South Australian Employment Tribunal Bill

Second Reading

Adjourned debate on second reading (resumed on motion).

Ms CHAPMAN (Bragg—Deputy Leader of the Opposition) (16:07): Geographical location is no impediment to the Workers Compensation Tribunal becoming part of SACAT and remaining in its current premises, where it could continue its operation. Even if the government decided that it wanted to relocate the industrial court and/or the commission and/or the Workers Compensation Tribunal, with or without the dust diseases practitioners and Licensing Court jurisdictions, to move it to its own headquarters, it would be in exactly the same position, whether it is an employment tribunal or part of SACAT. There is no justification on the grounds of geographical or physical location of the premises, and it could do as exactly as is proposed by the government for the purposes of residential tenancies and/or Guardianship Board matters.

There is obviously also the question of cost if it is a separate court, which the Attorney conceded in our SACAT debate in this house was a similar model; in fact, as I say, it is almost exactly the same model. There is obviously some synergy for the purposes of it coming together with their message; that is, we need to have a multifunction jurisdiction administrative court similar to other states, and this could be achieved.

Another aspect, of course, is the question of whether the industrial tribunal's advisory group or any subsidiary—either individual judges or the registrar of the commission and/or court—have been consulted by the government, and I would be keen to hear from the Attorney as to what has taken place in that regard. The industrial tribunal's advisory group actually meets weekly to deal with all sorts of internal management and policy matters, so I would be interested to know what their view is.

I indicate to the Attorney that, between the houses, we on this side of the house are more than happy to meet with current members of the Workers Compensation Tribunal and/or the court, given that the court is to be, at the very least, an appeal court under this proposed bill, and a lot of these personnel overlap. For members' benefit, I place on the record that the Industrial Relations Commission, the Workers Compensation Tribunal, its appeal tribunal, some other tribunals dealing with some other jurisdictions and the Industrial Relations Court of SA are all situated at the Riverside premises.

I move to what I think is really the pressing issue here and that is the personnel who will administer the future workers compensation disputes in South Australia. At present, as I say, substantially these are dealt with by the Workers Compensation Tribunal—

The Hon. J.R. Rau interjecting:

Ms CHAPMAN: I am just going to read a few names. Presently the Industrial Relations Court has its senior judges: His Honour Bill Jennings; and the judges sitting underneath as members of that court are judges McCusker, Parsons, Gilchrist, Hannon and Farrell. It is my understanding, as indicated by the Attorney, Judge Parsons has now retired, so on the electronic website we now have Mr Lieschke—

The Hon. J.R. Rau: He's a magistrate.

Ms CHAPMAN: Magistrate. I will come to him in a minute. I had a more updated list from the annual report but perhaps I will correct that in committee. My understanding is that a number of the industrial magistrates who are still there are Magistrate Michael Ardlie and Stephen Lieschke. There is an auxiliary appointment still of Mr Hardy. In any event, the Industrial Registrar is Mr Correll and there are, separate to that in the Industrial Relations Commission, the president who has a different role, Judge Peter Hannon; Deputy President Judge McCusker; and I think Judge Parsons also left that area but, in any event, similarly they have some commissioners to do support work.

In the tribunal, these judges who sit on the court, from that group we have president for the Workers Compensation Tribunal, Judge Bill Jennings and judges McCusker, Gilchrist, Hannon, Farrell and Lieschke, who is not a judge of the District Court but is, as I understand it, a deputy president of the tribunal. They all have different roles but they all, essentially, have been developed and amended over even some of the years I have been here to deal with—

The Hon. S.W. Key: Not any women?

Ms CHAPMAN: No—the industrial disputes whether they be pay disputes, entitlements, workers compensation, etc. I do not have to go into all the areas that they cover. In a way there is a bit of a multifunction aspect there. There is a separate Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal at the moment and that comprises the president, Judge Jennings, and the deputy presidents, I think, are Mr McCusker and Mr Gilchrist.

Obviously, they do not appeal their own determinations but they are co-located, and they work pretty well I think, as best as I understand it. I was not familiar with that jurisdiction but we get an annual report from them to the parliament. Whilst a big chunk of their work was removed as a result of the government's decision, ultimately endorsed by the parliament, to transfer industrial disputes in the independent sector across to the Fair Work Commission, which is the federal structure, we still deal with issues obviously at a state government and local government level and that is quite considerable.

The question is: what is going to happen to those? As I indicated with SACAT, positions in a traditional sense were advertised. Presumably, there was some process of assessment of them for consideration. As we know, His Honour Judge Greg Parker, Supreme Court judge, took the senior position as president, Judge Cole from the District Court is deputy, and a registrar has been appointed, etc.

The staff from a number of proposed areas were assured in the transfer that they would be given an opportunity to continue employment in the new SACAT from whatever jurisdiction they came. Those who had a role in the determinations, whether they were bond disputes and rental payments in the tribunal, or for those who are working in administration and mental health areas and the Guardianship Board, largely had an opportunity to apply for positions (there was no automatic transfer), and then selection took place. The head of the Guardianship Board is not quite in the same category because, of course, we have a new president and deputy president.

What will happen to these people, these judges, many of whom are District Court judges as well as industrial court judges (they have significant status) if they do not have their own independent structure and they are brought into SACAT? I suspect there will be some issues about what other work they will be given, given their tenure arrangements are different to those who will be employed. If we are really standing here considering establishing a new tribunal, separate from SACAT, to absorb this industrial relations responsibility, including workers compensation disputes, into a new structure so that we can give existing judges a job or a continued role, then I think we will have many more questions to ask about how that is going to operate.

It should have been disclosed by the Attorney during the course of these debates that obviously there is a connection between Mr Lieschke and the Premier. During their working life in the legal firm from which they come, Mr Lieschke was a former partner of the Premier. I make no disparaging remark about that per se. There is no reason that Mr Lieschke cannot seek the opportunity to achieve a judicial office, like anyone else, but I frankly think that it should have been disclosed during the course of the second reading contribution. It may be why, when I woke up one day—

The Hon. J.R. Rau: I haven't had a second reading contribution—

Ms CHAPMAN: You have had a second reading contribution—

The Hon. J.R. Rau interjecting:

Ms CHAPMAN: You have had a second reading contribution, thank you very much.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Order! No interjections. Don't even ponder interjections. Please just continue with your contribution.

Ms CHAPMAN: It may be that we will have a completely independent structure—which, I suggest, is unnecessary and a costly addition—which could be accommodated with the SACAT tribunal in situ, with the same model and personnel, especially if they are just going to be transferred and given some other tenure arrangement. There is absolutely no reason that these people would not be experienced enough in the work they are already doing to be able to continue in that role, albeit a slightly different model of application as of 1 July 2015. I do raise reservations about that.

I conclude by saying that, whatever the model, wherever it is, whatever they are going to call it, I ask the government to make sure about one thing that I think is concerning. We as members of parliament receive letters about people who feel they have been badly done by by a legal process. That is inevitable; of course we all get those. In this area, I have to say, most often the concern is not that they might have missed out on an entitlement they think they should have under workers compensation, because largely they are massaged through it and generally the agencies do quite a good job.

What they have a problem with—and this ought to be noted by the government—is the delay in respect of payments. I have had case after case, but a more recent case concerns settlement arrangements for a police officer who, from 2005, with post-traumatic stress disorder matters, went through the process of receiving fortnightly payments and making an application for redemption arrangements, with psychiatrist reports pulled in and all the usual processes. Sure, the negotiations took some time, but from the time the Crown Solicitor received, on behalf of the government, the terms of settlement between the parties in March this year, finally this week the applicant has received their money.

I could not believe, when I came into this place, how the delay in respect of payment of moneys by government agencies to other government agencies and/or to civilians (the latter being more pressing) occurs. I find it unconscionable, the delays we have had from payments from the Public Trustee and other agencies like that when there is no apparent justification. I find it appalling. The government needs to get the message that even though it is in charge of billions of dollars, people rely on getting those moneys in a timely manner. I just ask that, whatever structure they have, they give some attention to making sure that once the deal is struck and the payment is going to be made they do not drag the chain and leave somebody waiting for their money six months after the agreement.

Mr KNOLL (Schubert) (16:20): I would like to congratulate the Attorney on his recent article in CityMag, which was brought to my attention by my ever attentive staff (in fact, the look he was displaying just before was quite similar to the photo in there). As a new politician in this place, I am a sponge for any wisdom that my colleagues on either side of the chamber can impart to me, and in that spirit I went through the article with great gusto. I believe it does have relevance to the debate we are having today, and I will tie that all in.

The article did get a little bit Sex and the City to me though, when it said that the Attorney-General had agreed to give CityMag readers some hints on how to become a modern and effective politician (as opposed to a modern, effective woman). I did not pick the Attorney-General as a Carrie Bradshaw but, now that it has been pointed out to me, there are a number of things that make sense.

Something at the end of the article really sparked my interest, and I think it is quite relevant to this debate. In the last couple of sentences, with regard to 'Know your brief' (which is something I learned quite a bit about last night), the Attorney said, 'Don't gild the lily. Just call it what it is. Be as plain speaking and direct as possible.' I do think that to a certain degree that is something we have had in this debate as we have gone on.

