern in itself because we expect good government, no matter who is in office. We expect ministers in the cabinet to be responsive to the needs of the public and in this area, on this issue, you would struggle to find any reasonable South Australian who would not support tightening up this very legislation.
Some of these amendments go a long way to doing that, but why did it take so long? Why did it take the front page of The Advertiser? The Advertiser and Nigel Hunt can take some credit for this. Indeed, today's editorial in the paper calls on us as a parliament, on behalf of the people of South Australia, to work together constructively, which is why I was heartened by the Attorney-General telling us in committee that she would consider our amendments between the houses, but then I was concerned straight afterwards when she dismissed our amendments as unnecessary.
I think it is pretty fair to say that these amendments are coming to the government at a hundred miles an hour in the upper house. I would struggle to think that any reasonable member of the Legislative Council would not think it appropriate to tighten up this legislation. I would struggle to think of any member of the upper house who probably would not agree to the amendments that we moved today. Indeed, I think if there was a moment of clarity from members opposite, perhaps even they would admit that they should probably have supported these amendments.
What will they tell their constituents if they are forced into a position to accept these amendments if the other place does make these final amendments? What will they say to their constituents about the Attorney-General's confession to the parliament that, indeed, someone who cannot control their sexual urges can be released under amendments moved by the government today—
Mr Brown: Who refuses to control them.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: —or someone who refuses to control them. You might remark that this amending bill—I did not pose the question as I thought it was a bit too cheeky during the name and title of the bill—perhaps would have been better framed, as others have coined it, as a bill to enact amendments to allow aged and infirmed paedophiles to be released into the community, which is not the intent of the parliament.
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: John Rau would not be impressed with that.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: It is very hard to impress the former attorney-general. He is a man of taste and distinction and I have always found it very difficult to impress him. I think the government are coming to the realisation that sitting back and hoping no-one notices that they are in government does not work as a strategy. Hope is not a strategy.
Mr DULUK: Point of order: once again the member for West Torrens is straying from your wise counsel. I would urge him to listen to you more closely.
The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Member for West Torrens, I have been guided to the House of Representatives Practice, which states that the scope of debate in the third reading is more restricted, being limited to the contents of the bill.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Sir, I agree with you—
The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Good.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: —but every house is the master of its own destiny, sir, and given the remarks—
The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Indeed, but I am asking you to come back to the bill.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Yes, sir, and I will, sir, but I just point out that, given the Deputy Premier's second reading speech—
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: Don't defy the rules.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: I am not defying them.
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: You are.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: I am not defying them. Given the Deputy Premier's second reading speech for these amendments and the Speaker's ruling during points of order moved identical to the—
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Point of order: the member for West Torrens continues to defy your ruling. You have clearly pointed out to him that this is not the second reading speech. This is the third reading speech and, unless he directs his comments to the bill itself, I would ask you to rule him out of order or follow the process in relation to—
The DEPUTY SPEAKER: The point of order is taken, Attorney-General, and I have asked the member for West Torrens repeatedly to confine his comments as the third reading speech to the bill.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Thank you again, sir, for your wisdom. As you would know, I was unsuccessful in moving an amendment to the bill and I think I can flag that the opposition will be taking this up with the crossbenchers in the Legislative Council. There may be other amendments to this that the opposition has not flagged yet. My concern is with the wording of the bill. I also point out to the house that I will be issuing FOIs immediately after this seeking the draft—
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: Is that some sort of threat?
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: No, I am just informing the house. It is courteous.
The Hon. V.A. Chapman interjecting:
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: My mother always told me that to be courteous is better than to be—
Mr Picton interjecting:
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: I am a generous man. We have concerns about the wording of subparagraph (b) in clause 4, which provides:
(b) the person no longer presents an appreciable risk to the safety of the community (whether as individuals or in general) due to the person's advanced age or infirmity.
I seek leave to continue my remarks.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Point of order, Mr Speaker: we have had that debate. He is reflecting on a vote of the house, and I would ask you to draw his remarks back. In the meantime, we will no doubt hear his erudite contribution to the bill at 7.30pm.
Mr TRELOAR: Attorney, I appreciate your point of order. The bells have now rung, so we will break for dinner and resume at 7.30pm.
Sitting suspended from 18:00 to 19:30.
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: It gives me great pleasure to continue after the dinner break my remarks in the third reading debate about the passage of legislation destined for the Legislative Council in relation to convicted paedophiles being released on licence.
