Bills

Statutes Amendment (Youths Sentenced as Adults) Bill

Second Reading

Debate resumed.

Mr KNOLL (Schubert) (12:10): I also rise to oppose the Statutes Amendment (Youths Sentenced as Adults) Bill 2017. In doing so, I want to take the parliament on a path of how this process is used currently and then what the government is seeking to do and to change as part of this amendment bill. Youths, when charged with crime, get dealt with in a very different way from adults through the Youth Court. There are separate sets of penalties. There is a separate set of objects and sentencing guidelines that deal with how we approach youth sentencing given the fact that young people, those under the age of 18, are very different to adults in the way they conduct themselves. They are very different in their level of emotional maturity and they are very different in their level of cognitive reasoning.

There is a reason why we do not allow people under the age of 18 to vote. There is a reason why we do not allow people under the age of 18 to volunteer for military duties. There is a reason why we have a threshold for when young people can drive, have sex, get married or do a whole host of other things in relation to their own wellbeing, especially in relation to parents and the parental role in the lives of young people, and parents and guardians being responsible for children up until the point at which they turn 18. This in turn is reflected in the way our court system deals with offending by young people. It is why it is entirely proper that we have a separate Youth Court, a separate structure and a separate system via the Young Offenders Act as to how we deal with young people in our system.

There are circumstances under which youths can be tried as adults, and those circumstances are extremely broad. I look here at the factors that must be taken into consideration: the gravity of the offence with which the youth is to be charged, if the offence is part of a pattern of repeated offending, if the youth is a serious firearm offender, the degree to which the youth has previously complied with any undertakings imposed by the Youth Court or any bail agreements, the behaviour of the youth during any previous periods of detention, and, where they have previously been released on licence, the degree to which they have complied with the conditions of the licence.

That is extremely broad, an extremely broad set of circumstances in which young people can be tried as adults. The act goes on to talk about homicide and manslaughter as cases where youths will be tried in a superior court, but it is not limited to those things. It is not limited to those serious violent offences for which the public would consider that youths need to be tried as adults. The descriptions that I have just read into Hansard are much broader than that.

When we look at changing this system, looking at where we are going to try youths as adults and now, under this amendment bill, sentence youths as adults, we are not just talking about those who are alleged to have committed serious violent offences: we are talking about a much broader set of circumstances. It is why, in this case, with this kneejerk reaction the government has had, they have sent a sledgehammer to crack what otherwise should be a walnut. I think what they have done is that, in trying to fix a very specific problem, they have brought a very broad solution to the parliament.

If we are to look at more specific proposals around youth sentencing as adults, then we need to make sure that they are only limited to those circumstances that the community feels are most appropriate. The objects of the Young Offenders Act outline that when imposing sanctions on a youth for illegal conduct 'regard should be had to the deterrent effect any proposed sanction may have on the youth'—a very important consideration. It is there as the first object in understanding, when we try to sentence youths, what the number one effect is, and that is: to what extent is there a deterrent effect that this sanction will have on the youth offender? Paragraph (b) states:

(b) if the sanctions are imposed by a court on a youth who is being dealt with as an adult (whether because the youth's conduct is part of a pattern of repeated illegal conduct or for some other reason), regard should be had to—

(i) the deterrent effect any proposed sanction may have on other youths;

and

(ii) the balance to be achieved between—

(A) the protection of the community; and

(B) the need to rehabilitate the youth.

When reading those objects, one would consider that that is an appropriate way to deal with those who do not have full emotional maturity, cognitive reasoning, and those who are learning to become adults in an adult world. What we see here in this amendment bill is it makes the paramount consideration outweigh any other consideration, object or policy, including the object and statutory policies referred to in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) and the need to rehabilitate the youth.

Essentially, the government wants to throw all of that out of the window in every single case where youths are tried as adults. We would say that that is far too broad. If we were merely talking about the most serious and heinous of crimes then that would be different, but we are talking about something that is extremely broad, and it is dangerous. The reason why is that we are talking about young people at a stage of their life where we have the ability to intervene in their future behaviour.