However, I think that plain speaking has come with a bit of an agenda, and I will elaborate. I am a married man of 7½ years' standing and, as the man in the relationship, I often get in trouble; sometimes it seems as if I always get in trouble and that I can, indeed, do no right. As a typical man, my response to these situations is to either hide or try to avoid them, but there are times when the transgression is too great to either hide or ignore—indeed, if my wife is listening this may be one of those times.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: How many children did you say you have, member for Schubert?

Mr KNOLL: Just one.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: I think she will be doing something else at the moment.

Mr KNOLL: I employ another technique in those times, and in these times. What I do is go on the offensive. If I know that something big I have done wrong is coming out I go on the offensive, so that when I first get in the door when I get home, or on the phone, I will get as angry at myself as she seeks to get angry with me. What that does is have the effect of neutralising the attack, most of the time. In all seriousness she is not always necessarily in the mood to agree with me at that point—in fact, I think she is sometimes really spoiling for a stoush—but nevertheless she must agree with me. Indeed, the argument does fall apart at that point when we both end up agreeing about how bad a person I really am.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: You are drawing this back to the debate, aren't you?

Mr KNOLL: Right now.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: This is a circuitous way of doing it. I am sure it will be apparent shortly.

Mr KNOLL: All will be revealed in the next 60 seconds. The first step with any problem is to admit that you have one. That is a fantastic first step, and I am glad to see that, after 12 years, the Attorney has done that. He had a revelation, he says, just after he became minister, which led to some unparliamentary comments towards the end of last year, with which we wholeheartedly agreed, but in seeking to do that I believe the Attorney was trying to employ my technique, which I cleverly thought was my own. He was trying to go further in his level of outrage with the scheme than we in the opposition would otherwise have done.

The difficulty in this case is that the Attorney is part of a government that has been in power for 12 years and has had plenty of time to do this. Indeed, the Attorney and members opposite have been through the 'hide the problem and avoid the problem', and have finally come to the realisation that we need to go down a different path, hence we have had this process. The outrage, I believe, is simply not enough. I would like to highlight a couple of experiences, not necessarily personal experiences, I have been made aware of in regard to the WorkCover system, especially relating to the WorkCover tribunal system. Those experiences have been poor.

I know of a case of a person who was employed in mid-2011 and who ceased employment with an employer mid-2012, 12 months later. Three months after that, towards the end of 2012, a claim was put in by that person for an injury that she said was sustained 12 months prior. WorkCover rejected the claim. I will not pass judgement on whether or not they were correct in doing that, but the claimant then appealed that judgement and so began a two-year process of going through the tribunal to try to adjudicate an outcome.

There were many extraneous factors and many personal circumstances that made this case quite difficult and quite heartbreaking to hear about. Again, I do not wish to pass judgement except on the fact that the process took so long. There was meeting after meeting where all parties would get into a room, only for one party to say, 'I did not bring the information that I promised at the last meeting I would bring to this meeting; therefore, we have to adjourn again.' They had to adjourn again and again.

There were meetings upon meetings. There was restricted access to information by some parties. There were delays due to nonattendance. In the end, what was 'engineered'—and I use that term quite loosely—was an outcome, I believe, that was a genuine 'engineering' of the process.

The outcome was to pay off the claimant. It was an outcome that shielded the employer but for which the WorkCover Corporation bore all the cost, which then disperses to being a cost to the broader system. The method used to engineer the outcome was very creative. I believe that that process and that example speaks volumes about the way the current system has gone about things.

The length of the process, I believe, was a denial of justice to the employee. The length of the process came at huge inconvenience to the employer, and the length of the process came at greater and greater cost to the corporation. It was, I believe, an awful process and one that we need to seek to fix with this legislation.

A number of people I have talked to who work in this field have lamented that justice under the current system often depends on which judge you get. It is a bit of the luck of the draw. If you get certain judges, they are going to lean one way; other judges are going to lean the other way. The bias of those judges very much affected the outcome. It was something that was spoken about with such regularity it became one of those long-running jokes, and everybody was resigned to accepting the system as it was.

We are seeking to create an entirely new system. To a certain degree, I do not believe that is a bad thing, but my question is: how will this system be any different? I reread the bill this morning with a view to trying to understand how this bill will be different, and there are some questions I will be putting to the Attorney later on.

Another part of this system which we are seeking to change and which, I think, very much needs changing is the medical panels system. Having not had too much involvement with them but reading this year's budget, I understood that in the 2013-14 financial year there were 230 applications that were brought before the medical panel at a total cost of $8.662 million. Simple mathematics tells me that the average cost per claim that was transferred to the medical panels was $37,500 per claim. As the son of a sausage maker, trying to understand how those figures add up really did boggle the mind. So, any attempt by the Attorney to fix that situation I would wholeheartedly support.

In the briefing we had a number of weeks ago, the Attorney talked about wanting to get rid of duelling doctors. There are duelling doctors in two parts. We talk either duelling doctors when it comes to going through the tribunal process or duelling doctors when it comes to a claimant going through the normal WorkCover process. Last night, I tried to tease out some of the questions with regard to the normal process, and I must admit that the answers were a little vague, and that may have been possibly due to the advancing hour. I will give the Attorney another opportunity today to assist in appeasing those on this side of the house that this bill will indeed help to fix those issues.

There are a number of other issues I want to tease out today, such as the difference between 'compulsory conference' and 'compulsory conciliation conference', and I am sure that answer will be enlightening, as the Enfield enlightenment has come to be so. There is also the issue of understanding why conciliation officers need to have gender, social and cultural diversity. It seems to me to be a rather random cracking of the whip that we are asking conciliation officers to be employed on the basis of various degrees of diversity, when other officers, either within the corporation or within the employment tribunal process, are not. It seems a rather random cracking of the whip, especially when I understand that you get only one conciliation officer per conciliation conference. I cannot understand how a diversity of use can be encapsulated with one person, but I will move on.

The last point I would like to make is that the Attorney and the government are seeking to have the strongest possible concurrence from members of the opposition. In the process yesterday and today, what I and other members on my side of the house are seeking to do is to get a greater understanding of the system and a greater understanding of the changes and, hopefully, to have a greater level of confidence in the changes that are being proposed.

Our questions yesterday and today do not represent our seeking to delay the process or seeking to be difficult. I do appreciate the Attorney's attempt to answer questions in a fulsome manner, and we are merely trying to get a deeper understanding so that we can have a better system overall. We are trying to help the Attorney to understand our process so that, when we do come out the other end with a finished act, it is indeed the best that it can be.

Mr WILLIAMS (MacKillop) (16:32): I will take the lead from what has just been said, and apparently the words of the Attorney, and I will try to be plain speaking—

An honourable member interjecting:

Mr WILLIAMS: —but I hope to be brief as well. I remind the house of our leader's comments about this bill, the South Australian Employment Tribunal Bill, and the opposition's thoughts about why we are establishing another tribunal. When I read the bill, I think that it is even worse than that. We are actually re-establishing the existing tribunal, from my reading of it, and I will go to that in just a moment.

When the Attorney revealed just on 12 months ago or thereabouts that the system was buggered, a lot of us said hooray because a lot of us had been saying something along those lines for a fair while. Part of the system is the tribunal, and it seems that the Attorney wants us to believe that, in the legislation which controls the things we discussed yesterday in the Return to Work Bill, other things that had nothing to do with the disputation and the tribunal were buggered. I do not think that is the case, and the reason I say that is that I recall the WorkCover annual report, which was released about this time last year, and that is the latest report we have to go on.

I recall the then chairman's comments in that report, which included the statement that we had to do something about the disputation within the system, that the rate of disputation in the South Australian WorkCover system was higher than in any other jurisdiction. He went on to say that the longevity of those disputes was greater than in any other system. The Attorney says, 'And that's why we're changing it,' but I question whether we are changing it, Attorney, and I will come to that in a moment.

What I do know is that we have just been through a process of establishing another organisation called SACAT (a civil and administrative tribunal in South Australia) to handle, I would have thought, these sorts of disputes. Creating that new body would, amongst other things, give us an opportunity to break old cultures because one of the problems we have had in WorkCover has been a cultural problem, one that has gone on for far too long. I talked earlier about the 28 years of the existence of the previous legislation, and in that time we have certainly established a culture in South Australia.

I also want to bring to the house's attention a comment the Attorney made to the house in question time only this day. When the question was put to the government about the recent announcement to get rid of, amalgamate and otherwise look at the management of all sorts of boards and committees that report to various parts of the government, the comment (which I thought was a really smart comment by the Attorney) was, 'The obvious question is: should we be one rather than many?' In defence of the government's desire to get rid of all sorts of boards and committees and advisory groups, the Attorney's attitude is, 'Why would we have many when we can do the same job with one?'

The Attorney has just brought legislation to the parliament for us to establish a SACAT and shortly thereafter brings another bill to us to establish another tribunal to basically do the same sort of work. When I read the bill, I was really concerned. I believe the bill is setting up the employment tribunal as a subset of the existing Industrial Relations Court. The Attorney shakes his head, but let me read clause 10—Appointment of President:

The Senior Judge of the Industrial Relations Court is the President of the Tribunal.