As I was saying in my early remarks, the opposition intended to move some amendments to make very clear that we believed that in the debate during committee stage, through the explanations given to us by the Attorney-General, it was made very clear to us that there are scenarios that the Attorney envisages that would allow a sex offender who was in effect unrepentant and unwilling to do anything to constrain their urges or sexual tendencies towards preying on young children to be released on licence because of their age or infirmity.
The opposition also raised questions in the committee stage about whether there are alternatives to release on licence, such as prescribed locations being declared by the minister, which I think the member for Kaurna will expand on in his third reading contribution, and about whether or not there could be more investment into aged-care facilities or some sort of facility that would be able to deal with these people without having to release them into the community.
We also raised a number of questions—and I think valid questions—about the notification standards that were in place for victims. The Attorney quite rightly pointed out to us in the committee stage that it is very difficult for undeclared victims to be notified, which I think is a perfectly reasonable thing for the Attorney to say. We cannot expect the Attorney or the government to be informing people who have not made reports. Indeed, Mr Humphrys has been convicted, and I would expect only the people whose testimony was the basis of that conviction to be the ones who are notified, unless any fresh proceedings are put in place by the DPP to further charge Mr Humphrys after other people have come forward.
I note the Attorney-General mentioned one specific case of a member of the public coming forward to the Attorney, claiming that Mr Humphrys had assaulted them. I am sure that the DPP has been informed by the Attorney of those accusations, as it is a requirement for a public officer to inform the appropriate officials of any offence.
The Hon. V.A. Chapman interjecting:
Mr KOUTSANTONIS: Sorry. The Deputy Premier says she read it in the paper. In her remarks to the parliament, I thought she said she had been made aware by the member personally. If that is not the case, I am sure she will correct the record, or if I have got it wrong I apologise. But it seems to me that I am sure that this fresh revelation that the Attorney has raised in the parliament will probably sharpen the mind of the DPP for further charges to be laid against Mr Humphrys, which may of course again engage another important trial to keep this man behind bars.
Importantly, it cannot be forgotten that we are all in this place, as you say daily in our prayers, for the betterment of the people of this state. This legislation is very important, and it is important because it goes fundamentally to the safety of our community. I am the father of two daughters. I can think of nothing more horrific that could occur to them than to be sexually assaulted by a predator. I can tell you that it crosses my mind daily: where they are, who they are with, are they alone with someone who might have some sort of terrible plan for my children? You have to trust people in the end and make sure that systems are in place that the government sets to keep our children safe.
Without being hysterical about this, there is nothing more important than keeping our children safe because they are ultimately innocent. The right every South Australian has is to grow up in a community safe from predators, safe from molestation, safe from having their childhood and their life ruined by these predators. You can see what it has done to adults in their testimony. I hope that the legislation that the Attorney has introduced does that. Again, we will be moving amendments in the other place. I pose this question to the house: if no amendments are passed in the upper house and the government's legislation passes unamended, what happens if this person is still released on licence?
Mr MULLIGHAN (Lee) (19:35): I commend the Attorney for bringing this bill to the house. This is a critical bill, particularly right now, because we are seeing the potential release into the community of not only a convicted sex offender and paedophile but somebody to be released into the community who cannot control, or is unwilling to control, their sexual desires and hence is, perhaps on any layperson's assessment, likely to offend.
I commend the Attorney, but in part it is done somewhat grudgingly because I think the bill being brought to the house is being done under those circumstances as well: somewhat grudgingly. I think it was on 27 March, when the decision was made by the Supreme Court to release Colin Humphrys into the community, that we were told by the Attorney—or at least the media was told by the Attorney—that it would be prudent to wait to see whether the DPP would exercise its discretion and appeal against the Supreme Court's ruling.
Of course, we had to wait with bated breath to see whether the DPP would do that and there did not seem to be any countenance from the Deputy Premier to exercise her legal right and discretion to direct the DPP to do so. Happily, it seemed the DPP's concerns about this matter aligned with both the Labor opposition's and the community's and not necessarily with the Attorney-General's, and that appeal was lodged.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Point of order: as has been previously pointed out in this debate on third reading speeches, the commentary is to be confined to the bill, not as per a second reading speech. There are much more confined rules in relation to third reading speeches. The member for West Torrens departed from that notwithstanding, but I would ask, given some opening statements that have been made by the member for Lee, that he understand what the rules are and the rules for the third reading speech to be confined to comments in relation to the bill be brought to his attention.
The SPEAKER: I will listen carefully. Member for Lee.
Mr MULLIGHAN: I thank the deputy leader for her forbearance. Not only had the DPP then lodged an appeal but, when further commentary was made in the media about this matter, we were then told that no legislation should be brought before the house because it would be most prudent to wait until a decision was made by the Full Court of the Supreme Court so that the parliament could understand the reasons within that decision by the Full Court.