We are talking about young people, mostly from difficult circumstances, where we have a choice about whether or not we try to ensure that they are fully functioning members of society who contribute to society who, through better preventative efforts and better rehabilitative efforts, can actually go on to be fully contributing members of our society; or, we can turn them down a path where we are going to see increased repeat offending, we are going to see increased violence further down the track, and we are going to see a less safe community as a result.

That is why we stand here and oppose this bill—because we believe that is going to lead to worse outcomes, not better. If we were in this parliament and the Attorney-General was discussing ways in which we were going to help divert young people from lives of crime and violent offending, then let's have that discussion, but that is not what is being advanced. We need to look at ways to make those interventions.

I have recently been out looking at community and non-government organisations who work at that coalface and do the very difficult work with people who have not had the benefit of good upbringings, who have not had the benefit of parents who were there to guide them and teach them the lessons that needed to be taught. These are people who have witnessed and seen crime themselves, whether that be abuse of their parents, abuse by their parents, drug taking, alcohol abuse, or various forms of violent offending. Much work needs to be done to divert those people back to normal functioning in society so that we can have a safer community, and so that we can prevent these crimes from happening in the first place instead of just trying to be the ambulance at the bottom of the cliff.

We are open to other approaches. We are open to working together to make our community safer but, for the various reasons that the member for Bragg (the shadow attorney-general) has outlined, this is not that bill. As the shadow attorney has outlined, there are significant concerns and significant deleterious consequences as a result of passing this piece of legislation, so we must, as a matter of good conscience, oppose it; however, we will work constructively to make sure that community safety is at the heart of what we are seeking to do, and we will make sure that the best interests of all South Australians are very much in our minds as we make decisions on these very difficult pieces of legislation going forward.

The Hon. J.R. RAU (Enfield—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General, Minister for Justice Reform, Minister for Planning, Minister for Industrial Relations, Minister for Child Protection Reform, Minister for the Public Sector, Minister for Consumer and Business Services, Minister for the City of Adelaide) (12:19): I would like to say a few things about this provision and what we have heard today. In reverse order, the member for Schubert made a sterling effort of making a silk purse out of a sow's ear. It was fairly clear to all of us that he was struggling to find any form of plausible explanation for the position he is adopting. As for the member for Bragg, as usual her contribution was replete with nonsense, half-truths and rubbish, and I will go into that in a little more detail shortly.

Something struck me the other day. I was at home, watching the television. I am not sure about other people, but my TV has a lot of rubbish on it. I have to keep flicking through the channels to see if there is anything worth looking at, and quite often there is nothing at all. I stopped the other night because something came on that did bring me back to this place in a way, and I will give you a few clues about what it was. It was on one of those channels towards the higher number end.

I will give you a few names of some of the people who were on this channel (and this is a bit of a test for members, to see if they can pick up on what I am talking about) to see if you can identify what show I finally got onto. They were: Randy Orton, the Undertaker, Roman Reigns, Bray Wyatt and Dwayne Johnson. Do those names mean anything to anybody here? Possibly not. The show is called WWE SmackDown. Occasionally, they interview these people and they make contributions. You can imagine the sorts of contributions they make: they are high on hyperbole and low on relevance or content.

It was at that point I thought, 'I've seen this before. This is the member for Bragg.' This is the level it has got down to, the sort of contribution we get. Really, it is actually embarrassing—the use of the word 'unconscionable', which from the member for Bragg is like using a comma or a form of punctuation that you litter every sentence with, or the demeanour of constant indignation, which appears to overtake her every time she is in this place, and the fact that she is always affronted by something. It is very difficult to have a civilised conversation with somebody who approaches it constantly from that particular perspective.

The proposals in the bill are a reasonable and measured response to legitimate community expectations about a small number, I emphasise, of very dangerous individuals who, if at liberty, represent a significant risk to the safety of other citizens. In particular, other law-abiding citizens. The decision as to whether or not a youth would be affected by these provisions is not made by me. It is not made by this parliament. It is made by the court.

