Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (Miscellaneous) Amendment Bill

Introduction and First Reading

The Hon. J.R. RAU (Enfield—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General, Minister for Justice Reform, Minister for Planning, Minister for Industrial Relations, Minister for Child Protection Reform, Minister for the Public Sector, Minister for Consumer and Business Services, Minister for the City of Adelaide) (12:03): Obtained leave and introduced a bill for an act to amend the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012; and to make related amendments to the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935, the Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act 2015 and the Ombudsman Act 1972. Read a first time.

Standing Orders Suspension

The Hon. J.R. RAU (Enfield—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General, Minister for Justice Reform, Minister for Planning, Minister for Industrial Relations, Minister for Child Protection Reform, Minister for the Public Sector, Minister for Consumer and Business Services, Minister for the City of Adelaide) (12:04): I move:

That standing orders be so far suspended as to enable the bill to pass through all stages without delay.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: There not being an absolute majority present, ring the bells.

An absolute majority of the whole number of members being present:

Motion carried.

Second Reading

The Hon. J.R. RAU (Enfield—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General, Minister for Justice Reform, Minister for Planning, Minister for Industrial Relations, Minister for Child Protection Reform, Minister for the Public Sector, Minister for Consumer and Business Services, Minister for the City of Adelaide) (12:05): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

This bill amends the ICAC Act to further refine and improve its operation. The amendments are in large part a response to requests from the Independent Commissioner against Corruption to address some operational matters. The bill also addresses the recommendation by the reviewer appointed under section 46 of the act to provide a procedure for the making of complaints about abuse of the exercise of the powers of the commissioner or misconduct by officers of the ICAC.

The bill provides for complaints to be made to the reviewer directly and for the reviewer to investigate complaints relating to alleged abuse of power, impropriety or other forms of misconduct on the part of the commissioner or employees of the commission or the Office of Public Integrity and other matters if requested to do so by the Attorney-General or the committee. In addressing the operational matters raised by the commissioner, the bill removes the oversight of the Ombudsman by the ICAC, which will reduce the complexity and conflicting outcomes from current referral processes. A matter referred by the ICAC to the Ombudsman will be deemed to be a complaint under the Ombudsman Act 1972 and will be dealt with exclusively by the Ombudsman.

To streamline the assessment procedure, the bill provides for the Office for Public Integrity to assess and refer matters directly to the appropriate authority. Currently the OPI must, following the assessment of a complaint or report, make a recommendation to the ICAC about referral. In practice, this has proved to be an unnecessary and cumbersome exercise. The amendment will streamline the referral and reporting processes. The bill will also make clear what I understand is already the practice of the ICAC investigators when undertaking a search to secure documents over which a claim of privilege is made. It also provides clarity around the use of information obtained during an investigation under the ICAC Act.

In rare circumstances, there may be a challenge to the jurisdiction investigation undertaken using the powers of the ICAC Act and it is subsequently determined that the person under investigation was not a public officer at the time of the investigation. Information gathered in good faith that could lead to a prosecution for an offence will be able to be provided to a law enforcement agency. The amendment does not affect the ability of a court to rule such information inadmissible for any other reason.

Other amendments in the bill to facilitate operational matters and clarify the jurisdiction of the ICAC include allowing for law enforcement officers involved in a joint investigation with ICAC officers to be named on a warrant permitting an investigator to enter and search a place or vehicle and seize items during that search and amending the definition of corruption to encompass the act of lobbying.

The bill will clarify that breaches by members of parliament of a statement of principles cannot be investigated by the ICAC, and that a reference to a privileges committee for any misconduct of a member of parliament remains the exclusive responsibility of the house. This amendment addresses a recommendation of the report of the joint committee and it is supported by the commissioner.

Finally, the bill clarifies the primary object of the commissioner is to investigate serious or systemic corruption in public administration and to refer serious or systemic misconduct or maladministration in public administration to the relevant body. It does this by amending the act to redefine the circumstances in which the commissioner should investigate serious or systemic misconduct or maladministration in the public administration and by providing a definition for serious or systemic misconduct or maladministration.

The bill reflects the government's intention to ensure that the act operates as effectively as possible. I commend the bill to members. I seek leave to have the explanation of the clauses inserted in Hansard without my reading it.