As you can imagine, given the delay between 27 March and when the DPP made it public that they would be appealing, and then the further delay between the DPP making that appeal, it being heard in the court, and I think, if I have my dates correct, on 13 May, that case being concluded before the Full Court of the Supreme Court, we are still awaiting a judgement. Over that period of more than two months now, we have growing consternation throughout the community in South Australia but particularly in the community of Bowden where this offender was set to be released following the original decision by Justice Kelly. At each stage, we had been told by the Attorney-General that the parliament had time and that we would be best off waiting. What changed? I am pleased to say that the member for Croydon, the local member, raised this—
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Again, we have no direct attention to the bill. This commentary is just a repeat, a regurgitation of what has previously been asserted, a rewriting of history; nevertheless, the rules are very clear—
Members interjecting:
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: No, it's not debate.
Mr Mullighan: It is a third reading debate.
The SPEAKER: Order! I will listen to the point of order.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: It is not debate. It is the third reading of the bill and the rules have been pointed out. If the preceding speaker wants to spend their 20 minutes doing a third reading speech, they are perfectly entitled to do so, but the rules require that in the third reading contribution they stick to the contents of the bill. Clearly, another five minutes has passed and we still do not have any attention to the construction of the bill.
The SPEAKER: I am sure that the member for Lee is returning to the substance of the bill. Again, I will listen attentively.
Mr MULLIGHAN: Finally, we had some agitation of this issue and a commitment that a bill be brought before the house, which is terrific news. We are told, of course, that a bill had been in the workings for many, many weeks, presumably since 27 March. In the committee stage, we were told that there were no less than nine versions of the bill before we got to the six pages that this bill constitutes before us here—nine versions and six pages.
What we learnt during the committee stage was that large sections of the bill, if not all of it, except for perhaps the cover page and the first half of page 2, which is a table of contents, have been copied either from existing legislation or from other sources. I am drawing the attention of the Attorney and the house, in particular, to schedule 2, which constitutes two pages of the six pages. Really, what we are down to is the construction of clauses 3 and 4. In questioning, I sought very specifically to make clear to the Attorney what the parliament is attempting to do here.
We have had a situation where the Supreme Court has exercised its discretion to release a convicted offender out into the community against the advice, according to the Attorney-General, of the Parole Board. What we have learnt through the questions raised in the committee stage is that a person who is incapable of controlling or unwilling to control their own sexual instincts under the bill will be able to be released into the community. They will be able to be released into the community so long as they satisfy only one of two other tests in the bill: one is that they are old and the other is that they are infirm.
The test for their age or infirmity, being reason to release them into the community, is that their age or their infirmity means that they no longer present an appreciable risk. Under questioning, the Attorney admitted that the bill, which has been in process for many weeks and which has seen nine drafts, the vast majority of which has been copied from exiting legislation, means that these people can still be released into the community. So does the bill and its clauses seek to remedy the problem that we have before us in the case of Colin Humphrys?
The Attorney has made very clear what her view is, that is, that these matters should be determined by the discretion of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court only. That discretion should not be fettered in any way by a report from the Parole Board and it should not be fettered in any way by the advice from medical practitioners—bearing in mind that it may be a case like Colin Humphrys, or indeed, of course, given we are discussing Colin Humphrys, where the advice from the Parole Board is that they should not be released—that they should not be released because they are unwilling or unable to control their sexual desires.
What we are left with is a law that does not sufficiently constrict the discretion of the Supreme Court, and so the decision that was made in the case of Colin Humphrys by Justice Kelly can presumably be made again. This ninth draft—or perhaps it is the 10th, I am not sure if there were nine preceding and this is subsequent—of how the government proposes to address this has little constriction or little bearing on how these people will be treated in the future.
When we asked the Attorney why subparagraph (b) in clauses 3 and 4—and, as we saw later on, in schedule 2—were included, the explanation was that this was consistent with the discussions we had in the redrafting of the Sentencing Act, which was passed by this parliament sometime last year—sometime last year, in the absence of the context of a convicted paedophile who is unwilling or unable to control their sexual desires being released into the community of Bowden.
I guess in one respect it is not unreasonable for the Attorney to rely on a former debate and a former interpretation of what is sufficient constriction of judicial discretion in this regard by looking to the past and how this parliament has done it. However, this parliament, as those of us who have been lucky enough to be members of it in the past and those of us who have recently joined the parliament would realise, passes dozens if not hundreds of laws each session. The reason for this is that there is a need or changing community standards, or changing practices somewhere in the community are invoking a type of behaviour not previously countenanced by this parliament that needs to be addressed.
