CONSTITUTION (REFORM OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND SETTLEMENT OF DEADLOCKS ON LEGISLATION) AMENDMENT BILL

Second Reading

Adjourned debate on second reading (resumed on motion).

(Continued from page 3796.)

Ms CHAPMAN (Bragg) (15:57): Earlier I referred to the ministerial statement of the Premier as being on 24 November 2008; in fact it was 24 November 2005, and so my reference to the subsequent announcement by the Attorney at the time of his introduction of the bill that is the subject of this debate was not eight months later but three years eight months later.

As to the introduction of this bill, I have highlighted that the terms of the bill are a far cry from what the Premier had promised in his statement to this parliament in November 2005. But even more concerning is that at the time of the statement made by the Premier the government had, in fact, already convened the Constitutional Convention and that had been held over two years before the Premier's statement. This is particularly important, and members will remember the Constitutional Convention.

When the Attorney-General announced this legislation in the parliament here in July he advised us of the Constitutional Convention, and in fact described it as the government's Constitutional Convention—which it was—but what is important to remember is that the former Speaker of the house, the Hon. Peter Lewis, had, of course, entered into a Compact of Good Government with the Rann government to ensure its elevation to government. This was one of his conditions, that is, that the government actually convene a Constitutional Convention.

So, let it be clear to the public of South Australia that this was not something that was an initiative of the government; this was something that they were required to do to comply with this, and then lagged a very long time before they actually convened it and made provision for it.

The announcements by the Hon. Peter Lewis at the time of the Constitutional Convention were based on the fact that he considered it necessary to have a debate on a number of constitutional and political reforms, which he described as being consistent with direct democracy. They included such things as citizen-initiated referenda, different types of voting methods, and the size and function of the houses of parliament. So, the agenda for the Constitutional Convention was quite wide. The majority of those in attendance favoured optional preferential voting, the reduction of the upper house terms from eight to four years, and citizen-initiated referenda.

On 15 July 2009, the Attorney-General disclosed two details of the post-deliberation survey results. One was that there was support for the retention of the bicameral system, that is, that we retain the upper house. In fact, he advised the house that 80 per cent of those surveyed believed in the need to continue the two houses of parliament and that 75 per cent of those surveyed believed that the terms of Legislative Council members should be four years rather than eight.

The Attorney-General gave us selective information from the Constitutional Convention outcomes. However, it is important to note that, when the Premier announced that he intended to seek the views of South Australian voters and give them a say about how they would be governed—the three choices to which I have referred—he knew full well the outcome of the Constitutional Convention and that the post-deliberation survey results had quite clearly condemned any proposal to abolish the upper house. So, when the Premier stated in 2005 that he was going to listen to the people and give them an opportunity to have a vote, he was already in direct contradiction with the information that had come from the Constitutional Convention.

Let us assume, therefore, the possibility that he might have been privy to some other information; that is, he might have conducted some polling, referendum, assessment or investigation prior—

An honourable member: Why would you assume that?

Ms CHAPMAN: Well, let us assume that that is a possibility: that there was, in fact, some support for the proposition that he announced in 2005, pretending to give to the people of South Australia the hope and expectation that they would actually have a say. If he did do any of that and if he did have such information, you would think that he might have actually told us about it to justify it. So, as members of this parliament, we can only assume that there is no such information, no such data that he collated from the 2003 Constitutional Convention survey results at the time of his announcement.

If, in fact, there was a further survey, interview or review between 2005 and 2009—that is, between the Premier's announcement and what we ultimately had served up to us in July this year in the form of this bill—one would think we would be told about it. However, absolutely no information has been presented to the parliament in the Attorney-General's second reading contribution to suggest that anything has been done to assess and confirm a change of view of the public of South Australia, either from the convention or any other event since that time. Again, we can only presume that there is none.

Somehow or other, we went from a convention, at which 80 per cent of those attending said that they wanted to retain both houses of parliament, to an announcement from the Premier in 2005 that the people were going to have a choice, to the events of July this year when we were dished up a one-size package deal—take it or leave it—with no reference to choice in the specific reforms or whether we would proceed to deal with these bigger questions including the continuation of a bicameral system of parliament.

All that suggests that the intentions of the government are disingenuous at best and otherwise consistent with—talking about cons—an absolute con on the people of South Australia that they were ever to be given a real choice, a real vote and a real involvement in any legislative or, in particular, constitutional reform of the parliament and how it operates. They were never going to be given that and that is evident by what has been dished up in this bill—and it is concerning.

Other commentators have made statements about the process on which we are being asked to deliberate; that is, you have to take the whole lot as a package or nothing. As a community we cannot peel off a bit, consistent with the whole concept of choice and the people's democracy, and so on. Others have made statements about that.

Dr Dean Jaensch, for example, is a well-known academic in South Australia. He has advocated for reform over many years. He is an author, lecturer and writer in relation to political commentary. He made an observation in a published article of 3 September 2009 about the government's introduction of this bill and its imposition of a package of reforms as a one package or nothing deal. The article states:

We have had 19 referendums, of which 14 were multi question. In every case the government gave the voters the opportunity to decide on each question separately.

He himself poses the question in his article as follows:

Why is the Rann government refusing the voters a similar opportunity? Surely it should be up to the voters to decide which reform proposals they support and which they oppose. The only reason I can think of is that the package as a whole contains some benefit to the Labor Party which would not be there unless all the reforms were carried.

He refers to some aspects which I will be addressing in more detail shortly, but he certainly makes the point that it is arithmetic that is sitting behind the explanation as to why the government is refusing to allow voters to choose which reforms they support and which they do not.

Of course, they have not been consulted at all in relation to what reforms we should be considering. There has been no survey of that. Again, if we rely on the 2003 Constitutional Convention as the only guide we have as to any recent consideration by the public—as a group from highly diverse backgrounds that came together and sat in this chamber and deliberated—then by popular survey we are back to support for citizen initiated referenda and support for a changed preferential voting system. They seem to have evaporated from any consideration, not just in this bill but in any explanation as to why they should be excluded.

I personally do not support citizen initiated referenda. I could easily put a case as to why that would not be a smart thing for us to do—but that is not the point. The point is that the government has pretended to be saying that it will give the people of South Australia the opportunity to choose what reforms they have, if they want any at all, and then make a decision individually on those reforms. That is being absolutely denied.

Of course, one other alternative explanation as to why they would give this one package—reject or take-the-lot only deal—is because they know full well that by presenting it in this manner it will fail, not just here in this chamber—the numbers are obvious in this chamber—but also through the houses of parliament. It was always the government's agenda to say to the people of South Australia, 'We promised we would give you some reform; we have put it into the parliament; it is that nasty opposition that has opposed it, so it has failed. The Independents have made a decision based on self-serving interests, so it has failed. We have done our bit; we have carried out our promise.' In this way, it has created a situation that it knew would abort that ever occurring.

That theory has some legs if one has a look at the budget, because the budget for this year, I think, for the electoral commission to cover this issue is about $1.5 million. Clearly, that would not be adequate to conduct a referendum if one was serious about undertaking a referendum on constitutional reform. Where would there be the budget to prepare the 'yes' and 'no' cases, whether it is a lump sum or not? Where would there be the budget to have education programs for the Attorney-General or other academics to go around South Australia and sprout the important merits of such reform? Where would there be the budgeting for adequate advertising?

The budget itself, I think, indicates some corroborative support for the theory that, in fact, the government had no intention ever of ensuring that this would get through the parliament, and it had no intention of it ever getting to the people of South Australia. It was just a political con to attempt to seduce the people of South Australia into believing that it had done its bit, that it had done as promised, and that it was those wicked opposition and Independent members who sabotaged it.

However, irrespective of whatever the motives of the government are (which do not look too good at the present time), we would still need to look at whether there is a case for reform; whether it is appropriate that we look at reform of either house of parliament with respect to how we operate and function.

I agree that we need to review and consider reform. I think it is important that we should always look at ourselves and take the opportunity for review. We had constitutional reform after the 1989 election. The Attorney-General will recall that there were issues about the majority of the South Australian vote (over 52 per cent) supporting the then Liberal Party at that election, but still it lost the election. So, we had constitutional reform to ensure, as best one can, that we would have electorates that would produce a result, so that, in future, if a party or aggregate of parties received more than 50 per cent they would win the election. That was the objective of it. So, we had a process of redrafting the boundaries (we have different rules from those of a number of other states), and we carried out that exercise.

There was another time when we looked at whether, in fact, we should have elections every four years on a date to be at the whim of the Premier or whether we should have fixed terms, and the parliament made a decision that four year fixed terms would be more sensible. Shortly after I came into the parliament the government said, 'We need to look at when that should be each year,' and it was decided that March would be better than later. I think that, under the constitution, it was to be the third Saturday on the fourth anniversary in March that we would call a general election.

So, it is appropriate, and there are meritorious arguments upon which we bring about reform as to how we operate as a parliament: how we function, our size, and how we interact between the two houses of parliament.

The next question that would be asked is: what reforms would enhance the effectiveness of the Legislative Council, if we assume for the moment that the question of whether the House of Assembly needs reform is just completely taken off the agenda? But let us assume that we look at—as we should, I think, from time to time, both houses of parliament—how we would reform to ensure an enhancement of the effectiveness of the Legislative Council. After all, it is an important partner in our bicameral system of parliament, so that is a question that needs then to be asked.

Again I say, in this exercise, the parliament and the people of South Australia have been excluded from any discussion about what should be on the table for the purposes of carrying that out. What we have is four areas of reform which the Premier and cabinet have decided is what we need and that, if we have one of them, we have to have all of them. If we do want all of them, then we do not get any, and 'This is a not negotiable package and we are not going to add anything else. So, if you think it is a really good idea we should do something else, we are not interested in that. It is not up for amendment.'

They made their own decision about what we are going to do—which is totally inconsistent, of course, with the Premier's statement back in 2005 and all that nonsense about giving the people a choice. We have been totally excluded from that exercise and the government knows full well that the Australian Labor Party has been committed for over 100 years to getting rid of the Legislative Council. It never liked it. When it could not do that, it decided it would introduce a package of reforms that would suit it. So it is absolute nonsense to suggest that it is there for the people of South Australia.

We have a bicameral system of parliament. Other speakers have, and I think will, refer to the Westminster system. Members of the house would, I am sure, when they show schoolchildren around this chamber and in the other place, emphasise the important connection we have with the Westminster system of parliament, even with the layout of the chambers.

The member for Waite made reference to the House of Lords and the reform involving the casting vote of the president and the mechanism to resolve deadlocks. In his contribution he talked about that structure. We all know what it is. The only distinction I would make, of course, between the view he espoused and that which occurs is that, of course, it is a house of hereditary peers who have an entitlement to sit in the House of Lords depending on who their parents are, and that is an entirely different situation to what we have in South Australia where you are elected, and at elections—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: It's a bit like you and Goldie, and Iain, and Ivan—four of you.

Ms CHAPMAN: Weatherill. Therefore, it is important that we recognise both what we have in common and also what is different.

On the question of whether we have to decide on a package, I have talked about what I see as a disingenuous approach, at best, by the government in what it is introducing in this package. I will say this: it is reasonable, at times, to put a proposal where there is a reform and, to make sure that it operates as per the intended outcome, that there be other reforms—that there be other constitutional changes, for example—and that, if you do proceed with one, you do need to have the other. So there are some situations where, if you are going to tamper with one side of a practice, you do need to actually ensure reform in another.

I am not saying that there would never be a situation where, if there was to be a change, there would not be a flow-on of necessary or consequential amendments to effect what we are doing. However, that is not what we are talking about here. What we are talking about here is that, if you only want to reduce the numbers in the upper house but you do not want to do the other things, then bad luck. If you only want to introduce change to the term—that is, the time they are entitled to sit in the parliament on election, whether it is four or eight years—and not the other changes, well, bad luck. That is the position and that is completely unacceptable.

In recognition of and with respect for the only international visitor with us today who is from Germany, I will recognise that, in other jurisdictions, important reform has occurred. In 1949, in Germany, four years after World War II, they established a federal system and wrote their constitution. It is a very good one, I might say, compared to other federal constitutions around the world, a few of which I have looked at.

The Bundestag and Bundesrat have a bicameral system of parliament. They have a chancellor. Chancellor Kohl was in charge when I was there in 1995 and, of course, now we have Merkel, who is a woman. When visiting their chambers of parliament, I learnt about what they decided in the late 1940s would be important not only for the governance of their country but the passage which legislative reform and making these new laws should take in the operation of their parliament. Of course, theirs was a much more contemporary assessment compared with what we did in the late 1800s to draw up our federal constitution—and at a state level even before that.

