Statutes Amendment (South Australian Employment Tribunal) Bill

Second Reading

Adjourned debate on second reading.

(Continued from 4 August 2016.)

Ms CHAPMAN (Bragg—Deputy Leader of the Opposition) (16:06): I rise to speak to this bill and indicate that we will be supporting the passage of the bill. We are still consulting with some groups, and we indicate that we may need to reserve our position on any possible amendments in the Legislative Council. The Hon. Rob Lucas has assisted the opposition in advising us on this matter, as he covers industrial relations matters for the opposition. I indicate that to date we have received some responses from Business SA and the Australian Industry Group, which does not fill us with confidence in respect of the support for this bill, but there may be a number of other stakeholders who wish to express a view.

I also indicate that I have spoken to some in the profession who deal with areas in respect of employment law, and there has been a general indication of support from those who practise in this jurisdiction. I understand that the Law Society of South Australia has not put in a submission and will not be doing so. We are assuming that they are quite agreeable to the bill that is being presented, otherwise I am sure that we would have heard from them. As I say, there are a number of matters that have been raised by the two significant stakeholders who have responded.

This bill was introduced on 4 August by the Attorney as the Minister for Industrial Relations. The rationale for this bill is that it is to establish a one-stop shop for employment-related disputes at the South Australian Employment Tribunal. It is not a jurisdiction with which I am overly familiar, but my understanding is that apart from back pay disputes, which can relate to anybody in South Australia in an employment situation, largely this is an area of industrial matters that relate to the government as the employer or local government as the employer in disputes with their employees. We are talking about public servants, whether they are supporting local or state government.

Members might recall that some years ago in South Australia this parliament agreed with the government to allow industrial disputes between all except public servants in the state or council arena to be transferred to the Fair Work Commission and dealt with at a federal level. We were left with a structure, I think it is fair to say, that would have been built for a much more expanded area of dispute down to a smaller pool.

When the government in 2014 (I contributed to that debate) appointed under statute the South Australian Employment Tribunal, which was to establish a tribunal with jurisdiction to review decisions on employment and to confer powers to that tribunal, it was to coincide with return-to-work legislation that had been advanced and passed, and there was to be a new era in respect of the return-to-work regime and its implementation and enforcement.

The model that was promulgated in the statute we are now amending followed the model undertaken in SACAT (the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal), which had similarly been established in the preceding year, and then accepted jurisdictions on guardianship and residential tenancy disputes and valuer-general disputes, as I recall. However, largely that entity has been left untouched since, notwithstanding promises from the government that they were going to transfer many other jurisdictions to that entity. We have not seen those bills as promised.

I was particularly looking forward to the transfer of the Freedom of Information Act application appeals, which of course still have to wallow away in the old District Court. Nevertheless, that promise has not been fulfilled. The government went out after the 2014 election in a consultation frenzy of reviews, and we had 'transforming' everything. We ended up with Transforming Health, which of course is a complete disaster. We had Transforming Criminal Justice, which had some good points and bad, and we also had the Transforming Employment Dispute Resolution issues paper and policy statement, issued in April last year, to deal with reform in this area.

Ultimately, having got through the election, the government were desperate for ideas. They went out to the public to try to get some response to what they might do. It is fair to say that in this jurisdiction it was not unreasonable that, if they were going to have a separate court to deal with workplace injury disputes, it would be extended to other areas of employment law and the disputes that needed to be determined with it.

I could never understand why the return-to-work disputes were not put into SACAT. It is exactly the same model. It was a model that was to bring in a regime where you had a president, a deputy and magistrates and you had power to compel to give evidence. There were to be provisions for expert reports and it was to be a no-cost jurisdiction. This was sympathetic with the industrial dispute regimes that existed, and it was consistent almost exactly with the model that was supplied to SACAT.

Why did it never go into that? The only reason I was ever given was that they needed to get on with transferring other jurisdictions into SACAT, that is, guardianship and residential tenancies. As I say, they were busy doing that and there really was no time. On 1 July, a date that was in imminent—namely, 10 months later—they needed to get something in place for the new WorkCover legislation. That was the explanation given. I suspect it was more in line with those who were members of the various panels and tribunals that have existed independently of SACAT wanting to remain in place and not have their positions wiped out. I suspect that that is the real reason. Nevertheless, having set up a separate tribunal, it is not unreasonable that, under this bill, we then transfer the other areas of employment dispute to the Employment Tribunal.