What we are seeing here is behaviour by the Supreme Court that clearly has not been previously countenanced. That is what needs to be addressed. If there is insufficient constriction of the court's discretion, if the court can receive a report from the Parole Board and put it to one side and deem that its own judgement is better, if a court can receive reports from medical practitioners—who also have the capacity to seek further advice beyond their own expertise in compiling reports for the benefit of the Supreme Court report they have to produce—and if those reports can also find similar to the Parole Board that a person should not be released, if that court can then make a decision that that person should be released, clearly this bill is not sufficiently addressing the ill we are seeking to address.
That is particularly the case because, despite the Attorney initially telling me under questioning that only the person can be an applicant for release under licence, we know from the existing Sentencing Act that the DPP can make that application as well. Surely the mere fact that the DPP is making an application on behalf of a person is somewhat persuasive to the court. If the DPP is putting to a court that in their view this person should be eligible for release, from the outset that will influence the court.
Because the DPP is entitled to be an applicant in this process then, strangely, in the court's consideration of that application there is essentially nobody to oppose that application. What person, when an application has been made for their release by the DPP, is going to oppose their own release in the DPP's application? Of course they would not. So, the court is only left with one or two parties to a hearing advocating for the release of a person under licence and with no-one else, essentially, to oppose that release. Of course that will be persuasive to the court.
The opposition did, I think, what is reasonable in this bill and determined, after hearing from the Attorney, how many opportunities there are, for the person, for the DPP or for the person's legal representation, to make a compelling case that they should be released, despite the fact that they are unwilling or unable to control their sexual desires, that the other part of the clause, which determines whether the court will exercise that discretion, being their age or infirmity, should be removed, so it solely comes down to their sexual urge.
I do not know whether it was just out of wanting to seek some further and better advice, but the Attorney took another view. I think that is regrettable, but hopefully that is fixed up between the houses. I hope that the other place is able to sharpen up this bill and make sure that the court does not have that range of discretion, because it is not only conceivable that somebody would seek to take advantage of that court's discretion: that court's discretion has already been taken advantage of. A decision has already been made by the Supreme Court to release under licence somebody who is unwilling or unable to control their sexual desires, and that, quite frankly, is not good enough when we are seeking to amend the Sentencing Act to ensure that this does not occur again.
I began my comments by congratulating the Attorney-General on bringing forward this bill. I would also say that I am pleased that she answered the questions that were put to her during the committee stage in what I feel was a forthcoming and genuine manner. It was certainly an about-face from her introductory comments, but what I am concerned about is what she told me, the member for Croydon (the Leader of the Opposition), the member for West Torrens and the member for Kaurna, and that is again that what she has claimed publicly—and I noticed even as recently as this afternoon in a Twitter post, as well as in this chamber—that people who are unwilling or unable to control their sexual desires will not be able to be released due to the passage of this bill. That is frankly wrong. It is completely wrong, and it needs to be clear in the minds of all members that that is not what this bill does. This bill provides a much broader discretion to the court.
In principle, on general matters, I think I would probably align my views with the Deputy Premier and Attorney-General that it is usually important to provide the judiciary with a sufficient discretion to take into account as broad a range of matters as comes before it in making decisions. I think both the former attorney-general and the current Attorney-General and those before them and those on both sides of the chamber have usually made comments to that effect and I think, as a principle—
The Hon. V.A. Chapman interjecting:
Mr MULLIGHAN: That is right—maybe not all, but most. That is a fair principle. But there are times when, unfortunately, the decisions that are made in the exercise of that discretion, which is provided to the judiciary within legislation, is exercised in a manner that is inconsistent with community expectations, and that is usually the driver for change in legislation. That is what we have in this matter here that is to be addressed and countenanced in this bill.
I do not propose to make any further comments except to say that I hope that some of whatever was contained in the previous eight or nine drafts, which I hope showed a more fulsome and robust constriction of the discretion of the court in determining these matters, might find its way back into the final piece of law that is passed by this parliament, and that it might find its voice, not necessarily here, but in the other place. As it stands, this bill does not address what has been promised to the people of South Australia and, most importantly, does not address the case of Colin Humphrys, as has been most recently decided in the decision of Justice Kelly.
The SPEAKER: Before I call the next speaker, I would like to refer to the House of Representatives Practice, 6th edition, which talks about members' obligations under the third reading and final passage, where it states:
The scope of debate [during this stage] is more restricted than at the second reading stage, being limited to the contents of the bill—that is, the matters contained in the clauses and schedules of the bill. It is not in order to re-open or repeat debate on matters discussed on the motion for the second reading or during the detail stage, and it has been held that the debate on the motion for the third reading is limited to the bill as agreed to by the House to that stage. Clauses may not be referred to in detail in the third reading debate, nor may matters already decided during the detail stage be alluded to.