They are one of the more contemporary federations of the world. I think that some aspects of their bicameral system have some merit which we would look at in due course, at both federal and state level, when considering how to improve the operation of the house of review, that is, the Legislative Council. It is important to maintain that review and reform to ensure that we have the best possible situation, while being mindful of the fact that, if you tamper with one bit, you have to ensure that the flow-on effect is not significantly disadvantageous—and sometimes you cannot always anticipate that.

For example, we introduced a system of fairness in relation to the assessment of electoral boundaries with the view to having the aspirational target to which I referred before. Some would say that it has come at a huge cost of inconvenience to people who, every election, are thrown from one electorate to another, even without ever moving house. It happens every four years. I have not gone through all the debates of that time, but those consequences were probably not anticipated. You have to think about all those things and ensure that, when you tamper with something at one end of the constitution, it does not create an impractical outcome, or at least significant inconvenience, and that you get the chance to remedy it at the time of the reform rather than having to deal with it at a subsequent date.

Having considered those matters and the opportunity for reform, we are stuck with these four objectives, which I have summarised previously but which I wish to address individually. However, before doing that, I point out that the referendum bill (which will follow this bill) is necessary because section 8 of the Constitution Act stipulates that no bill which alters certain powers of the Legislative Council can be presented to the Governor for assent until it is first approved by the electors at a referendum. Accordingly, if this reform bill ever passes both houses of parliament (which I doubt), then the referendum bill is the mechanism by which it would be put to the people of South Australia at the next state election. That would effect compliance with the Constitution Act and enable the reforms to be implemented, if they passed the referendum.

I mentioned before the budget for this referendum and my cynical but accurate assessment of whether it ever gets to a referendum, given the low amount of money that has been provided for Ms Mousley to supervise and carry it out. Nevertheless, if it ever occurs, I think it is necessary that we have information that is prepared for distribution at a cost within a budget of public funding for the 'for' and 'against'.

In anyone's language, these are complex issues, and we would need to have some explanatory material for the voters to have some understanding of what they are voting for or against. Although there has not been any clarity from the Attorney-General's contribution as to what we are going to get in this regard, it was raised at the briefing provided by the government to members of the chamber. It gives me little heart as to whether they are really genuine about doing this, but it was clear from those briefings that there is likely to be something. We want to have some assurance from the government that there would be.

However, it was at a stage when there had not even been a decision about who or what the process would be to determine who would write the 'for' or 'against' case. There had been some discussion at the briefing at the last federal constitutional referendum which was written by (or at least was under the umbrella of) Messrs Turnbull and Howard. That is something we need to make some decision on, and we say that it is incumbent on the government to disclose to the parliament what provision it is going to make and what the process is going to be—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Of course we are going to do that.

Ms CHAPMAN: You didn't say that—what provision is going to be made as to who is going to select the people to do that and whether that is going to be under the supervision of the Electoral Commissioner. Whatever the rules are going to be, we need to know about that, and it should be absolutely clear.

In summary, the reforms themselves are: (1) to reduce the Legislative Council from 22 to 16 members; (2) to reduce the terms of a member of the Legislative Council from two to one assembly terms, requiring all members to retire at each election, so that it would be from an eight year term to a four year term, which would coincide with the election of the House of Assembly members; (3) altering the mechanism for the resolution of deadlocks by providing that the will of the assembly will ultimately override that of the Legislative Council through the mechanism of a joint sitting. Of course, that is the effect of the deadlock proposal that is being presented.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Wouldn't that be terrible? That is the same system as the federal parliament.

Ms CHAPMAN: Not the same system. No. 4 is to give the President of the Legislative Council a deliberative vote. Remember that these are all in together or nothing. The reduction of numbers—less politicians on the face of it—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Fewer politicians.

Ms CHAPMAN: Fewer politicians, on the face of it, I suspect would have some appeal to some people in the community. I think when you look at the Constitutional Convention and the surveying of the people who attended that convention of what their expectation was and what their general view was as to parliaments, there was a very substantial shift from the beginning of the convention to the end of the convention when the participants had become much more informed about how it all worked, what mechanisms were in place, why they were in place and what protection that gave to people in the community.

Therefore, it was hardly surprising that, when the convention concluded, they not only wanted to keep both houses of parliament but certainly were not in a rush to say that we should be diminishing it. This has shown up in the list and this is one which the government says is part of the package. It says that even though in the second reading explanation of the Attorney-General there is no justification outlined for reducing it.

There is a statement that says to the effect that, at various times in history, there has been between 18 and 24 members and information has been provided to all members setting out a history of South Australia's parliament and the different time periods that have applied, but there has not been any explanation given by the Attorney as to why we now need to move from 22 down to 16—no indication whatsoever.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: To save money.

Ms CHAPMAN: The Attorney-General interjects to say that it is to save money. It is interesting that, when you look through his contribution, there is no information from the government which supports that—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: It's the bleeding obvious.

Ms CHAPMAN: Again, the Attorney-General interjects to say that it is the bleeding obvious. I wonder why cabinet has expanded under the reign of the current Premier (way above what it has ever been in history) to such a size if it is so expensive. Why would you not just cut it back? The fact is that in the 7½ years of this government it has gone on expanding it, usually when it is suitable to secure some vote that it needs in the house.

The important thing to remember here is, first, if there is a case that it would save money, then we need to have the details; secondly, even if it did save money, surely we need to have presented to us what will be sacrificed in exchange for that. I will shortly refer to others who have made a contribution in this regard. The most obvious danger is that you reduce the effectiveness of the Legislative Council if you significantly reduce its number. The capacity for it to be able to function and undertake its areas of responsibility would be so severely restricted by the significant extra workload that it would render it far less effective, and one would have to balance the cost initiative and saving that the government claims there would be against that loss of effectiveness and outcome.

I suppose if one accepts the argument that the government really wants to undermine the effectiveness of the Legislative Council, then it would achieve exactly what it wants to do: that is, to minimise its capacity to function and therefore minimise its capacity to interrupt what the government views is its right to be able to govern this state without interference of the parliament. That is what it really wants to do.

The second matter involves the question of reducing the length of term. Essentially, if we look at it from a member of the Legislative Council's point of view, one would, after an election, have a four year rather than an eight year term. However, what it is actually doing is abolishing a system of staggered terms under which only half the members would retire at each election.

So, legislative councillors do come up for election every four years, but not all of them, only half of them. It is this system which involves only one half of those members retiring at each election that is the important point. It is important that we understand this and remind ourselves as to why we have it in the first place, and why we have had it for a very long time, and why, when as a parliament we have reviewed the constitution and the operation of the Legislative Council—and this is not a new thing—we have kept it. Number one, it ensures that the Legislative Council is not just a mirror image of what is the lower house, and that is a good thing. The second aspect is that the longer terms provide greater continuity of knowledge and experience, and they therefore provide a stability in the parliamentary process. That is also an important consideration.

So, the opposition takes the view that it is important to retain staggered terms, and if the people of South Australia—not that we have actually heard from them because they have not been asked—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

Ms CHAPMAN: But if the people of South Australia thought we needed to be like the federal parliament, like the Senate, then in fact we would still be having staggered terms but we would be doing it every six years. The House of Assembly would be having its election every three years. So, if you want to interrupt from time to time, Attorney, and offer some reform and claim that it is consistent with another house of parliament, then let us make sure that we do actually understand what that other parliament does. And, sure, they go to the election every three years in the House of Representatives, and half of the Senate, the states' house, goes every six years. But they have maintained a staggered term system. Happy to look at that as a sensible thing.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: But we don't want that.

Ms CHAPMAN: No, you don't want to, and therefore nobody else is allowed to look at it. I refer to the information provided by Ms Jenni Newton from the parliamentary library, in which she also outlines the political effect of the expected outcome of an election, since 1985, in the event that we had been electing all 22 of the members of the Legislative Council, and not 11; that is, the whole lot rather than half.

The very clear outcome that she has confirmed—and members have copies of this so I will not go into any detail, but she makes it very clear that, in fact, it is the minor parties that would be significant beneficiaries of having no further staggered terms and having an election altogether. There are, arguably, some merits attached to that. I have not found one that is of any persuasion to me yet.

But, again, the government claims, through the Attorney-General, that 75 per cent of delegates at the Constitutional Convention in 2003 voted for four year terms. They hang their hat on that. They ignore the rest of what they said but hang their hat on this bit, to say that this is supported by them and that it must be a good idea. However, it should be clearly noted that this issue was rated by the delegates as only the third most important change they wished to see implemented. The optional preferential voting and the CIRs (citizen initiated referenda) were their priorities, and they are nowhere to be seen, of course, in this package.

Then we have the new deadlock provisions. The standing orders of both houses of parliament provide a formal mechanism for resolving differences: the so-called conference of managers. Its differences are not resolved by that mechanism or by negotiation. Section 41 of the constitution provides a possible avenue of resolution. In brief, the bill must pass the assembly twice, once before and once after a general election, and the bill must be twice rejected by the council. A double dissolution can then be called. However, even after this procedure—which has never occurred in South Australia—the deadlock could remain indefinitely. The reform bill, and this aspect of it, provides a new mechanism to break such deadlocks; that is, a double dissolution—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: So, why are you opposed to that?

Ms CHAPMAN: —I am just explaining what it is—followed by a joint sitting of both houses of the newly elected parliament. Because of the greater number of members in the assembly, it is likely that any government with a reasonable majority will prevail. I think it has been pointed out by the government that the proposed mechanism is similar to that which applies in the federal parliament. Victoria introduced a similar but somewhat more complex procedure in 2003. The new Victorian procedure provides for a formal dispute resolution committee and also for resolution by referendum in certain circumstances. The New South Wales model allows for deadlocks to be resolved by referendum.

In the Attorney-General's second reading contribution, the government describes the power of the Legislative Council as a right of veto. However, it is equally valid to say that this house (the House of Assembly) also has a right of veto. In fact, the correct—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: We're the people's house. The government is formed here.

Ms CHAPMAN: Don't misrepresent then what the position is. The correct categorisation is that each house is of equal power, except on money bills, over which the assembly has greater power, and we have referred to that before. If the government was truly interested in a democratic mechanism for resolving deadlocks, a purer system would require a deadlocked bill to be put to a referendum for the people to decide, rather than distorting the power relationship between the houses.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: So, is that what you're in favour of?

Ms CHAPMAN: Wait to hear what other people say. I will come back to the section 10 provisions in a moment, but I just want to finally address the question of the deliberative vote of the President. I think members have seen some material regarding the long history of this, comprehensively prepared by the parliamentary library, and we appreciate that. I do not think we need to go into that in detail, because members are familiar with it. But for those who are following the debate, the situation is that, in South Australia from 1856 to 1973, both the Speaker here and the President in another place had only a casting vote.

There was reform in 1973, which included a provision giving the President the power to concur in the second and third readings of any bill. I will not go into all the amendments because it would take a considerable amount of time. So, there has been some change over 100 years.

The reform bill will give the President a deliberative vote on all questions, not merely the second and third readings of a bill. The President will no longer have a casting vote. Interestingly in this reform, notwithstanding that the houses are equal, there is no mention as to whether the same should apply to the Speaker of this house. I am not quite sure why your role, Madam Deputy Speaker, or that of the Speaker, would change. They seem to be completely ignored.

The President of the Senate has a deliberative vote but not a casting vote on the ground that, as senators supposedly represent states, a state should not be denied a vote because one of its representatives is president. The Victorian constitution was changed in 2003 to give the president of the Legislative Council a deliberative but not a casting vote. There was an inquiry by the Constitution Commission and recommendations were put which were consistent with that. In Western Australia and New South Wales only the president has a casting vote. This arrangement is based on tradition and is designed to preserve the neutrality of the chair.

Let us look at the real situation. The proposal to give the president a deliberative vote is clearly driven by the Labor Party's desire to improve its situation, its position. Plenty of its members, of course, would love to be president. This proposal is clearly self serving, a political move, to give the Labor Party the best of both worlds. It has not considered why we have this system, why it is important to have and maintain an independent chair and, if we are to look at reform in this area, why it is necessary to look at other direct consequences that would occur and at least put a proposal as to how they would be remedied.

The position of the opposition is that it opposes this package. We do not accept that it is fair in any way. We do not accept that it would make any improvement to the operation of our bicameral system of parliament. We do not see the merits of the scant and inadequate arguments put by the government to carry support for such an amendment. We reject entirely the government's approach of insisting that the people of South Australia consider only things that it deems to be meritorious in what it sees as reform.