Consultation on this is interesting. It is fair to say that one of the aspects under consideration is who should appoint commissioners and the like in this tribunal, especially with other existing entities like the industrial commission now to be transferred. The groups consulted were a whole list of employee associations, which, of course, are largely unions—everything from the Ambulance Employees Association of SA to United Voice, with about 40 or so unions or employee representative bodies in between—and the employer associations which, of course, include Business SA and a number of other associations representing industry.

Some judicial members were consulted, which is reasonable, as well as the other 'usual suspects'—if I can describe them that way—including the Law Society and the Australian Lawyers Alliance. The consultation was extensive to the extent of what has been dealt with. Two parties so far have introduced some concern. Firstly, Business SA supported in principle the establishment of the South Australian Employment Tribunal. They are happy to welcome some simplifying process if it reduces red tape and achieves cost-effective outcomes. Those are always welcome initiatives and Business SA confirms that.

However, they are concerned about loss of expertise, lack of stakeholder consultation and what they describe as 'an increasingly legalistic approach to employment disputes'. There was, I suppose, some scepticism as to what would be delivered for the practical outcomes sought by employers. In respect of the claim of loss of expertise, what I have seen in the bill really relates to a new order as to the appointment of those who are to be on the panels, etc. Historically, these personnel have been nominees of the associations or the respective unions or, at least, a number of candidates from whom the government can choose.

I think it is fair to say that, if this was the Attorney's view in having a different regime—which I agree is consistent with what I would now call a skills-based type appointment model rather than a representative body appointment—as much as these associations or unions think they are a voice of their group, the fact is that they usually have only a small number of their membership in those unions or associations. Indeed, if one looks at the profile of the members of Business SA, it is pretty clear that they do not represent the business community in South Australia.

They have some membership of it but, in fact, a number of industries have their own representative bodies and they, too, do not always have amongst their membership anywhere close to a majority of the businesses that operate. It is so, too, for unions, which may well have the interests of their members at heart, but may well not represent the views of an extended group.

Even if one looks at a highly unionised workforce like the train drivers in South Australia, I note that, in the course of a recent enterprise bargaining process, they had their union representative quite appropriately discussing with the government the terms of a new enterprise agreement. There has been a breakaway group. I cannot remember the name of the chap who headed it now but, in any event, he purported to represent those in the driving or signalling community of that industry. This is a real-life, contemporary example of where to simply nominate a particular association or union as being the body that is appropriate to nominate a representative falls foul of what I think is an acceptable test.

In the last 14½ years, I must say there have been plenty of bills that have come into this parliament where the poor old industry groups and unions have been smashed along the way when it comes to being able to actually nominate members of boards, but there are also a number of boards that have just been abolished and repealed. Certainly, I will say the government have been consistent on one thing.

Firstly, they have salvaged a number of unions along the way, but can I say they have at least put into the statutes some skills-based criteria or experience criteria for consideration. Whilst current or future ministers might still have a very large area of discretion in respect of the appointments they ultimately put to cabinet and approve, the fact is there are some guidelines there and there is, I suppose, at least on the face of it, some administrative law that helps to support that.

I also refer to the Australian Industry Group. They actually outright oppose the bill and its intention to extend the Industrial Relations Court. They do not see that it is appropriate for it to have the jurisdiction to deal with damages claims regarding alleged breaches of contract for employment, including claims for reasonable notice where employment is terminated. Currently, those claims need to be pursued in the state courts, such as the District Court.

The Australian Industry Group are very concerned that we are moving into a tribunal model which is not the same I should not say 'standard' because it is a different model approach, but they say that the District Court, Supreme Court or industrial court, which has been transferred, are the better courts to deal with a number of these matters, and that even things such as unfair dismissal matters could of course come into this area.