The same person will be the Senior Judge in the Industrial Relations Court and the president of this tribunal. I go on and read clause 13—Appointment of Deputy Presidents:

A Judge (other than the Senior Judge) of the Industrial Relations Court is a Deputy President of the Tribunal.

My reading of that is that all the other judges of the Industrial Relations Court are automatically deputy presidents of the employment tribunal, yet the Attorney-General will have me not think that this new tribunal is merely a subset of the Industrial Relations Court. The Attorney shakes his head, but that is the point I am making.

I made the point that I think we have had a cultural problem with the resolution of disputation within the WorkCover system, and we have had it for a long time. I think that the Attorney-General was right when he said the system was buggered, and he never turned around and said, 'This part of it is buggered, but the disputation part is not.' The longstanding chairman of the WorkCover board only 12 months ago in his report stated that disputation was a significant problem, and I think this bill just transfers that pre-existing problem into a new tribunal. I have a grave concern about that.

I have a grave concern about some other matters in the bill, which I will raise in the committee stage, but the position that the opposition has stated is that we think the matters under dispute within the new return-to-work arena should, indeed, come under the jurisdiction of the newly formed SACAT. That would do two things.

Ms Chapman: It would save money.

Mr WILLIAMS: It would certainly save money. It would fulfil what the Attorney said in question time today when making the point: why would we have many when we can do the job with one? It would be a cultural shift, and I think that is what we need as much as anything in this whole process, and it surely would do what the SACAT is designed to do, that is, step in and effectively manage fair and equitable resolution to disputes that arise under the return-to-work legislation. I will conclude my comments there, but there are some other questions on a couple of aspects I want to raise in the third reading.

Mr TARZIA (Hartley) (16:41): I also rise to support this bill. As we have heard, the opposition will support it in this place and reserve its right in the other place. I note it is a thin bill. A thin bill is a good bill. It is much thinner than the other bill we had to read a few weeks ago which accompanies this bill. No doubt, in future years to come, it will be seen as a crucial part of the Enfield enlightenment, as the member for Schubert has pointed out.

As the leader has said, we need to get on with this. We need to get on with these reforms that have been a long time in coming, and as soon as possible, because businesses are certainly suffering out there and employees are not getting the best deal in this area. We need to do what we can as an opposition and a government to work as expeditiously as possible to make sure that this broken system is fixed.

The tribunal which is aimed to be set up by this bill is a good thing, with jurisdiction to review certain decisions arising from the return-to-work scheme which is planned to commence on 1 July 2015. Like other tribunals, it will aim to provide efficiency in terms of cost and time and, hopefully, it will be extremely transparent and accountable and headed by a president who will hold a concurrent office as a judge of the IR Court. I really hope that it does work as a one-stop shop for employment litigation and, in regard to that, I will talk a little bit about ADR, and I note that ADR has an important emphasis in this bill and that is also a very good thing.

Legal costs and the cost of litigation, obviously, can be extremely high. A lot of the time, workers cannot get access to justice because the court system is extremely costly for them, so I think it is important to have, conversely, a cheaper, easier flexible alternative to costly dispute resolution, and I have pointed that out in other speeches.

In relation to the structure of the SAET, as I will call it, obviously we have heard comments. Generally, I consider it to be quite well constructed. However, I would say that I ask for government support in the appointment of conciliation officers, in that I would ask them to think wisely, and I would like to see a statesman-like approach to this. I know I might be a bit idealistic, but I really do not want this to become a partisan issue. It is extremely important if this is to work and if the government intends it to work well. It is fair to say that over the 12½ years of the government's history we have certainly seen some unfortunate appointments, if you like, in various areas. I hope this does not continue in that light.

Overall, I believe that shortening the time frames of disputes where we can, through the conciliation and the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms provided by this bill, will certainly help the justice system and take a lot of strain off the justice system we have at the moment. We all saw during the estimates process the long delays that are being experienced in the justice system at the moment.

I note that this tribunal, once set up, will perform similar functions to the SACAT. It will settle disputes of facts, not necessarily law, and questions of law are also able to be appealed as well. I reiterate what the Leader of the Opposition said to this place earlier today. I honestly question the government's wisdom in not rolling the SAET into the SACAT and I ask the Attorney to clarify. Why wouldn't you just roll it into one? Since we are here and we are keen to work with you, why wouldn't we just get it out of the way? Looking forward when trying to work with the government, I do not want to be looking at this in future years. If we are going to make this happen, let's get it out of the way right now.

In terms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), I note that in the act there is quite an emphasis placed on the role of ADR in proceedings which come before the tribunal. The bill provides the tribunal with some scope at an initial directions hearing or at any other time to ask the parties to attend conferences that are compulsory or refer to any aspect of the matter for mediation by persons listed as a mediator by the tribunal. That is a good thing because so many disputes at the moment proceed to litigation and trial unnecessarily and, therefore, it is in a setting like this, a tribunal, where it is much cheaper and more informal that I think it is a good thing to allow these disputes to be settled much more easily. Not to mention they are also going to save the taxpayers' dollars by resolving them sooner without the formal proceedings before a court.

I also support this bill. It is important to reiterate the reservations which we have and which will be addressed in the other place and I will be asking the Attorney to consider those comments. I expect all those answers to be suitably addressed and resolved in committee.

The Hon. J.R. Rau interjecting:

Mr PEDERICK (Hammond) (16:47): Don't panic, Attorney. I rise to speak to the South Australian Employment Tribunal Bill 2014. I note in the Attorney's opening comments of his second reading speech that the South Australian Employment Tribunal will have similar functions, powers and operating approaches as the newly established civil and administrative tribunal and how efficient and cost-cutting it will be. If it is that good, as the members for Hartley and MacKillop have reiterated, why not roll it into the SACAT? I am sure the Attorney will address that issue either in his address at the end of this or in committee.

Obviously at the minute under the WorkCover Corporation, the Workers Compensation Tribunal deals with disputes under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 and, with the Return to Work Bill that we were debating yesterday, the government is saying it needs a fresh approach to the resolution of disputes. I just hope that with the passing of all this legislation that has been put to us—and put to us in quite a hurry in the last few days to get it through—that we get real change. As I indicated in my Return to Work Bill contribution, we have had some grand statements made in this place before by former members of parliament who said it was the best day of their life that we were moving on schemes in regard to WorkCover, and none of that came to fruition.

I note that this bill proposes that the tribunal will be led by a president, supported by a range of deputy presidents, magistrates and conciliators, and then there will be at least one deputy president of the tribunal being a judge other than the senior judge of the Industrial Relations Court.

Obviously if this bill is enacted there will be the employment of conciliation officers who may be legally qualified but who may also be experts from different fields. The legally qualified officers must have at least five years standing as legal practitioners. With regard to the other conciliation officers, it will be up to the minister to decide how much knowledge they have, how extensive that is, and what their expertise or experience is in relating to a class of matter which may be discussed within the tribunal. The bill also clarifies members of the tribunal, which in particular circumstances will be considered the presiding member. This can be flexible throughout the tribunal in the hearing of matters and there is an order of precedence amongst members of the tribunal.

The matters that will come before the tribunal will be dealt with as a review of the original decision. The tribunal will obviously examine the decision of the original decision-maker by way of a rehearing, but the original decision-maker can reconsider their decision working with the tribunal to get to the end result. They will be invited to do that by the tribunal and the original decision-maker may affirm, vary or set aside the decision and substitute a new decision.

The bill sets out the principles of how the tribunal will act, rules of evidence, formality and inquisitorial approach, and acting according to equity and good conscience are just part of those principles. Then a range of evidentiary powers were brought into place about how evidence can be obtained, how processes are used, control parties, and how certain powers are proposed for inclusion, but they will be discussed throughout the committee stage of the bill.

With regard to the tribunal, the practice and procedures of the tribunal will be set out, and the bill sets out the conduct of proceedings and interaction of parties to proceedings. In relation to mediation or conferences regarding settlement of claims, parties can be required to attend a compulsory conference or it can go to mediation with a mediator as specified by the tribunal. I think also what happens in the process is that there will be the right of appeals. The bill outlines how staff can be hired. There will be at least one principal registrar and they will be supported by one or more other registrars to be known as deputy registrars.

When I began my short address, I did ask why there could not be some more streamlining done. We have seen the government in recent days wanting to streamline boards and committees, and I think this could have been managed under the SACAT. My one great hope with this legislation, in line with the Return to Work Bill, is that we get some real outcomes for the employers and the employees of South Australia, because when you have a system that has blown out to close to $1.4 billion in deficit, it is just totally untenable.

One thing I will say is that at least the Attorney-General has recognised that and he has the courage of his convictions to bring this legislation into this place but, as I said in my contribution to the Return to Work Bill, the proof will be in the pudding; that is, when we do not have people complaining about 7.5 per cent WorkCover rates for work that, quite frankly, I do not think justifies that level of rate and when workers get decent outcomes. Let's not live in Fairyland because not everyone is going to be happy with these outcomes, but we must have far better outcomes so that we can promote employment in this state, and so that we can promote the idea of people running businesses in this state instead of the opposite. I commend the bill.