The bill does not seek to change the test as to whether a person is a serious young offender and therefore should be tried in an adult court. We are not touching that test. That test remains entirely in the hands of the court, as it presently is and should be. All we are saying is that if an offender meets that very, very high threshold, then that offender should be sentenced as an adult.

I want to deal with two completely bogus propositions put by the member for Bragg and the member for Schubert, first of all that it is very easy for somebody to wind up in these circumstances—false. We have not changed the test for the type of young offender who could be tried as an adult. We have left that completely undisturbed, and it would be unusual for more than a couple of young offenders to get into that category in any given year. This is not opening the floodgates, and we have not touched that test, so the member for Schubert's observation that it is easy for somebody to fall into this category is completely false. It is very difficult for somebody to fall into this category, and they do so at the behest of the court, not the parliament, and we are not changing that test—point No. 1.

Point No. 2 is that just because they are being sentenced as an adult does not mean that a particular youth and another particular adult charged with the same offence would get the same sentence. It just means that the sentencing principles are the same and, in particular, that the safety of the community is paramount. That does not mean that no consideration is given to rehabilitation.

It does not mean that no consideration is given to training or other forms of, hopefully, remedial activity, but it does mean that, if this young person is so dangerous to other members of the community that they warrant being tried as an adult, and the court hearing the evidence determines that they represent a significant risk to other members of the public, they may use that as the primary consideration in sentencing that youth.

The government makes no apology for this. The position is that the government at least has been very carefully listening to the public outrage about two recent horrific incidents on our roads—the first one: as it turns out, the driver of the vehicle appears to have been an 18 year old, so this does not necessarily affect that case in any way; the second one: as I understand it, the driver of the vehicle was a youth, and this bill may affect the sentencing principles in the event of that individual being dealt with by the courts in an adult court. We make no apology for that.

What I would like to ask the opposition is: have they have paid any attention at all to what the public thinks about this? They are in here wringing their hands saying, 'Oh, we can't do this. We can't do this.' What we are saying—and let me be very clear about this—is that if a youth is tried as an adult and determined to be so seriously out of line that the court's determination that they be tried as an adult—not mine, the court's—and the court is of the view that there is a risk to public safety about that youth, that will prevail in sentencing considerations, just as it would if they were an adult. I am very happy to defend that, very happy indeed.

We are not walking away from a commitment to youth justice. We are not walking away from any commitment to young people being given every opportunity to rehabilitate themselves—that is fine and it is appropriate. But in exceptional cases, to be determined by the courts, if a young person represents a serious risk to the community, the courts should have the capacity to protect the community from that individual. That is what this is about.

This is about public safety. We are putting public safety first. It is self-evident, from what has been said by the member for Bragg—although she has thrown as much confetti into the air as she possibly can—that is not their primary consideration. I am not quite sure what their primary consideration is, but we are expected in this place to do things that protect the community from harm or unreasonable exposure to the risk of harm. That is exactly what this does.

I am very happy with the way this has been framed up by the government. I am confident that the number of people who would be impacted by this change in any year would be maybe one or two. That would only mean the sentencing principles were different. Whether or not in fact it affected the sentence would be impossible to say but, in many cases, quite possibly not.

But in cases where one of these young people was a clear risk to other members of the public, the court at least would have the capacity to protect us from them. I think that this what members of the community expect our courts to do, and they expect the parliament to give the courts the powers to do it.

Bill read a second time.

Committee Stage

In committee.

Clauses 1 to 3 passed.

Clause 4.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 1 [AG–1]—

Page 2, line 15 to page 3, line 9—Delete the clause and substitute:

4—Amendment of section 3—Objects and statutory policies

Section 3—after subsection (3) insert:

(4) This section does not apply to a court imposing sanctions on a youth who is being dealt with as an adult, whether because the youth's conduct is part of a pattern of repeated illegal conduct or for some other reason (and the laws applying in relation to the sentencing of an adult apply to such a youth).