If I can just say one other thing about this bill, I and, I am sure, other members are mindful of the fact that, when we talk about employment disputes, we are talking about disputes between the government and an employee, or a local council and an employee, for most of the disputes that we are talking about. In the back pay of wages or in return-to-work disputes, obviously, we are talking about everyone but big business and the government because we are talking about all of those who are in—

The Hon. J.R. Rau interjecting:

Ms CHAPMAN: I beg your pardon, it does include those, and the Attorney is quite right. It deals with those who are bound by the Return to Work Act, that is, government, self-insureds—the former is actually a self-insured—and those who are bound to pay a levy through the Return to Work Act through the corporation, and this tribunal is going to have a much more expanded role.

I am a bit cautious about some of the concerns that have been raised, and the Hon. Rob Lucas has certainly raised some concerns, so I would like to reserve our position on what may be considered in the other place. I see I have just been handed a number of amendments. I am sure the Attorney will explain what they mean and who has asked for them.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: The member for Hammond is going to make a contribution.

Mr PEDERICK (Hammond) (16:25): Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for noticing me. I rise to speak to the Statutes Amendment (South Australian Employment Tribunal) Bill, and note that last year the Attorney-General's Department released the Transforming Employment Dispute Resolution, which outlined the rationale for establishing the one-stop shop for employment-related disputes—one being the South Australian Employment Tribunal.

It was back on 4 August this year that both the Statutes Amendment (South Australian Employment Tribunal) Bill and the Statutes Amendment (SACAT) Amendment Bill were concurrently introduced into the parliament, and my understanding is that the SACAT bill is consequential on this bill. The bill intends to amend the SAET Act, and a number of other acts—quite a few acts, in fact—and bring extra employment-related jurisdiction into the South Australian Employment Tribunal. These acts cover dust diseases. Jurisdictions that already exist are the Industrial Relations Court of South Australia and the Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia.

There are a whole range of acts, which include: the Construction Industry Long Service Leave Act 1987; the Fair Work Act 1994; the Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005; the Industrial Referral Agreements Act 1986; the Long Service Leave Act 1987; the Public Sector Act 2009; the Training and Skills Development Act 2008; and the Work, Health and Safety Act 2012. In education, there is the teachers appeal board and teachers classification review panels, which involve the Education Act 1972, and the Technical and Further Education Act 1975.

I know that this is about employees' rights, but it is a fascinating process, especially in the education sector, not so much with teachers generally, but with how principals and deputy principals apply for appointments and get appointed. It is an interesting process, which I believe certainly does not take into account in some of the cases put before me the wishes of local communities, especially in the country, and especially in country electorates like mine in Hammond.

I believe actions have not been conducted in the appropriate manner, and I have witnessed that, because you get people cherrypicking roles. We had a situation in my electorate where, unbeknown to a school, a teacher had recently taken up a principal's position, and I believe it was for six years. It only lasted a term because the role they really wanted came up for the interview process, and the other hiring processes, and they accepted that role.

It was very unfair on that community. I was pretty close to this. It really makes you wonder about the role of schoolteachers—and there are many excellent schoolteachers, do not get me wrong. It just seemed to me that in this case, and certainly in other cases I have come across, people could pick and choose where they worked. They can sign a contract for six years but then just walk away with no penalty.

I relate that to what happens when you are an employer, even in this role in the parliament when you employ people. When you first come into this place, you find out that the standard practice is to employ someone for the life of a member. That could be four years or 24 years and anything in between, and even longer, perhaps 40 years. That puts on a lot of constraints if you have a problem with a staff member—and these things do happen, I can assure members. It would happen on both sides of the house and, I am sure, in crossbench offices.

As agreements change over time, you have to be very aware, as the direct employer. The Department of Treasury and Finance is actually the lead employer in this case but, as the direct employer, you need to be well aware of what you are signing up for. I became aware, when I had an issue I needed to deal with, that you do not have that three-month trial period at the start of a full-time person's employment. Sure, employees have rights, but the concern I had was that all my rights had gone out the window because I was not aware that the practice of the three-month trial period had gone away.