I just remind members of that.
The Hon. V.A. Chapman: That's for your benefit, Chris.
The SPEAKER: No, it is for the benefit of all members, Deputy Premier. The leader.
Mr MALINAUSKAS (Croydon—Leader of the Opposition) (19:56): I will try to stay as close to it as I can. Thank you, Mr Speaker. Let me again place on the record my applause for the Deputy Premier moving quickly to introduce this bill into parliament. Clearly, the opposition's support for the overall objective of this legislation is on the record previously. The opposition has been very keen to invite the government to work with the opposition to achieve the important objective of keeping Mr Humphrys in gaol for so long as he is unwilling and unable to demonstrate his capacity to control his sexual instincts.
I was very clear early yesterday morning in stating my appetite and desire to work with the government on legislative reform to achieve that objective. Largely, the government's bill does that, and that is why the opposition has elected to work with the government's bill rather than with our own bill, which we would have otherwise introduced into the parliament today. However, I was disappointed when the Deputy Premier and Attorney-General neglected to take up that sincere hand of bipartisanship yesterday morning when she initially indicated on ABC radio that they would not—
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Point of order: I can appreciate that the Leader of the Opposition is new in this house. Twice you have read out the directions in relation to third reading speeches. The preliminary is over. We do not mind a couple of introductory sentences, but let us get back to the bill as per the requirements.
The SPEAKER: I think the leader is coming back to the bill shortly.
Mr MALINAUSKAS: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Indeed, I was, because there was a lack of clarity in regard to the government's intentions as a result of the remarks they have made on the public record. Nevertheless, the opposition acknowledges the rapid change in position that the government has had and applauds it.
In regard to the bill that we have that is presumably being sent to the Legislative Council, the opposition remains somewhat concerned around some deficiencies within the bill. My particular concern is that there remains potential for an offender to be released on licence even if they have not demonstrated an absolute ability that they are both willing and able to control their sexual instincts.
The concern particularly relates to the fact that there appears to be an opening within the bill as it currently stands for a court to determine that an offender who is unwilling and unable to control their sexual instincts could be released on licence, provided they demonstrate that there is no appreciable risk as a result of their age or infirmity. We do not believe that is a particularly practical or, indeed, overly safe version of the bill. The opposition has already indicated our appetite to amend that particular section. I hope that subsequent changes are made between the houses or, indeed, in the Legislative Council.
The other concerns that we have about the bill relate to the role of the Parole Board in such matters. The government has indicated again on the record that there is a circumstance where the Parole Board could advise against the release of an offender on licence and then the court order their release. That seems to be somewhat illogical. If the Parole Board, with all the expertise available to it, makes a determination that it would not be safe for someone to be released on licence, then, for the life of me, why would we want a court releasing them on licence?
This is not about circumventing the court's absolute position as the ultimate arbiter on such matters. The court would still have the ability to preclude someone from being released into the community even if the Parole Board were silent on the issue or supportive of someone's release. This is about ensuring that a court does not release someone when the Parole Board is of the view that that should not occur in the interests of community safety. Again, this is an issue that we hope the government changes its position on over the next 24 hours, as quickly as it has changed its position on this bill already in the last 24 hours. I draw great confidence from the wisdom of the Deputy Premier, the Attorney-General, to change the position of the government on such matters out of the example of it changing its position on such matters in the last 24 hours.
Finally, the opposition and I remain concerned about the prospect of repeat applicants, offenders, seeking to be released on licence. The circumstance of an offender who is released on licence can in many regards be construed as an extraordinary privilege in the context of what they have done previously to warrant an indeterminate sentence and then subsequently a release on licence. We think it is reasonable that someone in such a circumstance, who was released on licence and then breaches one of the conditions attached to their licence, should then be reincarcerated and prohibited from making such an application to be released again for some time. That would strike me as an eminently reasonable position.
However, the principal concern relates to this question of someone being released into the community who is unwilling or unable to control their sexual urges. We think that should be a fundamental elementary test that is applied and passed in every instance that an offender gets released on licence. We would encourage the government to consider that position over the next 24 hours or the period that we have before us or before the matter is dealt with in the Legislative Council.
The Attorney-General has indicated that there are other email addresses apart from the ones that have been publicised on her own website—both in the parliament and indeed on her own administered website.