I will not bore the house by going through it at great length—

The CHAIR: Hold the house, surely, not bore it.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: —but the purpose of this amendment is to make it absolutely crystal clear, in the event that it was not already. A question was raised a few weeks ago about whether we were intending to capture matters which had events that had already occurred but not yet been tried, or whether we were only going to be attempting to capture events which were yet to happen. I made the point that my view was that once this bill passes the parliament—if it does, and I hope it does—any event which is before the courts should be captured, notwithstanding that the point in time when the event occurred was prior to today.

My reading of the original amendments we had said that that was what we were saying. Just to make it absolutely beyond doubt, and make what we are saying crystal clear, I am moving this section for the avoidance of doubt. I think, if we do not pass this, it already says that, but I do not want there to be any misunderstanding about what we are intending to do or what we are intending to achieve.

Ms CHAPMAN: I have a question in relation to this. I hear what the Attorney is trying to do, and in the brief discussion we had in the briefing on this there was suggestion that the wording was changed to make it clearer that, yes, all youths who were going to be tried as adults should be sentenced as adults. I thought the issue that was just raised as to current cases that are being dealt with was quite clear, because the wording has not changed on that.

Both in the current bill and the amendment, in this case, it is on a youth who is being dealt with—so it is not past or to future; it is being dealt with now. My understanding from the briefing was that it was not the reason for this redrafting, but that it was more to do with the clarity of the intent. So, rather than having sanctions imposed as X and then listing those, it was to be using the same wording as is in the act. I have a different explanation from the Attorney.

I thought what he just told us was in fact relevant to the transitional provision, which is yet to be dealt with as amendment No. 2, but I might be wrong. In any event, I am happy to say to the Attorney that something I do not like—and I do not think he likes—is that we still keep seeming to pass laws that have things in brackets for explanatory purposes to support the contention, rather than actually being necessary for the purpose of the drafter. We now have them going from a note form, which was quite common—it still happens sometimes; we have 'NB' in a bill, with some examples given. Now we have, in this instance, a provision which states:

(and the laws applying in relation to the sentencing of an adult apply to such a youth).

which is supposed to be explanatory, rather than instructive. I do not like that and I will put it on the record that I do not like it. I know that parliamentary draftsmen still do it but, nevertheless, we are not agreeing with the bill in any event, but my point is made.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Can I just say that the deputy leader is correct in this instance (I was out of order; I was addressing the transitional provision first); likewise, the particular matter before us now is simply a clarification matter as well. It does not in any way depart from the intent of the original provisions.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clause 5.

Ms CHAPMAN: Attorney, last week, when you advised that there were to be amendments, you also indicated that there had been 16 young offenders from 2013 to 2015, 10 of whom had been sentenced as adults and the others had been treated in different ways. You also advised that the sentencing remarks in the Tucker case (if I can describe it as that because, of course, we are referring to the victim) could only been released at the determination of the court and you were awaiting the court's decision. Have you read those sentencing remarks?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I am advised that that material can only be released with the consent of the sentencing judge. I am advised that has not occurred; therefore, we have not been provided with that material and therefore I have not read it.

Ms CHAPMAN: When the Attorney considered—which, unfortunately, it appears he has considered and decided not to—directing the DPP, had he sought advice from the DPP in respect of his opinion in respect of the sentencing remarks and the likelihood of appeal?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I am glad the deputy leader has raised this question because it actually relates to something I was going to comment about in the context of the initial debate but neglected to, and that is the absolute inconsistency between the opposition saying that as a matter of high principle you oppose this bill and then at the same time, purporting to be on the ethical soapbox, saying that you would nevertheless direct the Director of Public Prosecutions to make what he knows to be an unmeritorious appeal to the courts. As an Attorney-General, I can think of very little that would be more objectionable and unacceptable, and I am picking up words which—