Other important people with qualifications and experience in this area have made their own observations. We need to look at them carefully because they look at not just the political questions, some of which we have canvassed here today, but also the mess we can get into if we start to tinker with one piece of legislation in constitutional reform without understanding the full consequences of what we are doing.

I am concerned when I read some of the information in the submissions of the South Australian Bar Association and the Law Society. Their members have considered this matter, in addition to a wider consultation with other academics and professional people (to which I will refer shortly). Having raised these important points, they question whether, first, the government has even considered these things and, secondly, if it has—and I suspect that it has not—why an explanation was not inserted in the second reading explanation to support the fact that they were wrong, or there was no way around it, or it was not necessary to worry about it.

With the army of people and resources available to the government and the Attorney-General, including a myriad of lawyers—assuming there are any left who speak to him, who have not been the recipient of his vitriol and criticism over the past seven years—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

Ms CHAPMAN: Nevertheless, there are people in the Crown Solicitor's Office, for example—

Mr PENGILLY: I have a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. My point of order is standing order 131—the Attorney-General should not interject.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: The Attorney-General knows very well that he should not interject.

The Hon. M.J. ATKINSON: I am contrite, ma'am.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: I ask him to constrain himself.

Mr Pisoni interjecting:

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: I wish it were so simple. The member for Bragg.

Ms CHAPMAN: Thank you for your protection, Madam Deputy Speaker. There is an army of people, including those in the Crown Solicitor's Office, on whom he could rely to get advice. One would think these issues would have been canvassed so that he could explain to the parliament why it might be necessary to ignore some of the matters that have been raised by eminent legal and academic people on constitutional matters, but we did not get a look in as far as any explanation to us as a parliament as to the mechanical and good or bad outcomes that would result from this.

The South Australian Bar Association has presented its submission, which states:

The proposed amendments to alter the size and term of the numbers of the Legislative Council and voting by the President involve political questions upon which the association takes no position.

It makes it very clear, as it has in other parts of its submission, that that is a political matter, a matter for us in the parliament.

However, it has outlined its concerns about the government's proposed amendment which includes the repeal of section 10 and the proposed mechanism leading to a double dissolution, that is, a joint sitting to resolve deadlocks. It takes a different view on whether we need to repeal section 10 to do what the government aspires to do: that is, to ensure that whatever the government decides in the lower house is able to get through the upper house, to impose our will on them. The South Australian Bar Association makes the following observations in its submission:

4. Section 4 of the Constitution (Reform of Legislative Council and Settlement of Deadlocks on Legislation) Bill would repeal section 10 of the Constitution Act 1934, which in turn provides that, apart from money bills, the Legislative Council has equal power with the House of Assembly.

5. The Report by the Attorney-General accompanying the Bill says that section 10 must be repealed due to the introduction of the new section 41. This does not follow:

Existing section 41 already provides a mechanism for joint sitting to resolve a deadlock and it is clear that section 10 is subject to that section;

Section 10 would equally be subject to the new section 41;

In any event, even if there was concern that somehow section 10 constrained the operation of section 41, this could be put beyond doubt, out of abundance of caution, by amending section 10 to read 'Subject to section 41,except as provided...'.

6. As the bill does not otherwise alter the respective powers of the two houses, no case has been made to repeal section 10.

They go on to say, in respect of the deadlock scheme itself:

7. While the fundamental provisions for a double dissolution and a joint sitting involve political issues, the Association submits proposed section 41 produces several odd results and ought to amended in four respects.

8. First, to trigger a double dissolution, section 41(1)(c) requires that the House of Assembly must pass the bill twice in the same two consecutive sessions. There seems no reason why a double dissolution should not be triggered if the House of Assembly passes the bill twice within say three or four consecutive sessions.

9. Secondly, section 41(1)(c) requires that the house 'again passes the proposed law with or without any amendments that have been made, suggested or agreed to by the Legislative Council'. The intention appears to be that the House not make any amendments to the Bill after receiving it back from the Council other than to accept any Council-initiated amendments. Such an intent is sensible because otherwise the House might make amendments which radically change the nature and effect of the bill. Proposed section 41(1)(c) should be amended to put the position beyond doubt by adding at the end words to the effect '(and no other amendments)'.

10. Thirdly, section 41(2)(a) requires that the house 'again passes the proposed law with or without any amendments that have been made, suggested or agreed to by the Legislative Council'. The intention appears to be that the House not make any amendments to the Bill after the double dissolution other than to accept any Council-initiated amendments. Proposed section 41(1)(c) should be amended to put the position beyond doubt by adding at the end words to the effect '(and no other amendments)'.

11. Fourthly, the time limits prescribed by proposed section 41 for the Council to pass a bill the first time (45 sittings days per section 41(1)(b)), the second time (30 sitting days per section 41(1)(d)) and the third time (30 sitting days per section 41(2)(b)) are all defined in terms of sitting days of the House of Assembly: see proposed section 41(5). This is not logical as the time limits are all limits for the Council to act. The definition ought to be changed to sitting days of the Council.

So, the members of the South Australian Bar Association say, 'Look, it is up to you people down in the parliament to make the decision on the political issues. However, if you do, understand that, firstly, you do not need to repeal section 10 and, importantly, if you do invoke the new deadlock provision you need to appreciate that there are some significant consequences of your doing that.' They even offer, helpfully, some advice as to how that might be remedied. However, the important thing is to appreciate that they have identified a concern. The repealing of section 10 is the matter that really concerns me, and what the genuine intent of the government is in relation to this.

Can I explain it in this way. It is like the government has come in and said, 'Look, The Advertiser and Business SA are all in favour of this reform. Governments have to govern. We should not have to be obstructed in any way by our agenda through whatever the Legislative Council might do,' blah, blah, blah, but then it does not go through the detail when it provides us with a bill to tell us the whole truth.

It is a little bit like the government's recent request to have ownership of the strip of land in front of the proposed railway hospital. The Adelaide City Council, which owns that land, says, 'We can let you traverse it. We can let you put plants on it. We can let you have a bikeway through it. We are happy to accommodate all that.' However, suddenly, the government comes along and says, 'I think we should have the title. We should become the registered proprietor.'

It does not say why that is necessary, and it raises the question of motive. Why does the government have to own that property? Similarly, why does the government have to abolish section 10, which clearly states in our constitution that the two houses are to be equal? That is a fundamental principle of the constitution. Let us go back to the parkland: is it really the intention of the government to build on it or do something else with that land in the future?

The Hon. R.B. Such: Sell it off—

Ms CHAPMAN: Exactly. It could be all sorts of things. The government needs to be honest—just like it needs to be honest here, as to what the real motive is in what it is proposing to do by abolishing section 10, when it seems clear that it does not need to do it. It is not only the Bar Association members: it is also the Law Society of South Australia's subcommittee—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Surprise, surprise! The wholly owned subsidiary of the Liberal Party.

Mr PENGILLY: I rise on a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I again draw your attention to standing order 131 in relation to the Attorney-General.

The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Yes, you may, but it simply delays things.

Ms CHAPMAN: The Attorney-General makes the assertion that the subcommittee of the Law Society on constitutional matters is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Liberal Party. Let me just remind the house who sits on the subcommittee and who considered these matters. The first is Rosemary Owens, Professor and Dean, University of Adelaide Law School and convener of the subcommittee; David Clark, Professor, Flinders University Law School; Kate Henning, a council member of the Law Society; Tim Mellor, an executive and council member of the Law Society; Geoffrey Lindell, Adjunct Professor, University of Adelaide Law School; and other academics at the Adelaide University Law School who assisted with advice to the subcommittee, including, in particular, Mr Matthew Stubbs.

I wonder whether these people might like to be called a wholly owned subsidiary of the Liberal Party. I doubt it. I would be very proud if they would like to be associated with the Liberal Party, but I would not be confident, Mr Attorney, that they would be rushing to be aligned, publicly, either by membership or otherwise, to a political party.

I think it is disgraceful that the Attorney-General should try to diminish the view expressed by an experienced subcommittee of any association whose members are not only legally trained but also would have more experience and expertise in this area than, frankly, the Attorney-General will ever have. So, I think it is important that we value the fact that they have given their time to consider these matters and help us, as members of the parliament—all of us, because I do not know any constitutional experts here in the House of Assembly. I might be diminishing the expertise of the member for Mitchell.

Ms Fox: Patrick Conlon won a prize.

Ms CHAPMAN: Yes, well, I recall sitting on a committee with the Minister for Transport prior to our days in this parliament. It was about constitutional reform, and it was actually an inquiry into what the South Australian structure would be, including whether we would retain our governor in the event that Australia became a republic. We both sat on that committee, and it was very interesting. As I recall, the minister wrote a dissenting report, and it was very interesting.

I do not in any way wish to diminish what the minister might claim to be his expertise in this area or make any assessment of it. He clearly has some experience. So do I, but I do not suggest for one moment that that is an area in which I, like any other member of this house, would not benefit from the valuable assistance of these eminent people who have provided advice on this matter—and I thank them for it.

They make a number of observations, firstly, in respect of the proposed repeal of section 10, which removes the equality of the legislative powers of both houses. In a nutshell but in a lot more detail, they support the contention that there is no necessity to repeal section 10. They say:

The removal of section 10 altogether would give rise to doubt regarding whether other reductions in the powers of the Legislative Council are contemplated, even though none are explicitly mentioned in the bill, the Attorney-General's ministerial and second reading speeches or the explanatory clauses of the bill.

At the very least, the government should be asked to clarify its intentions. But, if no other exception is intended to be created from the equality of the powers enjoyed by both houses, it would seem advisable to retain section 10 in the Constitution Act with an appropriate change being made to its provisions to take account of the substitution of the new section 41 in that act.

So they make it pretty clear: there is a clear endorsement of that.

Regarding a reduction in the size of the Legislative Council, they make the point that others have made and that I have already outlined, that is, you are likely to reduce the capacity of the parliament and the executive government to perform its functions adequately if you proceed with this proposal; and they make some reference to the demands on upper house members, in particular, committee work and the like.

In relation to simultaneous elections of both houses, again, without getting into the political question, what they highlight is this. Even if the government had not understood these consequences and we assume they are genuine and just came to this debate naively and had not considered these things, rather than actually knowing full well what the consequences are and pressing ahead without telling us, the consequences of the changes to which the Law Society alerts us are that: because all members of the Legislative Council stand for election every four years, there is likely to be an increase in the cost of elections (so we are on cost efficiencies, Mr Attorney); given the reduced size of the Legislative Council, there may be a greater possibility that those representing the minor parties and Independents will be elected (and that has been canvassed by other research that has been referred to)—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

Ms CHAPMAN: —and there is thus a greater likelihood of fragmentation in the representation of the Legislative Council rather than a consolidation of power by the major parties. They raise those issues for our consideration, so I advise the house of their concerns.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

Mr PISONI: I have a point of order, sir, under standing order 131. The Attorney-General continually interjects.

The SPEAKER: The Attorney-General must not interject. The member for Bragg.

Ms CHAPMAN: I come quickly, then, to the question of the President having a deliberative vote but not a casting vote. In their assessment, it will lead to a greater likelihood that legislation will be rejected. That is probably pretty obvious to most people, and it is even more obvious that that is exactly what the government wants. So, this is a question not of reform for reasons of some merit and fairness but so that they may ensure that there are many more cases when legislation would be rejected—because, of course, we have 22 members in the council and there could well be situations where it will be 11-all.

They also note, notwithstanding the historical reasons for having kept the system that we have, that is, so as not to politicise the office of president, their concern that the direct effect would be that the office of president would become politicised. If we as a parliament think that is a good thing, that is fine, but let us understand that we need to be appraised of this and we need to have—and are entitled to have before we are asked to vote—a decent explanation from the government about how it is going to address these problems and why it continues to insist on them without that explanation; why it has the audacity to present to us what is a pathetic second reading contribution on important constitutional reform without having addressed these issues, considering the wealth of legal advice that is available to the Attorney-General and the parliament.

If they think that there is a case for politicising the office of president, then let us hear it. The people who will vote on this legislation are entitled to have some information. Even if they bulldoze this legislation through this house and they get their way in the upper house and they come to present it to the people of South Australia, then, at that stage, at least they should have the decency to ensure that that information is available.