The Hon. J.R. RAU (Enfield—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General, Minister for Justice Reform, Minister for Planning, Minister for Housing and Urban Development, Minister for Industrial Relations) (16:54): Can I thank all the members opposite who made contributions. I will respond to a number of the things they have raised in my closing speech in the hope (a vain hope perhaps) that that will mean that many of the things that might have been otherwise explored later on will be already explained and will not need to be canvassed or at least canvassed as in-depth.

Can I talk a little about how this is intended to be constructed and how it differs from the present scheme. First and foremost this is designed to be an inquisitorial scheme as opposed to an adversarial scheme. In other words, the presiding officer of the tribunal has control of the matter not the parties. The presiding officer obviously listens to the parties and hears from them and whatever, but they are not able to basically take the presiding officer and the whole tribunal on a ride they do not need to or want to go on.

In that sense it is a little more like the way in which the Coroner's Court behaves than an ordinary court, and this is not a court, it is a tribunal. That is point number one; it is intended to be inquisitorial. The second point which was raised by one or another of the contributors, I think by the member for MacKillop, concerns medical issues. The medical issues point here is quite simple: there will be an accreditation scheme, and we dealt with this last night in the conversation about IMAB.

Members need to understand that these two bills are interlinked in many spots so it is pretty difficult to talk about both of them in isolation. The idea of surgically excising this tribunal from the whole scheme is rather complex for that reason, amongst others. In terms of the medical people who will be appearing before this tribunal, first of all they will have complied with some form of accredited training program that means they are competent and capable of providing WPI assessments and other relevant medical opinions.

The second thing is that they are going to be looked at from both from the employer and employee perspective as to whether or not they are barrackers nonetheless. We are attempting to have a relatively refined pool of medical practitioners, and that gives me some degree of confidence that we will have a higher degree of consistency in the types of medical evidence that comes forward.

The next point I would make is that the question sitting around here is: why this and why not SACAT? There are a couple of points to be made about that. The first point is that SACAT does not yet exist and, if what is going on in another place continues, it may not exist for the foreseeable future.

Ms Chapman interjecting:

The Hon. J.R. RAU: It exists as an empty shell; it does not exist as a functional organisation. If what is going on somewhere else continues to go on much longer, it definitely will not be operational this year and may not be until at least the first quarter, if not the first half, of next year. That is not in our hands; that is in the hands of people somewhere else. The point is there may not be any SACAT for it to go to and, if anyone is serious about fixing that up, simply opposing this crazy last-minute proposition about excluding the Guardianship Board might be a way to achieve that.

Ms Chapman interjecting:

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Up there. So there is no SACAT to put it into. The next point is that nobody in SACAT has had a conversation about this, and they have had no time to do any working up or preparation on this at all—zero. They have been totally focused on the Guardianship Board and Residential Tenancies and they are not tooled up or ready to do it even if they were wanting to do it because nobody has given them any chance to be prepared for it.

What does this scheme basically do? It basically says, 'We are going to impose a different regime in terms of the management of claims and disputes to the existing one.' It will be an inquisitorial regime. It is going to have different evidentiary requirements, it is going to have different medical assessment models, it is going to have different cost rules, and a whole bunch of things which are quite different. We will start off, because there could be questions of law, using the existing complement of judges in the industrial court as the deputy presidents. They all have experience. It does not involve me or the government picking anyone in particular; they are an existing pool of people.

The intention is that there would be a call in respect of the review officers whose terms are for five years. That would mean existing review officers could apply, new people could apply. My intention would be to have some sort of arm's length selection process whereby those people are assessed by reason of their capability for office. That would be the method by which there would be appointment, and they could continue to occupy the same premises where they are presently operating.

The member for Bragg asked about consultation. Yes, there has been consultation. There has been consultation about this with the people at Riverside. I believe they would prefer this model to being rolled into SACAT for many of the reasons I have already mentioned. Members need to realise, too, that that place down there is a very complex place; the member for Bragg touched on it. You have an industrial court, which is populated by people who are also District Court judges, you have industrial magistrates, who are also regular magistrates for the purposes of the Magistrates Court Act, you have industrial commissioners, and you have a workers compensation tribunal.

The industrial commission also has deputy presidents, some of whom are judges—I think all of whom are judges—and then there are commissioners who hold dual commissions (state and federal commissions), who zip in and out of the place according to requirements. It is quite a complex little environment down there.

Obviously I am more than happy to try to answer any particular questions as we go through, but there are a couple of specific remarks that I want to make. First of all, member for Schubert, I am delighted that you went to that degree of research for that piece. You would note the bits that are not in quotes are not my words, so I cannot be held accountable for what the journalist, excellent though he is, might have decided to say. I was reflecting on a couple of the remarks the member for Schubert made. In the first one he gave us quite a bit of disclosure about internal house dynamics.

The only thing I can say about that is that I was formerly, many years ago, fortunate enough to be an employee of Mick Young for a period of time. As he described it, he was a member of the one true faith, a claim that I cannot make. He often used to tell people who had problems that 15 Hail Marys would probably fix up whatever was wrong. I do not know exactly what that means, but evidently if you are in the club you know exactly what that means. At the risk of making a rather poor pun, I think there was just one snag in your comments, member for Schubert. The other point I would make is that, when I heard you speak about being the son of a sausage man, that made me reflect on the great words of Dusty Springfield, which were, 'The only one who could ever reach me was a son of the sausage man, yes he was, yes he was.' That is just for you.

In respect of this disputation thing—if I can temporarily get back on to that—there will be less moving parts in the scheme, therefore less grounds for disputation, therefore less opportunity for disputation, more early intervention with the mediation, and suchlike. My anticipation is that the number of things that will wind up in a full-blown conflict situation will be much less than presently is the case.

The intention is basically this: there is a determination at the review officer stage. There is then a full de novo hearing, in effect, where the parties can chuck in any evidence they want, whether it is before a conciliation officer if it is a simple matter or before a judge if it is more complex matter, and after that appeals are on matters of law and not on let's hear the whole thing over and over again. Of course, the other thing, listening to the very positive comments from the member for Hartley, is that I would like to say, first of all, happy birthday. I bet he never anticipated spending his birthday this year sitting in here but here he is, living the dream.

I think I have mentioned the conciliation officers, but I sincerely say to the member for Hartley that the spirit of 'Let's all get together and do something about this,' is something I welcome, particularly from the younger members of the opposition, who appear to be quite positive about things, which is excellent. As I was listening to the member for Hartley's contribution my feet started tapping and I moved back into Strictly Ballroom, and it was John Paul Young and Love is in the Air. That is where we got to with you, but happy birthday anyway, and thanks for those positive comments. It is nice to see people being constructive. I will do my best to answer questions in the committee stage.

Bill read a second time.

Committee Stage

In committee.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I would like to say one quick thing at the beginning of the committee. We have a number of amendments here. Most of them are repetitive, and I just give members notice that we are still looking at further fine-tuning, which I will give them notice of if there is anything further between the houses.

Clauses 1 to 5 passed.

Clause 6.

Ms CHAPMAN: At present in the debate we have largely been considering the question of workers compensation disputes, currently the purview of the Workers Compensation Tribunal, as being the core business of this new tribunal. Because this independent, one-stop-shop type approach for industrial matters has been promoted as part of the reason it is important to have a separate court structure, where an employee elects to pursue a common law claim, for whatever miniscule amount that might be, and given the hurdles to overcome even to apply let alone face the threat of forfeiting other entitlements, for that brave soul who might make an application, is it anticipated that this tribunal will also hear common law dispute matters arising out of the tort, arising out of a workplace injury?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: As far as I am concerned the answer to that is no. The situation in respect of common law matters is that they would be dealt with either through, I guess, at that magnitude, the District or the Supreme Court. The only caveat I put on that is that some of these judges are notionally District Court judges. But this is not intended to be a court anyway, it is a tribunal. So the answer is no.

Divining where your question might be heading, it is conceivable that there are some functions sitting around the place, disciplinary functions or whatever they might be, which would ultimately be conveniently placed here. Where it says that the tribunal has jurisdiction conferred by statute, that is meant to imply that at some point in the future it may be deemed appropriate that some other functions be put in there. However, if they were to be put in there (if I can take you to clause 23), the anticipated situation is that they would be streamed. So whilst this would be a body that, at a high level, deals with employment matters, at the present time it is contemplated that it is just this workers compensation jurisdiction.

Let's say, hypothetically, that some disciplinary things popped in there, then there might be a disciplinary jurisdiction. If the work currently performed by the state Industrial Relations Commission were something that could be put in there—I am not saying it is; I am just saying that, again, that is an employment sort of matter—and it was conferred by some jurisdictional matter, first of all the parliament would obviously have to confer it and, secondly, the architecture of this thing is intended to say that that would constitute, as in SACAT, a separate stream, just as the guardianship bit and the residential tenancies bit are separate streams.