What happens now—and I am sure I am not the only one doing it—is that if you want to put someone on and try them out, because you have just gone through an interview process and they obviously look like they can do the job and interviewed very well (and people can school themselves pretty well), you put them on a three-month contract, or you can even put them on a two-month contract or one-month contract. You have to do that in case there is a problem. Even with proven staff, once I have got them through the first few months I put them on the initial contract for 12 months. They know why; we have these discussions. It is a two-way street: you need to look after your staff, but I believe they have an obligation as well. As an employer, you just have to be aware of your rights and obligations.

This bill also affects the Equal Opportunity Tribunal, the Equal Opportunity Act 1984, the Police Review Tribunal, the Police Act 1998, the Public Sector Grievance Review Commission, the Public Sector Act 2009, the criminal jurisdiction summary and minor indictable offences Summary Procedure Act 1921 and the common law civil jurisdiction contractual disputes between employer and employee and common law claims for damages, and this is in part 5 of the Return to Work Act 2014.

The government has made it clear that its intention in drafting the bill was that, where provisions in the act conferring jurisdiction on the South Australian Employment Tribunal replicate measures in the SAET Act, the conferring act's provisions would be deleted. Therefore, the Return to Work Act 2014, the SAET Act and the relevant conferring acts, as amended by this bill, would operate concurrently in the respective jurisdiction. The government has made the point that the bill preserves, in each of the conferring acts, specific functions, processes and powers that are unique or necessary to the respective jurisdiction.

For example, the Police Review Tribunal, although no longer having jurisdiction over terminations and transfers, would continue to have jurisdiction over promotion reviews. If special arrangements or powers are preserved by the amendments to the conferring acts, and these differ from the provisions of the South Australian Employment Tribunal Act, existing provisions in the conferring act will prevail.

From what I understand, the government intends that the relevant provisions of the employment tribunal bill will commence on 1 July 2017, and what will happen, in what I believe is consequential legislation, is that the SACAT Bill will seek to repeal part 12 of the statutes amendment act 2014 to avoid the Public Sector Grievance Review Commission being conferred on SACAT automatically in December this year.

It is to be noted that Business SA supports the principle of this bill, welcoming simplifying processes and supposedly the reduction of red tape and the achievement of cost-effective outcomes, although they are concerned about the loss of expertise, the lack of stakeholder consultation and the increasingly legalistic approach to employment disputes. One fear they have is whether the practical outcomes of this bill that are sought by employers will come.

There are also concerns (and I talked about some employers' concerns a little while ago) that the bill appears to water down employers' representation rights as are current at the moment. It is noted that the Australian Industry Group opposes the bill's intention to extend the Industrial Relations Court of South Australia's jurisdiction to deal with damages claims regarding alleged breaches of a contract for employment, including claims for reasonable notice where employment is terminated. Currently, such claims need to be pursued in a state court, such as the District Court. The Australian Industry Group is concerned that, if this bill were passed in its present form, there would be significant risk of such jurisdiction quickly becoming a de facto unfair dismissal jurisdiction for senior managers at great cost to employers.

I also note that some amendments have just been tabled by the government. As we go into more debate on this bill in the committee stage, it will be interesting to see how those arrangements and amendments will work and how the bill is supposed to improve on the practices we have in this place at the moment. I note that we are not opposing the bill, but we will be having a look at it between the houses on how it comes through the House of Assembly before it heads to the other place.

The Hon. J.R. RAU (Enfield—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General, Minister for Justice Reform, Minister for Planning, Minister for Industrial Relations, Minister for Child Protection Reform, Minister for the Public Sector, Minister for Consumer and Business Services, Minister for the City of Adelaide) (16:38): I thank the member for Hammond and the Deputy Leader of the Opposition for their contributions. There were a couple of things that were raised, particularly by the deputy leader, which I should put something on the record about so that the position is clarified because I do not want there to be, to the extent that it is possible to eliminate this, misunderstandings, certainly not in the other place where occasionally I have noticed there are misunderstandings. I do not want that to happen, and I do not want people to be agitated about things they need not be agitated about.

To frame up the conversation a little, since WorkChoices came in at a federal level, there has been, in effect, a stripping-out of jurisdiction from the state industrial system. As the Deputy Leader of the Opposition said quite correctly, we are left with basically a residual industrial relations system here, where it is only public sector people who are regulated inasmuch as their enterprise agreements, awards and suchlike are concerned. It is only public sector people who now utilise the state system.