The Law Society outlines a number of direct consequences of the new deadlock format. I will very quickly summarise what they are. They have been provided in detail, and I understand the government has been given a copy of the submission. One of the three matters which call for further attention is the effect of present provisions which allow for an early election of the House of Assembly in resolving deadlocks in the Legislative Council. First, neither the bill nor second reading explanation makes any mention of the relationship with the constitutional reform bill and the provisions of subsection 28A(1)(c) of the present Constitution Act 1934. That in itself raises some consequences.

The second matter is the new proposed method for resolving deadlocks between the House of Assembly and Legislative Council over legislation. The proposal to equate the length of term of the Legislative Council with that of one and not two terms of the House of Assembly may weaken the case for introducing any special procedure for settling legislative deadlocks between both houses of parliament. Thirdly, if this method is adopted, it will be wise to learn from the lessons of past experience with section 57 of the Commonwealth Constitution.

The opportunity should be taken to resolve ambiguities and deal with other difficulties, some of which are highlighted by the Constitutional Commission in its final report published in 1988. I will quickly read them. First, the need to clarify from when a three month interval which separates the two cycles of disagreement commences to run when the Legislative Council first passes a measure with amendments to which the House of Assembly will not agree. Secondly, the possible need to avoid a stockpiling of stale proposed laws as a means of obtaining early elections, rather than the resolution of deadlocks over the passage of proposed laws. Thirdly, to continue the existence of a disagreement as a condition for calling early elections. Fourthly, the need to clarify the extent to which proposed laws must retain their initial identity through the cycles of disagreement.

The two situations which call for the need to clarify that are as follows. The first situation relates to technical amendments necessitated by the subsequent passage of time. The second situation relates to whether amendments passed by the House of Assembly in the third cycle of disagreement with which the Legislative Council does not agree can be put to a joint sitting. Finally, there is the desirability of giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction to determine whether a proposed law has met the conditions of a double dissolution before an early election is called. They refer to what happened with the judicial interpretation and review of section 57 of the Australian constitution by the High Court. The detail of that is in the submission. I am happy to provide it to members, rather than read it to the house.

There are many technical aspects, but very eminent legal minds in this state have spent some time looking at this reform bill and the effect (even inadvertently) that may occur as a result of these amendments and that, even if they are deliberate, they need to be exposed and we need to have some answers before we as a parliament vote. However, at first blush, it is absolutely clear that this package of reform will not benefit South Australians. What they have been dished up by the government is not even close to being democratic in its presentation. It is inadequate, it is ill-conceived, and it will not produce any better democratic process for the people of South Australia both in the matter of governance and the protection which they are entitled to receive and which they currently receive by having a strong bicameral system, with two equal houses of parliament.

The opposition will always look to enhance and review how both houses operate. I will give the minister a couple of ideas that he might like to think about, if he comes back with anything half decent. First, he could look at how we might reform this parliament and the accountability of the government to this parliament, which is done in a number of ways but, most importantly, during question time and by putting questions on notice. We have some rules which ought bind the government in providing answers.

At the moment, on a daily basis, ministers do not answer questions, and when they are put on notice, they are ignored, and even when they take them on notice, they are often still ignored. I went through a folder today of questions I had asked the Minister for Health when I had the privilege of being the opposition spokesperson for health in this parliament over the last three and a bit years. There are well over 50 questions to which we do not even have an answer yet. They are marked and, of course, we do not have any answer. They do not care and there is no obligation. If you are thinking about constitutional reform that might be useful to ensure that the people of South Australia know what the government is doing and that it has some accountability to them through this parliament, then you might like to think about that sort of reform.

He ensured that, when we have committees of inquiry, whether they are standing committees or select committees, they are not stacked with government members and that we have some Independents, some capacity to ensure that what committees are vested with is a specific responsibility to inquire, supervise, ensure that there is a regular assessment of the performance of a particular area or jurisdiction—whatever their job is—that they are not bound by the fact that they are placed in a situation where clearly it would be near impossible for them to produce a finding or a report to this parliament that was inconsistent with the majority of those members associated with the political party that is in power.

The one person I can remember who was probably an exception to that was the Hon. Heini Becker, who was a member of the Liberal Party, and he was a member of the former version of the Economic and Finance Committee. I cannot think what that was called.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: The Public Accounts Committee.

Ms CHAPMAN: The Public Accounts Committee; that is it—a useful interjection by the Attorney-General for a change. He would be pretty tough on whoever was in power. He chaired that committee, and I have reread some of those reports that would come to the parliament back in the day when they were thick enough for you to get a reasonable report about what was actually going on. To be frank, he would get stuck into whoever was in power and whoever was in charge of the Treasury arrangements in order to make sure that there was accountability to the parliament through that committee.

If the government was really serious about the transparency, accountability and all the things it keeps espousing that it represents, it could look at some really good reforms that would help to strengthen rather than sabotage and undermine the power of one of the chambers in this bicameral system by the reforms that it is dishing up to us in the form of this bill.

Mrs Geraghty: By 'us' you mean the opposition—the Liberal Party.

Ms CHAPMAN: Us, as a parliament. You, too.

The Hon. R.B. SUCH (Fisher) (17:18): I want to make a brief contribution. Back on 31 May 2006, I introduced a bill designed to bring about the reform of the Legislative Council which was called the Constitution (Legislative Council Reform) Amendment Bill 2006. It lapsed because of prorogation.

The bill before us has a couple of commendable aspects. One is reducing the term of the upper house from eight years to four years; that was in my original bill and it is something I support. It is important that we do not have the two houses identical in the way they are formulated or function, but I think that an eight year term is too long, given the rapidity of change in a modern society such as ours. The world moves on very quickly, and I think that eight years is far too long, so I strongly support the four year term. I believe the member for Mitchell conveyed that in a bill of his some time back as well.

I differ from the government in respect of trying to reduce the number of legislative councillors from 22 to 16. Given that the government is saying that the population of South Australia is likely to double in the next couple of decades, and given what should be the role of the Legislative Council in terms of committees and so on, I do not believe 16 is a large enough number to sustain those committees effectively. In fact, many of our local councils have a membership of elected members which is far greater than would be the case under this bill if the government gets it through. For some of them, I think that is far too large but for the upper house of this state (the Legislative Council) 16 is too small and I disagree with that reduction in membership.

The deadlock provisions in this bill are certainly workable. I had a slightly different approach in terms of a deadlock provision, but nevertheless you need some mechanism. In fairness to those in the Legislative Council, and those who have been there before in recent years, I am not aware that it has been unduly obstructive in any way and I would like to see the evidence that the Legislative Council has been unnecessarily obstructive. They have acted as a brake on some things, but I do not think it has been in any way unduly obstructive.

All governments want to be able to do what they like, when they like, how they like; but unless you want the system with the person with the little moustache you are going to have a system where you have some checks and balances and, even though our bicameral system is imperfect, it provides some degree of a check on the government of the day.

When I introduced my bill in 2006, I mentioned that I had the privilege of going to the Isle of Man—and, as I said at the time, probably they should change the name to the 'Isle of Person'. They have a tricameral system where the upper house and the lower house formally meet together to resolve issues. We have always had a procedure in terms of a deadlock provision through a committee but various other models exist around the world.

I will confidently predict that the only part of the bill before us that may get accepted—and I say 'may'—is the provision relating to the reduction of the term from eight years to four years.

I do not believe the rest of it will. The deadlock provision may get up—I doubt it. However, I think the plan to reduce the number of members from 22 to 16 has little or no chance of getting through. I am pleased that the government moved away from the original proposal, which was canvassed back in 2006, to abolish the Legislative Council. I think the government read, quite correctly, the electorate view that it would not support the abolition of the Legislative Council.

I do not see any evidence that, in Queensland, where they did vote themselves out—that is, the upper house members back in about 1927—they have benefited from that. We have moved a long way forward from the days when we had a restricted franchise for the upper house, and we have moved a long way from the days when we had no women members in parliament.

What we have—and, as I say, imperfect as it may be—is a system which does have some checks and balances built into it. I certainly agree with the member for Bragg in that we should look in our own backyard in respect of reforming how we operate in this chamber. We have been very slow in bringing about any reform whatsoever in this house compared to other parliaments. No matter which one you look at they have moved way ahead of where we are and they have a much more efficient system, in my view.

If the government wants to reform something it should be looking at reforming local government. I do not believe it is going to do anything before the election—am not so naive as to believe that it would—but, when you have in the metropolitan area over 240 elected members in councils, a budget for all those councils which is only half the size of the City of Brisbane but operating at greater cost, there is the potential to maintain a democratic system at local government level but to save millions of dollars for ratepayers.

I understand that we are close to an election and that the government is not going to rattle the cage but, in my view, it needs to look at reforming how we operate in this house. It is not just things like estimates committees, which I have been on about for years. Nothing ever seems to change in the way of reform. We have question time but we do not necessarily have answer time, and it goes on and on. However, the biggest area for reform, in my view, is in relation to local government.

I will conclude by saying that I would be more interested in seeing some far-reaching reforms in terms of things like the Police Complaints Authority and issues like that. The Police Complaints Authority is in urgent need of reform and, if the government can reform in some of those areas, then I think we can avoid a costly ICAC.

I am happy to expedite things by concluding my remarks but I predict that this bill will be savagely mauled. It may be accepted in respect of reducing the eight-year term to a four-year term but, beyond that, I think the other aspects have a limited future.

Mrs PENFOLD (Flinders) (17:26): The government's ill-advised attempts to grab unlimited power through the abolition of the Legislative Council have been thwarted by their own supporters, in particular, the Public Service Association. That Public Service Association threatened to run a campaign against Labor in order to block the Premier's lust for power. The Public Service Association secretary, Jan McMahon, remarked in a radio interview that:

There have been many instances where the Public Service Association members and the community have really benefited from being able to have an independent review of legislation and nobody should ever walk away from the ability to have their own legislation reviewed and have amendments made that are in the best interests of South Australians.

The Premier has realised that his grab for unlimited power has been recognised as just that—a grab for more power—and he has given up on the abolition of the Legislative Council for the time being. I stress the phrase 'for the time being'.

We can look at one of Labor's strongholds, Queensland, to learn how Labor operates in order to get its own way in the end and to silence opposing voices. In 1917 the Queensland Labor government unsuccessfully petitioned, by means of a referendum, for the abolition of the state's upper house. The referendum was soundly defeated. However, that was not the end of the matter for the power-hungry Laborites. Over the next few years Labor governments advised the Governor to appoint a total of 30 new Labor members of the Legislative Council—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: The suicide squad.

Mrs PENFOLD: —until the party had sufficient voting strength to pass its push for abolition of the council. As the Attorney-General said, 'The suicide squad.' Nicolas Aroney and Scott Presser commented: 'The politics of Queensland have ever since been determined by this concentration of power—executive and legislative—in the hands of a small coterie of politicians.' Perhaps this is what the Attorney-General had in mind when he said:

The government cannot call a referendum without the passing of the bills...This means that for reform to occur the Legislative Council must vote to reform itself.

Is it the first step in a long-term Labor aim to abolish the Legislative Council?

There are many different ways to change the operation of the two houses of the South Australian parliament, far more than the narrow approach taken by Labor, and this applies especially to the upper house. It is also interesting that the Attorney-General ignores the Independent and minor party councillors and puts all the ability for change on the Liberal Party. I am pleased that the honourable member for Croydon recognises the integrity, probity and strength of the Liberal Party.

While other states have, at times, been plagued by government corruption, Queensland has arguably experienced more of it. In recent times, Queensland governments have attempted to deal with a lack of government accountability associated with the 'winner takes all' power in a single house through the establishment of a Crime and Misconduct Commission and parliamentary committees. It is worth noting that we already have parliamentary committees where legislative councillors provide input. Hence, Queensland is only setting up what this state already has.

Queensland's attempts to provide a brake on corruption and corrupt practices with the Crime and Misconduct Commission have been unsuccessful since the members of the commission are appointed by the government and each parliamentary committee has a majority of government members. Abolishing the Legislative Council on the argument that it would save money is flawed reasoning that ignores the reality of the need for these bodies. It also demolishes the argument that funding now spent on the Legislative Council could be directed elsewhere. The process is simply a smokescreen to bamboozle the gullible and to fool the unwary. It would be cheaper and more effective for Queensland to reinstate its upper house. Queensland's President of the National Civic Council, Ron Munn, said:

In part, Tony Fitzgerald QC (commemorating the 20th anniversary of his report on government corruption) said of the Queensland Labor government, 'Ethics are always tested by incumbency. Secrecy was re-established by sham claims that voluminous documents were "cabinet-in-confidence". Access can now be purchased, patronage dispensed, mates and supporters are appointed and retired politicians exploit their political connections to obtain "success fees" for deals between business and government'.