Leave granted.

Explanation of Clauses

Part 1—Preliminary

1—Short title

2—Commencement

3—Amendment provisions

These clauses are formal.

Part 2—Amendment of Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012

4—Amendment of section 3—Primary objects

This clause alters the statement of primary objects to reflect the changes to section 7.

5—Amendment of section 4—Interpretation

This clause changes the definition of inquiry agency to remove references to the Commissioner for Public Sector Employment and updates the definition of law enforcement agency. The section is also amended to define what constitutes 'serious or systemic' misconduct or maladministration in public administration.

6—Amendment of section 5—Corruption, misconduct and maladministration

This clause includes offences or attempted offences against the Lobbyists Act 2015 in the concept of corruption in public administration and provides that a statement of principles applicable in relation to the conduct of members of Parliament will not be treated as a code of conduct for the purposes of the statutory concept of misconduct in public administration.

7—Amendment of section 7—Functions

This clause amends the functions of the ICAC to reflect the fact that the ICAC will not be giving directions or guidance to the Ombudsman on referring a matter and specifies limits on the Commissioner's powers to investigate misconduct and maladministration in public administration.

8—Amendment of section 17—Functions and objectives

This clause allows OPI to refer complaints and reports to inquiry agencies, public authorities and public officers, and to give directions or guidance to public authorities, in circumstances approved by the Commissioner.

9—Amendment of section 24—Action that may be taken

This clause is consequential to clause 7.

10—Amendment of section 31—Enter and search powers under warrant

This clause amends section 31 to allow a warrant to be issued authorising a police officer or an investigator to conduct a search and also to allow a Judge of the Supreme Court to issue a warrant in relation to any premises or place. The clause also provides that new Schedule 3 (relating to claims of privilege) will apply to searches.

11—Amendment of section 36—Prosecutions and disciplinary action

These amendments provide that the power to refer a matter to the relevant law enforcement agency or public authority on completing an investigation or during an investigation applies regardless of the subject matter of the investigation and make it clear that the Commissioner can provide both evidence and information to the relevant law enforcement agency or public authority.

12—Amendment of section 36A—Exercise of powers of inquiry agency

This clause makes minor amendments to reflect the amendments in clause 7 and clause 9.

13—Substitution of section 37

Section 37 is substituted to remove provisions relating to oversight by the ICAC of a matter that has been referred to the Ombudsman.

14—Amendment of section 38—Referral to public authority

This clause amends section 38 consequentially to clause 8 and also to limit the Commissioner's power under current subsection (7) (now to be subsection (7a) under the proposed amendments) to situations where a referral of a matter included a requirement that the public authority submit a report or reports in respect of the matter.

15—Amendment of section 42—Reports

This clause broadens the Commissioner's power to report but includes a requirement that a report must not identify any person involved in a particular matter raising potential issues of misconduct or maladministration in public administration that is, or has been, subject to assessment, investigation or referral under the Act unless the person consents to being so identified. The amendment also provides that a report relating to a completed investigation must be provided to the public authority responsible for any public officer to whom the report relates and to the Minister responsible for that public authority (as well as to the Attorney-General and the Parliament).

16—Amendment of section 44—Public authority to assist with compliance by public officers

This clause makes a minor change to simplify the wording of the provision.

17—Amendment of section 45—Commissioner's annual report

This clause is consequential to clause 8.

18—Substitution of section 46

Proposed section 46 requires reviews to be conducted in accordance with new Schedule 4 (see clause 23).

19—Amendment of section 48—Commissioner's website

This clause is consequential to clause 18.

20—Substitution of section 54

This clause substitutes a new provision on confidentiality. The basic rule is that a person who is or has been engaged in the administration of this Act must not disclose information in relation to a matter that is the subject of a complaint, report, assessment, investigation, referral or evaluation under the Act, except as required or authorised by this Act or by the Commissioner. Proposed subsection (2) lists circumstances in which disclosure is authorised. Proposed subsection (3) deals with disclosure by a person who receives information knowing that the information is connected with a matter that is the subject of a complaint, report, assessment, investigation, referral or evaluation under the Act.