If there were industrial—and I am talking in the broader sense—streams which ultimately were devolved into this by the parliament at some point in the future, clause 23 enables there to be created a discrete stream so that the particular requirements of that jurisdiction, should it be granted, could be accommodated as a discrete element. That does not mean that all personnel for both elements would always be completely separate, but it does mean it is a discrete stream.

Ms CHAPMAN: Is it proposed that the South Australian employment tribunal will physically be located in the premises currently occupied by the Industrial Relations Court and tribunals?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: For the time being, yes, because I think there are existing leases. They have plant, equipment and God knows what; there is no reason for us to disturb that. Also, even if this goes through, there will be a transitional period where there will have to be a run-off, up to a certain point, of old claims being dealt with under the old system, and it would be ludicrous to separate the whole thing out.

Ms CHAPMAN: We will come to the personnel in a moment, that is, who is going to take up the positions within this tribunal, but at present, as we have already identified, the Industrial Relations Court, which is an entity that will continue, obviously, even as an appeal body to this tribunal, is still going to be in existence. At the moment, they comprise the same personnel you are proposing to support the operation of this new tribunal.

We are going to continue to have, for the time being, this new tribunal. The other responsibilities are health practitioner disciplinary, licensing, dust disease, commission responsibilities, which has slightly different personnel, but some overlap again, and the continuing Industrial Relations Court, which has other matters, even prosecution, together with being an appeal court to this new entity.

As I say, many of the personnel overlap in that regard, so my other question is whether, down the track, it may be that a common law claim by an employee against an employer, arising out of an industrial accident, could be heard, subject to the jurisdictional limit, by one of the industrial court/District Court personnel; is that possible?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: It is possible, but I make the point that, firstly, such a person would only be hearing it in their capacity as a District Court judge, not as an industrial court judge, and, secondly, the registry in which that application would be filed would be the District Court registry, not the industrial court registry or this tribunal registry. So, the probability that the presiding judge of the District Court would, for the first time ever, allocate such a matter to somebody who is outside the court and then have to negotiate with the senior judge of that court in order to secure the opportunity for that to happen, is so small I just do not think it is going to happen.

It is true that a person who holds a commission as a District Court judge could, if the head of the industrial court and the head of the District Court agreed, be allocated work across those boundaries, as has happened with dust diseases and as has happened with liquor licensing. I can assure the member for Bragg that there is absolutely no intention on my part that there be any common understanding or any practice that a common law matter arising by reason of the amendments we have made earlier today would be dealt with in any other way than a normal common law matter filed in the registry of the Supreme or District courts.

Ms CHAPMAN: What about the equal opportunity disputes—again, industrial flavour—often in relation to employer-employee disputes? Is it likely that that jurisdiction is going to be transferred for its resolution in this new tribunal?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: The present plan with those is that they would be rolled into SACAT, and that is in the absence of there being this alternative available. I do think that if this alternative is available, because sometimes an industrial issue about workers compensation involves bullying or it might involve allegations of discrimination, there is some common sense in having those dealt with in a single forum. But in the work we have done so far on EO, we were doing it in the context of there being only one option, which was a stream of SACAT. It might well be that, if this is passed, because it is a relatively small jurisdiction anyway, there would be some sense in that being moved into here.

Clause passed.

Clauses 7 and 8 passed.

Clause 9.

Ms CHAPMAN: In relation to the members of the tribunal, following this clause, set out in more detail, are the functions of the president and the deputy presidents but not magistrates. Clause 15, which is coming up, sets out the fact that magistrates can be appointed. There are similar arrangements relating to their establishment, but they do not actually have any functions as apply to the president or the deputy president.

Unsurprisingly, the Law Society has asked: what is the intended function of magistrates and do we need them at all? That is not to say that, under their current role, they are not doing good work. Mr Ardlie and Mr Lieschke are both magistrates, and this is no reflection on either of them. I place on the record that I know Mr Ardlie from practice and that I have met Mr Lieschke, although I do not know him personally. This is no disrespect to them, but you have not made any provision for them in this bill in terms of what their function will be. Can you tell us what is going to happen there?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Yes, I can—and, again, a good question. Bear in mind what I said before about the potential under clause 23 for there to be an alternative stream; for instance, there is a whole bunch of things that the magistrates presently do, such as underpayment of wages claims and various other matters—

Ms Chapman interjecting:

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Yes, exactly, criminal prosecutions—a whole bunch of things. If it were decided that a stream would be created to encapsulate that work, we would have to create a facility for magistrates. That is the first point. If it is there anyway, it is part of the future-proofing, if you like, for potential jurisdictional enhancements in the future. The second point is that, if you look at clause 13(2), the way I read that and I have understood that to be is that there would be nothing to prevent the Governor nominating a magistrate to become a deputy president—

Ms Chapman interjecting:

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Clause 13(2), page 9.

The CHAIR: Line 17 or 18.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: No, it is 21:

The Governor may, on the nomination of the Minister, appoint a person who is eligible for appointment—

Ms CHAPMAN: That could be anyone with five years' legal experience or whatever. Is it intended, then, that the current magistrates in the industrial court are to become deputy presidents under your new proposed—

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Not necessarily. It may be the case. It is partly a question of workload and skills base. There is no doubt that Magistrate Lieschke has considerable experience in the area, and it is highly likely that he would be of value. Magistrate Ardlie is not a deputy president, as I understand it, presently. Whilst he may have done enormous community service by occasionally being entertained by Mr Moore-McQuillan, I believe, on special events, he has basically not been in this jurisdiction. That would just be a matter—

Ms Chapman interjecting:

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Sorry, I am advised he is an auxiliary already, so yes, it might well be that one or both of them are put in. As I said before, and I will say it again, my expectation is the volume of work, once things settle, will be less than the volume of work is now. That is my expectation, but that is in the context of there being a run-off of existing matters in the pipeline after 1 July, which will take some time. I do not know exactly how long, and that will keep everyone occupied for that period, and then there will be a period as the new ones start to filter into the system. It might be that there is a point in time where the combination of the run-off and the new matters entering the system actually create a bubble in the total workload.

Clause passed.

Clause 10.

Ms CHAPMAN: The Senior Judge of the Industrial Relations Court is to be the president of this new tribunal, so it is a he and he is currently in place. What are his terms in respect of employment? Does he just continue under his current contract as a District Court judge for retirement at 65 or 70, or is he someone who is already on the up-to-70 provision?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Part of the reason for this was to actually make it clear to anybody reading this thing that the government was not about picking winners. We were just saying, 'Look, here is the existing complement.' Judge Jennings is the Senior Judge of the Industrial Relations Court. He has a tenure until the age of 70 and, therefore, whoever that judge might be from time to time would, by reason of being the Senior Judge of the Industrial Relations Court, attract the office of president of the tribunal. We did have an alternative, theoretically, which could be that the government could nominate whoever they want, but it struck me that the more transparent and accountable way of doing it would be to say, 'These people are there. They will basically be the people who will be picked up by the scheme.'

Mr WILLIAMS: Technically I should be asking this question further on but I will—

The CHAIR: Technically you shouldn't be asking this question? Then sit down.

Mr WILLIAMS: No, I said technically I should be asking it a little further on, but I will ask it now while we are on this. Was I right in my summation in the second reading that all the judges of the Industrial Relations Court automatically become deputy presidents of the tribunal under the same—just carry on?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Yes. In much the same way that they are presently deputy presidents of the tribunal, so they would, in effect, in that transitional position have four roles: District Court judge, Industrial Relations Court judge, Deputy President of the Workers Compensation Tribunal, and deputy president of this. Possibly also Deputy President of the Industrial Commission.

Clause passed.

Clauses 11 and 12 passed.

Clause 13.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 1 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 9, line 27—Delete '65' and substitute '70'

Ms CHAPMAN: Of the current judges who are going to be the deputy presidents, there is provision there for them to retire at 65 years. It is subclause (4)(b). Is there any reason why that was originally proposed at 65 years? The reason I ask is that under the SACAT Bill it is five-year appointments, so it is somewhat different.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: This is one of those points where, given that we are dealing with an existing complement of judges and given that they are there by reason of their appointment until the age of 70, it would be kind of weird if they were there until 70 but at 65 they stopped being on this part, so that is just to align those two things.

Ms CHAPMAN: For the purposes, then, of understanding the distinction, this is exactly the same model of tribunal as the SACAT. Why is it that this is different to the SACAT umbrella bill, which makes provision for people to have five-year terms of employment? In the two jobs we are talking about, which is Mr Parker's and Ms Cole's positions, why are they on five-year contracts and why is their tenure not for the course of their time that they are Supreme Court and District Court judges?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: That is, I guess, a fair enough point. One of the slight differences in this environment is that we are moving into an already settled and established framework and we are simply trying to reflect the existing tenure positions. Both Judge Cole and Justice Parker have tenure until the age of 70 but not specifically in SACAT. That is the point you are making, isn't it?