We come to the bill before us. The number of councillors and the operations of the Legislative Council have changed at times over the years. There is always support for change when change is an improvement on current practices. However, the government has given no satisfactory explanation for its push for change. Parliamentary committees, in which councillors play a large role, are a thorn in the side of Labor's quest for domination without responsibility and/or scrutiny. Our Premier is very quick to show his dislike of opposition and/or adverse criticism, usually by a sustained rush of bullying, abuse and harassment by his head kickers. It is a ploy that has often succeeded since it focuses attention on the acting ability of ministers while deflecting attention away from valid issues.

It seems obvious that legislative councillors have blunted Labor's push for unchallenged power, hence Labor's suggested reduction in the number of councillors. This would allow the council to be controlled more easily and for their investigative work in committees to be diluted. It is curious that the Premier does not want proper scrutiny of his ministers and government. Perhaps he is frightened by the actions of legislative councillors in New South Wales who, supported by decisions of the New South Wales Supreme Court, forced the government to produce documents on matters of public concern in situations where the government wanted to protect itself by keeping the documents secret. The first disclosures of disturbing information about the financial entanglements of Sydney's cross-city tunnel were the result of a New South Wales council order.

Labor governments in New South Wales have done some extraordinary deals with private enterprise to push projects through at the expense of taxpayers.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: That would be extraordinary.

Mrs PENFOLD: Just because the Attorney-General has probably had better education than I have, coming from a small country school with three classes in one room, he need not be arrogant about it. Labor governments in New South Wales have done some extraordinary deals with private enterprise to push projects through at the expense of taxpayers.

Members interjecting:

The SPEAKER: Order! The member for Light is not in his seat.

Mrs PENFOLD: I have been told of the financing of toll roads, where users are reimbursed by governments for the tolls they pay to the owners of toll roads. The mind boggles at the possibility for preferred treatment for favoured developers or companies when there is no brake on the power that a one-house parliament confers on the ruling government.

South Australia enjoyed a Liberal government when the federal government conducted a referendum into whether or not Australia should become a republic. The Liberal state government set up a committee comprising representatives of the three parties who then had members in either state house—Liberal, Labor and Democrat—to research how South Australia may have been affected if the referendum succeeded.

One of the surprising conclusions from that extensive research was that we are not over-governed. We have a lesser number of politicians per capita compared with other democracies. Another conclusion was that we are likely to end up with more politicians than we have now if the state tier of governments were abolished and Australia moved to only federal and regional governments.

Another furphy that we hear and that Labor likes to trumpet is the incorrect notion that the Legislative Council is particularly obstructionist. In the 23 years from 1975 to 1998, only 1.8 per cent of government bills were rejected outright, and this was usually after exhausting the legislative process, resulting in a deadlocked conference between the houses.

Excluding sessions which were prorogued due to the calling of an election, only 7.1 per cent of government bills did not pass the upper house over that 23 year period which, incidentally, covered both Liberal and Labor governments. Likewise, in the eight years from 1997 to 2008—again covering both Liberal and Labor government—only 2.9 per cent of all bills were negatived or laid aside in the Legislative Council. It is also acknowledged that many of these—possibly a majority—were private members' bills and not, therefore, government legislation.

The Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Bill is an instance where the scrutiny provided under the bicameral system produced a worthwhile piece of legislation due to the numerous committee stages and subsequent amendments introduced in the Legislative Council. The bill was introduced by a Labor government in 1992 and was eventually passed 2½ years later by a Liberal government. The operation of government should always be subject to not only scrutiny but to a real mechanism that can check its action, as enabled by the existing provisions pertaining to the upper house.

Reducing the effectiveness and authority of the upper house in a bicameral system produces governments which eventually embrace tyranny (because humanity tends towards corruption, as illustrated around the world), thus an effective check on the operation of government is needed. One way this is done successfully is to subject bills to a second chamber, the way in which now happens under the two-house system of the South Australian parliament. Restraint on government occurs as the upper house examines every proposal of the House of Assembly (the lower house) in which government is formed, and vice versa, as governments rarely control both chambers.

The election of half the legislative councillors at each election—which Labor wants to throw out—is a protection against electoral swings. This helps shield the parliament from major swings that may otherwise largely fill both houses with members of one party, or the anomaly, in the upper house, as with the Xenophon factor, which I understand would have given us six more Xenophon anti-pokies members if it had been an election of the whole of the upper house at the time.

When the federal Liberal government under John Howard proposed radical changes to Australia's gun laws, a very strong, vocal and active gun lobby was formed, with candidates standing for election in all available domains. When a candidate stands for election there is always the possibility that that candidate could be elected, no matter how bizarre or way out their policies and intentions. Our nation would be a very different place if a large number of the Shooters Party had been elected, bringing with it the gun mentality of the United States of America. A society controlled by that mentality is radically different from accepted Australian values and ethics.

Consideration of long-term impacts is more likely when members of the Legislative Council serve for a term twice the length of members of the House of Assembly. We only have to look at the way in which governments have dealt with the world financial crisis to see the value of long-term views. The Australian Labor government, despite its plunging the nation into unprecedented levels of billions of dollars worth of debt, after being left billions of dollars by the former Howard Liberal government, can only predict more difficult times for our country and its people. The Prime Minister is anxious to get an election out of the way and hoping to be re-elected before the levels of debt, as a result of his mishandling of the Australian economy, become insurmountable and our economy slides.

Reconsideration of policy is an important aspect of the Legislative Council and is more likely to happen when two sets of members have to consider and pass proposed legislation. This enables scrutiny, public awareness and an increased community response. Two chamber parliaments where all legislation is debated and voted on twice is a safety measure against human frailty, either by deliberate tyranny or unintended errors. We cannot afford to weaken it.

We are one of the few countries that has not seen violent elections involving major corruption. I believe that this is because of the soundness of our bicameral system of government which, while annoying at times to all sides—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

The SPEAKER: Order!

Mrs PENFOLD: —is much preferable to what we see happening around the world in countries without a similar system.

The Hon. G.M. GUNN (Stuart) (17:40): I rise to oppose the bill because I do not believe there is any public demand for these provisions. These are purely old-fashioned bigoted Labor Party attitudes because members opposite cannot bear to have people's rights protected by having a second opinion. If the argument to downgrade or abolish the Legislative Council was so important to the community, they would be writing to us by the dozen.

Mrs Geraghty interjecting:

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: The honourable member is deluding herself if she thinks that. I will give an analogy. When you are sick and go to the doctor, if the doctor is really concerned he seeks a second opinion. He sends you to a specialist so there can be no doubt that the treatment prescribed or the operation recommended is absolutely necessary.

When we are talking about changing laws, which can affect the rights and welfare of every citizen of this state, two fundamental principles in democracy must be observed. First, it should not be rushed. People should have the chance to consider, absorb and comment upon it. Secondly, they should have the right to have a second chamber consider it, change it, organise discussion between the two houses or reject it.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Why not a third chamber?

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: You are the only person who would be so foolish and naive to make that off-handed comment. Surely, the Attorney-General—Her Majesty's first law officer—can do better than that. This is a serious matter because we are talking about the role of parliament to have the opportunity to contain and restrict the executive. That is a fundamental principle in a democratic system.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: And to review the issuing of infringement notices.

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: Well, if the Attorney-General thinks that, I have a number of bills on the Notice Paper which the Government Whip is blocking. I call upon the Attorney-General to bring on debate in relation to those issues. I look forward to them—and I will tell him what they are. There is one important one.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: How many of your bills have become law in 38 years?

The SPEAKER: Order!

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: There is one thing for which the Attorney-General can never claim credit. Even though he and his cohorts set out to remove me, they have never been successful. If I had wanted to come back here again I could have, but in a democracy I should let a young person of Liberal persuasion come in and take my place.

I have an important bill entitled the Constitution (Basic Democratic Principles) Amendment Bill. The basis of it comes from the German constitution which provides that it is an offence—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: In what period?

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: The current one, because it comes about as a result of what took place over the Kaiser and Nazi regimes. This democratic bill provides that it is an offence to bind a member of parliament to vote against their conscience. That should be the law in this state and across the country. The provision that we currently have before us is to reduce the size of the house to make it ineffective and to put other provisions in there which not only are unwise and unnecessary but which are not in the long-term interests of the people of South Australia.

A great deal has been said about what has taken place in Queensland. I would recommend that all members of parliament read the editorial that appeared in The Australian of 18 July. It ought to be compulsory reading for members of parliament, because it talks about the corruption in Queensland—more corruption than anywhere else in Australia; the only place that does not have an upper house. The editorial states:

Labor's abolition of the Legislative Council in 1922 concentrated power in the hands of a small coterie. The committee system was reformed by Wayne Goss but in practice it is often lame and tame compared with other jurisdictions.

Of course, the Legislative Council in Queensland was abolished against the wishes of the people. They filled it up with their cronies and got the Lieutenant-Governor, in the absence of the Governor, to sign to abolish it, contrary—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Why are you afraid of it having a vote? Why are you afraid of going to the polls?

The SPEAKER: Order!

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: I have never been afraid of going to the polls. I put to the Attorney-General this is not about that. He knows what the result will be, anyway. So do we. This is a political stunt, organised because—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Organised by the SDA!

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: You are accusing your friends of organising it. You may be correct; I do not know. They are not my mates; they are your mates in the SDA, Senator Don Farrell and those people. If they are calling the shots I will let the Attorney account for that. However, this proposal is a political stunt, because they went out and criticised the Legislative Council; they went out and made comments that this was a reforming government, 'We are going to reform,' and of course they were stuck with it. So, at the last moment, in the last 17 or 18 sitting days of this parliament before the election, they put up this bill. They put it up in a particular way knowing full well that it has little or no chance of getting through the parliament, because they are asking one question when there is more than one. They have lumped them all together knowing full well what the result will be. It is an unnecessary stunt and it would be an expensive stunt. However, even worse than that—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: It is a pity that the Attorney cannot contain himself, and we need a Legislative Council to contain people like the Attorney who have a narrow point of view. Therefore, the Legislative Council brings in the people who are able to contain him. He cannot get away with some of his radical ideas, and that in itself is a good thing. That is one reason why I would want to oppose him, because if he got his way they would not be able to contain people like him. If the Attorney in his wisdom—and I give him the benefit of some wisdom, I am a charitable character, but at the end of the day—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: We saw that when you were Speaker.

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: If the honourable member wants to talk about that, the only reason he got into trouble is because he would not conform to the standing orders—and I note that he has not changed them since, so he must agree they were right.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: What about commander Quirke: why didn't he get into trouble?

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: Because he behaved himself—and if you were to follow the same example you would not have got into trouble either, nor would some of your colleagues, the Deputy Premier and others.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: If we had been part of the fraternity of firearms we would not have got into trouble.

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: I thought you were pro firearms.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: I am.

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: There you are! So you have contradicted yourself again. I do not know why the member wants to pay so much attention to my comments, because it takes a lot to get me on my feet. It has taken me all day to work myself up to this speech!

I was fortunate to read what I thought was a very good article (it was historic and covered a lot of facts) in the VoxPoint publication of August 2009, FamilyVoice Australia. It has a photo of Senator Fielding on it—not always the wisest senator, but a well meaning character. It says here—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: An outstanding senator.

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: He has stood in the way of some of the more radical foolishness of the Rudd government: I give him credit for that. The article states, 'Do parliaments need an upper house?' and, of course, of answer is yes, they do need an upper house.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Which magazine is this?

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: I am surprised that you have not read it, because I would have thought it would have been something that the honourable member would read as soon as it came across his desk. It goes through the history of upper houses and why we need a bicameral system and why we need these provisions. However, at the end of the day, we are not talking about the rights of members of parliament: we are talking about protecting the rights of the average citizen of this state. That is what it is all about. It is not the role of this legislature or any legislature to grant absolute power to the executive government. It is not the role of this parliament to legislate for and on behalf of powerful bureaucrats.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Except when the Liberal Party is in office.

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: No—and I will prove my point by saying that I think I am one of the few people who chaired a select committee that directed the Sergeant-at-Arms to go to the minister's office and seize the files. I did it because this parliament—this House of Assembly—had set up a select committee and asked that committee to inquire into certain very important matters. I for my sins was made the chair of that committee and I made it my responsibility to be able to truthfully report to this parliament. When it became evident that certain people were giving less than forthright or accurate information, I took the next step and directed the Sergeant-at-Arms to go and get the information from the minister's office without advising the minister or forewarning them. It was, in my view, a proper exercise by the parliament over the executive of the day. I have to say that I did not endear myself to the minister.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Who was the minister?