The Hon. V.A. Chapman interjecting:
The SPEAKER: Yes, please bring it back to the bill, Leader of the Opposition.
Mr MALINAUSKAS: I was just making the point, Mr Speaker, that we will communicate—
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: Point of order: the Leader of the Opposition has 13 minutes. I am sure he can fill it up with some useful contribution on the bill without repeating things in breach of the orders.
The SPEAKER: Relevance; yes, please bring it back to the bill.
Mr MALINAUSKAS: I am simply pointing out, Mr Speaker, that we will be corresponding with the Attorney-General by any means that she desires, even ones that go beyond what she publicises on her own website. The bill, though, in its essence probably goes to the principal objective and concern that we have. Ever since the news of Mr Humphrys' release into the community was made public, it is fair to say that I, probably more than any other member in this place, have had a number of representations made to me from members of the community.
In my capacity as the member for Croydon, I have had a lot of people within the community contact me concerned about the prospect of Mr Humphrys being released into the community. Indeed, I myself am a resident within the Bowden Brompton area. I myself, with my wife, am raising young children in the area and note that there are a lot of great playgrounds, a lot of great childcare centres and a number of different schools within the Bowden Brompton area—within itself, not within the vicinity of it but in the area itself. It strikes me and the community generally that the proposition that Mr Humphrys could be released into our community, with so many great facilities, young families and so many services provided to children in that area, as being somewhat absurd.
I have felt an obligation here to act on a number of different levels: an obligation to act as a leader within this parliament, an obligation to act as the local MP and local resident and also an obligation to act as a father concerned for the safety of his children and the community generally. This is a concern that I am sure every member within this place would share. I do not think any member in this place would feel comfortable with the prospect of a repeat sex offender, the likes of Mr Humphrys, being released into their community.
This bill hopefully goes a long way to addressing the collective concern that we all share. The bill, we believe, largely goes a long way forward to achieving that objective and realising a safe community, which is a principal and paramount obligation of everyone in this place, particularly the government. Despite our concerns, we look forward to the swift passage of the bill in this place. My sincere desire to work with the Attorney and the government on this matter is maintained.
I have every confidence that, if the government is keen to work with us rather than to make political pointscoring the name of the game, which was alluded to earlier in the day, it is fair to say we can achieve that objective and do a good thing for community safety in this state.
Mr PICTON (Kaurna) (20:07): I rise to speak on the third reading debate on this very important piece of legislation, the Sentencing (Release on Licence) Amendment Bill 2018, the second piece of legislation this parliament has dealt with. As other members have said in the third reading debate, the opposition will be supporting this bill, although we hold some reservations, which we have outlined in the debate so far, in terms of our concern about some of the drafting of this bill and that it might not meet the objectives that the parliament and certainly we on this side are trying to achieve with this bill.
Of course, this bill has followed the very concerning case of Mr Humphrys' release on licence, where we have seen the Supreme Court make a decision in terms of Mr Humphrys being released into the Bowden Brompton area, despite the fact that the court was presented with evidence that he is not capable of controlling, or unwilling to control, his sexual desires. Also, that the Parole Board was adamant in their view, as was the DPP, that he should not be released because he is a risk to the public.
Despite that, the Supreme Court, or a single justice at this point in time, has decided that he should be released, and that is now being appealed in the Full Court of the Supreme Court. I am sure everybody in this parliament hopes that the DPP is successful in overturning the decision of the Supreme Court and ensuring that somebody who has committed some very serious acts and serious crimes and has shown no willingness to control their behaviour is not released.
These are very serious powers that any parliament should contemplate because what we are talking about here is the power of detaining somebody after the end of their sentence for committing a crime. Mr Humphry's sentence for his crimes has finished but he is on continuing detention because of his inability to control himself and his sexual predator behaviour in the community—something very serious obviously but I think it is important and something the community who sent us here, only recently, a couple of months ago on election day, expect our parliament to take action on to protect their communities, and to protect in particular our most vulnerable members of the community, our children.
I am very glad and delighted that this parliament is now debating this bill. As has been discussed, there was another version of this bill that the Leader of the Opposition and the Hon. Kyam Maher had drafted as well that we released, but we are delighted that the Attorney has today introduced her version of this bill into the parliament. However, there are some concerns that we have. There are some particular concerns where we see some deficiencies in what has been presented in this bill that we have elaborated on during the committee stage of the debate, and we see that our bill was superior in a number of regards.