Ms CHAPMAN: For as long as they are Supreme Court or District Court judges, which is a requirement for the purposes of being appointed president and deputy, they are in exactly the same position as these judges, that is, they have tenure until that time. I am just simply puzzled, because they are going to be continuing in a Supreme Court role and District Court role respectively and taking on the new responsibilities in the new tribunal, why they are not entitled to the same, I suppose, privilege of security of tenure in this jurisdiction which would sever, in any event, if they cease their judicial role independently of the tribunal.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I understand the point and all I can say is what they have in common, all of them, is they have tenure until the age of 70. What is different is their tenure in the tribunal dimension. It was just thought that this is the most transparent way of dealing with this which would not involve there being a threshold appointment. What happened with Judge Cole and Justice Parker was that the government at some point had to appoint them for the first time. If we did not do it this way and we had just a five-year term, it might be argued by some, 'Who are you going to appoint on there?' Bear in mind they do not have to be District Court judges to be appointed as deputy presidents. They only have to be eligible to be a District Court judge.

What this was attempting to do was make it very clear to everybody reading this bill that if this bill passes you know exactly who and what you are getting. It is not going to be a question mark and then wait and see who the Governor decides to appoint in the fullness of time. Everyone will know exactly what is going on. If the opposition has an issue about that between here and there, I am happy to have a talk about it, but it was intended to make it very clear and basically depoliticise the appointment of these people because we are just picking up existing people. Otherwise, the Governor would have to appoint these people for the first time and that would raise the issue of, 'Who are you appointing for the first time?' because you can appoint anybody who is a lawyer of over seven years.

Ms CHAPMAN: I suppose the issue then really becomes this. Having already set up the umbrella for SACAT and made the five-year appointments as you have—I appreciate that is for the first time—instead of simply saying, 'I am going to nominate this person,' who might be the senior puisne judge, or whatever, of these courts, 'to be the person', it is known to us who you are going to be putting on this tribunal or who you are going to be transferring jurisdictions, effectively, and you are being open and transparent at this point.

But some could argue that it is actually the other way around, that is, you are setting up this tribunal to receive these people for a job that is in addition to their current role, or in some cases a continuation but a slightly different model of one of their current roles, but, on the other hand, the SACAT judges who have been appointed have not been offered that same opportunity. Sure, you get to pick them. You have already done that, and I am not suggesting that in any way they are unworthy appointments.

I just make the point that you have set up a separate model and we did not know at the time you were setting up SACAT that you were going to have a separate one over here. We thought it was all going to be happy families and everyone is going to be all in together. We now have this separate jurisdiction. I suppose, really, the question is going to be: is it the government's intention to offer exactly those same terms to Mr Parker and Ms Cole?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I have no intention of doing that. I have not even turned my mind to it, should I say, which is the reason I have no intention. Between the houses, if the member for Bragg is sufficiently concerned about this matter, we can have further conversation about it. It was not intended to be anything other than absolutely transparent.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 14 and 15 passed.

Clause 16.

Ms CHAPMAN: The provision for the appointment of the conciliation officers is made in this clause. Under this clause a panel is to be established, and then I think it is for you, minister, to consult with the president about who goes on it. In other jurisdictions when we have dealt with SACAT, some of the persons in the professional category, as distinct from the counter staff and data processing people and the like, have gone through a process of application. I think it is fair to say that pretty much without exception those who have applied to transfer in these professional roles as distinct from judicial roles have been given an opportunity to take up a position in the new SACAT.

The Hon. J.R. Rau interjecting:

Ms CHAPMAN: There may be people that you have excluded, I do not know. I imagine there would be some who just elect to retire or do other things anyway, but for those who have asked to be effectively transferred to the staff they have the right to apply and the others have gone through a process. That has been pretty much without incident in that sense, and I am not being critical of that. I think we are changing the structure here, it does not necessarily mean we have to wreck people's employment life. Is this the same process that you are proposing here that you did for the first round of the SACAT appointments?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Essentially it is an exact replica of that process.

Mr KNOLL: Referring to subclause (4)(c)(i) and (ii), can the Attorney give some sort of indication as to why for conciliation officers there is a need for balanced representation? The second part of my question is that I would assume conciliation officers deal with conciliation on a one-on-one basis. It is not a case of getting a panel of broadly represented people per matter. You are going to get one person. You are not going to get diversity for each matter.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: All I can say is that the member for Schubert makes a very good point.

The Hon. S.W. KEY: I was not going to ask this question but the member for Schubert has inspired me. It is a little bit different to what the member for Schubert has asked. I am interested to know why we need to look at gender representation for the conciliation officers—let's face it, we certainly need it in the industrial arena—and the membership of the tribunal but we do not have the same proviso for magistrates and deputy presidents. Admittedly, I know these people are in positions. With Judge Parsons moving from the position, I think that leaves the numbers down to one. As for the acting president and the appointment of the president, I wonder why we cannot have a general objective that provides we take notice of those matters, not just pick on, depending on your point of view, the conciliation officers.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I think a combination of the arguments of the members for Schubert and Ashford has convinced me that those provisions are otiose in subclause (4).

Clause passed.

Clauses 17 and 18 passed.

Clause 19.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 2 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 13, after line 21—Insert:

(2a) A Full Bench of the Tribunal consists of 3 Presidential members.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 20 and 21 passed.

Clause 22.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 3 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 14, line 28—Delete 'Presidential member' and substitute 'Full Bench'

Amendment No 4 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 14, line 31—Delete 'Presidential member' and substitute 'Full Bench'

Amendment No 5 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 14, line 32—Delete 'Presidential member' and substitute 'Full Bench'

Amendment No 6 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 14, line 34—Delete 'Presidential member' and substitute 'Full Bench'

Amendment No 7 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 14, line 35—Delete 'Presidential member' and substitute 'Full Bench'

Amendments carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 23 to 26 passed.

Clause 27.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 8 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 16, line 11—Delete ', and give appropriate weight to,'

Amendment carried.

Ms CHAPMAN: Here we have the general nature of proceedings and this includes what jurisdiction they exercise. Under the Return to Work Bill the description of what they are going to be doing is outlined in clause 97, so assuming that bill goes through there is a list of all the roles that are going to come their way in that jurisdiction.

If the Return to Work Bill is not passed, I assume we will not have an employment tribunal, so I put this to you as a hypothetical. It assumes the Return to Work Bill in some form will go through and that there will be a list. What is going to be transferred seems pretty uncontroversial, but what has exercised some of the legal people is that, under section 89A(1) of the current WorkCover legislation, the jurisdiction handling workers compensation deals with a 'decision on a claim for compensation' as being reviewable. Now we are going to move from that general statement to this very prescriptive one.

It is fairly comprehensive, but often when you go to a prescriptive list some things get missed out. For example, if there was to be a decision made on what the amount was to be of a lump sum death benefit, that is not on the list, so I want to know how we cover that. Is it intended that it will actually exclude some of these things which currently could be within that very all encompassing clause?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Part of the problem with the existing legislation is that there are an immense number of reviewable things. Some of them are very critical for an individual and some of them one might regard as being parsley on the side of the plate and not the main game, so what we have decided to do here is to try to be specific about what is reviewable so that people confine themselves to arguments which are actually critical to an individual's process and not tangential.

Ms Chapman: So the lump sum death benefit is included?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: My understanding is that it is. My understanding is that the lump sum death benefit is included. We will check between the houses and, if it is not, it should be.

Ms CHAPMAN: Just for the record, and I appreciate it is quite a comprehensive list, if there is any other area which it does not cover or if there is any other intention of the government that you want to cut out certain claims because they are frivolous, could you identify those between the houses as well?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: You will note here that there are powers to remove things that are frivolous.

Clause as amended passed.

Clause 28.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 9 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 16, line 25—Delete 'the review' and substitute 'a review'

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clause 29.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 10 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 17, line 13—Delete 'the review' and substitute 'a review'

Amendment No 11 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 17, line 18—Delete 'the review' and substitute 'a review'

Amendments carried; clause as amended passed.

Clause 30.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 12 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 17, line 32—After 'a review' insert 'of a decision'

Amendment carried, clause as amended passed.

Clause 31.

Ms CHAPMAN: I think I heard this during the contribution in reply on the second reading. Although this clause is written, as sometimes we see, to look like everything is in plain-speaking language about how this is going to operate so that it is clear to the litigants in these tribunals that everything is going to be simplified and easy to understand, having read this clause I am not sure that I am absolutely clear whether applications will be heard as a complete rehearing de novo or whether this will be a review because you are now using the language, if I can say that in a general sense, that looks like where there are review hearings, and you then end up with a bit in or out.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: The member for Bragg has touched on one of the other very important but, to less forensic people, subtle differences between this and the SACAT. In the SACAT, it is very much a rehearing of an administrative decision essentially on the basis of the material before the original decision-maker. In this case, if we were to do that, that would mean that a person who made a claim for compensation and then was unhappy with the outcome would be only able to go to the tribunal with the material before the original decision-maker, even if that was inadequate material, and argue within the confines of that boundary.

I have thought about this a lot, and I think that would be unfair to at no point in time give an aggrieved applicant for benefits under this scheme the opportunity of actually telling somebody all their evidence afresh. The intention is that they get one go, and one go alone, when they get the opportunity of calling witnesses and all that sort of thing. That is at the level immediately above the original decision-maker. That is where they get the chance to actually have the hearing, that is it, that is the only crack they have at it. If they are dissatisfied with the hearing there, they only have the capacity to agitate it on limited grounds and with leave.