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: Dorothy Kotz. She got very cross with me, and I was not on the morning tea list of the premier of the day; I think I got a telephone call at 6.30 in the morning. That was all right. Not only did we do that, but also we sent the secretary of the committee to Mount Gambier to clean out the office down there to make sure we had the files.

The Attorney cannot say that people on this side do not stand up to the bureaucracy in government, because we did. I believe that was an important test case, and it is important that parliamentary committees in the future stand up to governments. The NRM parliamentary committee did the right thing when it made people come back and apologise for giving inaccurate information to that committee. That is its proper role.

An honourable member interjecting:

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: Well, those NRM committees leave a fair bit to be desired, in my view.

Mrs Geraghty: You like the bureaucrats.

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: No, because you have appointed people on them, not elected people. Where you have appointed people they become self-important. Where you have elected people, the people who are affected by their decisions have the ability to replace them. Appointed bureaucrats become insular and self-important and, at the end of the day, often they are not acting in the best interests of those they serve.

So, not only is this bill, in my view, unnecessary but it is also a threat to proper parliamentary democracy. What happens? This house should be fully aware that, where you have backbenchers who are not capable or game to take on the executive, governments bring forward legislation that in some cases is unwise and not in the long-term best interests of the people of this state. If you have one house of parliament, as there is in Queensland, you see what happens.

Under Bjelke-Petersen they suspended standing orders and passed a bill overnight and the law had been changed when people woke next morning. That is an outrage! Also, look what happened to the member of parliament who first exposed 'Dr Death' in Queensland and how he was publicly ridiculed for bringing that to the attention of the parliament. He had parliamentary privilege, but they ridiculed him. They let Nuttall off for misleading a budget estimates committee, because the executive had total and absolute power. That is something that this parliament should never permit.

I know governments of both persuasions do not like the Legislative Council amending their legislation, sending it back, questioning it and holding it up, but, at the end of the day, what is the most important element in legislating? Is it to get it right? Is it to make sure it is fair? Is it to make sure that we are not legislating deliberately to enhance minority interest groups improperly? It should be there to ensure that we are bringing a balanced, responsible view which is going to have long-term benefits to all citizens, and we should not take away their rights.

I have seen ministers get terribly angry at conferences between the houses and threaten all sorts of things, but some of those amendments that eventually were put on the statute book have never been changed. Those modifications and responsible actions have never been changed and they have stood the test of time because they applied common sense and a sensible arrangement. We all recall in the early days here when we had another premier shouting about the Legislative Council but hoping that it modified some of the silly radical legislation that he knew was a nonsense but it was only put up because the activists in the Labor Party had forced him to do so. And he was pleased because it saved him from the power of the ballot box.

Obviously, this legislation has a fair way to go, and I sincerely hope that it does not see the light of day because it is not a genuine attempt to do something positive. I hear the member for Fisher talking about parliamentary reform. What does he actually mean? What does he actually want? At the end of the day we all come into this place knowing what the rules are, but what do they actually want? Do they want a parliament to be responsible and to be able to properly engage the government of the day? Do they want a parliament that can question and challenge, or do they want some sort of rubber stamp that is part time?

In my view, we have a pretty good system. There could be some improvements and, if you are talking about parliamentary reform, you should be looking at some of the provisions in the United Kingdom where some of the important committees are chaired by a prominent person from the opposition so that you can make sure that matters are not stymied from being debated or investigated by those committees.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: So, what did you do to bring that about in your eight years of government?

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: One of the things I have done is stick up for the rights of members of parliament always. I do not know whether the honourable member has done that, but what he has done is continued to occasionally involve himself in odd personalities. I have never been sued and cost the taxpayers lots of money because of my unwise comments. I have got a clear conscience in my nearly 40 years here, so the honourable member can throw all the bouquets across the chamber to me that he likes, but at the end—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

The SPEAKER: Order!

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: Can I say I have a very clear conscience, and I continue to be received in a very happy and harmonious way in my electorate and around the state where I have been involved.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Don't retire, Gunny. Go again.

The Hon. G.M. GUNN: At the end of the day, I have a clear conscience and I think I have been involved in making some small improvement in the welfare of the people that I have represented, and I am pleased to say that I have the opportunity of voting against this ill-conceived measure.

[Sitting suspended from 18:00 to 19:30]

Mr VENNING (Schubert) (19:30): It would appear that I am the last speaker from this side, and the last on the second reading tonight. I was not going to make a comment, but I want to make an admission. I made comments in the early days of my being elected—and that is 19 years now—and publicly expressed what I thought about upper houses.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: It was different from what you are going to say now.

Mr VENNING: The Attorney perceives it very well; I have changed. Back in the days of the Hon. Legh Davis we had many a stoush in relation to the value and place in our parliamentary system of upper houses, and back then I thought we did not need them. Queensland had done alright without one, and without all the rhetoric that goes with that. However, I have changed my mind, and I will tell you why. Being here for all the years I have, I have seen the opportunity for governments—of all persuasions—to get it wrong.

There is also the spurious argument that it is too high a cost to have two houses, but the argument is just that, spurious. I believe that the cost of our upper house is nothing compared to the cost of getting it wrong. Today we see parliaments—and not just this one, all of them—in most countries of the world spending more and more money on spin, more and more money on government-paid advertising, and more and more money on professional—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: You never said anything about this when you were in government.

Mr VENNING: It really has reached a height now—

The SPEAKER: Order! The Attorney-General will have his opportunity to respond.

Mr VENNING: I think the cost of the Legislative Council is cheap when you consider what could be done. You only need look at Queensland today; it is one of the poorest performing states in the country. There is no excuse for that, but one of the biggest reasons for it is that it lacks the accountability of an upper house. I am biting my tongue here, because one only has to read Hansard to see some of the things I said back in 1991, 1992 and 1993. Joined with the then—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

Mr VENNING: If the Attorney would allow me to finish he will see the proviso I put on all this at the end. I often discussed this with Heini Becker, another member with me in those days, who is still with us and still very knowledgeable, and, because some of our upper house colleagues were fairly 'bolshie' (the word I would use in those days), we had these very strong debates about the value of an upper house.

However, I have to say that today we have governments that are hesitant about setting up ICACs, that are hesitant about accountability, that are running from facts, and that do not answer questions at question time. Everything is spin; and there are professional spin teams to help you do it. In fact, when you are spending $19 million in an economy the size of ours it is a disgrace. It has been getting worse over the years, but it has now come to the point where people have had enough. They are asking the opposition to look at an ICAC; they are supporting anything that keeps governments accountable.

Every day we hear about—well, I will not say shonky, but about potentially doubtful deals. We are hearing about access for cash; ministers charging $2,000 or $3,000 for access—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

The SPEAKER: Order, the Attorney-General!

Mr VENNING: In all this, am I allowed, with the Attorney-General's permission, to reconsider my position? Why would I now ask—

An honourable member interjecting:

Mr VENNING: —to keep an umpire present. Why would I ask that we keep a second opinion there, a house of review? I think it is in this climate that we do support it. I will admit—and not too many MPs would—to earlier comments I have made as a younger person without the wisdom of time. In this climate today I will go back on that, and I will say that, at this point in time, I am happy to support the retention of our upper house.

I am concerned, though, that there is opportunity for certain individuals to grandstand up there and certainly have more than their fair share of say, without naming anybody. At least in this house, in support of us, we each have approximately 25,000 electors, and we are all responsible to them. In the upper house you can—and people do—hide behind party tickets. I would just love—and it will not happen, Mr Speaker—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: You wouldn't be able to pursue this if you weren't a Liberal.

Mr VENNING: I'd like to test you on that one.

An honourable member interjecting:

Mr VENNING: I have learnt from the member for Spence and now the member for whatever it is—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

Mr VENNING: On the end of Barton Road. Is that right? We know all about this. What is your record like, Attorney-General? When you were in opposition you were going to fix that road, and, have you? No. Irrespective of all the hoo-ha that has been going on with you—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Watch this space.

Mr VENNING: I've been here a little longer than—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: I've been here longer than you.

Mr VENNING: You have. You came in one year before me.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: I campaigned against you in the by-election in which you were elected.

Mr VENNING: That's why I was elected.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: I doorknocked Hamley Bridge.

Mr VENNING: I know you did, and that's why I got a big vote in Hamley Bridge.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: We win Hamley Bridge now.

Mr VENNING: As much as I regret it, I am no longer the member there now. I digress. Let's get back to the subject. Certainly, I believe that, with what we are seeing today in modern politics, we need the checks and balances provided by the upper house. Going back to a previous opinion, I have changed my mind, because of the experience I have gained and the concern I have about what is actually happening and how modern governments are governing. With all the opportunity for fraudulent activity and the corruption that can go on, particularly in the area of planning, we see all sorts of deals that are done, and yet a lot of them are all—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: People lying to parliament.

Mr VENNING: I have never lied to parliament.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

The SPEAKER: Order! The Attorney-General will have an opportunity to respond.

Mr VENNING: I cannot believe all these red herrings. You have a very complex thought process, Attorney-General. You do not seem to be able to keep on the subject. I will not go on for much longer because the shadow minister is here. I congratulate her on the conveyance of this very important bill for the Liberal Party. We have given this matter a lot of thought over a long time, and I think our position is certainly supportable.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

Mr VENNING: If he would stop yapping long enough to listen, I would ask the Attorney-General whether he has ever had his ears tested. I do not think he has; either that or he doesn't use them. In looking at what I said many years ago and reflecting on what I think today, I think that the upper house should remain there for as long as we have a state parliament. I think we can see the day coming when some people, probably younger members in this house, may make a strong push to eventually phase out state parliaments altogether. There is so much duplication coming in now. I do not think I will see it, and I am not in a hurry to do this, but you can see the duplication we are having in health, education and many other areas.

With the waste that is going on, particularly at the moment with this state government, and the duplication of services, particularly within the Public Service, I am sure that there are a lot of efficiencies to be made by eventually phasing out state parliaments altogether. I probably will not see that while I live, but I am sure that the member for Bright will, because I think that is what is coming. While we retain the state parliament, and while it has to be effective, I put on the public record that I support the retention of an upper house.

As I said to you this evening, sir, it always annoys me that the members of the other house are honourable and we are not. That always upsets me—because I try to be a nice fellow—when you are out in public and you get introduced as mister, and the others are honourable, even though they have been in the job for five minutes and I have been here for nearly 20 years, but that is part of the tradition of the place and you get used to it.

I know it annoys the previous member for Unley, the Hon. Mark Brindal; in fact, he is not honourable, because he missed out by about a month. These are the sorts of things, the inequity—

Mr Bignell interjecting:

Mr VENNING: That is a reasonable interjection: when he was minister, yes. These are the little things, the inequities, that you often consider. We have some excellent members who have served many years, like Heini Becker, and I do not think he is an honourable, yet he served here for—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: No, because your party would not make him a minister.

Mr VENNING: —way over 20 years, irrespective. As with you, Mr Speaker; you are honourable while you are here, but I understand that unless you do it for a second term you are not going to be honourable either. So, these little things come in to the differences between the houses, and they are different.

As I was saying before you interrupted, one thing I would love is to see us return to the time when we had the upper house representing regions. As I said earlier, I do not like the way it is now; I never have. I do not like the fact that a member can hide behind a party preselection. You only have to go to your caucus or the state council—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: What do you do in Schubert?

The Hon. I.F. Evans: An excellent job.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Do you think they would elect you as an Independent?

Mr VENNING: Yes.

The SPEAKER: Order!

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Try that on 20 March.

The SPEAKER: Order!

The Hon. I.F. Evans: Do you think they would elect you as an Independent?

Mr VENNING: Would you take the risk in Croydon?

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: I'm happy with my party.

Mr VENNING: I am happy with my party—very happy—to the point where I will serve my party long after I have left here. I will serve my party as long as I can, as long as I have the capacity, and I will.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Longer than they want you to.

Mr VENNING: This fellow is full of confidence, isn't he? You have called me all sorts of weird things. You have called me the bag man for the Liberal Party. I have been called all these insulting things. I do not care. It does not worry me. I have a thick skin. I have a conscience, and I have nothing to worry about. I do not know how you sleep at night.