It is not even all public sector people; it is basically state public servants and local government employees. Even then, it is not all of them. For example, there is an enterprise agreement process being undertaken in respect of train drivers. Train drivers, even though they are state government employees, are actually governed by the federal system because they are subject to federal arrangements through the rail industry. So it is not even all state employees who have that jurisdiction.

Once upon a time (and it was a simpler time) when the state commission had a broad function and pretty much covered all industries in the state, there was an argument that laypeople with experience either through the business or industry side of the equation should be appointed to become industrial commissioners. This was because they brought with them some practical knowledge or experience of industries which could be quite diverse.

Now of course the fact is that none of those industries is in the state system—none of them. The only industry that is in the state system is the public sector, so the rationale for that old structure has basically disappeared. I indicate that the next stage in this process is, once we get this through, we are going to have to have a look at the Fair Work Act and bring that into contemporary times. The state Fair Work Act, if you read it presently, is still behaving as if the whole state industrial system was intact, and of course it is not. The Fair Work Act is almost overwhelmingly a legislative framework for public sector employees, and for that reason we are going to have to have a good look at that.

Luckily, as I understand it, people at the Attorney-General's Department are just champing at the bit to get stuck into this. They cannot wait. They know how much I have been chastised already today by the Deputy Leader of the Opposition for my tardiness in getting stuff done. I got a real tongue-lashing a little while ago about how long it took me to bring in mental impairment legislation and I do not want to be treated that way again. It is very distressing for me, and when I get that distressed I like to share it with the people with whom I work. Distress shared—

Ms Cook: She's on the phone.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: It is not just for her benefit. Distress shared is distress reduced. That is my theory. The Fair Work Act is going to be worked on, and I can see happy smiling faces around the room indicating that people cannot wait to get started or in fact, even better, cannot wait to finish. The next bit was some discussion about SACAT and the Employment Tribunal.

Can I just make it clear that SACAT is an administrative review body and the analogy for that is the Administrative Appeals Tribunal at a federal level. It is designed specifically not to be a court. It is designed not to be a court, not to be captured by chapter 3 of the constitution. There are a number of good reasons for that, not the least of which is that there is a case floating around which people here may not have had to turn their minds to a great deal called Cable—not named after the great footballer, I don't believe. This Cable case creates an enormous number of problems for courts.

The functions of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal are administrative review functions; they are not the functions of a court. That is my story and I am sticking to it. I just hope that if it ever gets litigated, whatever court it goes to will form the same opinion, because we have tried very hard to make sure SACAT is not a court.

The Employment Tribunal, on the other hand, is a court. It is designed to be a court, and it is populated by people who, when they are wearing their hats as industrial commissioners or whatever—they call themselves deputy presidents—when they are doing other things, at the moment they are industrial court judges, but under the new arrangements they will be both deputy presidents and District Court judges. In fact, pretty well all of them down there are already District Court judges, but this regularises the whole thing.

The transitional situation is basically this: we have two people who are presently down there who are described as industrial commissioners. These people are remnants of the old system. We do not propose that under the new system there will be more people appointed like them and paid like them to do the job that they were employed to do, because quite frankly that work has dried up like a billabong in the sunshine. Did you like that?

Ms Chapman: What have they been doing for the last 10 years?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Good question—but now we are fixing it up.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: No sunshine. No sunshine on the billabong.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I am being corrected: it has reduced significantly. I thought 'dried up like a billabong in the sunshine' sounded better; but it has reduced significantly. There is a concern out there—we have received a lot of representations from different people who said there is some attachment to the concept of a commissioner. It is almost a historical thing, that people do not like to get rid of the word 'commissioner', so the amendments I have just circulated will simply—

Ms Chapman interjecting:

The Hon. J.R. RAU: It will not change anything. All it will mean is that the people who are presently conciliation officers, and are paid as conciliation officers, and are employed through a completely—this is the other point that was made by the deputy leader. The process of appointing those people is we put an ad in the paper, people express interest, we have a selection panel, and all comers can come forward. We ask the selection panel to recommend the best people and ultimately that comes to the minister of the day to make appointments. That is the process; it is a transparent process. The amendments that I have filed simply say that the people who are presently called conciliation officers will be called commissioners.