Ms Chapman interjecting:

The CHAIR: Deputy leader, you will have the option to ask a further question once the Attorney-General—

The Hon. J.R. Rau interjecting:

The CHAIR: Order!—has finished his contribution in answer to your first question.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, I appreciate that. I do not think I can imagine anything more objectionable and unacceptable than an Attorney-General who is properly advised that there is no merit in an appeal abusing—and I will use the word 'abusing' because in my view that is what it would be—his position to order an independent public official to nevertheless undertake an unmeritorious appeal. In every one of these cases that have come to light, the knee-jerk reaction of the member for Bragg is to say, 'Direct the DPP! Direct the DPP!' always. 'Why don't you direct the DPP? I am calling on the Attorney to direct the DPP.'

Now what I do is I actually say to the DPP, 'Look, there is a degree of community concern about this particular matter. I would like you, director, to please have a look at this case and indicate to me whether you have a view about the appropriateness or otherwise of an appeal in this case.' Invariably the director gets back to me and indicates his view.

On some occasions he has come back to me and said, 'In my view the judge has made an appealable error. I believe this matter is not a safe judgement and I'm intending to appeal.' He goes ahead and does that without me telling him to do that. It is his job to do that, and he does it. There are other occasions where he will say to me, 'I have looked at this and, notwithstanding the shrieking from various quarters,' often including the member for Bragg, 'there is no merit in appealing this case. People may not like it but the law says that the judge who has heard this case has actually correctly applied the law'.

If that is the opinion the director has come to, and it is his job as an independent officer to discharge that function, and in the absence of me having some other advice that is equally persuasive, or more persuasive I should say—and I have never had it, not once—then my view is that I should let the director do his job. In some instances that means it becomes my problem, because the problem is not with the director, it is not with the courts, it is with the law, and the director cannot change the law and the courts cannot change the law.

The only person who can change the law out of the courts, the director and me is me, in cooperation with the parliament. That is it. That is why sometimes—as in cases like this—I have come to the view, the director has told me, that because an individual would be sentenced as a youth there is not any appeal available, for instance. If you want that to be different you are going to have to change the law. It is no good arguing with me.

So what I am doing is bringing to the parliament the proposition that the law needs to change. What I am not doing is going through some sort of bogus stunt where I direct the Director of Public Prosecutions to go off on a completely unmeritorious appeal, which is an abuse of process and which I hope would be roundly condemned by the courts as being an abuse of process.

Ms CHAPMAN: I am quite concerned at the answer from the Attorney because the law quite clearly says that he has the power to direct the DPP. He may have chosen to decide, 'I'll accept whatever the DPP recommends and I am not going to direct him,' but that is what it is there for. Quite frankly, the Attorney's predecessor, minister Holloway in an acting role, at least had the guts to do that in the Nemer case and was prepared to take that risk and make that judgement, and was successful.

The Hon. J.R. Rau: Based on the advice of the Solicitor-General.

Ms CHAPMAN: I am coming to that in a minute, Attorney. The then DPP, Mr Rofe, had given advice that in his view there would not be any success in an appeal in relation to the sentence of Mr Nemer. Quite clearly he was wrong. The Attorney-General sought other advice, and I am very concerned to hear today, as I am sure all parliament is, that in a situation where you have a legal power—and in fact a responsibility—to consider the advice you are given, you apparently do not even read the sentencing remarks, let alone call for them. You do not ask the Solicitor-General or some other person to make an assessment. You have an army of advisers—you are the biggest employer of lawyers in the state—yet you do not take any action to fulfil your responsibility of making an assessment in a circumstance where the DPP has said, 'I won't be initiating an appeal of my own motion. I am reporting that to you, as Attorney. This is my advice.'

You take no other action. You just see it as an abuse of process if you were to attempt to do so. I am concerned, Attorney, that you should completely ignore your responsibility to do that. The fact that you have not even read these sentencing remarks or even asked for other counsels' advice on behalf of the government is just disgraceful.