That is not the case with most administrative decision review procedures, but in that sense it will be a hearing de novo at that first level. While that process is underway, it is intended that concurrently, not awaiting the determination of anything, a message goes back to the original decision-maker, 'Hey, original decision-maker, do you realise the applicant before you a while ago is not happy with your thing? They have commenced proceedings in the tribunal. It will result in a hearing de novo, but if you wish to turn your mind to your decision and reconsider whether you think your decision is okay, and on review of the papers you work out you didn't read something, you did not get the date right or something, you can notify us that you've changed your mind and everything stops.'

One of the problems, and the thing that annoys a lot of people, is that at the moment there is a notional reconsideration by WorkCover of the original decision. Nobody has much confidence in that because it is like Caesar reconsidering Caesar, but while that reconsideration is going on everything else stops. Until that reconsideration has been finished, the next bit—the reagitation of it before a tribunal—cannot begin.

What we are saying here is that the day you press the 'I'm unhappy' button, it gets you into the framework of the tribunal. At the same time, a message goes back to the original decision-maker, 'You can please yourself, but it would be smart of you to review your papers, and if you're wrong tell everybody now before we waste a lot of time and effort in having a full-blown hearing about it.' That is how that is meant to work.

Clause passed.

Clause 32 passed.

Clause 33.

Mr WILLIAMS: Minister, you might disabuse me of my ignorance on this, but the evidentiary powers in clause 33 seem, to me at least, very draconian. I have come across this sort of thing where the right to remain silent seems to be—

Ms Chapman: It's exactly the same as SACAT.

Mr WILLIAMS: Exactly the same as SACAT?

Ms Chapman interjecting:

Mr WILLIAMS: Well, I still raise this point: where I have seen this before, certainly in an attempt by your government to bring in these powers to take away the person's right to remain silent, has been in some environmental law. I just heard that it is exactly the same in SACAT. Do we have any other law on the statute book where these rights have been removed?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Can you point to a bit that you are really concerned about? I think what this is saying is that they can make orders to get material, they can ask you to come in and you can tell fibs in front of them—

Ms Chapman: It's an informal subpoena.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: It's an informal subpoena. Interestingly enough, because we are trying to make it clear that this is not a court, if you go on to page 20, and in particular line 10, one of the original cuts of this had something about them having the power to punish for contempt. I said, 'No, no, no, that comes out because this is not a court.' There is an offence—

Ms Chapman: It is a misbehaviour penalty.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: It's misbehaviour penalty, which in turn would have to be prosecuted before a court. Isn't that good? It means it is not a court.

Mr WILLIAMS: Minister, I draw your attention to the top of that page, where paragraph (d) provides:

(d) refuses or fails without reasonable excuse to give evidence before the Tribunal or otherwise refuses or fails without reasonable excuse to answer any question put in proceedings...

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I do not see anything here which overrides the natural privilege against self-incrimination. I think any court would interpret those words as meaning subject to the right for an individual to say, 'I refuse to answer that on the grounds' unless it is explicitly taken away from them—and it is not. My reading of this is that a person still could say, 'Sorry, I'm not answering that because it will incriminate me.'

Mr WILLIAMS: I am happy with your interpretation.

Clause passed.

Clause 34 passed.

Clause 35.

Mr KNOLL: I have shoehorned this in because I assume that expert reports may be brought in by medical practitioners. In my speech earlier, Attorney, I referred to the concept of duelling doctors. In your briefing, you said that there is the opportunity here for the corporation or the tribunal to appoint a doctor. An accredited doctor will then give evidence, and that evidence is the evidence and there is no opportunity to enter into anything else. So when the tribunal calls for a medical witness, that evidence is the evidence. Is that correct for the tribunal, and is that also (and I am digressing a little bit, and seeking your indulgence here) the same in the normal course of a dispute? So if it is a normal claim, and there is a duelling doctor situation, is there still the ability for the corporation, as well as the tribunal, to say, 'Look, this is the person you have to go see, and this person's view overrides any other view'?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: That is a very good question, and here is one of the novel bits and pieces in here. At the point that something comes to this tribunal, if the dispute is a medical dispute, there are already contending positions, because the injured worker has gone off and got a report from somebody that says, 'I think you're 10 per cent,' or whatever, and the corporation says, 'No, you are five.' You have those two as evidence.

Each of those parties comes to the tribunal and says, 'Look, there is a difference of opinion here. We want you to nut it out.' What clause 35 says is that the tribunal then says, 'Okay, we will nut it out. We will call a completely independent medical witness; not one of yours and not one of yours. We will give them your medical reports, we will ask them any questions either of you think need to be asked, and they will provide advice to the tribunal—which, of course, you will hear because you are present before the tribunal.'

The important difference there is that it is the tribunal as an independent body that is instructing the doctor, 'Please doctor, inform us, as an independent body, what you make of this dispute.' It is not each party coming in and saying, 'I say this, I say that.' That is the whole idea.

Mr KNOLL: Is that process available to the corporation in the normal course of a claim, as well as the tribunal? Obviously the tribunal goes through that process you just talked about, but the corporation would have situations where an employer gets a doctor's opinion and the employee gets a doctor's opinion, and there is a difference of opinion. Is there the ability for the corporation to say, 'Hey, you go and see this accredited person and make a determination'?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Yes, there is, but it is at a stage before this dispute. Let us say that a person says, 'I think I am entitled to a whole person impairment payment,' and they go off to an accredited doctor—because, remember, under our scheme only accredited doctors can give those assessments, not any old doctor. So they go off to an accredited doctor, and the accredited doctor says 10 per cent or 15 per cent or 20 per cent, whatever it might be. They then say to the corporation, 'Here is our accredited doctor's statement. We want to be paid a section 43,' or whatever it might be.

The corporation might say, 'Well, you know what? Because this person is an accredited doctor we are not even going to argue about this. This seems okay to us,' and they just say, 'Yes, claim accepted.' They might say (and they might not), 'Look, we think we had better check this out,' and I assume they would if it were a 30 per cent plus number, because there are big consequences. They would then find another accredited doctor just to make a judgement as to whether that was more or less in the ballpark, and make an offer to the person. If those two could not resolve it, then they both trot off to the tribunal, which would then ask its own person to come in and inform the tribunal.

Clause passed.

Clauses 36 to 42 passed.

New heading.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 13 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 23, after line 31—Insert:

Subdivision 1—Conferences

New heading inserted.

Clause 43.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 14 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 23, line 34—Delete 'compulsory conference' and substitute ' compulsory conciliation conference (a compulsory conference)'

Amendment No 15 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 23, after line 38—Insert:

(3a) A conference must be commenced within the time fixed by the rules.

Amendment No 16 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 24, line 1—Delete 'and clarify' and substitute ', clarify and narrow'

Amendment No 17 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 24, after line 5—Insert:

(5a) However, in any event, the proceedings constituting a compulsory conference should not run over a period exceeding 6 weeks (unless the member of the Tribunal presiding at the conference considers that special circumstances exist that justify an extension of time for attempting to settle the matter).

(5b) If the period in which proceedings constituting a compulsory conference are conducted is extended beyond 6 weeks, the member of the Tribunal presiding at the conference must ensure that the special circumstances justifying the extension of time are recorded on the file maintained by the Tribunal in relation to the matter and that a record of the circumstances is issued to the parties.

Amendment No 18 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 24, lines 12 and 13—Delete paragraph (a)

Amendment No 19 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 24, lines 31 to 33—Delete subclause (9) and substitute:

(9) Despite section 22, the member of the Tribunal presiding at a compulsory conference may not refer a question of law to a Full Bench of the Tribunal.

Amendment No 20 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 24, after line 33—Insert:

(9a) If settlement of a matter is not reached at a compulsory conference, the member of the Tribunal presiding at the conference—

(a) must give to the parties an assessment of the merits of the party's case; and

(b) must seek to recommend ways to resolve any matter in dispute.

Mr KNOLL: This is my last question on the entire bill, and it is quite simple. What is the difference between a compulsory conference and a compulsory conciliation conference?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Yes, it is largely terminology. The idea is, first of all, that people cannot just say, 'Blow you, I am not going to turn up because I am not interested.' Secondly, they should participate in good faith in these things and at least have a try.

The member for Hartley made a very good point a little while ago, which is that this alternative dispute resolution is a really important opportunity, not just because it saves time and money but because a person who resolves their matter themselves, albeit through alternative dispute resolution, walks away with a certain satisfaction that certainly a losing party in a contested matter will never have. The other point is that the amendment of clause 43(8)(a) is to ensure that questions of law are not considered as part of the conciliation process.

Amendments carried; clause as amended passed.

New clauses 43A and 43B.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 21 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 25, after line 13—Insert:

43A—Referral of matters for hearing and determination

If a compulsory conciliation conference under this Subdivision does not result in an agreed settlement of the matter, the member of the Tribunal presiding at the conference must refer the matter for hearing and determination.