Mr Pederick: It just puts a new name there.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: It just puts a new name there, that is all it does. It does not mean they are attracting all of the current emoluments of a commissioner. It just means that the two existing commissioners—I am not sure how much longer they want to stay there—have been sort of red-circled. When they finish, that will be the end of it.

There are a couple of responses to the concern by Business SA about not being able to have laypeople there. Firstly, as the deputy leader said in her remarks, this is a public sector employment tribunal predominantly in the industrial context. Why Business SA should have any concern about what is going on in there, I do not know, because it really has nothing to do with them. It does not touch them. That is a bit of a furphy, I think.

It was the case, though, that once upon a time both business and employee groups had a view that it was their turn to have somebody put forward for appointment to a job as a commissioner. What I am saying is that that particular regime is going to finish with this, and when the existing two remnant commissioners—and I have not appointed a commissioner in my whole time as an industrial relations minister for the reason that I thought the position had become largely redundant, or increasingly redundant—are gone, that is it. That is the end to it.

The other thing of course is that the deputy presidents are in fact District Court judges. The point made—I cannot remember if it was made by the deputy leader or the member for Hammond—about some people saying that they are a bit anxious about people in the Employment Tribunal hearing certain matters, they need to remember that these people are in fact District Court judges. As to the idea that 'They should not be hearing them there, they should be hearing them in the District Court,' they are actually District Court judges. Two of them are magistrates, that is true, but they basically hear money claims and we are not likely to be doing much to their practical workload.

I hope we can get this thing through both houses successfully. I am very happy to organise briefings for the deputy leader and/or Mr Lucas.

Ms Chapman: I have had it.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: You have had it, good. If there are any further questions or anything we can resolve between the houses so that we do not have misunderstandings about what we are doing, I am happy to be of assistance and obviously clearly happy to meet with Mr Lucas, if he wishes to do so, to discuss any of these matters. At this stage, what we would like to do is go into committee so that I can deal with the amendments that I have just foreshadowed which, as I indicated, do one thing and one thing only, and that is where in the bill—no, there are some more things.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: We are back to the billabong, I think.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Back to the billabong. I will wait for them to turn up. Let's go into committee.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Why don't we read the bill a second time first.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: That is a good idea.

Bill read a second time.

Committee Stage

In committee.

Clauses 1 to 3 passed.

Clause 4.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 1 [IndustRel–1]—

Page 8, lines 7 to 9 [Clause 4(1)]—Delete subclause (1) and substitute:

(1) Section 3(1), definition of conciliation officer—delete the definition and substitute:

Commissioner means a person holding office as a Commissioner of the Tribunal;

decision, of a person or body (other than the Tribunal) under an Act includes a direction, determination or order of that person or body;

Can I just expand on my not entirely comprehensive comment before.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: About the billabong?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: What most of this does is take the words 'conciliation officer' and rubs them out and inserts the word 'commissioner'. That is all it is doing. There was another matter that came up, I am reminded, in consultation, which this bill does deal with in due course, which was to assure people that whatever the current arrangements are in respect of costs will not be disturbed merely by reason of this bill being brought in. That was to calm people who might have thought that suddenly a no-cost jurisdiction was becoming a costs-based jurisdiction or whatever. It preserves the status quo in that respect.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 5 to 7 passed.

Clause 8.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 2 [IndustRel–1]—

Page 10, lines 36 to 38 [Clause 8(2)]—Delete subclause (2) and substitute:

(2) Section 9(d)—delete paragraph (d) and substitute:

(d) the Commissioners; and

(e) the supplementary panel members.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 9 to 12 passed.