Irrespective of that, why can we not go back to the regions, as they do, say, in Tasmania, although I do not like the Hare-Clark system there. If we go back to the regions, as we used to have prior to Dunstan changing it all, where members represented a region, then when you need to target certain people with a problem you could actually vote for them in a region. Members actually represented an area, not like they do now under a whole of state franchise. I can remember upper house regions like Midlands, Northern and South-East. I think we had five or six across the state. When my father first tried for parliament he stood for preselection for Northern in the Legislative Council.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: The other thing you liked was stopping people who didn't have property from voting. That was a Liberal Party measure.

Mr VENNING: This is a blast from the past. The gentlemen is talking about things as they were in the 1930s and 1940s.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: That was the 1970s.

Mr VENNING: I am not going to waste the time of the house even arguing on that line. I want to sit down shortly, but I will just say, look: I have changed my mind. I still have a strong desire—if it was possible, but I do not think it is—to bring regions back to the upper house, as they have in a lot of the other bicameral systems around the world, so that these people can be more responsible to their areas.

At the moment if you have a party ideologue as the No. 1 or 2 candidate on your ticket, whether it be Labor or Liberal, you are stuck with them; you are not going to get rid of them. I will not name them, but there are a couple on the other side who have a long history and who have been around for many years. If you had a region where there were only two or three members then it would be quite easy to vote for the person that you want.

As a lower house member, you can work with the upper house member who is working with you in that region—if you look at the old regions, I would probably have had an upper house member serving at least two state seats—so you would know who your colleague was in relation to representing the people.

With those few words, I commend the shadow minister for the work we have done, and I ask that members consider our position. I think our record in this area has been strong, consistent, loyal and responsible. I heard the member for Stuart this afternoon, and it was the good, strong solid speech we are accustomed to hearing from him.

Certainly, for me, it is a change of heart, and I am the first to admit it. The member for Stuart would say, 'About bloody time. It has only taken 13 years,' but it is on the record. All I can say is that today, more than anything else, we need an upper house, and we also need an ICAC.

Mr HANNA (Mitchell) (19:46): We finally have some measure of constitutional reform from the government. I believe it was an election promise leading up to the last election that the Labor Party would put a referendum to the people to abolish the upper house. Since then, it has been very quiet about it and, indeed, the principal measure that was talked about—abolition of the upper house—it has entirely backed away from.

It sounds like one of those policies that was made on the run for the sake of a good press release that day. Upon closer examination, the feet turned cold in the knowledge that the measure was not truly popular. The measure that is brought forward is curious in a way because I cannot but suspect that the Labor government does not intend for this bill to succeed and does not intend for any referendum to succeed. It seems like the minimum it could do to fulfil an election promise without any spirit whatsoever.

It has borrowed from John Howard's referendum on the republic tactics. It has put a question in which there is enough for each separate party and individual to object to that very few people will agree to the whole package. There is no need for several questions to be rolled into one in this legislation, or in the proposed referendum, yet that is what the government has chosen to do.

The principal measure in the bill, as far as I am concerned, is the suggestion that the upper house should have four year terms, and I support that. However, the reduction in the number of members, I believe, is purely a piece of populist politics, and what I mean by that is that it is not necessarily there to appeal to reasoning voters who are familiar with the workings of parliament. It is there to appeal to the popular prejudice that is often peddled in parts of the media which suggests that MPs work for three days a week on about 20 weeks a year and have the rest of the time on holiday. That is actually true in very few cases, if any.

Indeed, in respect of upper house members, the hardest working members, apart from ministers, would be those who are in the minor parties or among the Independents. I realise that Liberal and Labor backbenchers, whether they be in this house or the other house, have somewhat less to do because they do not have to think about the legislation going through; they simply vote the way they are told.

Nonetheless, numerous permanent committees are established in the upper house and, also, committees are set up from time to time that are of considerable value. One of the reasons that I suspect that the Labor government is just playing political games with this legislation is the numerous barbs and provocative remarks inserted by the Attorney-General into the second reading explanation for this legislation. For example, the reference to 'members in the other place are justifying their existence by setting up a committee to examine everything under the sun' is just rhetoric.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: The committees don't even meet or report.

Mr HANNA: It is being personal without being productive in terms of the debate. Some good committee work is done in the upper house, particularly in relation to examining the budget, for example. The upper house process for examining the budget is a lot more effective than the estimates committees process we have for the lower house—which is the equivalent of a show trial.

The other terms of this proposal include a change to the president's vote. No real case is made out for that. There is also an elaborate deadlock procedure that is the mechanism for resolving the issue if the upper house and lower house groups of MPs have different views on a particular piece of legislation. It must be resolved one way or the other, and we have an adequate means of resolving disputes already set out in the constitution.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: You're joking! The House of Assembly goes to the polls twice before it gets a joint sitting.

Mr HANNA: Section 28A provides for legislation, if refused by the upper house, to be reintroduced after a general election in order to be tested again in the upper house. Section 41 also provides for a bill of special importance as the trigger for an election. In sections 28A and 41 we already have two possible means for an early election being called as a result of contentious legislation, so we do not need this elaborate Senate-style process introduced by the government.

If the government really wanted to introduce a cheaper, more effective means of resolving deadlocks it could suggest a joint sitting of the houses without going to an election at all. There is some democratic argument for that to this extent: when the House of Assembly has a very strong majority, which would suggest a significant mandate for the ruling party, then it would probably have the numbers to carry the day in a joint sitting. If the election was in the usual course reasonably close then it would not have the numbers to impose its will through a joint sitting of the parliament; so that is something for the government to think about. I am quite content, however, with the provisions as they are.

Of course, this is in the context of legislation which is almost always passed by the upper house. The number of bills that have been rejected by the upper house or abandoned by the government over the past five years I could count on one hand. In terms of amendments, a significant number of bills are amended. About a third of the upper house bills, as I recall, are amended in the upper house. However, a lot of the amendments are from the government. That is to say that the government considers legislation after it leaves the House of Assembly and thinks better of its own proposals and brings in amendments in the upper house. It is not as if there is a problem to be fixed in terms of obstruction or even delay.

I must admit that my thinking in terms of the upper house has changed over the years. Soon after I entered parliament in 1997 I gave some thought as to the appropriate political system for a province such as South Australia, and the conclusion I came to was that we should do without the upper house and that we should have something akin to the New Zealand system or the German provincial system; list members and constituency members. This would satisfy the two critical requirements of a democracy; that there be stability but also a plurality of voices represented in the parliament.

Over the years I have also extensively studied the prospects for multi-member electorates, and I believe they work extremely well in places such as the ACT and Tasmania. The only drawback, which I have not been able to entirely solve in terms of South Australia, is the fact that if we had multi-member electorates, such as seven members in each of seven electorates or nine members in each of five electorates or five members in each of nine electorates, we would have enormous country electorates.

I think it would work quite well in the city, because there is no great problem with people travelling from Blackwood to Brighton or from Unley to Glenelg if those areas were all contained in the one electorate. However, in the country I have to admit there would be perhaps some disconnection between the local members of parliament and their community. Indeed, there is an argument to say that already happens with our massive federal electorates in country South Australia. So, I could understand if country citizens or country members of parliament thought that multi-member electorates would not work in South Australia for that reason.

However, apart from that, there is no question in my mind that they are more democratic and produce a plurality of views but also still have a connection of each member of parliament to a particular community within South Australia.

As I have gone on I have seen how difficult it is to reform the upper house. I took great note of the Constitutional Convention held in 2003. That was particularly important, because it took several hundred South Australian citizens at random and educated them about the political process and then asked them what changes they thought ought to be made to our political process. One of the few changes that was suggested in terms of our political system was the institution of four year terms for the upper house. I think there is very strong democratic justification for that measure, because I cannot really understand why all members of parliament should not face the public one way or another at every general election.

So, it seems to me that the only worthy proposal in this legislation is the proposition that the upper house should be elected with only four year terms and that it should face general elections at the same time as the House of Assembly. For the government to have rolled up these other contentious issues in the one package, I think, dooms it to failure. However, I will make an effort, no matter how quixotic, to amend this legislation so that it only carries with it the proposal of four year terms. The other elements of the bill I reject.

The Hon. I.F. EVANS (Davenport) (19:55): I wish to contribute to the second reading debate about the bill before the house in relation to the proposal to hold a referendum in respect to reform of the upper house. I want to argue a case against the government's proposed reforms on the basis that I do not believe that we should weaken the system of government in South Australia so that any political party, regardless of colour, can get absolute control of the parliament or, indeed, the executive.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: The Attorney keeps making inane interjections, and I am happy to argue my case despite his interjections because he will have the opportunity to respond and he will have far more opportunity to contribute to this debate than I during the committee process.

Let us look at the position on this. The Labor Party's long-held position is to abolish the upper house, so let us not misunderstand its philosophy. Its philosophy is that the parliament should be of one house and whichever party wins that house controls the parliament. What that would do to the citizens of South Australia if it were to occur is transfer the power from the parliament to the executive, that is, the cabinet office. Single house parliaments such as in Queensland are worthless because they cannot hold the government to account, because the government can come in (as happened under the Bjelke-Petersen government and, indeed, other governments) and use the guillotine to close off debate, introduce legislation at 11 o'clock at night when all the media are asleep, pass the legislation by 1 o'clock and proclaim it the next day, and no-one is the wiser.

It could be any law, in effect, that the states deal with. We deal with courts, parole systems, taxation and policing powers—there is a whole range of matters that houses of parliament deal with. For a party to have a philosophy that we should make the parliament powerless in holding the government to account and transfer the parliament's powers, in effect, to the cabinet room is, I think, a very dangerous philosophy, and I will never support it. I will always advocate for a two-house system.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: You weren't doing it in the 1990s when you were in government.

The SPEAKER: Order!

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: Mr Speaker, I will pick up that interjection so it is on the record. I will invite the Attorney to show any evidence of that statement. If you cannot, Attorney, I expect an apology.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: You were a member of a government that wanted to change the—

The SPEAKER: Order! The Attorney will have an opportunity to respond.

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: We have never suggested abolishing the Legislative Council.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: I didn't say that.

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: My whole speech has been about your party's philosophy to abolish the Legislative Council.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: You wanted to reduce its powers when you were in government.

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: You go and read what you allege I was involved in. You will apologise, Attorney, I am sure.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: You were a minister.

The SPEAKER: The Attorney-General!

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: The reality is that the Labor Party's underlying philosophy is: less power to the parliament, more power to the cabinet.

Ms Chapman: Less power to the people.

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: And less power to the people: the member for Bragg is quite right. I sat in a government, as the Attorney reminds the house, when the Labor Party held up the lease of the electricity assets legislation for 500 days.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Yes, that's right.

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: 'That's right,' says the Attorney. Did we have the Premier and the Attorney coming into the parliament saying, 'This is outrageous. Get rid of the upper house because we are holding up the government's legislation for 500 days'? Did we hear the argument then? Did we have the amendments moved and the referendums proposed? Did we have the press conferences called to say, 'This is an outrageous abuse of power by the upper house. We should be passing the legislation as the government wants'? No. So, do not sit there, Attorney, and lecture this side of the house about a position of convenience—a conversion of convenience—because, on every occasion the Labor Party has been able to use the upper house to block legislation or amend it, it has done it for its own political gain.

I support that. I support the upper house having its current powers because it prevents cabinets getting too much power. I do not trust cabinets with the power of a single house parliament.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Except when you are in one.

The SPEAKER: Order!

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: I have never been in a cabinet of a single house parliament. Never.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: In a cabinet.

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: In a single house parliament. Never.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Your party wanted to change the upper house ballot.

The SPEAKER: The Attorney-General will come to order!

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: He is carrying on like a pox doctor's clerk. The issue then becomes this: if the Labor Party cannot win the argument about abolishing the upper house because it is simply unacceptable to the people of the state, what is the next best thing? The next best thing is to weaken the upper house or to change the construction of the upper house or the way it works so that any government has a better chance of getting control of the upper house, and so the upper house becomes a rubber stamp. Now, the last thing we need in South Australia is the upper house becoming a rubber stamp, whether that be for a Liberal government, a Labor government or a government of any other complexion in the future, because I do not have faith that cabinets are incorruptible. Why would I say that?

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: Well, you served with Dale Baker.

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: I will get that on the record, because the Attorney has again suggested that Dale Baker was somehow involved in corruption. Mr Baker has never been charged. The Attorney continually and recklessly attacks the reputation of people contrary to the ministerial code of conduct. I mean, this bloke has form, as we know. What do they now call him in cabinet? Cannon fodder, I think they call him, do they not? This bloke has form in attacking people's reputation unfairly. To my knowledge, Dale Baker has never been charged with corruption.