The CHAIR: Is that a question? That is just a comment.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I would like to respond to that. I stand accused of not being a cheap, cheer-chasing spiv in the role of Attorney-General. That is what I am accused of, and I plead guilty. I am not a cheap, cheer-chasing spiv. I am trying to discharge an important public function in an appropriate way.

Ms CHAPMAN: In respect of the youths for whom there are cases pending, I am advised by Mr Shannon Sampson—who is apparently your adviser, who was not available yesterday and who has the conduct of this matter—in the email that we received that there is a youth currently before a court who is apparently awaiting sentencing. I assume that either a plea has been entered or they have been found guilty and they are waiting to be dealt with in sentencing. Obviously without identifying the person, are you able to inform the parliament as to the circumstances surrounding this case and why it was not made available to us until 3.20 yesterday afternoon?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I am advised of a number of things. Thank you for the question. Apparently, the question was only asked yesterday and so not having the answer immediately might be inconvenient, but we will get it.

Ms Chapman interjecting:

The CHAIR: Order!

The Hon. J.R. RAU: We will get it from the courts if we can. Can I make another observation that I think is relevant for Mr Bevan, who I understand might be watching this broadcast. The situation is that I have a routine policy of extending the courtesy—and I emphasise the words 'extending the courtesy'—of briefings to the deputy leader in order to assist her in being able to come to grips with matters that are coming before the parliament.

That is offered as a courtesy and, lamentably, it tends not to be received as a courtesy. It tends to be received as an entitlement to which indignant responses are often made about whether or not unreasonable time lines are met. In addition, I have noticed recently not only the rudeness about it but the fact that material provided in the context of a courtesy briefing is placed immediately in the hands of journalists in order to provide some sort of entertainment in that respect.

The CHAIR: I would like to get back to the substance of the amendment before us. If we have any further questions on the amendment, let's put them, otherwise, we need to—

Ms CHAPMAN: Is the Attorney telling us that in respect of this bill, which he is going to now propose to ensure that it captures current cases, he does not have any idea about the circumstances surrounding this case, which is clearly going to be caught if he progresses with this bill, including the confident confirming transitional clause to catch existing cases? Is he seriously asking us to, in complete ignorance of the details of this case, change this law and capture current cases, act retrospectively in that regard, without you even having any clue about what the circumstances of this case are?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I am trying to work out which one of the histrionic remarks is plumbing the depths the most, and I think that one probably gets there. The point is pretty simple. The point is very, very simple: I am not asking the parliament to change the threshold as to whether a person is declared to be in this class or not. I am not touching it, not proposing to touch it. That remains entirely in the hands of the courts. They are making that decision, not me.

Likewise, I am not seeking to interfere with the court's determination of what an appropriate sentence might be. All I am saying and all I am asking the parliament to do is to get in step with what the public reasonably expects, which is that, when one of these young offenders is so far out of line the courts decide they are to be tried in an adult court, the primary consideration in that sentence is whether or not this young person is going to go out and hurt other people—that is it.

We are not saying they cannot consider whether they require a rehabilitation program. We are not saying they cannot be given appropriate supportive mechanisms, training, or whatever else. We are not saying any of those things, but what we are saying is that if the court thinks that person represents a danger to other law-abiding members of the community the court has to put the risk to the other members of the public at number one and deal with that at number one. The court can then deal with all the other issues they need to and, yes, let's hope in many of these cases rehabilitation works. Obviously, we all agree with that.

The fact of the matter is, and it is an uncomfortable fact and it is one that the opposition does not want to admit but I am going to say this here because it needs to be said, there are some young people—mercifully very, very few but there are some—who are so determined upon a path of self-destruction and destruction of the safety of other people that it is in the interests of the public that that young person be restrained from doing that after they have committed an offence that demonstrates their capacity to do that.