New clauses 12A, 12B, 12C and 12D.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 3 [IndustRel–1]—

Page 14, after line 24—Insert:

12A—Substitution of heading to Part 2 Division 3 Subdivision 5

Heading to Part 2 Division 3 Subdivision 5—delete the heading to Subdivision 5 and substitute:

Subdivision 5—Commissioners

12B—Amendment of section 16—Appointment of Commissioners

(1) Section 16—delete 'conciliation officer' wherever occurring and substitute in each case:

Commissioner

(2) Section 16—delete 'conciliation officers' wherever occurring and substitute in each case:

Commissioners

12C—Amendment of section 17—Commissioner ceasing to hold office and suspension

(1) Section 17—delete 'conciliation officer' wherever occurring and substitute in each case:

Commissioner

(2) Section 17—delete 'member' wherever occurring and substitute in each case:

Commissioner

(3) Section 17—delete 'member's' wherever occurring and substitute in each case:

Commissioner's

12D—Amendment of section 18—Supplementary Commissioners

Section 18—delete 'conciliation officer' wherever occurring and substitute in each case:

Commissioner

New clauses inserted.

Clauses 13 and14 passed.

Clause 15.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 4 [IndustRel–1]—

Page 15, lines 36 to 38—Delete the clause and substitute:

15—Amendment of section 20—Who presides at proceedings of the Tribunal

Section 20(3)(d)—delete paragraph (d) and substitute:

(d) Commissioner;

(e) supplementary panel member.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 16 to 25 passed.

Clause 26.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 5 [IndustRel–1]—

Page 20, lines 8 to 10—Delete clause 26 and substitute:

26—Substitution of section 52

Section 52—delete the section and substitute:

52—Costs

(1) Subject to this Act or a relevant Act, parties bear their own costs in any proceedings before the Tribunal (other than proceedings assigned to the South Australian Employment Court to which section 26B applies).

(2) If the Tribunal makes an order for the payment of costs and does not fix the amount of costs, that amount is to be assessed and settled in accordance with the rules.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

New clause 26A.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 6 [IndustRel–1]—

Page 20, after line 10—After line 10 insert:

26A—Amendment of section 53—Costs—related matters

Section 53(1)—delete 'The power of the Tribunal' and substitute:

Any power of the Tribunal under this Act or a relevant Act

New clause inserted.

Clause 27.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 7 [IndustRel–1]—

Page 20, line 14 [Clause 27(1), inserted subsection (1)(a)]—Delete inserted subsection (1)(a) and substitute:

(a) a Commissioner; or

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 28 to 35 passed.

Clause 36.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 8 [IndustRel–1]—

Page 25, after line 28—Insert:

(5) A person who was, immediately before the relevant day, a conciliation officer of the Tribunal will continue in office as a Commissioner of the Tribunal on the same terms and conditions as applied to the person immediately before the relevant day.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 37 to 46 passed.

Clause 47.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 9 [IndustRel–1]—

Page 35 after line 29—After inserted section 22 insert:

22A—Costs generally

(1) SAET may only, in the exercise of jurisdiction under this Act, make an order for costs where specifically authorised to do so under this Act.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to proceedings that constitute an appeal under the South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014 in respect of the exercise of jurisdiction under this Act.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 48 to 61 passed.

Clause 62.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 10 [IndustRel–1]—

Page 46, line 22 [Clause 62(5)(b)]—Delete 'conciliation officer' and substitute 'Commissioner'

Amendment No 11 [IndustRel–1]—

Page 46, lines 29 to 31 [Clause 62(5)(b)(iii)]—Delete subparagraph (iii)

Amendments carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 63 to 90 passed.

Clause 91.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 12 [IndustRel–1]—

Page 55, lines 26 to 28 [Clause 91, inserted Schedule 1(2)]—Delete '1 or more members of the panel established under subclause (1) should sit as a member of the Tribunal' and substitute:

the Tribunal will sit with 1 or more members of the panel established under subclause (1)

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 92 to 145 passed.

New clause 145A.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 13 [IndustRel–1]—

Page 74, after line 24—Insert:

145A—Amendment of section 220—Contravention of WHS undertaking

Section 220(5)—delete subsection (5)

New clause inserted.

Remaining clauses (146 to 155) and title passed.

Bill reported with amendment.

Third Reading

The Hon. J.R. RAU (Enfield—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General, Minister for Justice Reform, Minister for Planning, Minister for Industrial Relations, Minister for Child Protection Reform, Minister for the Public Sector, Minister for Consumer and Business Services, Minister for the City of Adelaide) (16:59): I move:

That this bill be now read a third time.

Bill read a third time and passed.