The reality is that this bill is about the second best option to weaken the upper house so that future governments are more likely to get control. If you want to look at what happens when governments gain control, go to Queensland. Look at the number of ministers of every political colour who have been charged with corruption because the system has given them too much power. It is not just the Labor side: there are people on the conservative side who have been caught under the system up there. Have a look at the last argument; that is, we are used to having ministers saying, 'Yes, I took $300,000, but I made no decision to the benefit of the donor and therefore it is not corruption.' Hello! How bad does the system have to get? South Australians should be very wary of this bill, and I suspect South Australians will vote down this bill.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: No, because you will not give them the opportunity to vote it down.

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: The upper house may not give them the opportunity to vote down this bill, but, Attorney, you have constructed this bill so it will lose.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: I don't know how you can say that.

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: I just said it—and the Attorney smiled as he said it. Everyone here sees the body language of the Attorney. It is crystal clear what the tactic is: design a bill so it loses and blame the Liberal Party for not letting the people have a say. The people will have a say—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: No, they won't.

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: Yes, they will. At the election, they can vote for your reform, because you will give a commitment, will you not, Attorney, to reintroduce it next time? Attorney, you will give a commitment at the election that, if this bill is lost, you will reintroduce it next time. I am sure that will be the position of the Labor Party, because you are so passionately committed to this bill—I do not think so.

Let us walk through some of the technical matters of the bill: 22 members down to 16. I share the view of the member for Mitchell that this is nothing but a cheap political appeal to the populist notion that there are too many politicians. Interesting, was it not, that when the member for Hammond negotiated the government into having the Constitutional Convention about citizens' initiated referenda and all the other matters, what was the one thing that came out? The one thing that did come out was that people wanted more—not fewer—politicians, because when they understood the role and the benefits of having MPs they actually wanted more of them. But, of course, that is not in the bill. The other issue is four year terms. I actually agree with staggered terms, regardless of whether it is an eight year or a six year term, for the Senate.

An honourable member: Or a 12 year term?

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: No-one is proposing 12 year terms. Not even the Attorney, in his moments of madness, has suggested a 12 year term. I support staggered terms. I will give the example of the Liberal government in 1993, when it won 37 seats but did not win control in the upper house. So, there was a brake on the excesses of power; there was a brake on the cabinet. There was a second set of eyes second guessing the cabinet. The Attorney and others will roll out a whole range of allegations about the previous Liberal government, but I would ask: didn't the upper house serve a role in bringing some of those issues to the public's attention?'

So, I am a supporter of staggered terms. My personal view—not the party view—is that we should have shorter terms. I would support a three year lower house term and a six year upper house term, as is the case in the Senate. I think a four year term gives governments too long to do nothing, particularly early in their term. In this parliament, the government was elected in 2006 and said, 'Ah; what the heck; it's only March. I tell you what, we'll bring a budget down; we'll make it the end of September.' So, six months of the term was wasted while the government sat around trying to work out how the hell it was going to get itself out of the financial mess it had got itself into. You could not do that with a three year term. So, I actually support shorter terms but a staggered term for the upper house, because I think it prevents any party from getting hold of both houses and therefore the excesses of power.

There is a concept of giving the upper house president a deliberative vote. Why would the upper house president need a deliberative vote after all these years? Well, the reason the president would need a deliberative vote is that the government is not getting its way as often as it wants. That makes the government think, 'We'll change the system. We'll weaken it that little bit, and we'll give the president a deliberative vote.' Obviously, that means the government will have more chance to win its argument in the other place. If the government wins its argument in the other place on all occasions, you are effectively forfeiting the parliament to the cabinet.

Let's go through some of the really good cabinets we have had in this place. I will take up the Attorney's argument. If you asked the Attorney if he would really want the great personalities of the Liberal cabinets of 1993, 1997 and 2002 to have unfettered power, I think his answer would be no. It might surprise the Attorney, but I actually do not want a Labor government, particularly this Labor government, to have unfettered power with the parliament not holding that cabinet accountable.

Let's have a look at Labor parties all around Australia. What have they done? They have essentially dumbed down the parliament. How have they done that? Well, have a look at Victoria: question time is half an hour, and the opposition has five questions. Gee whiz! The reality is that the Victorian parliament and others—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: The Attorney does not know what my view was about that. He makes a very broad assumption, as usual, and he is wrong. The reality is that the Labor Party all around Australia has attempted to dumb down the parliament so that there is less accountability—it is as simple as that—and what that is all about is giving the parliament less power and giving the cabinet more power to escape scrutiny.

I think a good way to sum up the Labor Party's philosophy is simply this: more ministers but less scrutiny—and that is exactly what we have with these particular processes. Imagine having the cabinet not accountable to the parliament, because the parliament would be ineffective if the government had control of both houses. How would you get information out of the government? 'Oh; we could FOI it.' Really? Try to FOI some information out of the government and see what you actually get. You do not get much at all. The Premier, of course—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson: The government tried to stop the Anderson report being FOI'd, and you were a party to it.

The SPEAKER: Order!

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: The Attorney can apologise for that as well because Iain Evans as a minister was not FOI'd, neither was my department, on the Anderson report. I had no influence in respect of other ministers' departments; the Attorney knows that. I know that the Attorney likes to stick his bib into every other minister's department and protect them from questioning and other measures of accountability, because that is his wish. I did not operate that way. I ran my department. If the Attorney—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

The SPEAKER: Order, the Attorney-General!

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: —can show me any evidence that Iain Evans interfered, table it; otherwise, stop making—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: And the FOI application did not go to cabinet.

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

The SPEAKER: Order!

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: The Attorney—

The Hon. M.J. Atkinson interjecting:

The SPEAKER: Order! The Attorney-General is warned.

The Hon. I.F. EVANS: The other issue I raise is that, if the government is serious about reforming the upper house because it wants to get control, it could look at other measures about the way Independents can also get control of this house. You can look at this rather cute practice of now signing agreements with Independents that they will undertake certain action or that they will not undertake certain action on the basis of actions taken by the government and whether that is a good or bad thing for the people of South Australia.

To summarise briefly, having been in this place for 16 years and having been an observer of politics for probably 40 years, I have seen enough of the system under any colour of government to know that we should not in any way, shape or form be weakening the system so that cabinet becomes more powerful and the parliament becomes less powerful because, if that occurs, we will live to regret it, just as Queensland is living to regret it.

I will say this to the house: I think Queensland will reintroduce an upper house. I think that Queenslanders are sick to death of seeing the corruption that is within their system. I think there is an argument mounting in Queensland that the political parties need to be brought into line, and the way to bring political parties into line is to make sure they do not get absolute control. The way they do not get absolute control is to have an upper house.

The Attorney-General's government has designed this bill so that it will lose—and lose it will—either in the parliament or at the election. That is what the government is about. As the member for Mitchell suggested, this is a tick box to say that we made a promise one day in a rush of blood, and it was good media for a couple of weeks. This is about distracting the media between now and the 2010 election to fill a lot of media space about an issue that is not going to go anywhere. So, my view is that this will be defeated either in the upper house or at the 2010 election. I hope that South Australians are smart enough to realise that we should keep a strong upper house, because you cannot trust cabinet with the power.

The Hon. M.J. ATKINSON (Croydon—Attorney-General, Minister for Justice, Minister for Multicultural Affairs, Minister for Veterans' Affairs) (20:19): I will respond to some of the points that have been made by speakers on the bill. I am surprised that the member for Mitchell regards the deadlock provisions as adequate.

Mr Hanna: We've never had to use them.

The Hon. M.J. ATKINSON: Well, we have never used them because they are so burdensome to the people's house.

Mr Hanna: There's been no need—just no need.

The Hon. M.J. ATKINSON: No government, no House of Assembly, would go through the constitutional equivalent of the Great Eastern Steeplechase in trying to prevail over the other place. It is, I think, unfair that, under these deadlock provisions, the Assembly is sent to the polls and the other place, which has rejected the bill, does not go to the polls. If the member for Mitchell thinks that is adequate then we have a different notions of democracy.

Mr Hanna: We sure do; yours is closer to fascism.

The Hon. M.J. ATKINSON: I will put that interjection on the record; it is part of the constant personal abuse of the member for Mitchell, which reminds me of nothing so much as Rik Mayall from The Young Ones—everything that the member for Mitchell opposes is fascist.

The member for Bragg asserted that the houses are equal. If the houses are equal why does the parliamentary Liberal Party not choose its premiers or its leaders of the opposition from the other place? Indeed, the case for the Hon. Rob Lucas to lead the parliamentary Liberal Party at points in its history has been unanswerable.

The member for Davenport should be aware that more than 10 years ago the Australian Labor Party changed its policy on the upper house. That is to say, the State Convention of the Australian Labor Party decided that it was no longer in favour of abolishing the upper house.

Members interjecting:

The Hon. M.J. ATKINSON: The government does not, as members opposite assert, have a better chance to control the other place under these bills. The quota for election to the other place is lower under the government's proposal, therefore making it easier for Independents and minor parties to be elected there.

The projections on what the outcome would have been under these provisions from 1975 onwards show—and I think every member of the house has access to those projections—that the Labor Party would not have gained a majority in the other place at any election. So, for the future, the Australian Labor Party accepts that it will not have a majority in the other place.

Indeed, the member for Davenport seems to imply in his contribution that he would not want his party to have a majority in the other place should it form a government. I have some sympathy with that point of view because the expectations of a governing party that had a majority in both houses would be burdensome indeed.

The bills to amend the Constitution Act will pass only if an absolute majority of the whole number of members of the house concur at the second and third readings, and that is required by section 8A of the Constitution Act. So I wanted to make that clear.

The budget for the referendum, in the unlikely event that the parliamentary Liberal Party allowed the people to be asked to vote on these proposals, would be $1.434 million for the electoral commission and $300,000 for the Department of the Premier and Cabinet for communication and publicity, namely the cost of a 'yes and no' case.

Ms Chapman: How pathetic!

The Hon. M.J. ATKINSON: How pathetic?

Ms Chapman: Clearly you don't intend to have it.

The Hon. M.J. ATKINSON: So it's not enough money?

Ms Chapman: Clearly not!

The Hon. M.J. ATKINSON: Not enough money in the view of the member for Bragg. So that is $1.734 million. The member for Bragg says that is not sufficient to send out a 'yes and no' case to the electors and to hold the referendum. Obviously the member for Bragg has long experience of government in estimating costs.

The member for Bragg complained that my second reading speech does not address the points raised by the Law Society of South Australia and the South Australian Bar Association. That would be odd if it did because the Law Society submission arrived with me on Monday 7 September and the Bar Association submission was received today. My recollection is that my second reading on this was in July so I would have to be a clairvoyant to know what the Law Society and Bar Association opinions are.

Members interjecting:

The Hon. M.J. ATKINSON: Yes, well, first of all they have to formulate a submission before I can know what it is. I am not a mind-reader. The other thing to say is that the member for Bragg implied that I was saying about the Constitutional Committee of the Law Society that it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Liberal Party. No; I was referring to the president.

The Hon. I.F. Evans: Another reckless attack on someone! Unbelievable!

The Hon. M.J. ATKINSON: I've told him to his face. Clause 11 of the bill would become section 41. The Bar Association says that there should not be a requirement that the bill be passed in the same or two consecutive sessions. It sees no reason why it should not be passed twice within three or four consecutive sessions. The aim of the bill is to speed up the processes that can lead to a double dissolution election and possibly a joint sitting. The Bar Association proposal would slow that down.

The proposed new subsection 41(1)(c) is the same as section 57 of the Commonwealth Constitution. It is what the deadlock provision of the bill is modelled on. I am astonished that so many members opposite, so many members of the parliamentary Liberal Party, regard adopting the federal deadlock provisions as an attempt to undermine bicameralism. Astonishing! It has been there for more than a hundred years.

The Bar Association says the sitting days referred to in section 41 should be upper house sitting days, not House of Assembly sitting days. Well, that would enable the other place to frustrate the government in the House of Assembly by not sitting. With those responses, I commend the bill to the house.

Members interjecting:

The SPEAKER: Order! This bill seeks to alter the constitution of a house of the legislature. In accordance with section 8 of the Constitution Act 1934 and standing order 242, it is necessary that both the second and third readings of the bill be passed by an absolute majority of all the members of the house. There not being an absolute majority of members present, ring the bells.

An absolute majority of the whole number of members being present:

The house divided on the second reading:

The SPEAKER: There are 23 ayes and 9 noes. As this does not meet the constitutional requirement of an absolute majority, the second reading is thus negatived.