Firstly, in terms of the Parole Board, as has been discussed in the debate already, and as the Attorney herself has outlined, the Parole Board do a very difficult job and in my view they do it on the whole quite well. I certainly would not want to be on the Parole Board having to decide lots of the tricky things that they have to decide. They are certainly one of the closest bodies in touch with analysing the behaviour of criminals in our justice system, in our corrections system, and understanding their abilities and their capacity for rehabilitation and to control their behaviour in the future.
So I think it is very serious when we see a recommendation from the Parole Board that an offender who has been detained under this regime not be released from an institution. Not only should the court take that seriously but that should be enough to prevent that application from being considered by the court to begin with. If the Parole Board have a view that somebody is so serious or so unwilling or so unable to control themselves then that is something that should rule them out of contention from being considered by the court for release. That is something that we have put in our bill. Unfortunately that is not something in this bill that we are debating right now.
I hope that is something that the government will consider adding in to the legislation between here and the other place. If that is not the case, then I am sure that that might be something that the other place might consider in terms of adding as an additional amendment to ensure that there is an added level of security because, if we do not have that, then it raises the possibility of somebody who is detained under this regime, who the Parole Board adamantly says should not be released, is released by the court. That is exactly what happened in the Humphrys case and it is exactly what we do not want to see repeated in the future.
The second matter where we see a significant issue with what has been proposed by the government is in relation to clause 3 of the bill, which amends section 58 in terms of (1a)(b) and also clause 4, which amends section 59(1a)(b) where this bill creates what I regard as a loophole. We have been very firm that we believe that if a person is not capable of controlling or is unwilling to control their sexual instincts then that should disqualify them from consideration for release under the Sentencing Act.
What this bill does is create a separate category, where a person can still be unwilling or not capable of controlling their sexual behaviour yet no longer present an appreciable risk to the safety of the community, whether as an individual or in general, due to their advanced age or infirmity. That means that there is a way for a person not to have to prove their ability to control their sexual instincts if they can show that they are so old that they are not a risk or they are so infirm that they are not a risk. It is an ability to get around that earlier measure, but we think that earlier measure should be the predominant one. That is the one the courts should decide on.
We should not have another avenue where people can consider it. We know, and we have seen this time and time again, that, as tight as we try to make this, there will be people—and, as I have said previously, these people have nothing but time on their hands—who will try to challenge this and get through every possible loophole. I am very concerned that we are creating a loophole that will see people released whom the community at large and, I am sure, this parliament would not want to see released into our community. Again, we hope that the government consider amendments to this section between here and the other place. They have said that they have a willingness to do that.
They have a willingness to consider it, although there was some concern, in some of the statements made during the committee stage, that maybe they do not. I hope that they do. I hope that they see the light in terms of addressing this section of it. We know through the debate and the committee stage that this section was added in one of the nine drafts created through the Attorney-General's office after recommendations from the Director of Public Prosecutions himself. We are not sure of the circumstances of that advice. We are not sure what other recommendations or advice the DPP made to the Attorney-General. We have asked for that and, hopefully, that will be coming between the houses.
I think it is very important that we see the full context of that advice as to why this section should be added when, in our view, it adds an additional layer of risk in an area where we want to have very clear, very firm laws that do not create risk. We also asked the Attorney-General why such a provision should be in there. One of the answers was that it relates to people who have become old—and, obviously, many of these people will be in that category—and whom the government or one of its agencies might want to establish in aged care rather than in a corrections institution. I think that creates a number of concerns, queries and points of contention in the future as well.
Firstly, as I outlined, there is an ability for the government to declare an institution, whether it be an aged-care institution, that has appropriate safeguards around it, where that person could be managed within their existing detention order in a secure setting without being released into the community. It sounds like that has not been contemplated: this section has been contemplated instead. I hope that the government, if that is really their concern in this regard, will contemplate other options for placing those people rather than placing them into the community.
The other risk of placing these people into community aged-care facilities is the risk it will create in those facilities. We know the risk of elder abuse. We know the risk of damage that can occur in aged-care facilities. We do not want to see this exacerbated by some of these very serious offenders being put from gaol straight into a community aged-care setting just because they are of an advanced age under the definition of this bill. I think it would concern a lot of members of the community if we were to start seeing applications made to the Supreme Court along those lines. I think that is another reason why the government should review their position in regard to that section and consider taking it out.
Of course, there is no detail about how they would manage these aged-care residents, how they would protect the safety of other aged-care residents if these offenders were being released. We have no details as to how many people in that category they are concerned about or whether or not those sorts of people currently have applications before the court or are in the process of making applications before a court.
Another question I asked was in terms of how many applications had been made, and that is another thing that had to be taken on notice to be provided between the houses. This is an area that is full of significant risk. It is an area where we seek clarification between the houses to make sure that we can provide the community with the certainty that they require.