21—Amendment of section 56A—Use of evidence or information obtained under Act

This clause clarifies that use that may be made of evidence or information obtained by the lawful exercise of powers under the Act and specifies that evidence or information will be taken to be obtained by a lawful exercise of powers under the Act notwithstanding a jurisdictional error in the exercise of those powers.

22—Amendment of section 59—Evidence

This amendment allows for proof by evidentiary certificate of the requisite suspicion for the purposes of section 5(2) of the Act.

23—Insertion of Schedules 3 and 4

This clause inserts new Schedules as follows:

Schedule 3—Search warrants and privilege

This Schedule makes provision in relation to claims of privilege when search powers are being exercised pursuant to a warrant.

Schedule 4—Reviews

This Schedule provides for the appointment of a reviewer and for the conduct of annual and other reviews in relation to the ICAC and the OPI.

Schedule 1—Related amendments and transitional provisions

Part 1—Amendment of Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935

1—Amendment of section 237—Definitions

This clause ensures consistency between the concept of a public officer in the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 and the definition of that term for the purposes of offences in Part 7 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (offences of a public nature).

Part 2—Amendment of Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act 2015

2—Insertion of section 29A

This clause ensures that a review under proposed Schedule 4 of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 (see clause 23) could consider also the conduct of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner if the ICAC were also appointed as the Judicial Conduct Commissioner.

Part 3—Amendment of Ombudsman Act 1972

3—Insertion of section 14B

This clause inserts a new section 14B providing that matters referred to the Ombudsman under the ICAC Act must be dealt with under the Ombudsman Act 1972 as if a complaint had been made under that Act.

Part 4—Transitional provisions

This Part provides transitional provisions.

Ms CHAPMAN (Bragg—Deputy Leader of the Opposition) (12:10): The Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 has now been in effective operation for some three years, and the commissioner appointed is Mr Bruce Lander QC, who has been the one and only commissioner pursuant to that legislation. As a state, we are better off in the protection of having an ICAC. It was a long time coming. It was introduced finally by this government after many years and after almost every other jurisdiction around the country had advanced to having a criminal and/or corruption commission.

It is in a form that is a model that was not exactly as our side of the house wanted. It was often described as the 'skinny ICAC' at the time of its establishment, particularly reflecting the limited amount of funds that were available to it. However, from our side of the house, we accept that, as a relatively new integrity institution in the state, it does require refinement from time to time and improvement and, as the Attorney has pointed out, there are operational matters that need clarification and enhancement and sometimes they are only evident as a result of the operation of the institution.

After some three years, during which the commissioner has undertaken direct investigations by the government at the request of the Attorney-General, which is in his purview to do, he has provided to the parliament several dedicated reports, including a review of all the integrity authorities operating in South Australia, identifying their overlap and the need for some review; the investigation and consideration of police complaints in South Australia; the review of the whistleblowers' law; and his reporting to us in respect of lobbyists and how they should be regulated, in particular to protect the public in respect of any behaviour that may fall into corruption, maladministration or misconduct.

The commissioner has also provided two comprehensive reports to the parliament in his annual reports and, of course, in a few months I expect we will have his report for the 2015-16 financial year. Members will also be very well aware of his report into the sale of state-owned land at Gillman in which he investigated the activities of ministers, senior personnel in Renewal SA (or the Urban Renewal Authority, as it strictly is), and other parties, and found two senior members of Renewal SA, including its then chief executive, to have undertaken maladministration in their duties or lack thereof. He has already provided an enormous amount of advice to the government and to the parliament and indeed given comprehensive advice and provided information to the Legislative Council's committee, which is the—

The Hon. J.R. Rau: The public integrity committee.

Ms CHAPMAN: —public integrity committee. It has a longer name, but I will find it in a moment and just correct that. Yes, the Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee of the Legislative Council has provided evidence to that committee. I should also acknowledge that a reviewing party, a former justice of the Supreme Court, His Honour Mr Kevin Duggan QC, has acted as a statutory reviewer of the commission itself. All in all, we have had a lot of advice. We have had specific requests from the Attorney to consider a number of matters, including the operation of ICAC itself within the context of a number of other public integrity entities.

