LAW SOCIETY RESPONSE

Ms CHAPMAN (Bragg) (15:40): Today I rise to place on the record the concerning—and I think now toxic—relationship between the Attorney-General and the legal profession in South Australia and, in particular, refer to the statement made by the Attorney-General in this parliament on Thursday 15 October 2009 in which his poisonous invective was at its best.

I and other members of this house have received a letter dated 19 October 2009 from the former president of the Law Society of South Australia in response to those statements. He refers to the issue of a Mr Goode—that is Mr Andrew Goode of Mellor Olsson—in respect of a bill to the Guarantee Fund which was the first subject matter of the Attorney-General in his statement to the parliament on 15 October, and this letter states:

You stated that Mr Goode was claiming outrageous costs and you also said that despite you giving me as Law Society President the opportunity to respond to your concerns I said that I was satisfied that there was no impropriety in the manner in which Mr Goode submitted his claim for costs.

What you failed to tell Parliament was that you sought my response and that I provided a response in an email to you of 4 March 2009 where I informed you of the circumstances in which the account was submitted.

And he goes on to detail that. Further, he says on page 2 of his letter:

You [the Attorney-General] also said, 'Who investigates lawyers in this state? The answer to that is: lawyers do.' As the Legal Practitioners Act falls within your portfolio as Attorney-General, you should be well aware that the investigation of misconduct by lawyers is carried out by the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board, a body that is independent of the Law Society and the legal profession. It falls upon you, Attorney-General, to appoint the majority of members of the Conduct Board.

As to the case of Mr Niarchos AM to which you referred, he made an application pursuant to Section 49 of the Legal Practitioners Act to the Supreme Court for leave to continue to practise while subject to an insolvency agreement. He applied to practise as a barrister only and accordingly there was no likelihood of him handling or dealing with clients' money. In accordance with a settled procedure, Mr Niarchos's application was served on the society and in accordance with a Protocol signed by you, was referred to the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board.

The conduct board made no objection to the application. The Society advised the Court that in the event the Court granted the application, it should be done on stringent terms and be monitored by the Society . The terms of the Order made by the Court including their requirement to report on a quarterly basis, were as suggested by the Society. The Professional Standards Section of the Law Society monitors compliance and instances of non-compliance would, as appropriate, be referred back to the Supreme Court.

The Legal Practitioners Act does not mandate a role for the Attorney-General in this type of application and prior to the case of Mr Niarchos AM, I am not aware of any interest shown by you or any of your predecessors in any such application by insolvent practitioners. In any event, the decision making authority is a Judge of the Supreme Court; it is not the Law Society and it is not the Attorney-General.

He goes on to, of course, refer to these matters in some detail, but particularly in respect of having had no notice. He states:

Nor for that matter does your claim that there was some form of cover-up by the Law Society or by me. You said in parliament that, 'It was only upon requesting that a staff member of mine attend a matter in court that I learned of the nature of Mr Niarchos's appearance.' That is not so. You learned the nature of Mr Niarchos's appearance in the Supreme Court from me prior to the hearing.

The Hon. A. KOUTSANTONIS: I rise on a point of order.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Order! Minister, point of order.

The Hon. A. KOUTSANTONIS: The member for Bragg is implying that the Attorney-General has misled the parliament. She can only do that by substantive motion.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: That is correct, she can only do that by substantive motion.

Ms CHAPMAN: I have not got to the allegations yet, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am reading out a statement of a former president of the Law Society. It continues:

We both attended dinner at the Naval and Military Club for military lawyers—

The Hon. A. KOUTSANTONIS: I rise on a point of order. The member for Bragg is canvassing argument that the Attorney-General has misled the house. She may only do that by substantive motion, and she knows it.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: It is the case that she may only do that by substantive motion. I am now paying close attention to what she is saying.

Ms CHAPMAN: It continues:

I informed you that Mr Niarchos was making an application to the court to continue to practise while insolvent. In the circumstances I take objection to your characterisation of my conduct as 'calculated silence'—

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Order! The member's time has expired. I think she was moving into dangerous territory.