There is another very significant element that is missing from here that was part of our bill that we presented publicly and that we are going to present here in relation to repeat offenders. We have a strong view that people who breach the orders under which they have been released into the community under this section of the Sentencing Act do not deserve second chance after second chance after second chance. That needs to be timed.
We need to have a process whereby people who are given a second chance under this section—hopefully, a much strengthened section—do not breach the orders under which they have been released into the community, and if they do so, that they do not get another chance to breach those orders once again. That was something we included in our bill. It has not been included in this bill before the house, and we hope again that that is something the government will consider closely before it is debated in the other place to ensure that the community has a lot more confidence in regard to the future.
I think a number of other matters that I raised questions about before the committee stage are quite important. One involves the appearance of people before the court. At the moment, the act is very clear in that it is the applicant and the DPP. I think there are a number of issues there; one is: if the DPP does not have a view that is necessarily supported by the government or the community, what ability does the government have to make a separate set of views before the court? There is none in this bill and the Attorney sees no reason to instigate that.
Interestingly, she referred to the powers of the Attorney-General to direct the Director of Public Prosecutions, which I thought was interesting. I thought that was something the Attorney had generally spoken against, but apparently that is something she might be willing to countenance in the future in relation to this bill. That is something we will have to monitor in the future.
Another important issue is in relation to how this bill is going to affect both the current case that we are talking about and other cases that we know are out there or are soon to be looming before the courts. There was discussion at the committee stage in regard to the case of Mr Gavin Schuster, who is a very serious offender, somebody who had almost been released previously. As the Attorney said, he has an application before the Supreme Court at the moment, but it has been adjourned and has not been decided on by the Supreme Court.
The Attorney has assured the house that this bill will cover that case and I hope that it does. I hope that this means that Mr Schuster will not be released. I also hope that there has been sufficient work done by the Attorney and her office across those nine drafts to make sure that other cases they know the details of that are looming before the courts—and the Attorney said that something like 27 people are detained under this section, so there are a regular number of applications made.
I hope that a lens has been put over this legislation in regard to those future cases coming before the courts to make sure that this legislation is going to be able to deal with them and that we are going to hopefully not have the sorts of loopholes that I feel we might have again in the future. I think that that is very important for the future as well.
Another very important issue that needs some debate and discussion is in relation to the location that people are released into, if they are to be released by the Supreme Court. We had a discussion, briefly, about one of the issues with the most recent case, the Humphrys case, where the court decided to make public the location in which the person was to be released, which is obviously a bit controversial. It does provide some level of certainty for the community—but obviously with a limited amount of information to act on that information—to provide themselves with any comfort.
We are very keen to prosecute to make sure that victims have as much say in this matter as possible to ensure that, when the locations are determined, victims are consulted and, if locations have to change from time to time in the future, that victims are also consulted at that point of time. I asked in detail about what the procedures are when locations have to change in the future. If somebody is released and their housing situation cannot last for whatever reason, what process do they go through to change that? Is it to the Parole Board? Is it back to the Supreme Court? There was not quite a clarity of answer. Hopefully, that is something that can be clarified between the houses as well.
I hope that we are making sure that victims are consulted, not just in the initial location of the person but also, should they have to move in the future, to make sure that the victims are consulted. I think that is a very reasonable thing to do. In what would be a horrible situation—to be a victim of such a crime—the least that we can do is consult the victims in that situation. This bill deals with some of the worst offending people we have in this state.
It is a serious bill and it involves some very significant powers and significant oversight of our courts. I hope that we make sure it is as robust as possible to ensure that we do not see some of the people we are talking about released into our community—people who are unwilling and unable to ensure that they can control their sexual instincts in the future. I hope that the Attorney-General and the government consider very closely our amendments between the houses because I think that they will strengthen the bill and strengthen the safety of our community.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN (Bragg—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General) (20:27): There being no other speakers, I indicate that I appreciate the contribution of members of the house. I ask that they give favourable consideration to this bill. If they do not, then so be it. Although mixed messages have been received in relation to their commitment to the advancement of protection of the community in light of the case that has been detailed—
Mr PICTON: Point of order, Mr Speaker: if this is a third reading speech, as I suspect it is, surely the Attorney has to abide by the same standard as everybody else?
The SPEAKER: Deputy Premier, please keep your remarks to the restricted form of the third reading.
The Hon. V.A. CHAPMAN: I thank members for their contribution and look forward to the passage of this bill. As indicated, answers and consideration of one amendment that was presented will be given our due consideration between the houses.
Bill read a third time and passed.