Primarily as a result of recommendations from his annual report 2015 and the Gillman land sale report, tabled 14 October 2015, there were a significant number of machinery reforms, which I think the Attorney describes as a refinement of operational matters. It is pedantic as to what it is described as. We are talking about relatively minor matters, but things that need to be fixed. As a result of that, I introduced a bill to this parliament to capture a number of these recommendations.

In the first instance, let's deal with the elephant in the room, that is, the question of public hearings. Members know what the Liberal Party's position has been on that issue. Indeed, the commissioner himself took the view that there needed to be some relaxation of publication rules to enable proper administration of his commission, but to deal with public hearings and deal with the course of the investigations of maladministration and misconduct he has since advanced a more relaxed view than he has in the past.

That has been a moving feast, but the government's position, to be fair, has always been that they will not agree to public hearings and that this will not be an institution that will be heard in public. Cogent arguments have been presented, but in any event it is not a matter the commissioner has advanced as something that should fracture the proper reform of all other matters that need to be attended to. We agree with the commissioner on that; we agree with the government on that.

We welcome this bill, largely because it deals with a number of matters that are covered in the bill that I have had in the parliament since late last year, but also because it deals with the extra matters of making it clear in respect of members of parliament. In respect of that, the commissioner's view, and indeed the Attorney-General's view, has been placed on the record in correspondence, but just in case they are dead and gone by the time there is any challenge to that, I think it is important that it be in the legislation, and so I welcome that being included in this bill.

Finally, as the Attorney has pointed out, I make reference to amendments to the objects of this act to make it abundantly clear that the purpose of this commission is to investigate corruption and serious or systemic maladministration or misconduct. Its primary role is not to be a police department with extra powers. In short, the reason we have advocated for and supported having an ICAC in South Australia is because corruption is a criminal offence and it does exist.

Regrettably, there are situations where, wherever there is property, money or power, there can be people who are vulnerable to committing this offence. We need to ensure that it is identified and eradicated so that we can maintain confidence in public administration in particular. Bear in mind our ICAC only deals with public administration. It does not deal with the private world of banking or horseracing or any other area which some other international ICACs favour.

I just place that on the record because, when trying to identify and secure in the investigation accumulation of evidence to successfully prosecute, it is an unusual piece of conduct. You do not very often immediately have an apparent victim to complain. It is generally accepted that it is necessary to have a body that is vested with very specific extra powers to be able to investigate that.

The most common powers, of course, are to be able to require people to submit to questioning, provide documents and statements, have their phones tapped, etc. These are extraordinary powers for extraordinary circumstances, so we support the government in ensuring that the nature of investigations by ICAC are at that serious level and are not being applied, using that structure with its extraordinary powers, to deal with cases which, frankly, can be dealt with by other agencies.

I undertook an exercise just recently of listing all of the public servants, police officers and even the head of a department who, in the last 18 months or so, had been the subject of an ICAC inquiry of which the commissioner had made a public statement—in fact, his usual practice was to issue a media release—to confirm that he had referred these persons to the police or to the DPP for prosecution or further investigation. Indeed, there was a very healthy list of people who were largely charged with theft or abuse of public office. There were some accounts of aggravated theft and some accounts of dishonesty.

That was the nature of the types of charges that resulted and, to be frank, most of them were for relatively minor amounts. Sometimes it was stealing some of the property of the government, sometimes it was using a credit card for some purpose that was not allowed and sometimes it was misappropriating moneys for which they had responsibility for a specific purpose. I think one of them was for a sports fund for young children, and the misappropriation of those moneys was for their benefit.

So, we are not usually talking about really large amounts of money or valuable property. These are matters which could have been reported, identified perhaps by the Auditor-General or some other body within government, referred to police and prosecuted. Frankly, I do not think any of these matters needed the involvement of an ICAC. However, some of these matters were the joint investigation of South Australia Police and ICAC, and in any event they have all gone on to be prosecuted. Most of these have been dealt with now that have been made public, and they have been appropriately dealt with in the end—a very expensive process to go through, I suggest. It gets the Rolls-Royce treatment for relatively small amounts of money or value of assets.

The other thing I make the point on is that our police force, which is largely our investigative agency in South Australia, actually is pretty good at investigating a number of these matters anyway. Indeed, they have even been prepared in recent times to identify, investigate and prosecute their own, so I do not think we should be in any doubt that SAPOL themselves have successfully investigated, as part of their own anticorruption operations, even their own.