43B—Pre-hearing conferences

(1) Before the Tribunal proceeds with the hearing of a matter, a pre-hearing conference must be held before a Presidential member of the Tribunal.

(2) The Presidential member presiding at the conference—

(a) must—

(i) make an assessment of the matter; and

(ii) for the purpose of making the assessment—

(A) inquire into and consider the steps taken, and the steps that should be taken, to explore, or further explore, possible settlement of the matter (including referral of the matter to a Presidential member of the Tribunal for mediation); and

(B) seek to identify and narrow the issues in dispute; and

(b) may give such directions or orders as he or she considers appropriate.

New clauses inserted.

New heading.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 22 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 25, before line 14—Insert:

Subdivision 2—Mediation

New heading inserted.

Sitting extended beyond 18:00 on motion of Hon. J.R. Rau.

Clause 44.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 23 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 25, line 15—After 'an initial directions hearing' insert ', a compulsory conciliation conference'

Amendment No 24 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 25, line 22—After 'the parties' insert:

or, if a settlement is not achievable through this process, to further refine or narrow the issues in dispute

Amendments carried; clause as amended passed.

New heading.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 25 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 26, after line 8—Insert:

Subdivision 3—Settling proceedings

New heading inserted.

Clauses 45 to 48 passed.

Clause 49.

Ms CHAPMAN: My question relates to representation. I understand the Law Society has requested that this clause be amended to include an officer of a registered association, for example, officers belonging to an employee or an employee association. I cannot see that in the list as being considered favourably. Is that under consideration or has it been rejected or can it be accommodated?

The Hon. J.R. RAU: There is, in principle, no fundamental difficulty with that. In the case of this particular thing, it is already catered for as the Return to Work Bill makes that clear, and the two work together. There is not a gap in this case. In the future, there could be other jurisdictions, but that is not a problem for the moment because it is already fixed.

Clause passed.

Clause 50.

Ms CHAPMAN: This relates to costs. Reading it with clause 51 as well, I have to say I am a bit confused now about what the situation is going to be. Essentially, it is the set-up, and each party pays their own costs except in exceptional circumstances, is the way I would summarise it, but there seem to be lots of double-negative arrangements here. Do I have that correct? Is that the current situation with Workers Compensation Tribunal matters at present, or is it more common that they are ultimately costs that are met by the employer's representative? I only ever appeared there once so I cannot remember.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Again, the member for Bragg is onto a very important point here. The present regime basically works this way: the parties for the worker receive 85 per cent of the schedule fee, unless there are, in effect, special reasons for not giving money to the worker, and that could be that the worker is found to be a perjurer. I can say that it is very unusual. Unfortunately, I had the privilege of acting for one of these people once where the unusual did happen, and that was not good for anybody, particularly for me, but that is another story.

What we are intending to do here is to pick up another little nuance. It operates in the Industrial Relations Commission, and it comes from the unfair dismissal environment in the state jurisdiction. What happens there is that the parties have a preliminary conference, much as what is required here. They sit down and somebody says, 'Okay, tell us what your case is,' and at the end of that a recommendation is made by the person who is sitting at the conference table, the presiding person at the conference.

Parties are not obliged to accept that recommendation. They can say, 'No, we're not going to do that.' What happens where the parties do not accept the recommendation, and this is quite important, is that the recommendation is recorded and sealed in an envelope and, if the proceedings do go ahead, contrary to the recommendation, and if the party that is pursuing the proceedings does worse in the proceedings than they would have done had they accepted the recommendations, that is prima facie ground for them to be not successful in a cost application.

What that is intended to do is to discourage the person who might have a let's roll the dice type of attitude. They have been through the situation where they have had a good hearing in an informal way, a recommendation has been made and they say, 'I don't care what the recommendation is, I'm just going to take my chances, whatever the odds are,' because that person is wasting everybody's time if they lose. That is essentially what that is about.

Clause passed.

Clauses 51 to 62 passed.

New clause 62A.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 26 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 32, after line 7—Insert:

62A—Power to enlarge scope

The Tribunal may, with the consent of all parties to proceedings, enlarge the scope of the proceedings to include questions that are not presently at issue in the proceedings.

Ms CHAPMAN: I ask the Attorney to explain the amendment. On balance, all I was going to be saying is that the current clause 63 is a bit of a dog's breakfast. I do not quite understand under what circumstances you have a single party and when you have a Full Court, etc., but it looks like some of the Attorney's amendments might be tidying that up to make it a bit clearer as to under what circumstances they will sit and in what composition.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Again, the member for Bragg has hit another hot button here, because this is something, I have to confess to the committee, I am still not absolutely convinced we have got right. It might be that there is some further tweaking to this between the houses. The intention is laudable. The intention was to be able to assemble full benches relatively easily without having to have competing diary issues and suchlike. That is all very good, but you do potentially get to the problem where you have a bench of two and they do not agree. What do you? Do you say that the one who has the best tie on wins or the one who was appointed to the bench first wins? What do you do? It has been troubling me that there is an almost haphazard element to that which is perhaps not—

Ms Chapman: Lucky dip.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: Lucky dip. I am having a look at that myself. I did foreshadow at the beginning that we are still looking at things, and I am still tossing up in my mind whether the relative flexibility of a bench of two is more of an illusion of assistance than practical assistance.

New clause inserted.

New headings.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 27 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 32, line 8—Delete 'Appeals' and substitute 'Review and appeals'

Amendment No 28 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 32, line 9—Delete 'Appeals' and substitute 'Review and appeals'

New headings inserted.

Clause 63.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 29 [IndustRel–2]—

Clause 63—Delete the clause and substitute:

63—Review of decision of conciliation officer or magistrate

(1) A decision of the Tribunal—

(a) constituted of a conciliation officer; or

(b) constituted of a magistrate; or

(c) constituted of 2 or 3 members (but not including a Presidential member),

may be reviewed, on application under the rules, by a Presidential member of the Tribunal.

(2) A Presidential member of the Tribunal may, on a review under this section—

(a) affirm the decision that is being reviewed; or

(b) vary the decision that is being reviewed; or

(c) set aside the decision that is being reviewed and—

(i) substitute his or her own decision; or

(ii) send the matter back to the member or members for reconsideration in accordance with any directions or recommendations that the Presidential member considers appropriate.

63A—Appeal on question of law—single Presidential members

(1) An appeal lies on a question of law against a decision of the Tribunal—

(a) constituted of a single Presidential member; or

(b) constituted of 2 or 3 members including a Presidential member (other than a Full Bench),

to a Full Bench of the Tribunal.

(2) An appeal under this section must be commenced, heard and determined in accordance with the rules.

(3) If an appeal is allowed, the Full Bench will endeavour to determine the matter for itself and will not remit the matter for re-hearing or reconsideration unless exceptional circumstances apply.

(4) In exercising the power conferred by subsection (3), the Full Bench may draw inferences of fact from evidence taken at the original hearing and, in its discretion, hear further evidence on a question of fact.

63B—Final appeal to Supreme Court

(1) Subject to subsection (2), an appeal lies on a question of law against a decision of the Full Bench of the Tribunal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court.

(2) An appeal cannot be commenced under this section except with the permission of a Judge of the Supreme Court.

(3) On an appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court under this section, the Full Court of the Supreme Court may—

(a) decide the question of law;

(b) refer the matter back to the Tribunal with directions the Full Court considers appropriate;

(c) make consequential or related orders (including orders for costs).

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clause 64 passed.

Clause 65.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 30 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 33, line 18—Delete 'Presidential member' and substitute 'Full Bench'

Amendment No 31 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 33, line 19—Delete 'Presidential member' and substitute 'Full Bench'

Ms CHAPMAN: Again, this is a reservation about question of law and who hears it, etc. I think the next amendments might cover this because we are now going to have the full bench hearing these and that does tidy it up a bit.

Amendments carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 66 to 76 passed.

Clause 77.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I move:

Amendment No 32 [IndustRel–2]—

Page 37, line 8—Delete 'compulsory conference' and substitute 'Compulsory conciliation conference, a pre-hearing conference'

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 78 to 83 passed.

Clause 84.

Mr WILLIAMS: Attorney, I would ask you to consider between houses amending this particular clause. It is about the annual report. This a pretty standard clause, except that the date for the report to be handed to the minister is 31 October, and the minister must table it within the house within 12 sitting days. That would mean that quite often the house would not get the annual report until February.

I would ask that you consider either bringing the date forward to 30 September, like the WorkCover report (which I think is currently due on 30 September) or, alternatively, changing the 12 days to say that, in any case, the report must be tabled by the end of November, such that the house did have it before the end of that calendar year.

The Hon. J.R. RAU: I would be very happy to look at that.

Clause passed.

Remaining clauses (85 to 88) and title passed.

Bill reported with amendment.

Third Reading

The Hon. J.R. RAU (Enfield—Deputy Premier, Attorney-General, Minister for Justice Reform, Minister for Planning, Minister for Housing and Urban Development, Minister for Industrial Relations) (18:07): I move:

That this bill be now read a third time.

Bill read a third time and passed.