I am not pretending there are many young people in this circumstance—there are very few, thank goodness—but if one of them is in that circumstance we have a responsibility to protect the community from that individual. I am going to say this a couple of times because there are potentially circumstances where what I am saying is highly relevant, and I will say it again: there are some very, very rare situations where you have a young person who is completely wired up or determined, or whatever you want to call it, to behave in a destructive fashion notwithstanding the consequences to themselves or others.

As I said, it is very rare, but if we do have a circumstance such as that—and all of us hope we never do, but the truth is that they are there—the court should be able to protect the rest of us from the danger that is represented by that person in the same way as they protect us from people who are convicted of not being able to control their urges and who may be detained for lengthy periods with their liberty restrained. Again, we are talking about very, very few people in that category as well, thank goodness. To be clear on this, this is not the sort of thing we are attempting to apply to lots of people. Let's be clear about this: the few people to whom this should apply are people the community expects it to apply to.

Ms CHAPMAN: My question to the Attorney is: in respect of this youth, in respect of this disclosure, this is a youth for which a determination has already been made, apparently, that he or she be tried in a superior court according to the law that exists today. However, the law as at tomorrow, if this bill passes, or in a weeks' time or whatever, is that that same youth, determined to be tried in an adult court, will be sentenced under the adult sentencing rules.

My question to you is: given the assessment that was made by the judge to have this made into a superior court in that case, surely as a parliament we need to know and be satisfied that if you want to introduce or capture a case halfway through—that is, a decision made under the old law about whether it is tried in an adult court, and the decision to then capture it so that it is sentenced under the new rules—then we need to know what the circumstances of that case are. If you do not have a clue then we certainly are in the dark.

It is completely unacceptable that you try to suggest that there is some courtesy of providing it to me yesterday afternoon when you introduced this amendment. The first notice I was given was when it was dumped in my pigeonhole mid-morning on Friday. I then find that you come into the parliament and say, 'I want to capture this case,' under the general piffle that you have just gone through about the justification for this legislation. You then expect us to say, 'Oh, fine, we will just push it through.' We have no clue what this case is about. You apparently have no clue about what it is about, but you do not care.

You want to give us a briefing, which you say is some kind of privilege but which I understood to be an opportunity for your government to present to the opposition the good reasons upon which the basis of legislation is being presented and to answer any questions or concerns that we might have, which might remove any concern that we would have to otherwise oppose or amend. You are treating the parliament like we have to somehow or other accept the crumbs that are thrown to us as some kind of privilege.

You might be the Attorney-General and a member of the government—I would be embarrassed to be in it, frankly—but you are also a member of this parliament. If you think you can get on your high horse and suggest to this parliament that we should pass amendments on your say-so when we are completely in the dark on the information before us, then think again.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: There is no ending the sense of indignation and effrontery that the member for Bragg is able to bring to her contributions; it is really quite spectacular but consistent. My answer to her is simple. There are two points. Point No. 1 is that the government is in tune with the reasonable expectations of the public that these very few offenders will be dealt with on the basis as to whether or not they represent a risk to the community. That is point No. 1. Point No. 2 is that I am not deciding what happens to them; the courts are, and I have confidence the courts will do it properly.

Clause passed.

Clause 6 passed.

Schedule 1.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 2 [AG–1]—

Page 3, lines 23 to 29 [Schedule 1, clause 1]—Delete clause 1 and substitute:

1—Transitional provision

An amendment effected by this Act applies to a youth who is being sentenced as an adult after the commencement of the amendment, whether the offence in respect of which the youth is being sentenced occurred before or after that commencement.

Amendment carried; schedule as amended passed.

Title passed.

Bill reported with amendment.

Third Reading

The Hon. J.R. RAU (Enfield—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General, Minister for Justice Reform, Minister for Planning, Minister for Industrial Relations, Minister for Child Protection Reform, Minister for the Public Sector, Minister for Consumer and Business Services, Minister for the City of Adelaide) (12:58): I move:

That this bill be now read a third time.

Bill read a third time and passed.

Sitting suspended from 12:58 to 14:00.