There was a very public case several years ago of Amanda Boughen, who was a police officer charged with abuse of public office, attempting to pervert the course of justice, later pleading guilty to fabricating and concealing evidence in a major drug investigation. Most recently, there have been allegations involving six police officers of evidence for crime scenes being taken, and theft and corruption charges are pending. So, we have some very good agencies that do their work, but for the special high-level cases we need to be clear that we have a corruption commission to be able to deal with it. The new primary objects will be substituted to read:

(2) Whilst any potential issue of corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration may be the subject of a complaint or report under this Act and may be assessed and referred to a relevant body in accordance with this Act, it is intended—

(a) that the primary object of the Commissioner be to investigate corruption in public administration; and

(b) that matters raising potential issues of misconduct or maladministration in public administration will be referred to an inquiry agency or to the public authority concerned (unless the circumstances set out in section 7(1)(cb) or (cc) apply).

This is important, I think, to record. The exercise of this by the commissioner is to take into account, and this is defined in clause 5(3)(2)(a), as follows:

…serious or systemic if the misconduct or maladministration—

(a) is of such a significant nature that it would undermine public confidence in the relevant public authority, or in public administration generally; and

(b) has significant implications for the relevant public authority or for public administration generally (rather than just for the individual public officer concerned).

Let us consider the one and only case so far that the commissioner has reported on at length to the parliament, which is in this category, that is, the sale of public land at Gillman. A very comprehensive inquiry was undertaken by the commissioner, acting as though he were the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act, and there was a finding of maladministration.

I do not think there is any doubt that a case such as that which involved a government agency, in particular Renewal SA and the multitude of parties that were relevant to investigation and consideration by the commissioner, that that would qualify and remain qualified as an issue that ought to be within the purview of Mr Lander to undertake. The amendments in this bill would not remove his opportunity to do just that and, frankly, I would expect him to do it.

Can I just leave aside the other area in relation to police complaints and the conduct of all employees in the police department, from the Commissioner of Police down. It is proposed that there be a rewrite of the police complaints procedure in this area of integrity management. We have already given notice of our bill, from our house. We have been waiting a long time for this, but we understand the government is now going to advance this, and we are happy to work with them in relation to it.

Certainly, it is important to remember at all material times that, because police officers are in a unique position of service to the people of South Australia, they are often the repository of information—including criminal intelligence—which, for all our sakes and for our protection, they need to keep confidential, etc. So, we accept that they need a separate structure and that they should have it. For other government departments or, as has been identified in this bill, public entities that come under serious criticism, to the extent that they are a public authority or in public administration, where there is an undermining of confidence we must surely have someone at the level of Mr Lander to effectively investigate those allegations and restore public confidence.

There is only one other matter I want to address, and that is an issue that has not been adequately dealt with in this bill—that is, how we manage the time frames for items that are the subject of a retention order or a warrant that have either been handed up pursuant to a retention order or seized pursuant to a warrant, and the processes that operate currently. I am assuming that the amendments in this bill are consistent with what I have read in recent days. I still do not think that it actually resolves an issue that we have raised and I think does need to be raised, but we are happy to follow it through in the other place, and that is a question that I have advised the government about—that is, there being no time limit in some of the processes in respect of confiscated assets and documents.

I will outline the issue because I was referred to the ICAC website, in particular their standard operating procedure in respect of entering and search warrants and exercise of powers, and I have obtained that and read it. I do not think it actually resolves the problem. In fact, it does not really deal with the issue at all. What that document tells us is the process to be undertaken if a warrant is issued, how the powers are to be exercised and what notices should be given to the party receiving the warrant, etc.

I will try to be brief on this. Members would be aware that under the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012, there is provision in section 31 for the 'Enter and search powers under warrant'. I hope I do not butcher this by my abbreviation, but the commissioner himself, on application, can issue a warrant authorising an investigator to enter and search if the place is in respect of an inquiry agency, public authority or public officer. If you want to get a warrant for a private place or a private vehicle, you have to get it from a judge of the Supreme Court. In short, that is what that tells us—for the purposes of an investigation into a potential issue of corruption in public administration. It has to fit within the objects of the act.

Provisions under section 31(7)(c)(v) and (vi) go on to tell us what the warrant authorises the investigator to do. In particular, subparagraph (v) states:

to seize and retain anything that the investigator reasonably suspects has been used in, or may constitute evidence of, a prescribed offence, or issue a retention order in respect of such a thing requiring that it not be removed or interfered with without the approval of an investigator;

Subparagraph (vi) essentially enables the same thing in respect of an offence, other than 'other prescribed offence', and there are some qualifications. That tells us what is to happen and that there is the capacity to then issue a retention order.

We have two events that can result in goods being brought into the possession of ICAC; one has a time limit on it and one does not. If a seizure or retention order procedure is undertaken and, in particular, a retention order is issued, anything that is taken into possession essentially has a two-year limit on it—that is, if the retention order lapses after two years as defined in the designated period in the act. However, if an item is seized pursuant to a warrant, that can be held indefinitely. Obviously, the commissioner has the discretion to release that material, but it appears that there has been an evolution of our law in this regard, with two distinct alternate positions.

Bear in mind that in 2014 we were asked as a parliament to consider amending the six-month warrant limit and our parliament was happy to oblige. That was presented to us as too short a time for some inquiries and therefore there needed to be an extension, so we considered what I colloquially call the 'two-year rule'. I do not think that it was intended at that stage by anyone that there should be a limit on one and not the other, and I still do not think that there should be a distinction between these two items. I accepted that in 2014, and still today I accept that six months may be too short a time to deal with these matters.

Bear in mind that members might also be aware that in the issuing of warrants they lapse if they are not exercised within a month. We have certain protective rules around any potential abuse by any investigator who has the benefit of searching and seizing under warrants and some fairly strict guidelines that go with them, but there is nothing in the guidelines that I have been directed to that gives me any comfort that we have not dealt with this other matter.

I am happy for the Attorney to have a look at that between houses and to consider how we might best address it, but it seems to me that it is something that needs to be considered. Remember here that the items that are the subject of seizure under a warrant may not just be items owned by the person who is the subject of investigation. They may be the equipment or items of a third party; for example the most common, as one would expect, is other co-workers of the person under investigation, or agents for that person (an accountant, for example) who may have property or documents which are the subject of a seizure order—which, at present, can be indefinite, and I do think we need to tidy up that issue. I indicate that I am happy to work with both Commissioner Lander and with the government to have that dealt with.

I conclude by confirming my appreciation to Commissioner Lander for his ongoing work. He has had a busy three years, and he has served South Australia well in his work to date. I would also like to record my appreciation of his registrar, Ms Patricia Christie, who has acted so well in the administration and ensured that we have our annual reports to parliament promptly, something I cannot say for every agency of the government. I thank them for their continued work.

The Hon. J.R. RAU (Enfield—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General, Minister for Justice Reform, Minister for Planning, Minister for Industrial Relations, Minister for Child Protection Reform, Minister for the Public Sector, Minister for Consumer and Business Services, Minister for the City of Adelaide) (12:41): I thank the deputy leader for her contribution and also thank her for her indication of support for the bill. I think all of us in this place agree that it is necessary for this work to be done by the parliament to maximise efficient performance of this important agency of government.

I note the deputy leader's remarks about warrants and indicate that I am very happy to have that conversation with her. However, I think the conversation should occur in the context of both of us speaking—quite possibly together but certainly both speaking—with the agency to ensure that we understand what their perspective on these matters might be. It may or may not be that there are very sound operational reasons for things not to be disturbed, but that is a matter we can talk about.

Whether or not that fits the timetable for this particular legislation making a swift passage through both houses of the parliament I do not know, but I will certainly do nothing to impede or slow that conversation if it can occur and we can resolve those matters.

Bill read a second time.

Third Reading

The Hon. J.R. RAU (Enfield—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General, Minister for Justice Reform, Minister for Planning, Minister for Industrial Relations, Minister for Child Protection Reform, Minister for the Public Sector, Minister for Consumer and Business Services, Minister for the City of Adelaide) (12:43): I move:

That this bill be now read a third time.

Bill read a third time and passed.